"German WWI Anti-Tank Tactics" Topic

By 1918, the Germans had learned to deal with tanks. At the Battle of Amiens (1918) 72% of the Allied Tank Corps was destroyed in the first 4 days. 41.4% of all British tanks had been destroyed by the 64th day. On November 5, there were only 8 tanks left in the British tank corps.[5]

I have seen this quote a few times researching WWI Tanks/Tank Warfare.
So what did the Germans do to devastate the Allied Tanks?
Or maybe I should ask is this true?
This seems to be the source "Blitzkrieg, pages 109-10"

I had never heard that the British Tank Corps was pretty much out of action at he end of the war.

This seems like the sort of comment that Zuber would make ;-). There is an incorrect cause-and-analysis going on. The attrition of the Tank Corps is correct but the effects of German anti-tank weapons was only a minor contributing factor. It was hard to maintain the tanks in the field for any length of time. Maintenance was a problem but the bigger issue during the Last 100 Days was the increasing distances from railheads. Plus those railways that did exist were overwhelmed with resupplying the needs of the advancing infantry and cavalry.

The Germans had the same problems of attrition with their tanks. They were falling back on interior lines which made the forming up process somewhat easier. This is why some of their tanks got into action quite late in the war, resulting in the second tank vs tank battle near Awoingt.

The predominant German anti-tank weapon remained the field gun. The tremendous pre-planned bombardments often nullified the field guns to a great degree on the first day of an offensive. If an offensive continued, field guns were less likely to be suppressed and therefore could exact a higher toll on British tanks. This phenomenon was not new or 'learned' in 1918. It was apparent in 1917, for example around Flesquieres during the Battle of Cambrai and on the Menin Road in the Third Battle of Ypres.

Robert

The vast majority of the losses were breakdowns/bogging. The operational life of tanks was extremely short, although breakdowns could be recovered of course. Crew exhaustion was also a serious problem, they were generally out of action due to fatigue, heat stroke and gassing after eight hours.

That was partly why there weren't any tanks left to stop the German counterattack at Cambrai. Some losses were due to AT and artillery fire, mines, and obstacles of course.

iirc the last week of the war was fought without any operational heavy tanks at all, Whippets & armoured cars were still around.

The same thing happened in WW2 of course, tanks were just consumed by offensive operations regardless of physical opposition. The panzer units used in the occupation of Austria lost 50% of their strength just marching.

Good point on WW2, Martin. The 'gassing' related mainly to carbon monoxide poisoning, which was still a problem though less so in the later Mk tanks. Effects of gas shells could be a problem as well.

Robert

Thanks for all the replies, I figured that the Germans were not "all of a sudden" great tank killers, but the quote seems to imply such a thing. I think it was Guderian that said after the war the Germans did not forget the fear induced by being attacked by tanks.

It was Guderian.

Robert

'Destroyed' is pushing the definition quite a bit. Broken down, bogged or crew unfit for service would cover a lot of the tank casualties sustained.

My late great uncle was a sniper during WW1. As a young boy, it took me a while to understand why he was so reluctant to talk about his experiences, compared with his younger brother, my grandfather, who had served as RAF ground crew during WW2. The one aspect of sniping which he was prepared to talk about was being tasked on several occasions to set fire to bogged down tanks – "denial" in the modern parlance. He said this was "memorable" since they were issued tracer rounds with which to plink at the fuel tank at the rear of the vehicle.

Of course, for a sniper, firing repeatedly with tracer rounds was just a tad counter-intuitive, and always attracted an unpleasant response. Uncle Fred said you always knew when the Germans had either established an OP in the bogged down tank, or had set their heart on doing so, since that was when you as a sniper got a full divisional artillery effort down in your vicinity…

He said it was for those tasks that the snipers placed a particularly high value on trench armour, for all its awkwardness and limitations – his team was nicknamed the Black Gladiators.

It seems that the Germans had some anti-tank measures to hand even before they knew about the tanks. German troops were issued with steel-cored, armour-piercing bullets to penetrate the loop-holed metal plates used by British snipers. These were quickly dished out and some of the British tanks used at Fleurs-Courcellette in September '16 were hit by them. The British Mark IV and V tanks had upgraded armour plating on their fronts to combat this, so the Germans switched to letting the tanks come level and firing into the sides and rear.

That was the theory at least. In practice, British tanks were rarely put out of action by armour-piercing bullets. The best example was during the Battle of Bullecourt in 1917. The British tanks were Mk IIs with non-hardened steel. They were targeted with armour-piercing bullets fired by MGs. Detailed accounts, however, show that even these tanks were able to operate if they did not break down from engine failure. Minenwerfer were used against tanks with effect in this battle.

Robert

Re. bullets – no, I would imagine injuries to key members of the crew would be far more problematic (that said, there must have been the odd lucky strike on some part of the engine or transmission. Artillery fire seems to have been the main cause of "brewing up".

Given the state of knowledge/maintenance at the time, it's not surprising mechanical failure was the biggest "killer" (especially if you include all the machines that never even made it to the start line). Am I right in thinking that 80% – or some equally ridiculous figure – of German AFVs lost in Normandy were from mechanical failure?