"Were 88 mm FlaK pieces capable of firing artillery barages?" Topic

Well the above asks it all. I always thought the 88 was a direct fire weapon and were incapable of plunging fire. But their are numerous first person from GI's who swore they were bombarded by 88's. Were these poor fellows simply mistaken or were they really being bombarded with plunging fire by 88's.

Bruce the Texas Grognard

I'm thinking they were being hit with heavy barrages of 8cm mortars. It was one of the plentiful German support weapons down to the company level. The Germans were good at bringing them to bear in heavy concentrations and flexible with their deployment and the round is heavy enough to cause GIs to think they were being hit with 88s.

Later in the war you can add 12cm mortars to the mix for even more firepower to make the GIs miserable.

My Dad was caught in an 88 "barrage", but it was direct fire from several guns that were emplaced on higher ground. Similar effect, but not the same thing as a true barrage.

I don't think there were enough 88s in enough places for so many GIs to get hit with them the way you read about. The Germans used 8cm mortars to support most infantry attacks and counter attacks and often pounded GIs when the Germans withdrew and the GIs occupied the position. With so many tubes from company up to battalion it is no wonder the Germans were able to impress upon GIs the idea of being plastered with 88s.

with over 20,000 guns of all models produced there were significant numbers available.

TM E9-369A The US armys tech manual on the gun states that it was used in the direct fire mode (AT Fire), indirect fire mode, and AA fire mode. The sighting and fire controls could be adjusted depending on how the gun would be used. For the HE round there were 3 fuzes available.
1. Combination superquick and delay fuze
2. inertia operated mechanical time fuze
3. spring-wound mechanical time fuze

so yes…it could fire in an indirect fire mode

"I always thought the 88 was a direct fire weapon and were incapable of plunging fire."

Plunging fire happens when you point a gun way up and fire it. Being an anti-aircraft gun, the 88 had no problem achieving the necessary elevation.

In fact, 88s were often used for indirect fire, especially in Normandy. The Luftwaffe had a large stockpile of shells and there was a special Luftwaffe grid map. Barrages were called into a grid square and batteries could fire from all directions without the need for central direction. During the period of fairly static fighting, it was a flexible system capable of very fast response with a great volume of fire.

I always thought the 88 was a direct fire weapon and were incapable of plunging fire.

Give any gun some elevation and the laws of ballistics will cause plunging fire. The 88 was obviously capable of high angles of elevation in order to function as an AA weapon.

Of course there is always the adage that in WW2 personal histories every German gun was an 88 in the same way as every German tank was a Tiger!

Is it the same as; all German tanks were Tigers, all German artillery was 88s?

88s were capable of firing artillery barrages just like the American 90mm was.

In fact, 88s were often used for indirect fire, especially in Normandy. The Luftwaffe had a large stockpile of shells and there was a special Luftwaffe grid map. Barrages were called into a grid square and batteries could fire from all directions without the need for central direction. During the period of fairly static fighting, it was a flexible system capable of very fast response with a great volume of fire.

That's fascinating, because that's basically how the US and UK called in artillery (i.e. gridded maps). Since US and UK artillery were both much faster than German, I can believe that such a system would be very quick.

Can you point me at a source for this?

Salut Bruce!

Plunging fire is actually not indirect fire. Indirect fire is when the firing weapon and the crew can't see the target and are guided by an observer.

Truly, any gun can be fired indirect.

Guf

Learn something new every day, and this is why I love TMP. I would have thought with having so much sky to defend the Luftwaffe would be too busy with its primary mission to dedicate that much fire to ground targets. But I see how it could be done.

I doubt most GIs cared that much about what exact gun was sending hot metal death their way and so you end up with lots of fire being lumped under "88s".

Yes, 88s were capable and were used for indirect fire – even PaK 43s in a number of divisions in Normandy (and probably other places).

HOWEVER, old soldiers' references to '88 barrages' or 'airburst 88' were 99% of the time actually 105s or some other artillery piece. It's the old 'Every gun's an 88' chestnut, although in a slightly different form.

1944 Panzer Division had the following tubes

203 75mm
34 105mm
18 150mm
12 88mm

The 8.8cm was always a minor player.

The 8.8cm was always a minor player.

Sure, in the Panzer divisions. But those divisions were themselves were always a minority. In a fixed defensive belt scenario (like Normandy) there would be independent battalions of 88mm for air defence, but were of course available for anti-tank use as required (see Luck's appropriation of a battery of them during Operation Goodwood for example). As the fighting got closer to Germany, all the fixed AA units that had been shooting at the 8th Air Force and Bomber Command for the past few years started getting sucked into the ground fighting.

As lasalle012 pointed out, they made 20,000 of them, they must have shown up somewhere.

The 8.8 cm was a Flak gun. Sure there were 1000's of them mainly in fixed positions around towns and important instalations. Guns bolted down and unable to move at all.
As for Normandy there was III Flak Korps who had 120+ guns but they were for protection against aircraft. The whole Korps claimed less than 90 tanks destroyed for the whole Normandy campaign. They might have been pressed into use as artillery but that was a bonus and only applied to guns near the front line. Zetterling points out the disadvantages of placing such a large target in the front line in his Normandy book on page 152 . The 3 special 'tank-hunting' 8.8cm Units formed by the Luftwaffe were a disaster losing 35 8.8.cm and 70 light flak guns and claiming only 20 tanks.
The divisional listing I gave is not all the artillery the Germans had. The had 17 Artillery Abteilung and 5 Wefer Brigades. Total up the German artillery assets and the 8.8cm is the smallest group. German Infantry divisions had no 8.8cm Flak guns.
Luck's claimed 8.8cm Flak Unit has not a scrap of evidence to show it even existed. The only evidence is von Luck saying it did. To date no supporting evidence of any kind has been found to identify it or the claimed location.

8.8cm artillery barrages were the least of the Allies worries. The 10.5cm gun did the bulk the work keeping Allied heads down.

"Can you point me at a source for this?"

It was a major topic a little while ago in the research for the upcoming Operation Dauntless game link Before that, it came up in research on the Canadian defense against 12SS Panzer for the game Canadian Crucible link

Vincent Lefavrais wrote this summary of his research:

What the 88 Flak had going for it, though, was its ability to fire indirect artillery support (HE and smoke shells) at ranges of up to 16 km, i.e. from the same rear positions where they were set up to provide AA cover. Given the overall dearth of German artillery pieces and ammo compared to the Allied forces, this made the 88 Flak very valuable in this capacity. I have found in my research several testimonies of this, one being Hubert Meyer's history of the 12th SS Pz-Div, the other being the post-war report written in captivity by Generalleutnant Pickert, commander of III. Flak-Korps, about his corps' fight in Normandy. He describes at length, over several pages, the procedures set up to facilitate quick and efficient artillery support, and mention that such support represented a good deal of his unit's activity (when the Flak-Korps arrived southwest of Caen, on June 9, it set up in the rear area of I. SS-Pz-Korps to provide AA cover and fire support, with the following mission statement: "Supporting the Army (…) against enemy air and ground attacks in the area close to the front, with emphasis laid on defense against enemy air attacks. Main basic principle: strict concentration of forces, no commitment in less than regimental strength. No fragmentation at Army request.").

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III. Flak-Korps immediately took up connections with the command in charge of the Caen area (i.e., that of I. SS-Pz.Korps, in Baron) and with its artillery commander, so as to secure the support of this sector by concentrated Flak fire above its center of gravity, and by participation in ground combat with artillery fire. The Flak regimental commanders were ordered to cooperate with the divisions, and the artillery commanders of these divisions, in their sectors.
Mission for the battles in the Caen area: Supporting the Heer in the sector of Panzergruppe West against enemy air and ground attacks in the area close to the front, with emphasis laid on defense against enemy air attacks. Main basic principle: strict concentration of forces, no commitment in less than regimental strength. No fragmentation at Heer request.
The elements committed in the proximity of the front — i.e. the bulk of the forces — were committed by Regiments at points of particular importance, in areas designated by whichever Armee or Korps they were to cooperate with. Close cooperation with the Artillery Commanders for the purpose of superimposition on the artillery fire of the Heer was very important. In this, the batteries of III. Flak-Korps were commanded, for sudden concentrations of fire, by means of the so-called NORMANDIE method, by radio. For this purpose the areas within reach were divided on the map into small squares and clearly marked. It was then possible, by broadcasting short, uncoded target-indications, which were nevertheless in accordance with camouflage specifications, rapidly to direct the fire of numerous Flak batteries for sudden concentrations of fire. The release of the surprise fire would also be ordered by radio, through the Flak regimental commanders, by short, camouflaged signals giving the time it was to take place, and would generally be effected 10 to 15 minutes (or even less) after the target had been indicated. Thanks to the long range of the 88mm Flak batteries and their unlimited extend of traverse, a large number of Flak batteries could always be concentrated for these surprise fire concentrations.
A lot of ammunition was expended lending a hand in ground fighting (by way of the NORMANDIE method), for surprise fire concentrations on whole battalions or Regiments. Besides this, the heavy Flak batteries had forward observers, mostly with radio communications, and, whenever the situation in the air, and the ammunition situation permitted it, attacked ground targets by observed fire.
Losses: During the battles around Caen, the unit periodically suffered considerable losses in men and material, due to artillery fire.
[…] The resupplying of guns was surprisingly efficient.
Combat impressions about the enemy on the ground: According to personal observation, and to statements made by POWs, the sudden releases of fire from as great a number of Flak batteries as possible, directed by the NORMANDY method, proved valuable against ground targets. When carrying out these sudden concentrations of fire, it was important for the overall effect that they started at precisely the same instant. In this manner, limited as to space and time, the 88mm Flak, which fired extraordinarily rapidly, attained strong concentrations of fire. What it lacked in caliber it made up for by the number and speed of the hits scored. The extreme traversability of the 88mm guns made the transition from aerial to ground targets, and vice versa, extremely easy, and caused no loss of time.
[…] Further, the lively participation in the ground fighting, with surprise fire concentrations or with observed fire guided by forward observers, caused the enemy quite significant losses, and often decisively helped the Heer fighting side by side with the Flak-Korps.
Supplies: Despite the initially overextended supply routes for Flak ammunition, an almost adequate supply of this was always maintained. Admittedly the expenditure was rather high. Had the supply of Flak ammunition with impact fuzes been sufficient, then the Flak artillery could have participated even more strongly in the ground combat, with surprise concentrations of fire, than it actually did. The necessity for conserving gun barrels, and the limited supply of these, also imposed restraint on participation in the ground fighting by means of surprise fire concentrations.

II SS Panzer Corps Artillery Commander assessing Flak artillery efficiency over the 15 Jun.–24 Jul. 1944 period:
"However, when they were called upon to take part in sudden concentrations of fire by all heavy arms, they [the 8.8cm batteries] were always readily available. This amounted to an important improvement of the density of fire, particularly so, because the available supply of ammunition of this branch was much better than that of the artillery."

Thank you very much emckinney for teaching us this. It goes against most ready made old ideas rehashed in games.

I sort of remember something: many of the pure static or semi static flak did not have the optics to fire properly in AT role( and training,likely).

It's been a while since I read this, but by the Ardennes offensive the Germans had started installing AT guns on artillery carriages in order to bolster their AT capability without increasing the number of tubes supported. The idea was you could use an 88 or 75 as artillery but when needed they were available as AT guns. Some of the Bulge infantry divisions' OB's showed 75 or 88 mm guns in their artillery regiments.

If someone can confirm this, 88 barrages are entirely to be expected.

Indeed 8.8cm barrages are to be expected. However barrages by the other 1,184 German field pieces in Normandy (10cm to 17cm and excluding all Werfer batt.) would dwarf it both in numbers and weight of shells.

I wonder who shot down the 2000+ Allied aircraft in Normandy
whilst the 8.8cm was busy shelling the Allied ground forces?

It is a simple numbers game.

One advantage the 88 had in indirect fire was that timed fuse. A properly set barrage from 88s would all detonate as airbursts instead of groundbursts, which is much more effective against dug-in infantry.

As noted above barrel life was an important factor. the 8.8cm had a 2000-2500 round life but the 10.5 cm le FH 18 could fire 10,000+.

"I wonder who shot down the 2000+ Allied aircraft in Normandy
whilst the 8.8cm was busy shelling the Allied ground forces?"

20mm and 37mm flak?

"The 8.8 cm was a Flak gun."

The weapon was used in many roles. There were also dedicated 8.8cm tank guns and naval weapons. There was nothing magical about the caliber that said it had to be shot at aircraft.

Just as ever German tank is a Tiger, so every German gun's an 88.

There's a difference between a barrage and a bombardment. A barrage is a barrier of fire – a defensive screen to discourage the enemy from moving through the area fired upon; a bombardment is fire directed at a known or suspected enemy position to damage the defenses, suppress the enemy and/or to cause casualties.

88 FlaK guns were often used as artillery as early as the Spanish Civil War.
Apparently they also made fine 'bunker busters'

The one being shelled is always convinced that the other guy is using 'wonder-kit'. That's why German prisoners in Normandy were so keen to see the British 'belt-fed' artillery.

I do feel educated by this thread, but am wondering whether it is already going in the direction of a 'the German's had the best kit and did everything better' kind of view of the world. The short barrel life of the 88 has already been pointed out. There were few guns in a battery (6 max), and often that battery was divided into single or two gun penny-packets. Not much basis for a bombardment there!

And when were Luftwaffe crews going to practice all this? Their primary role was air defense. There are reports of some parts of Normandy received several HUNDRED allied aircraft sorties in a day. A single identified battery could expect a couple of dozen attacks on it. That's why many units became 'gun-shy', refusing to fire at all. Hence the need for the Hans Von Lucks and Waffen SS types of this world needing to threaten crews with pistols to get them to open fire!

I think that we are all agreeing what could be done. It probably wasn't actually done very often. Every HE shell fired at a ground target was no longer available to fire at an air target. So add logistical problems to the other practical reasons to either desist or never start.

The German 105mm K 18 gun was 52 calibers long, so the 88mm at 56 calibers long would have a similar trajectory. They would only plunge at a very long range or if on an Italian hilltop.

emckinney's quote is a dramatic push into new understanding of exactly what was going in in Normandy; thanks.

There's certainly no reason why they couldn't have been used in an indirect fire role. The Americans often used M-10 tank destroyers in the artillery role. They built wooden ramps to give the guns more elevation. The 88 wouldn't have to do that.

A history of the German III AA Corps support of the Army during the allied invasion of Normandy. Written from memory by the commanding officer, General Pickert Wolfgang.

link

Extract from a Steve Zaloga book showing the US 244th Field Artillery using a PaK 43/41 as artillery. link

I recently read that it was the distinctive crack that identified the piece was an 88mm being used as a direct fire mode using HE.

Many British troops identified the 88's from normal artillery fire.

I had just checked the Pak 43 info. Thanks Etranger. They were set up to fire airbursts as standard, unlike the Flak versions.

The US use of captured guns (not limited to the '88') was due to a severe ammunition shortage. They found substantial stocks of German ammo and just returned it to the original owners. In the end they were even supplied with 100 complete 25pdr outfits and ammo.
In its designated role the 8.8cm Flak was inferior to both the 3.7 inch AA gun and 90mm AA gun gun.

No one ever seems interested in US 25pdrs………….

by the Ardennes offensive the Germans had started installing AT guns on artillery carriages in order to bolster their AT capability without increasing the number of tubes supported.

I read somewhere that at least some of the Volksgrenadier divisions used 75mm paks as artillery pieces; possibly they were put on artillery carriages so they could be elevated more, IDK.

Panzer divisions often had at least one battery of 105mm guns (not howitzers), which would also have fired on a flat trajectory -- useful, I suppose, for longer ranges.

I read somewhere that at least some of the Volksgrenadier divisions used 75mm paks as artillery pieces; possibly they were put on artillery carriages so they could be elevated more, IDK.

The Fk7M85 a Pak 40 barrel on the carriage of the 105mm Le FH18/40. Could be used for artillery or AT fire.

Panzer divisions often had at least one battery of 105mm guns (not howitzers), which would also have fired on a flat trajectory -- useful, I suppose, for longer ranges.

The 105mm guns were often used for counter battery fire.

"Indeed 8.8cm barrages are to be expected. However barrages by the other 1,184 German field pieces in Normandy (10cm to 17cm and excluding all Werfer batt.) would dwarf it both in numbers and weight of shells."

88's may have actually contributed disproportionally more to the German artillery due to the woeful lack of ammunition for conventional artillery,and relatively better supply for 88's.
Zetterling goes as far as suggesting that the Germans would have had better support with fewer artillery pieces which could have had more ammunition.

"I wonder who shot down the 2000+ Allied aircraft in Normandy
whilst the 8.8cm was busy shelling the Allied ground forces?"

Allied aircraft losses for the Normandy campaign were 4,101, not 2,000.

"That's why many units became 'gun-shy', refusing to fire at all. Hence the need for the Hans Von Lucks and Waffen SS types of this world needing to threaten crews with pistols to get them to open fire!"

If the famous "little pistol" event actually happened, which it probably didn't: Ian Dalglish in his excellent book on Goodwood goes into considerable detail on this, and in the same chapter quotes Pickert (OIC IIIrd Korps) on 88 indirect doctrine and implementation.

"I wonder who shot down the 2000+ Allied aircraft in Normandy whilst the 8.8cm was busy shelling the Allied ground forces?"

Allied aircraft losses for the Normandy campaign were 4,101, not 2,000.

Getting wildly off-topic here …

20% of Allied aircraft losses in Normandy were attributed to small arms fire. That gives some idea of the low-level attacks that the fighter-bombers were making, which took them into the heart of the envelope of the light flak (20mm and 37mm). It's possible that "small arms" includes the 20mm guns, but I would be very surprised if it included the 37mm flak.

III Flakkorps OOB on 23 June 1944
Heavy Batteries 27
Light Batteries 26
Flakkamfgruppen 3

III Flakkorps OOB on 9 August 1944
Heavy Batteries 29
Light Batteries 40
Flakkamfgruppen 3

They added a lot of light batteries, not a lot of heavy batteries. I suspect that this reflected the need for defense against fighter-bombers, as opposed to defending against medium bombers (which were a considerable threat to supply lines as well).

Nominally, a mixed Flakabteilung had the following organization and equipment:

1-3. Batterie : each 4 x 8.8 cm towed , 3 x 2 cm solo towed
4. Batterie : 9 x 3.7 cm (self-propelled)
5. Batterie : 9 x 2 cm solo self-propelled and 3 x 2 cm vierl self-propelled

If nothing else, it gives some feeling for the size of the flak batteries.

III Flakkorps claimed kills from June 6 to withdrawal to Germany:
462 Aircraft

Those are claims, not even losses confirmed against Allied records.

I would suggest that the 88 was not a very good weapon against fighter-bombers. They could too easily maneuver to to ruin predicted fire or avoid static barrages. At lower altitudes, lines of sight limited the range at which 88s could engage them.