"Suppression & Shock in Infantry Fighting" Topic

Researching something totally un-related, I found these articles which may be of interest to some.

PDF link

PDF link

PDF link

I'll have to take my time a look thru these … should be interesting to me being a former Grunt for over a decade in my youth …

Whirlwind,

Those are very interesting articles which have formed the basis for a lot of consideration within my own army and, I am aware, the British army as well.

One thing that we noted was the comment that the Taliban were not intimidated by concentrated machinegun fire but were badly affected by HE. The result of this was that we ended up with more than the regulation number of mortars and Milans; the latter in particular had a huge impact on the enemy's willingness to continue to fight as there is nothing more demoralising than having large lumps of explosiveness hitting you from which you cannot hide and to which you cannot effectively return fire.

The use of cut-off groups was also something that we adopted.

Jurgen

Yes, they are interesting, I've read similar stuff before but these ones are good and quite widely useful for a gamer audience, I think.

One interesting point in the first one ("The Real Role of Small Arms…") is the emphasis on accuracy as an important part of suppression. This differs a little from the stuff in here link which considers important secondary effects of belt-fed machineguns in demoralizing the enemy, and the negative effect of cohesion on suppression (i.e. if some people in a group are suppressed, group cohesion will cause the others in a group to become suppressed, even if the rounds aren't anywhere near as close).

One thing that we noted was the comment that the Taliban were not intimidated by concentrated machinegun fire but were badly affected by HE. The result of this was that we ended up with more than the regulation number of mortars and Milans; the latter in particular had a huge impact on the enemy's willingness to continue to fight as there is nothing more demoralising than having large lumps of explosiveness hitting you from which you cannot hide and to which you cannot effectively return fire.

Why do you think the MILANs were more effective than mortars in this regard? In theory at least, the TB could engage or suppress the MILAN teams.

I vaguely remember hearing from someone that ANA troops were more suppressed more easily by RPGs, NATO troops by machine gun fire…an indirect result of better armour, if there is anything to that.

Thinking of body armour and the third article, I've heard there is a deal of discussion about that. Everyone wants the body armour, but nobody is sure how to manoeuvre as well as a lightly-equipped insurgent whilst wearing that stuff and carrying around a ton of ammo too. Some talk going on about how to reduce that load, otherwise use off cut-offs where you can.

Anyway, hope it is interesting to some members.

Whirlwind,

Our Milans were fired from armoured vehicles, which probably helped to make them more intimidating. They are also quite impressive in flight, which is probably quite scary for the enemy.

The ANA that we worked with did not seem to be suppressed by anything! RPGs seemed to be pretty poor in the anti-personnel mode as their fragmentation effect is very limited. Heavy machinegun fire is intimidating and often required something big and explosive to get rid of it.

As to body armour, it can be quite confining but nobody wants to get rid of it as it is effective and has a good morale effect. Moving as quickly as insurgents is not possible for Western infantry on foot but cut off groups are useful and the technological advantage means that the difference in speed is not always critical. For example, pinning the Taliban in place through mortar or artillery fire on their escape route made me a happy commander on at least one occasion. Also, aircraft are faster than insurgents:).

Jurgen

As a friend of mine put it after his tour in Astan:

Operational doctrine preached, if not well practiced, is to maneuver ground elements to positions of advantage.. being defined mostly as positions which threaten the enemy enough that they have to relocate from prepared positions and displace.

On the move, they're highly susceptible to air interdiction

Basic premise is planes > enemy tanks, tanks > enemy IFV, IFV > enemy infantry

Very interesting stuff boys … and I'm a big fan of big firepower in the Infantry Squad, Platoon and Company … like MGs, GLs, AT wpns, etc. … And the proven tactic of cutting off, flanking, envelopement, etc. … And of course all the Hell that can be called-in with a radio from many assets … And the comments on body armor are interesting … we were still using old "flak vests" left over from Vietnam. And once Kelvar Vest were available Mech units were not getting those at that time …

Thanks for those links.

Duck

"Combat is primarily a psychological phenomenon: it is resolved when one side (or occasionally both) believes it is beaten."

How often does this happen in a wargame? or rather how often does this happen in a game which is close to how it happens in actuality?

Thanks for the above, Jurgen. There does seem to be a deal of agreement that significant HE effect seems to make the crucial difference.

Regards

All Grunts like to call-in Ham & Eggs [HE] !!!!

The Milan as bunker-buster, in the Goose Green battle, broke the deadlock and allowed the British to roll up a defence that had held them up for hours. After the battle, the effects on morale, of the Milan attack, were debated at length.

It seems that the crucial factors were,
The effect of the warhead was highly visible and spectacular, it was devastatingly accurate, the missiles were visible to the target and the Argentinians had no way of hitting back. This last point is rarely reflected in games, as one of the reasons the Paras had been held up, was the fact they had no way of countering the Argentinian 50 cals that out ranged their GPMG's, which affected morale as well as limiting tactical options.

Morale is still too often a separate roll, where, in my opinion, it should be the predominant but temporary factor, with casualties a permanent secondary effect. As said before, I'm playing around with a system that represents firepower as a fear factor that both affects a units ability to fight and move. As a unit accrues more fear, it find its ability to fight and move forward severely restricted.

Milites,

I would agree with those observations about the Milan; they are awesome from the firer's perspective, so being on the wrong end of one must be devastating.

I completely agree about the importance of morale; while casualties reduce the effectiveness of a unit and affect morale (having your colleague lying a few metres from you screaming in pain and fear is not entirely motivating), poor morale is what stops soldiers fighting.

Jurgen

The interesting thing is the visible effects of a weapons destructive capability are often neglected in rules, especially the sound. If the Milans had destroyed the bunkers, as completely, but less spectacularly, the Argentinian troops would have fought on longer.

I'll try and firm up my ideas and put them out for comment by TMP'ers. At the moment I'm looking at the role of NCO's by allowing a sections first tactical competency roll to be modified, if it's low and to allow HQ units to be able to use the dice rolled for each section to be allocated, not randomly assigned (rather like pips in DBM). It seems to work quite well, but needs some tinkering to reflect different styles of combat, with NATO troops using standard battle drills and the Taliban using classical skirmish tactics.

What is your opinion: how does cover play into suppression? Does the level of cover affect the level of suppressive fire required – or is suppression achieved with about the same amount of accurate fire regardless of cover?

If I had to guess the Taliban had gotten used to fighting others like themselves. Lots of fully automatic highly inaccurate firing was nothing to be scared of. The chances of getting hit were quite small. It just became background noise and part of the experience.

Now large caliber HE weapons that make a loud boom and have some area effect are probably considered much more terrifying.

Just a wild guess…

Howdy,

My two cents, the lesson has wider application than Afghanistan.

Ponder on,

JAS

So the lesson is that what is needed is louder bullets not more accurate bullets.

Yeah, I'd have to agree with that … If you ever have been near explosions that rumble you and the ground around you, you can feel attentuated blast, heat, sound, etc., and debris falling all round … it can be quite unsettling … and hope the next one does not come in any closer …

"So the lesson is that what is needed is louder bullets not more accurate bullets."- Mobius

No the lesson is the Taliban don't fear gunfire as much because in their experience it rarely produces results. Gunfire is very much an "ALLAH AKBAR" event when someone does get hit.

It reminds me of a story I heard about hunting Walruses. The hunters would fire guns in the air creating lots of noise. The Walruses would be startled look around and see that no one was getting hurt or hit. The next time they heard the gunfire they ignored it.

"No the lesson is the Taliban don't fear gunfire as much because in their experience it rarely produces results."
So the whole lesson from the British tests was that British soldiers were suppressed by near misses. Good to know if the British went to war against the British.

I remember one story of a Korean war vet. He was so used to gunfire that he strolled down a path to check if the enemy was near with bullets flying all around him. He was surprised when one actually struck him.

Isn't that essentially just a "fresh' versus "veteran" thing?

Regardless of whether it's an insurgent or a regular army trooper, if you've been shot at before and survived it, you'll fare a lot better the next time around because you know what to expect.

So the whole lesson from the British tests was that British soldiers were suppressed by near misses. Good to know if the British went to war against the British.

Not exactly, I think that the 'near misses' cause suppression were built into the test i.e. if a round got as close as 1m, then it suppressed the target.

It is quite interesting if Taliban and/or ANSF troopers aren't suppressed by bullets passing that close.

Regards

This is nothing new.

WO 291/471
Weight of small-arms fire needed for various targets

Two levels of neutralisation are recognised.
"Light neutralisation" is defined as the minimum weight of fire to appreciably effect the accuracy of
enemy fire. The enemy will suffer casualties at a rate of 2½% per minute, or one man per platoon per
minute, if they stay in a firing position for more than a third of the time they are fired on.
"Heavy neutralisation" is defined as the weight of fire needed effectively to stop any retaliatory
measures on the part of the enemy, with a casualty rate of 10% per minute, or one man per section per
minute.

It is estimated that a bullet passing within 3 yards sounded near enough to be dangerous.

I've just started reading Storr's The Human Face of War, very provocative and, if correct, a stake through the heart of quite a few games and rules systems. It might also explain the success of ISIS. I'd definitely recommend the book and it ties in nicely with Leo Murrays 'Brains and Bullets.

It's doubly interesting, as I started tinkering with my embryonic combat system, based on fear, before reading both books. So far though, they reinforce my initial thoughts. I'm now looking at an immediate penalty for both sides entering combat, and a units combat score, based primarily on morale, with training, range and weapons affecting the morale dice, or alternatively an average of three dice. Finally movement, especially to the flanks causes a morale attack, on top of any firing, though can be penalised if the enemy unit does not break or is not suitably supressed (the effectiveness of fire is decided after all units have moved).

"Regardless of whether it's an insurgent or a regular army trooper, if you've been shot at before and survived it, you'll fare a lot better the next time around because you know what to expect."- Weasel

True but if your experience is based on fighting other tribal types it won't serve you well when you encounter highly trained Western troops with quality weapons. The allied contingent killed boat loads of Taliban. The survivors put away their AKs and started planting bombs in dead goats.

Indeed …

Dragon Gunner – That seems to be less to do with suppression and more to do with adapting tactics.

No one ever won a conflict by playing to their opponents strengths.

… adapt, improvise, overcome … it's what troops on the ground do … do what works … and brings you and your comrades home …

@ Weasel

You missed the point I was attempting to make.

@Dragon Gunner,

I can think of several things you could have been getting at but I'm not sure which…

Sorry for the threadomancy here, but could anyone who downloaded them send me copies of the second and third documents I originally linked to please? I can't find my copies and it looks as if the original links are dead.

My e-mail is j*w*h*0*7*1*4*@yah*oo.co.u*k with the asterisks removed

If someone could re-up those pdf's (dead links), I would be very grateful.

Here they are:

link

link

We had a long discussion about these a while back.

I've talked to a few guys that loved their body armor and it made them feel invulnerable. My son got hit by a 4" piece of shrapnel from a 155mm arty IED that stuck in his SAPI plate doing no damage except for knocking him down. He brought it home with him too. He went through three sets of body armor while deployed, not unusual. I still have my VN era flak jacket, no comparison to the new stuff.

Wolfhag

Thanks Wolfhag, they are both on Scribd though which I don't trust (they ask for credit card details up front); is there anyone who has them pdf who could send them to me please?

Here is a link to the first one on Small Arms PDF link for people without Scribd accounts

Really interesting discussion, gents. Hats off.

B

Whirlwind,
If you are looking for papers about small arms fire and suppression I can send you PDF's of my collection. Can you take a zip file?

This discussion may save you some time: TMP link

Just Jack was probably the best person to discuss this stuff as he's had recent real-life experience and is an intensive gamer. Sadly, our Fearless Leader has terminated him.

Wolfhag

@Wolfhag – Yes please to the zipfile. Happily I am in contact with Just Jack by other means.

Whirlwind,
I sent you three different zip files. Let me know if they work for you.

There is a small arms suppression report done from VN that showed the VC and NVA had a different level of fear for the same types of weapons. Similar to what was said about the Taliban. I read where the Germans really feared the .50cal HMG. It chewed up their cover making concealment ineffective. A .30cal round would drill a hole in your shoulder, a .50cal round takes off your entire arm.

Here is my conclusion on my readings:
No one seems to be able to get a consensus on the definition of "suppression", not even the experts that study it. They can't agree on a formula that would recreate the effects either. Most agree it is a sliding scale, not an all or nothing effect. There are many physical and psychological factors involved. This gives you a lot of latitude to design rules that will give the feel you are looking for. Since no one can agree on exactly how to model it no one can tell you that you have it wrong. Enjoy.

The description I like best is: suppression is the enemy fire that degrades a units ability to shoot, move, observe and communicate. However, they are not all affected equally by the same volume of fire. You can be pinned down (not moving) but still effectively return fire and communicate.

One description of covering/suppressive fire I like is: Enemy fire always suppresses (degrades performance) but only rarely kills. That's why I concentrate modeling suppression rather than causalities. I allow defenders to automatically obey a withdrawl to get out of enemy fire. Once out of enemy LOS they recover from all suppressive effects. The more suppressed a target is the smaller chance of causalities too. That's because they are spending more time concelaed and less time exposed to fire.

If suppression is on a sliding scale, using all or nothing activation die rolls are not going to reflect that. When enemy fire slackens or lifts troops recover pretty quickly. I use an Aggressiveness Check to advance in the face of enemy fire. Coordinating a fire & maneuver greatly increases the chances to advance.

Winning the initial firefight will determine who is going to be the most suppressed. This is where short range SMG and automatic weapons matter most along with surprise/ambush tactics.

After the initial firefight, the squad and team leaders are making sure the sustained ROF is correct and the enemy frontage is being covered. The platoon leader is getting the maneuver unit ready to move. If enemy fire increases you increase yours too until his slackens. Just before the maneuver element makes it assault the squad leader will give a signal for max ROF to get the enemy heads down for the assault group to close. That's how it is supposed to work.

According to the "experts" to keep the enemy suppressed after winning the initial firefight takes only 1/3 of the amount of firepower that originally suppressed them in the initial exchange.

WWII manuals state a sustained ROF for rifles is 6-10 rounds per minute. This basically makes bolt action and semi rifles equal (semis have an advantage in the initial firefight). However, accuracy counts and rounds coming within 3 feet of your head or hitting in front of you will be most effective.

I've talked to guys that ignored enemy fire until they heard the "snaps" near them. Bottom line is inaccurate fire seems to be pretty ineffective. I don't think it would be unrealistic to have units advance and pretty much ignore enemy fire until guys start dropping.

When first under fire I let units react. To advance under fire they must pass an Aggressiveness Check. If they fail they must hit the deck or fall back to cover. I consider this different than a morale check.

The War Office report Mobius posted is the best info I can find on causalities from sustained fire. I use a modified version of it by taking the volume of fire against the defender position to get the % chance. I get the causality result from a single die roll on a binomial table. It's easy, quick and accurate.

For suppression, I use 6 levels (using a small D6 to mark it next to the unit). At 3:1 odds = +1 level for Vets, +2 levels for trained and +3 levels for green troops. 2:1 odds is ineffective against vets, +1 level for trained and +2 levels for green. If the enemy fire is light enough to not cause a level of suppression you automatically recover one level. You get the idea. This can create a nice ebb and flow in a battle without a lot of other rules.

Each level degrades their ability to move under fire, shoot and react. At level 6 you can only voluntarily fall back.

Wolfhag