" December '41 - bad month for allied battleships" Topic

Just a reflection: With three ships (Rodney, Nelson, Resolution) already out on Repairs or Refit, nine additional allied battleships (Oklahoma, Arizona, California, West Virginia, Nevada, Prince of Wales, Repulse, Valiant and Queen Elizabeth) sank that month. Granted, five rose again, but loosing between a quarter and a third of the combined British/US strength in one month must have raised some eyebrows.

"There is something wrong with our battleships this month."

@John the OFM, good one.

Yes, but in the long run it was our advantage in carriers that mattered.

I know… but we did not know it at the time.

Someone made the argument that having our ships sunk at Pearl Harbor was a good thing because they were ultimately recovered, with exceptions, whereas under Plan Orange they would have sailed to defend the Philippines where they would have been lost forever.

The allies lost some Battleships but gained a whole country that month. The allies were much better off at the end of December than at the beginning.

Sure, the Allies lost battleships. And, in light of the upcoming battles, it was totally irrelevant.

The interesting thing to me is the lesson learned, particularly after Force Z: "aircraft can sink even fully-functional battleships". If Force Z had found the Japanese invasion fleet first, and been beaten up a bit before the bombers arrived, that lesson might not have been learned until rather later: everybody knew that aircraft could take out damaged ships.

Here's a scenario in which that happens:

link

"Someone made the argument that having our ships sunk at Pearl Harbor was a good thing because they were ultimately recovered, with exceptions, whereas under Plan Orange they would have sailed to defend the Philippines where they would have been lost forever."

I agree that any BB lost at sea would have been lost for good, but it's far different to attack a fleet in complete surprise at anchor and to attack one out at sea, escorted by CV's and expecting trouble. I think the Japanese would have done less damage and suffered more losses in irreplaceable pilots if they caught the US battlefleet out at sea.

… it was totally irrelevant.

Except to the crews who manned them. We lost a lot of good sailors in those defeats.

Quote: I know… but we did not know it at the time.

Yes we did, RN policy had been driven by it, the Norwegian Task Force allocations proved it and Taranto underlined it.

The fact that the RAF starved the RN of the needed aircraft designs, and refuted the need for anti-shipping training obscures the fact but the recognition of air power in the coming conflict is highlighted across the board in RN briefs. memos and the vessels under construction.

We just lacked decent strike aircraft – and what was done with swordfish, skuas, rocs, ansons and gladiators demonstrated how right the admiralty boards were and how wrong Bomber Command and ADGB were.

By 1941 there was absolutely no doubt where power at sea lay. By December 1941 it was old news indeed.

Barnham was sunk Nov. 25, 1941. Another loss in the same period.

Interestingly, the Japanese remained obsessed with battleships. Kept their main fleet out of the line of fire for the "decisive battle".

At Midway, captured Americans were queried about the location of the US battle fleet. More than once, Japanese surface ships tried to hunt down US carriers.

Leyte Gulf revolved around the Japanese battle fleet, with their carriers reduced to the role of bait. The final sortie for their navy involved the Yamato.

"By 1941 there was absolutely no doubt where power at sea lay. By December 1941 it was old news indeed."

It was also old news to the USN. The role of the carrier was well recognized as a result of the fleet problems run pre-war. True enough, all navies still had their 'gun club' that felt the battleship was the final arbiter. But their influence was definitely on the wane in most navies (especially the Allies).

Actually, I wonder if sinking the US battleships at Pearl Harbor was a "good thing" as the experienced corp of petty officers and trained seamen survived, as opposed to dying if sunk at sea.