"If not Hood, who? 1864" Topic

I have a hard time seeing Hood as competent to command a corps in 1864, much less an army. However I can't see Davis appointing any of Bragg's old enemies to the posts, Cleburne had taken himself out of the running with his support for arming slaves, and then Polk got himself killed. If Hood hadn't been promoted or available in 1864, who would have been given the corps he commanded? And if Davis hadn't gone for Hood to succeed Johnston, who was his likely alternative?

Lee might not have liked it, but Longstreet would have been a good appointment.

I've long thought they would have been better off moving Lee down to take command of the western department and let Longstreet defend against Meade/Grant.

But Lee was a "Vuhginyun by God!" and never would have gone for it.

Always a fun "what if" to ponder. But the simple fact that Hood was promoted to both corps and then army command in the west tells you how few choices Davis felt he really had. Alexander Stewart replaced Hood as corps commander and I think he proved himself to be a serviceable officer in that capacity--certainly better than Cheatham later proved himself to be when elevated to corps command.

The much tougher question is who David could have appointed to replace Johnston in July 1864. Perhaps the most obvious question is whether Johnston needed to be replaced at all! But assuming so, we know from correspondence that Davis could not have considered the most senior officers, Beauregard or Bragg. That left Hardee, Hood, or a Lt. Gen. from the East--none of which Lee was obliged to release. "Jumping rank" to promote a major general all the way to army command was a political nightmare at the time (easy to overlook now, when we think merely of merit).

Not so sold on Longstreet. His only independent command in the West was a big flop. Maybe force Hardee to accept it?

deleted and moved to new thread about alternate history

Should have kept Johnston. By being overly aggresive Hood threw away his army.

Longstreet really wasn't available to replace Johnston, as he was wounded at the Wilderness and didn't return to duty until October of 1864.

Based on information available to Davis and Davis' views, I think Hood was his best choice. He was aggressive, proven fighter, known by the troops, his loss would not be noticed by Lee. Johnson had to go since he had lost the faith of the Confederate leadership (Davis, another topic for discussion).

But IF they had pulled Longstreet before Wilderness…maybe? IMO he would have made a much better Army commander than Hood. Then again, why replace Johnston at all? Knee jerk reaction I say! Aggressive leadership was not what was needed in those days.

Aggressive leadership is ALWAYS needed in any army to be successful. It just requires competence behind it. Lee had it. Jackson had it. Yes, they both made mistakes, but their successes far outweighed their failures. Hood did not have it beyond the division level. Johnston had the competence, but not the aggression.

Two other possibilities who had already held theatre/army command…P. Beauregard and Kirby Smith.

And two others that would be interesting options – Richard Taylor and N. B. Forrest. Both Davis and Lee are recorded as saying that Forrest's talents were underutilized.

Another possibility is Stephen D. Lee, who acquitted himself reasonably well as a corps commander under Hood.

I believe that Davis threw away whatever chances the South had left (and there were darned few of them) when he relieved Johnson of Command.

Johnson understood that the one hope the south had was to make things in the western theater so difficult, so costly, that the northern people would tire of the war and elect someone other than Lincoln who would make peace with the south. Johnson was a master of defense. He knew how to slow down Sherman, to make him pay for every mile of ground, for every acre of land.

Hood was a darned fine Division and even Corps commander, but he was suffering physically from the effects of his wounds and from the medications used to treat them. He also wasn't well acquainted with the differences in philosophy between the Eastern and Western theaters of war.

Hood was exactly the sort of man whom Jefferson Davis wanted in command. he was someone who based his entire tactical thought upon "Elan!" which was well within keeping with the American veneration of everything and anything Else. It was an attitude not to change until the Prussians became victorious over the French.

Davis was enamored with the concept of "The best defense is a good offense" and, in retrospect, was living with the same attitude and delusions as were found in a bunker in Berlin some 80 years later.

Johnson was the only rational choice for the job, and if he wasn't to be entrusted with the task, the surrender to the north should have been done. It's easy to look at in hindsight, but there it is.

All of which goes to prove how limited the Souths options were. In better circumstances Lee should have replaced Ewell and A.P.Hill but that never happened either!

If this were the NFL, they could have traded a few draft picks for Sheridan. Up and coming, competent, aggressive…

I agree completely with TKindred. Johnston was the only high-ranking Confederate commander who knew what really had to be done to have any chance of winning the war. Delay the Yankees, hurt the Yankees, and don't give them the chance to hurt you back very badly. Keep your army intact! Washington understood that during the Revolution.

Hood was chosen largely on his connections and reputation. Davis' experience in the Mexican-American War gave him an unreasonable belief in attack in almost all circumstances, a belief no doubt shared by Hood. While this tactic was very plausible in the era of the smoothbore musket, the time for it passed with the advent of rifles.

Davis could not pick Hardee, who was probably a good choice, but alas, he did not want the job. Longstreet coveted the job, but was not offerred the role for political reasons. Cleburne was the best choice. However, based on political reasons he was not even a corps commander. Cleburne could have made a real difference. Lucky for Sherman he was not a candidate.

Who is left? Johnston and Beauregard remain considerations. Johnston's performance during the Vicksburg Campaign and the subsequent Atlanta campaign shows his overwhelming reliance on defence and his timidity in the face of crisis. Beauregard, as an almost constant opponent of Davis politically, was not a realisitic choice either. Given all these factors, I would say A.P. Stewart was the only reasonable alternative. Someone else mentioned him in this thread.

Johnston and Beauregard both were bitter political opponents of Davis. I don't know how Taylor's relationship with Davis was, but he seems like a possible choice. Kirby-Smith was a good brigade commander promoted way above his level of competence. And he was a prima-donna, as shown during the Perryville campaign.

Johnston and Sherman formed a mutual admiration society after the war and agreed that they had both put on a professional campaign. Both made mistakes and got away with it. I think Lee would have thumped Sherman and Grant would have captured Johnston.

Part of the leadership problem was Davis not being willing to work with enemies. Lincoln overlooked McClellan's insubordination in the hope of backing a winner. Likewise he overlooked Hooker's talk about a military dictator until Hooker was found wanting in the field. Davis was too thin-skinned for that.

One more thing: Hood was actively undermining Johnston during the Atlanta campaign, seeking his job. He also bungled the one real shot at thumping Hooker's wing, though that may have been a foul-up rather than undermining.

I like Hood, he helped end the war early.

Dan

Aggressive leadership is ALWAYS needed in any army to be successful. It just requires competence behind it. Lee had it. Jackson had it. Yes, they both made mistakes, but their successes far outweighed their failures. Hood did not have it beyond the division level. Johnston had the competence, but not the aggression.

There was a good deal of difference in the levels of competence each faced, however. Lee looked good when pitted against McClellan, Pope and Hooker, Jackson when against Banks, Shields and Fremont; but Hood had to fight Sherman, and AFTER Sherman had gained experience and confidence under Grant.

As a corps commander, Hood undermined Johnston just as almost everyone had undermined Bragg. Other than that, he seemed to be competent enough at that level. Not sure he was any better than D. H. Hill.

I have a dim view of Hood at the corp level. He couldn't coordinate his attacking divisions at Resaca, botched the planned attack at Cassville, botched the planned flank attack after Pickett's Mill, and really screwed up at Kolb's Farm.

I think Richard Taylor would have done a better job.

No army ever won a war on the defensive. Even Lee, when he was being worn down in the Overland Campaign and at Petersburg, went on the tactical offensive whenever possible. The Wilderness, Harris Farm, Po River, Jericho Mills, Bethesda Church, Jerusalem Plank Road, Globe Tavern, Ream's Station. He wasn't always successful, but it kept his enemy off balance. And yes, he did eventually lose. The difference between Lee, Johnston, and Hood is that

1. Lee had much better subordinates. Yes, Richard Anderson, Ewell, and Hill had their faults, but they were much better than Hardee, Hood (at corps level) and Polk. And Lee's division generals really stepped up to the plate when necessary. Early, Gordon, Mahone. Hardee, Hood and Polk just weren't in their league. Other than Cleburne, Cheatham, and Stewart, there were no standouts in the Army of Tennessee at the division level. By July, when casualties had caused battlefield promotions in the Army of Tennessee, the leadership was wrecked. By contrast, look at the performance of Hill, Mahone, Hampton, etc. at Petersburg in the same time frame. Leadership.

2. Lee had that winning combination of aggression and competence. Johnston was competent, but not aggressive. He did not take advantage of every opportunity to go on the tactical offensive, and when he did, his subordinates botched it. He didn't defend major river crossings. He let the enemy come to him too often. Hood was aggressive, but lacked the competence. He tried too much too quickly. He often had some good plans, but didn't have the ability to coordinate his subordinates, and by July 1864 his subordinates just didn't have what it takes. Clayton, Brown, Maney, just weren't up to the task. After the Atlanta campaign, Hood just made stupid decisions. Sending a lone division to Allatoona, attacking at Franklin, staying at Nashville.

I think the Confederacy had a number of candidates for the open corps command in the Army of Tennessee. Within the army itself Cleburne was the most qualified based on record. He had exercised a temporary corps command. He knew the troops and the area. Cheatham had seniority, generally and within the army. The difficulty was that most candidates in or having a prior connection with the AoT had disqualified themselves with Davis. Outside the AoT the best candidate was Taylor. He was a Lt. Gen., he had exercised independent command, and he was coming off the success of the Red River campaign. Being Davis's former in-law didn't hurt. The problem for Taylor was that he didn't become available until just before the campaign started.

Hood was not qualified for a corps in 1864. His reputation had been made as commander of a brigade or a demi-division in 1862. His record as commander of a full division was not the same. His division was not seriously involved at Fredricksburg and was absent from Chancellorsville. At both Gettysburg and Chickamauga he was knocked out with wounds. Also Hood had been a junior division commander within Longstreet's command.

I don't see Longstreet as a candidate for a corps command in the AoT in 1864. It makes no sense to strip the most experienced corps commander from the ANV and send him to an army that already had Hardee. If Longstreet went west again, it would have been as army commander.

To me the best option satisfactory to Davis would have been if Polk had returned to the Army. Then Taylor could have led the Army of Mississippi when it came to reinforce the Army of Tennessee at the beginning of the campaign.

Davis must have thought, given his relationship with Johnston and Johnston's reputation, that he might have to replace his army commander in the middle of the campaign. I suspect though that he thought the successor would be Polk. Once Polk was killed, it becomes inevitable that Hood is going to take over the Army of Tennessee.

But Lee was a "Vuhginyun by God!" and never would have gone for it.

Lee told Davis that he would go if so ordered, but that he would not know the area nor the personnel as well as someone already with the AoT.

CSPAN3 is replaying a Richard McMurray program "General Joseph E. Johnston & the Atlanta Campaign" Sunday morning. Gives another opinion of the Johnston /Hood debate.

Excellent discussion on this thread BTW !

cwbuff-I enjoyed Mr. McMurry's talk. The problem is that it stops right at the point where my question starts.

Surely by the time Davis decided he must replace Joe Johnston the damage to the Army of Tennessee's leadership had already been done? Without opening a can of worms on Braxton Bragg, it is my belief that during Braggs tenure as army commander he had succeeded in crushing the initiative and aggressive leadership of his subordinates.

Bragg's stultifying influence prevented the development of competent, independent minded officers, capable of leading corps and the army itself? Combine this situation with Davis' policy of restricting high command appointments to graduates of west point and the pool of potential candidates shrinks even further.

"You have played the part of a damned scoundrel. … If you ever again try to interfere with me or cross my path it will be at the peril of your life."

Forrest to Bragg after Chickamauga.

Yes, I think you have a really good point there. Something about being able to start a fight in an empty room springs to mind! :o)

The problem with the Cornfederacy was that the President wanted to be the General in chief, but unfortunately was elected president instead, and hence could find satisfaction with no one. He also was extremely prejudiced towards "the ring knockers" (as was Grant) and did not believe anyone who wasn't could run a war.

But Davis was no fool. I have no doubt he understood the realities of war as good as Joe Johnson, but he could not express them. Johnson understood how to conduct the war, but when faced with the likes of Grant and Sherman, where Lee had the likes of Burnside, Pope, and Hooker, "Unka Joe" was not likely to get the opportunity.

Davis, as president, was also forced to face the realities of politics, and he needed victories. He needed a victory that would knock a union army or two off the board, and that was not likely at all.

Finally the salvation of the cause would come only when the South made peace-- a political decision, not a military one, and one which the First President of the Confederacy could not do. Maybe the second had there been one, but not the first.

It's not that the choices Davis had were so poor, it's that none of them would fit with what the circumstances demanded.

"it is my belief that during Braggs tenure as army commander he had succeeded in crushing the initiative and aggressive leadership of his subordinates.

Bragg's stultifying influence prevented the development of competent, independent minded officers, capable of leading corps and the army itself? "

It wasn't just Bragg. Hood in many ways continued that path of stilting independent thought. Here's an example just before Allatoona. Remember, Hardee had just been relieved of command by Davis a few days before. With Stewart's Corps tearing up the Western & Atlantic Railroad, Hood sent orders to capture the garrison at Allatoona Pass, fill up the railroad cut, and destroy the bridge over the Etowah River if possible. Stewart had three divisions under his command: Loring, Walthall, and French. Loring's Division with 4,000 to 5,000 present for duty (sorry, I forget the exact figure) was at Acworth, only 4 mile away by road. French's Division was about 3,200 present for duty and at Big Shanty (modern day Kennesaw) about 8 miles away. This was the afternoon of Oct. 4th. Hood specifically ordered French to capture Allatoona. If Stewart had modified the order and sent Loring, he could have arrived the afternoon of the 4th and captured the pass before Corse arrive with reinforcements at 1-2 am the next morning. In my opinion, Stewart did not want to risk modifying the order in any way short of written confirmation for fear of any backlash.

That, ladies and gentleman, is how you foster an atmosphere of CYA and crush the initiative of your subordinates, ensuring the defeat of your own army or cause.

Bragg's stultifying influence prevented the development of competent, independent minded officers …

Given the nature of some of his subordinates, I can't really blame him for trying to "stultify" them. Unfortunately, the ones who really needed it (especially Polk) seem to have been immune, as they did, or didn't do, according to their own limited lights whenever it suited them.

As a corps commander, Hood undermined Johnston just as almost everyone had undermined Bragg. Other than that, he seemed to be competent enough at that level. Not sure he was any better than D. H. Hill.

D.H. Hill may have been one of the best, and most under utilized commanders the South ever had. His personal disagreements with both Lee and Bragg effectively killed his chances of promotion (though he was in fact correct more often then not in his opinions, such as his reluctance to make the attack at Malvern Hill against Lee's orders).

D.H. Hill led his troops with both bravery and distinction in several key battles and is performance in action was never a cause of failure. Had he not fallen out of favor with Lee he may have been given one of the Corp commands in the ANV. I would have rather had D.H. Hill in command instead of Ewell at Gettysburg. I think the results would have been different.

We'll never know how well D.H. Hill may have done at higher command, but in my opinion, based upon his battlefield performance he would have faired as well as Johnson and certainly better then Bragg or Hood at army command.

Kim

donlowry …we are in agreement on polk, though jeff davis must shoulder much of the blame for sustaining him in his position after repeated displays of unfitness for command.

D.H.Hill's greatest enemy was sadly himself, his inability to get on with civil and military officials rivalled that of bragg. his ability, at least at divisional level, was never in question. he certainly possessed 'independence' so lacking in others in the high command of the army of Tennessee?

Probably my favorite book on the Confederate Command in the West is Steven E. Woodworth's "Jefferson Davis and his Generals: The Failure of the Confederate Command in the West". My copy is from the University Press of Kansas, 1990 (ISBN0-7006-0461-8). This book firmed my belief that there is little fault with the Western Confederate soldier but that the problem with the upper command structure, certainly Corps and above, caused much difficulty with the conduct of the war. Well worth the addition of this book to your library.

How does it compare with Connolly's two volume work on the Army of Tennessee?

Probably my favorite book on the Confederate Command in the West is Steven E. Woodworth's "Jefferson Davis and his Generals: The Failure of the Confederate Command in the West". My copy is from the University Press of Kansas, 1990 (ISBN0-7006-0461-8). This book firmed my belief that there is little fault with the Western Confederate soldier but that the problem with the upper command structure, certainly Corps and above, caused much difficulty with the conduct of the war. Well worth the addition of this book to your library.

that does sound a must have for me!!

Have discovered that both "Army of the Heartland" and "Autumn of Glory" must still be in storage, swore I got all of my ACW and WWII out but alas. Connolly is also a must but, if memory serves, more detailed in the battle details and lower level (Division) and common soldier input. Woodworth's focus and blame (?) rests with the dealings of upper commands and Jeff Davis.

Thank you CW. Sounds like I will need to track down Woodworth too.

by the time joe Johnston was replaced the position of commander of the army of Tennessee had become a poisoned chalice ….only someone with Hood's confidence would have actively sought such the command?

Richard taylor would never have taken it …he returned to Louisiana (at, I believe, his own request) to defend it, I don't think he would have agreed to the move?

beauregard was too alienated from davis to be even considered …and lets face it, davis had already experimented with one foe of the administration (in joe Johnston), I for one don't see davis being the big enough man to hand command back to beauregard?

But Beauregard was later given overall command in the West, including the AoT.

Patrick Ronayne Cleburne…end of that argument.

GOR-Taylor had a falling out with Kirby Smith in April of 1864 when Smith took away a large portion of his command and sent them north into Arkansas. Taylor even threatened to resign. In the summer of 1864 he went east and took command of the Dept. of East Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.

donlowry 24 Apr 2014 5:34 p.m. PST

But Beauregard was later given overall command in the West, including the AoT.

…Beauregard saw service in Petersburg in 1864, then served under Joe Johnston in 1865?

GOR-Taylor had a falling out with Kirby Smith in April of 1864 when Smith took away a large portion of his command and sent them north into Arkansas. Taylor even threatened to resign. In the summer of 1864 he went east and took command of the Dept. of East Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.

true enough ….though he was still responsible for the defence of a portion of Louisiana, albeit the part east of the mississippi

Beauregard was given command of the Department of the West containing both Hood's and Taylor's commands in early October 1864.

I should add, it was largely administrative with little real power other than logistics. Hood pretty much ignored him. I haven't read enough to know how Taylor got along with him in that position.

I think by that stage of the war …a lot of what was emanating from the confederate war department was a case of much too little, much too late