"Rating troops" Topic

While numbers can be found I am never sure how to rate the various regiments. Armaments are also thin on the ground, unless its artillery.

I'm afraid there's not much you can do (other than early war where nobody knew much about what they were doing) except tedious research!

It's also a case of trying to recreate specifics. Did that unit hold under fire because they were really crack troops, or did they (in a manner of speaking) "roll well" under the circumstances?

I must be weird …I rarely find research tedious? to be fair ratings of regiments can be a very subjective thing …author opinion, personal bias, historical performance (real or imagined) …

I'm with Fozzy – where a specific regiment is mentioned its hard to tell why it stood/broke. Also it can vary from battle to battle.

I generally prefer to use a slightly more random approach. I give the unit an initial rating. In general everyone is green, trained or veteran, based mostly on seeing action. Until they make a morale check they are just average. At the 1st morale check roll to determine quality. You know vets will generally be better than green troops but not always…

Rating implies a set of universal criteria that a specific unit's performance is judged against--over several events.

Without some basic set of criteria for the rating, you are just tossing numbers about. Without a broad spectrum of unit behavior, you can't establish a norm to judge against.

You either do the work or play guessing games that can never be substantiated one way or the other. [This is 'the feels good' method]

If you have an adequate body of data, you can run statistical studies. OR has that kind of broad set of examples. The nice/valuable thing about statistics is that if you can get a large enough base around a set of criteria, a lot of the miriad of disparate details and unknowns tend to cancel out.

I have always thought that morale plays too much of a part of the game. Generals were rarely concerned about it on the battlefield. If you read the OR's and AAR's, it seems that neither side really cared what types of troops they were facing, their morale grade, etc.

Certainly troops aren't automatons, but there's much more to the whole concept of why troops stand, or why they break, than just morale. I'm of the opinion that the majority of cases of troops retiring or breaking under fire are the result not of reaching any specific level of casualties, but rather a sudden and catastrophic event such as a deadly volley that drops most of the front rank, or shellbursts that take out the entire color company and color guard. Some specific event that came unexpectedly and for which the only logical response was to "fall back", as it were.

One other point. If morale is to be considered in the game, along with troop types, etc, there should be a way to hide those errata and results from your opponent. There was not much that a brigade, division, or Corps commander could do to ascertain the quality of the troops facing him. All troops drilled well and maneuvered well under fire, whether green or veteran. In fact, I'd say that green troops perform better than experienced troops when under fire for the first time, as they simply don't KNOW any better.

Bit of a ramble here, I know. It's a part of the game mechanics, of course, but as I said, I believe that morale and troop grades, etc, play much too great a role in our games than they ever did in the real war.

Ike had no combat experience before 1942.

Marshall had tons of it in WW1. He was VERY good. Most people do not realize how good he was.

Read Marshall's biography, and see if you don't think he could not have done as well, or even better.

Okay where did my post go, somebodies else has somehow attached itself to my name, (: Well I am not going to write it all over again, damn stupid how this happens with TMP. Grggghhh!

Siege: I feel your pain. It happens to me too. The only thing I have found that works *sometimes*, is to hit the back arrow and return to the message before submitting it and try again.

If you read the OR's and AAR's, it seems that neither side really cared what types of troops they were facing.

TKindred:
I think you will find that often any 'morale grade' of the opposing forces was assumed [and perhaps exaggerated] before the period of AARs. However, you will find officers very interested in who they are facing and give specific enemy units names to identify their 'morale' and combat tactics.

I am sure the British and Prussians at Waterloo cared about which enemy units were facing them, those French troops advertising their morale grade with bearskins, plumes and unique uniform distinctions.

Will keep that in mind, cheers McLaddie :)

What exactly do you mean by 'do the work'? I know you mean 'Read' but what? Vary rarely do you see comments about the morale of a unit, beyond 'They broke', 'They charged forward despite heavy casualties', and frankly that can be more about awareness than actual morale.

Unless there is some compelling reason otherwise, I rate troops using: first their reputation if they had one (Iron Brigade, Irish Brigade,Stonewall Brigade, Texas Brigade), second how long they had served with longer service making them veterans and shorter making them green, third if they were exceptionally good or bad at that particular battle.

Yes, it requires research. That is the best part for me.

Seems to me that the quality of a unit usually depended on the quality of its commander.

Any ratings of units can only be based upon the sum total of their performance throughout the war. Brett Farve had a hall of fame career in the NFL, yet when he was a rookie with Atlanta no one could see that.

Ranking units as Green, Trained or Veteran makes no sense in reality. Virtually all troops were trained. Late war conscripts or converted heavy artillery units maybe not so much. Even so called veterans with multiple battles did not fare so well. The men of the Union 11th corps had a reputation of performing poorly. A common saying was "They may have fought ‘mit Sigel, but in the Army of the Potomac they fought like s#!t".

The Iron brigade was a green brigade at Grovetown, but performed superbly. Yet at Antietam and Gettysburg gave ground when confronted against a strong attack. The Irish Brigade, though often thought to be an elite unit really didn't have any more success on the battlefield then a typical brigade in either army.

A better way of thinking of troops would be to classify them as Reliable, Unreliable or simply Unknown. Many green units fought well in their first battles, many veterans performed poorly in battles.

The whole concept of "unit morale" in wargames is subjective, and in many cases totally artificial. I would agree with Don, men hold their ground and make a fight of it more so due to their commanders then their reputation.

At Winchester the Union army was completely defeated when Sheridan arrived. He turned the troops around and led them to a great victory. At Missionary Ridge, Sheridan's men stormed an entrenched Confederate position and won the battle. Forget the ratings of the units, just give me Little Phil!

Kim

What exactly do you mean by 'do the work'? I know you mean 'Read' but what? Vary rarely do you see comments about the morale of a unit, beyond 'They broke', 'They charged forward despite heavy casualties', and frankly that can be more about awareness than actual morale.

Hussar:
What do I mean? Part of 'doing the work' means knowing enough about statistics and how things are 'rated' to identify what information you need.

It also has to do with the questions we ask.

For instance, how did men of the time 'rate' their units? Knowing how dependable they were in a fight was far more important to them than us.

Also, what do we really want to know? We want to be able to create unit behaviors that mirror the real behaviors of historical units in combat. I don't need to know what the men were 'aware of'. I don't need to know the number of casualties. I need to know the expected responses of the whole unit in a variety of circumstances. That requires finding out how many times the unit ran, stayed, stopped etc.

So, if we frame the question around what we want the game to portray, that can change what we look for and how we view the evidence when we find it.

It takes work.

The whole concept of "unit morale" in wargames is subjective, and in many cases totally artificial. I would agree with Don, men hold their ground and make a fight of it more so due to their commanders then their reputation.

It's a mixture of both. Take the possible actions that could occur when presented with a need for falling back:
-Large numbers of men decide they would be better suited watching the camp and then the regiment falls apart in disarray and panic.
-The regiment falls back a bit, regroups and begins a fighting withdrawal.
-The regiment falls back a bit, regroups and takes up a defensive position.
-The regiment falls back a bit, regroups, and charges.

The ability to maintain order is a reflection on the commander, but if there is a panic then a good commander is useless. Likewise digging in could be the result of a command or of individual initiative by soldiers or NCOs. Morale rules need to reflect both.

No one has mentioned the consideration of units composition changing over time.

There are plenty of units who fought like demons at one battle only to be shot to bits.

If this unit then received a draft which reduced the original survivors to a fraction of the overall total, would those survivors really have enough effect on the new men to have the same level of performance until the whole unit had seen action one or more times after that?

The whole concept of "unit morale" in wargames is subjective, and in many cases totally artificial. I would agree with Don, men hold their ground and make a fight of it more so due to their commanders then their reputation.

That view too is subjective until there is some statistical evidence to support it. Certainly there is antedotal examples, as well as Trajanus' consideration concerning unit composition over time.

Those could be added to the criteria in rating a unit, but then any conclusions would have to be grounded in the historical evidence and a statistical basis.

I didn't mean just the commander's action on the field, but also the training and esprit de corps he has instilled in the unit before the battle.

McLaddie,

I agree statistics would be of benefit. An extensive study of unit performance would be great. Trajanus point is also important, as are many other variables. How did a unit perform on the attack, the defense, under different commanders, in different theaters, with what type of weapons, at what strength level, and so on. Anyone who undertakes such an extensive study would need to publish it, not waste it on a set of game rules.

Trying to ascertain the nominal ranking of a unit or commander over the course of a war can still be done without an extensive statistical research. I doubt anyone questions giving Napoleons Old Guard a high ranking as being questionable. For commanders its pretty obvious that some do very well at Divisional command, like Hood and A.P. Hill, not as good at Corps command, and at Army command, some not good at all (Hood, Hooker).

In my games I have always rated units and commanders just as they performed in the actual battles I re-fight. Whether it's re-fighting Antietam, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, or Nashville, we know how actual units fought in those particular battles and how well the army, corps and divisional commanders performed too. Hood at Antietam in divisional command is not the same commander as commanding the army at Nashville.

It appears I am very much in the minority here but I believe some outfits performence was usually better than others, hence their enhanced reputation. I think that discipline and drill were the factors that made that so, and that they got that from old time professional soldiers who led them in their early war experiance. The Iron Brigade had Gibbon, the Texas Brigade had Hood, the Stonewall Brigade had himself, and the Irish Brigade, (being the exception to the above) had, (IIRC), a very large percentage of men who had prior military experiance. I realize that wargamers have a tendency to treat better rated units differently than others on the table, and that real Commanders did not have that luxury, but I still prefer to have morale as a factor. I remember a line from "The Red Badge of Courage" where the commanding General is about to send Henry's Regiment in and asks what unit they were, and when being informed of their identity refers to them as "a bunch of mule drivers." Of course all of this could just be the hopeless romantic in me.

I agree statistics would be of benefit.

Kim:
No, it wouldn't be a benefit. It is what is required if you are going to rate units based on historical evidence. All those variables make it even more necessary.

An extensive study of unit performance would be great. Trajanus point is also important, as are many other variables. How did a unit perform on the attack, the defense, under different commanders, in different theaters, with what type of weapons, at what strength level, and so on. Anyone who undertakes such an extensive study would need to publish it, not waste it on a set of game rules.

Kim:
Waste? Waste? Why would it be a waste?

Trying to ascertain the nominal ranking of a unit or commander over the course of a war can still be done without an extensive statistical research.

Nominal as in 'feels good'? I don't think so.

I doubt anyone questions giving Napoleons Old Guard a high ranking as being questionable.

How high? And compared to what? And how would that represent actions such as 1815 including the last Guard attack? How different would the British 52nd Light compare to the Old Guard, particularly when the Old Guard were in very few engagements compared to the 52nd?

For commanders its pretty obvious that some do very well at Divisional command, like Hood and A.P. Hill, not as good at Corps command, and at Army command, some not good at all (Hood, Hooker).

Commanders only know such obvious things from experience--seeing those officers in action. And even that doesn't necessarily help them predict how those men will perform in the next battle. We are back to some are good, average or poor, but what that actually means in comparative performance only becomes meaningful when you start researching their performances over several engagements and around very specific criteria. Until then you are just guessing when you create wargame mechanics.

Since I started in Napoleonics, I was actually surprised how much easier it was to get a basic handle on rating ACW troops. For me, the basic distinctions are Green (no prior battle experience), Experienced ("seen the elephant"), and Veteran (Experienced with "that little something extra"). There are copious on-line resources with the battle histories of most regiments, which will give you the most important information about experience. From there, it is usually a matter of a little digging to make sure that what looks like an Experienced unit on paper wasn't shattered and brought back with Green troops. Rating troops as Veterans/Crack etc. above that can be a matter of personal opinion, but I tend to rely on the reputation and results attached to the unit for that particular campaign. It's an imperfect method, but there is usually enough basis to give opposing armies a realistic distribution of tough units in the right places.

The influence of charismatic battlefield commanders during this period was often great, but I prefer to model those affects separately from rating unit experience.

Cheers,

Christopher

I think I have done this on TMP before but I don't mind doing it again.

The 57th Mass was raised in Autumn 1863 as a "Veteran Volunteer" Infantry Regiment, although 80% of those who joined in fact weren't.

On 16th April 1864 they were paid their Bounty and told that they would be shipping out in two days, 10% promptly deserted.

548 personnel engaged in their first fight in The Wilderness where they lost 262 men. On 12th May, 333 men fought at Spotsylvania and lost 78 more, losing an additional 23 on the 18th.

On the North Anna, 237 of them entered the fight, losing another 38 men and the Regiment then went on to field 184 at Petersburg, losing a further 52.

They then lost 51 from 98 at The Crater and 15 of the remaining 45 at the Weldon Railroad.

Built up (?) to 93 before Poplar Grove Church, they promptly lost 9 there and were then raised to 212 men for the 1865 campaign, fighting at Fort Steadman where 93 of them were casualties.

As a result of this attrition rate only 11 men fought in every one of the unit's actions over that period of service.

Outside of those fortunate 11, who clearly qualify as ‘Veteran', the unit was on a downhill slide in terms of manpower most of its life and went from 100% 'Veterans', all be it at reduced company strength, on the Weldon Railroad, to 50%+ ‘unknown' at Poplar Grove Church.

What would you call the 333 who, as Green as Grass on 5th/6th May went into action at Spotsylvainia on the 12th? Or for that matter the 237 at the North Anna eleven days later.

When are you ‘Veteran'? The second time you fight, or is that ‘Experienced'? Or are you ‘Veteran' in the twenty days from The Wilderness to the North Anna?

It's a moveable feast!

There's not just "experience," there's different kinds of experience -- as in "whipped them every time," and always seem to get stuck out on the end of a limb by some nit-wit general. These "experiences" must have some influence on expectations. If you expect to lose, you're probably going to, and if you expect to win, that certainly helps.

Yes, past experience and faith in, or lack of faith in your commanders can have a lot to do with performance.

If a unit has been beaten by the Rebs [however you define that] several times over the course of a year or two, there are some latent expectations in meeting the Rebs in the next engagement.

And yes, a moveable feast indeed. You don't even know what that means unless, like T., you follow it out for several units and see how such attrition occurs and THEN who it does or doesn't affect performance.

Do you know what – I don't think we can rate units with any confidence, mostly because often we can't tell if lucky dice rolls or an innate fight to the last man spirit, unless we have something that shouts "THESE ARE GOOD". In H&M battles 'special forces' were rare – you just didn't get Royal Marine Commandos, or SAS, that you het WW2 and beyond.

Do you know what – I don't think we can rate units with any confidence, mostly because often we can't tell if lucky dice rolls or an innate fight to the last man spirit, unless we have something that shouts "THESE ARE GOOD". In H&M battles 'special forces' were rare – you just didn't get Royal Marine Commandos, or SAS, that you het WW2 and beyond.

That's where statistics is a must. Those die rolls are nothing more than the expected ratio of various behaviors. The designer supposedly creates the odds of things happening with the dice based on historic occurances. So if the designer has done his job, you should be able to tell what the odds are of a 'lucky die roll' as opposed to a last man spirit.

There are a lot of descriptions of what constitutes a 'good unit'. It is a matter of simply doing the research as to what and where those descriptions fit.

Statistical studies can be counter-intuitive compared to a few antedotal or assumed 'common-sense' beliefs. For instance, I am in the midst of analyzing over four hundred brigade and battalion engagements from the Napoleonic wars and to my surprise, I can't find a single instance of a unit retreating or routing from a fire fight. Something else had to happen, like a bayonet charge or flank attack.

If we are to recreate history in any quantitative, ratio driven, probability-based fashion, we can not do that in amy meaningful way without statistical analysis. Period. That's what the task requires to be done in a truely representative way. That includes rating units, which is simply creating a probability table for any particular unit's behavior, whether you call them good, veterans, elites, experienced or grafflesnarks.

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Barloon's data shows the major factors on combat performance were:

1. Unit quality – well trained, well led units did much better than poorly trained and led units.

2. Combat exhaustion – peak combat performance was on the 3rd or 4th engagement (40% success), and rapidly dropped below the performance of "green" regiments thereafter (20% success or less).

3. Immediate activity before the battle – the two days immediately prior to combat had a very large impact. Units engaged the day before especially were much less likely to succeed, with a 90% defeat rate. Marching or entrenching also seriously degraded performance.

The last two factors are easy to quantify. The problem is with the first factor.

Barloon used his judgement, but I think the primary parameters should be:

a. Time under instruction, especially that prior to taking the field.

b. Quality of officers.

In the absence of any evidence regards (b) then (a) is a quantity and can be dealt with. If a regiment had particularly good (or bad) leadership at higher levels we can apply a plus or minus one.

Thus we simplify the problem to how much drill (and how good the training was) the unit got, and everything else can be quantified.

You know sometimes electronic media lets you down. I'd clean forgotten I have Barloon's Phd disertation on my PC somewhere.

That's the trouble with estuff – out of sight & out of mind!

Balroon did some great work here, but as you said, on the #1 issue, Unit quality [in other words, how the unit is rated] he simply "used his judgment,which leaves that door wide open. he could have done analysis similar to #2 and #3. Why, I don't know.

What he misses is:
1. The differences in terrain. He seems to simply have three: 'exposed positions', hasty works and entrenched. Forests, hills, rough terrain etc. don't seem to be factored in.

2. The history of the units. A series of defeats, even a series of commanders can have an impact on the unit's performance. Most units had a series of officers, most units had a mix of training and experience over that three or four engagements.

All could have been factored in by cross-analysis as he does in other places, but he didn't go that far, which is too bad considering how much good work he did do.

Agree w McLaddie. A bold work, and I admire Balroon's effort, but not a truly scientific study by any means and ultimately falls short. It would have been nice to see a great deal more of the raw data he gathered.

It would have been nice to see a great deal more of the raw data he gathered.

Amen!

Desertion rates could be interesting too, although you would have to adjust for Bounty Jumpers in the North and 'Seasonal Desertion' in the South.

Clearly units that were built from a single source of volunteers would be good and stay good until their ranks were depleted or filled with unrelated replacements.

Unwilling draftees- that's easy to figure out.

Too veteran units would have too many people unwilling to die any longer but might fight well if cornered.

Green units could be too stupid or too unsure of themselves and could go either way. At any time.

Most units changed drastically over time. The best and the bravest would advance first, retreat last and get killed the most. What was left could be the cowards or men inspired by their mission.

It should be hard to predict how any specific unit in a wargame would fight- although some units who historically fought well would be exceptions. Other than these, I assign troop quality somewhat randomly, although very big units are usually green and very small units are veteran.

It should be hard to predict how any specific unit in a wargame would fight

That's why most rules have some sort of morale check, involving a dice roll.

This is a great thread and throughly enjoy reading it, here is my two cents.

What jumped out at me is the unknown qualities of the word morale in a gaming content. I believe we try to put to many items in that bucket,i.e. shooting , movement, formation changes, break points, etc.. Maybe breaking it down into a simpler form of what it takes for a unit to "Break" is the answer. I really like Extra Crispy's idea of everybody's average until the first check, that seems a good way to represent the randomness of some the influemces, i.e. marching, digging in, prior bad performance, prior good performance, tired, thristy, etc. prior to the battle.

Shooting and movement/formation changes can be handled less randomly based on how well a unit is trained and how much action they have seen. These could be assigned prior to a game based on your own research or feel of what you want out of the game.

A green unit can be well trained but never seen a battle so they move average but shoot below average.
A green unit could also be poorly trained and never seen a battle so move below average and shoot below average.
A veteran unit may move above average and shoot above average.

My one rule would be that MOST units are just plain average.