" book recommendations covering the battles of 1914?" Topic

The translations took longer than expected because of work. I have managed to source almost all of the French and German accounts of this battle, across the full range of units that were involved. A small number of units either did not leave histories or I could not get hold of them.

In the discussion above, we had clarified that units of the German Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 88 had engaged 1 battalion of French infantry (1/87 RI). The battalion was accompanying the advance of the French 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions.

In actual fact, elements of two other German regiments were involved. IR88's history makes the following reference to IR87, which had been advancing in parallel and to the north of IR88:

"[Infantry] Company von Hirschfeld [6th Company / 87th IR] and an attached machine gun section from the Brigade Regiment, which had strayed from their regiment, made themselves available for the assault. The machine gun section was used in the front line, while the company from 87th IR was retained as backup."

Here is what happened from IR87's perspective:

"9th and 10th Companies advanced from Respelt towards Longlier and then stormed the place. The regimental commander, Colonel Kierstein, accompanied his staff from Respelt towards the main focus of the action, Longlier village. His fighting spirit took him to the forefront of the attacking companies but he was so badly wounded during the assault on the station that he died from his injuries soon after in a military hospital in Koblenz. 1st Platoon from the Machine Gun Company, under the command of Leutnant Borchert, was positioned by the triangular forest south of Tronquoy in support of 4th Company and the advancing II Battalion. The platoon advanced with 7th Company initially and with 4th Company later but without coming into action. As the two infantry companies turned towards the railway embankment, the MG platoon bore away to the south and linked up with 3rd and 4th Companies (Infantry Regiment 88), whose march route had taken them to Longlier. The place was already burning when the platoon arrived. The machine guns were brought into position on the Longlier – Neuchâteau road and were able to be used from there to provide flanking fire with good effect. The regimental commander from Infantry Regiment 88, Colonel Puder, specifically recognised the work of the platoon in a message to the MG Company commander."

IR88's history does not mention the regiment on its southern flank. Füsilier Regiment 80 was marching towards Witry when the lead elements:

"…met some cavalrymen who were riding back in step, both cuirassiers and hussars [NB:- there were no cuirassier or hussar squadrons attached to either IR88 or FR80. These were likely from the German 3rd Cavalry Division that was operating in the area]. Some troopers had freshly blood-soaked bandages and there were riderless horses being led with dislodged saddles and damaged sword sheaths. The two groups shouted back and forth! "Where have you come from?" "Near Longlier and Neufchâteau where we got shot up in the sunken road!" "Hey, comrades, trouble today!" All eyes and ears were rivetted on the horsemen. A quick glance at the map revealed that the enemy wasn't more than 10-12 miles away from us.

Meanwhile the division had already given the order to rest. The regimental staff as well as I and III Battalions were to bivouac in Ebly; II Battalion and the Machine Gun Company in Maisoncelle. The regimental commander did not trust the peace and quiet. He kept the battalions in a state of battle-readiness, only allowing billets to be set up and the the main meal to be prepared and eaten. At 1200 hours the battalions got ready to move. Soon afterwards the noise of battle could be heard in the northwest. At about 1300 hours the division's adjutant, Major von Fabeck, arrived by car with the order for the regiment to provide flank support to the attack by part of 41st Infantry Brigade [comprising IR 87 and IR 88], which had left Bercheux (10 km northeast of Neufchâteau) and was in action at Longlier. The division had encountered Sordet's Cavalry Corps unexpectedly. The battalions were just lining up to be served, the rifles were stacked in pyramids in the street. In a few minutes the regiment was on the march, in the order I, III, II Battalion, advancing along the Ebly – Longlier road. The regimental adjutant galloped down the road: "Colonel's order, unfurl the battle flags! I Battalion – deploy the men on both sides of the street; II Battalion – follow on echeloned to the left; III Battalion – follow on along the road in the second line! "

I Battalion encountered weak cavalry (1-2 squadrons and cyclists), causing it to veer away from the direction of Neufchâteau. The regiment made contact in the Bois le Hol with the left flank of 41st Infantry Brigade [i.e. IR 88], who were already engaged in a tough firefight there. Given the situation, the regimental commander decided that the battalions should turn [southwest] via Hamipré and then head [west] towards Neufchâteau. The aim was to get around behind the enemy, who was holding the high ground to the east of Neufchâteau. Oberleutnant von Heeringen, the regimental adjutant, immediately set out on the steep road to deliver the order to the leading battalion. He fell off his horse and suffered, as it turned out, a concussion. But he did not let on, getting back on the horse again and galloping off.

As soon as I Battalion debouched from the forest 2 km east of Neufchâteau, it came straight into combat. III Battalion had been deployed on I Battalion's left flank by then and carried on towards Hamipré. The battalion commander, Major Waitz, rode ahead right up to Hamipré, to discover personally the enemy's flank – bullets whistled around him. The companies followed and from Hamipré they were soon able to take the enemy in the flank. From the road the men could see the long line of red trousers lying in a railway cutting. There was no hesitation. The companies shook out to the right from the column of sections and destroyed the enemy very quickly by enfilade fire at close range. Individual ‘red trousers' tried to run back but they were all felled after a few steps. Suddenly the men broke into yelps of joy, cheering, and laughter. Coming down from the hill could be seen – the first French prisoner. He was an infantryman from the 309th Regiment [sic. there was only 1/87 RI in the area] dressed in a long-tailed blue coat and red pants, walking with a jaunty step between the Fusiliers in their field-gray uniforms. When he saw the jubilation that his appearance produced in the Gersdorff Regiment, the prisoner also cheered and waved his kepi with Gallic humor. Then came a new surprise. A shrapnel shell burst in the line of poplars along the road. It was our first experience of artillery fire. This was something that was very new and different: nobody knew where it came from nor how to defend against it either. Everyone was taken aback momentarily but then the street was cleared. Only one man remained lying there! Stretched out in the middle of the road on his back, half of his head blown off – Gefreiter Keller from 9th Company. He was the first casualty in the regiment. Several wounded had been dragged into the ditch, their helmets pierced by shrapnel. Fusilier Nitsch, 9th Company, had a particularly severe neck wound. The regimental doctor, Stabsarzt Dr Busch, was close by and quickly came to his aid – the medical officer moved the wounded behind a large tree after a second shrapnel shell burst nearby.

The route to Neufchâteau was open, with dead horses, breast plates, gleaming helmets with black horsehair plumes and wooden lances lying in the road – the French cavalry had disappeared. The hill to the east of Neufchâteau was littered with corpses and wounded in red pants, all infantrymen, who had bravely fought to the last man. II and III Battalions now turned towards the town and they arrived there to the news that 41st Brigade had captured Longlier."

Therefore at least one battalion of FR80, namely I/FR80, made a major contribution to the 'success' of IR88's attack. This battalion got around the southern flank of 1/87 RI and took the right flank French infantry company in enfilade. I/FR80 delivered this attack in support of III/IR88, which was the left flank battalion of IR88.

Robert

Great thread, everyone.

huevans011

I saw that you had asked a question about the book "A Mad Catastrophe", by Geoffry Wawro. While I rarely thrown my 2 cents here on TMP, it just so happens that my masters thesis in graduate school was on Austro-Hungarian foreign policy from 1867-1918. I have to say, he was pretty spot on despite it at times feeling like the Austrians were getting a bad rap unfairly. I do think he cherry picked some of his anecdotes, and downplayed the eventual Austrian victory over the Serbs. but the bottom line is that the Austrian military probably should have been more prepared to roll the Serbs, especially since they had been plotting their demise and war planning ever since 1908, following the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Granted, they didn't have the raw materials or overseas empire to properly supply a modern military, but that's a whole separate conversation.

As I said, just my opinion.

J

Thanks J.

The information from Füsilier Regiment Nr. 80 now helps us to understand how the left flank battalion from IR 88 achieved success. III Bataillon's commander, Oberleutnant Böhm, left this account in the regimental history:

"We were under heavy enemy fire though. The company didn't have any cover and its losses were increasing. I spotted that the railway line also ran through cuttings as well as on an embankment. These must provide excellent cover. We had to get forward quickly!

I gave the order to move forward. The company bounded forward by platoons and sections. The process was repeated over and over, in between the bursts of enemy fire. The distance came down. Still 400 meters from the railway line. Then 200 meters away. And suddenly we were there, just at the point where the railway ran through a cutting. The first dead Frenchmen were around about. We were in a defilade position, hidden from the enemy and from our own troops. My men started to pick up French kepis. One took a French bugle. The situation could have become uncomfortable if the French, who were only a few meters above us, had pushed forward. They would have been able to shoot down on us from above.

The company rushed up the edge of the depression and we then found ourselves in the midst of the French position. Very few Frenchmen were left, maybe 10 or 20, in the railway cutting at this point. They stood up, raised their hands and ran towards us. We could see that our regiment was still in a firefight off to our right but, in several places, some sections were also getting up and bounding forwards."

It struck me when I first translated this section of IR 88's history how III Battalion was 'under heavy enemy fire' and 'its losses were increasing'. Böhm was so worried about this that he ordered the battalion to move forward across essentially open ground. Normally such a move would only have been attempted if there was fire superiority, which III/IR 88 clearly did not have. Nevertheless, it was possible for smaller units to bound forward 'in between the bursts of enemy fire'. By the time III/IR 88 reached the French position, however, there were few French infantry left alive – this without III/IR 88 being able to lay down devastating fire. As soon as I read FR 80's account, it made perfect sense of what had happened. Either Böhm was not aware of FR 80's contribution or he chose to ignore it in favour of keeping the focus on III/IR 88's efforts. I tend to favour the latter interpretation because I/FR 80 was right next to III/IR 88 and it does not get a mention either.

In other words, fire superiority was achieved over the right flank company/s of the French 1/87 RI but not by IR88 – it was through the efforts of FR80.

Robert

Just bringing this thread back to the fore in the context of the discussion about 'winning the firefight'.

Robert