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"Battle of Britain campaign game idea" Topic


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Skarper16 Mar 2014 8:41 p.m. PST

While re-inventing B-17 as a VASSAL module I had an idea that it might work to do something similar with a squadron of Spitfires/Hurricanes during the battle of Britain.

You'd run a squadron of I guess about 12 A/C with their pilots and get missions (scrambles) which would lead to air-combat with German bombers and/or fighters.

I'm profoundly ignorant about the Battle of Britain having rad about 2 books on the topic and seen the film with Micheal Caine et al…so I don't know if my idea will really work.

I don't mind a bit of stretching history for game play but I don't want a fantasy battle of Britain either.

I'm concerned about the following :-

How often would a given squadron be scrambled – on average and during periods of high intensity.

How much bad weather was there which would preclude flying. Folk memory is of clear blue skies right thru that summer but I read somewhere that the weather was actually quite poor even by the typical British summer standards and this went a long way to saving the RAF's bacon.

How many pilots/aircraft in a SQUADRON? I'm assuming around a dozen a/c with a few extra pilots.

Mako1116 Mar 2014 8:56 p.m. PST

Could be as much as 3 – 4 times a day, during really high intensity, if I recall correctly. Maybe even more.

Of course, not all of the scrambles may result in successful intercepts.

Not sure about the weather.

12 is a pretty good number, with more pilots and planes than that, but only about 60% – 67% serviceable, on average.

marcus arilius16 Mar 2014 9:35 p.m. PST
jowady16 Mar 2014 10:14 p.m. PST

You didn't necessarily have entire squadrons scramble. Sometimes it would only be a flight. The weather was unusually good that summer. The Battle was really quite complex with different tactics at different times and for the different Fighter Groups themselves. There were periods of flying standing patrols as well as scrambles.

Skarper16 Mar 2014 10:27 p.m. PST

Forgot about that game – vaguely remember seeing ads for it back in the day. Thanks Marcus Arilius for the lead.

Some googling about is giving me a figure of maybe 20 a/c and up to 30 pilots as a full strength squadron, but unlikely to remain so for long under combat conditions.

Pilots apparently became the limiting factor rather than a/c due some claim to the RAF stupidly assigning pilots to all manner of desk jobs.

I'm leaning towards a less abstract version of LONDON'S BURNING with better graphics and smoother mechanics.

Skarper16 Mar 2014 10:36 p.m. PST

Thanks Jowady. It's a vague half recollection I have of the weather being bad. I would need to randomise it in my game anyway.

And indeed part of the scramble order would include how many a/c from all up to perhaps a single a/c with about 50% being pretty common I guess.

Standing patrols are also a feature at various times.

A question about the running pellmell across the airfield to man the A/C – was it really necessary or just the adrenalin? Perhaps there were more pilots than A/C and it's first come first served??

I remember my father scoffing at these scenes in the 1969 film and claiming the RADAR warning system gave them ample time to respond – but on the other hand perhaps it's like rushing to catch a train – you don't want to arrive on the platform 2 seconds late not having run for it…

10 seconds extra time to maneuver for a better angle of attack could be decisive too.

jowady16 Mar 2014 11:03 p.m. PST

No, there weren't more pilots than aircraft. Pilots were the limiting factor but not because they were being assigned to desk jobs, there simply weren't enough experienced fighter pilots. Throughout the battle corners were cut on the training program, the light bombers and Coastal Command were raided and eventually the foreign squadrons undergoing training were activated. Radar did not always give adequate time to respond. Squadrons wouldn't be scrambled until the last moment possible, otherwise the Germans could send a decoy raid over to draw the RAF up and then let them run out of fuel before the real raid appeared. Also there was no radar coverage once the Germans passed the coast and there were blind spots as the Germans knocked out a number of radar sites.

Casualties were higher than expected. The early part of the battle, what the Germans called the "Kanal Kampf", their attacks on British shipping in the Channel that were protected by standing patrols had taken a large number if pilots from the RAF. Until the Luftwaffe decreased its attacks directly on Fighter Command and switched to Cities as the primary targets they were attriting away a Fighter Command and it was possible for Dowding to create a chart showing when Fighter Command would cease to exist. There were plans to pull 11 Group north of the at games out of range if escorted raids. Some vulnerable Air Fields were abandoned.

Skarper16 Mar 2014 11:31 p.m. PST

Thanks Jowady – that's some very useful info. Like I said in the OP I am largely ignorant about the BoB period and mistrustful of what I do think I know.

Hindsight is often 20/20 and I gather that Dowding's assessment of the situation, though an accurate interpretation of the data he had available, was unduly pessimistic. The Germans had started from a weaker position than realised and with no clear plan of how to proceed rather bumbled along.

I always did understand the switch to night attacks on London and other cities to have been a blunder and had the Germans persisted in attacks on the RAF fighter stations they could have gained the upper hand – but this does seem to be contested.

A fundamental flaw in the German plans is that if the RAF retreats beyond the range of the Bf 109s and refuses to engage when it cannot afford to take losses they can hold on indefinitely. The Luftwaffe having relatively weak strategic bombing capabilities what damage they could do to London and industry could be weathered easily enough.

However the Germans were at the end of their rope by that point and the Blitz just a last resort tactic when all else had failed.

Again – hindsight is 20/20 and those in charge at the time were uneasy about the morale and moral implications of letting London bear the brunt of the German wrath undefended. It looked bad too to potential allies (the USA) and enemies (Japan) alike. British Imperial Prestige still meant something at that time.

Not A Member Anymore17 Mar 2014 4:16 a.m. PST

i recommend that you take a look at battleofbritainblog.com
it has loads of detailed information and a day by day account of the battle derived from squadron operational diaries. No need to randomise the weather the daily prevailing weather conditions are listed on the site. It will also give you a sense of how many planes were allocated to specific interception tasks.

Once the Battle proper got underway standing patrols ended, far too inefficient a use of the available resources.

Remember Fighter Command at the time didn't have the luxury of being able to retreat north of London and beyond the range of the Bf109s. It was a strategic imperative to contest the airspace over the Channel beaches to deter invasion which was a very real threat during that summer.

The German decision to switch to bombing Britain's cities was no last resort tactic, but a considered strategic choice to try to force Britain to negotiate. The timing of the switch may have reflected Hitler's frustration with Goering's lack of progress but the change was planned.

In addition to the courage and skills of the pilots who took part, the sophisticated and integrated command and control system created by Dowding is what really won the Battle for Britain. it made sure that the available pilots could be deployed were they were most needed.

If you are looking for a set of campaign rules for the Battle then I would point you to the "Finest Hour" supplement from the Too Fat Lardies stable.While intended for use with their "Bag the Hun" rules it has wider application and enables you tp track the success or otherwise of your squadron through the dark days of that summer. Try toofatlardies.co.uk where you can download the PDF for the princely sum of £8.00 GBP

John

jowady17 Mar 2014 11:33 a.m. PST

It wasn't undue pessimism that lead Dowding to his conclusions it was reality. The British public, then and now, like the American public about the Bulge, was never told and doesn't understand just how bad it got. By late August the RAF's command and Control system was beginning to fall apart. Pilot fatigue had reached a critical point. Replacements were being lost at an alarming rate. At a few airfields pilots had to service their own aircraft as ground crews refused to leave their shelters. They were worn out and suffering from combat fatigue as well.

If you want to learn more I would suggest two books to start, one is "A Time for Courage" which is a history of the RAF in the entire war and "Fighter" by Len Deighton which cover the Battle itself. A good novel that covers a Hurricane squadron for the first year of the war is "Piece of Cake".

BattlerBritain17 Mar 2014 12:41 p.m. PST

I'd second the suggestion of the boardgame 'London's Burning'.

bobblanchett25 Mar 2014 4:46 p.m. PST

Disagree about the boardgame.
John Butterfield's two iterations of "RAF"
are simply outstanding, one of the best operational-level games I've ever played, air land or sea.

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