"Artillery and Formations" Topic

Building on the interesting discussion on infantry formations, you could argue that Napoleon's key tactical innovation was the use of massed artillery rather than infantry to do the shooting
(not surprising given that he was a gunner himself) – and picking battlefields where better artillery mobility could be used to concentrate fire to best effect. Does artillery have the emphasis it may deserve, or are rules fixated on formations as the determinant of infantry combat?

you could argue that Napoleon's key tactical innovation was the use of massed artillery rather than infantry to do the shooting

I would lean towards disputing this because I think the Russians did it first though it is possible that he did it better (I really don't know).

Does artillery have the emphasis it may deserve

Yes and no in my opinion. The facets of artillery that make it difficult to use are poorly understood by the masses (this includes me) and are commonly ignored or oversimplified. This seems to result in artillery on the gaming table being polarized as underpowered so that it is not used like a WW2 tank platoon or overpowered so that it is used like a WW2 tank platoon.

My poorly founded impression is that if we understood better what prevented artillery from acting like modern tanks we'd be better able to increase the damage it does to a more historical level without causing a radical unbalancing between it and the other arms.

or are rules fixated on formations as the determinant of infantry combat?

Yes, and I think it is largely because they look pretty combined with a poor linkage between the scope and scale of what we are representing.

Cheers,

The Bandit

I would say it's what you think of the rules you play. I use Empire III and there it seems to be a powerful part of the equation.

Since Peter the Great Russia has emphasized a lot of artillery with the field armies.

Competent generals had massed (two batteries or more) their available artillery for years before the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. French artillery doctrine before Napoleon came to power was both to mass their artillery and to employ it in conjunction with their infantry. The only doctrinal publication on artillery employment above the battery/company level for the period was written by Jean du Teil in 1778.

Russian artillery employment during the period was defensive in nature and didn't begin to use what they had learned from facing the French artillery arm until after Tilsit in 1807.

Napoleon himself massed field pieces at Lodi in 1796, Castiglione in 1797, at Marengo in 1800, Austerlitz in 1805 and Jena in 1806 for a few examples. The French artillery command structure was also developed from the army level down to facilitate the employment and command and control of artillery in the field. Artillery generals commanded artillery formations at the army and corps level.

However, massed artillery as an offensive weapon was not Napoleon's doing, but his subordinate artillery commanders such as Senarmont and Drouot. They followed the old horse artillery dictum of General Foy's to 'get up close and shoot fast' and to maneuver their artillery into close range and destroy the portion of the enemy line chosen as the main French effort.

B

Bandit has put his finger on the issue I think- Rules need to have mechanics that reflect the difficulty of firing, moving and deploying artillery; best done by understanding the same before they are written! Without getting into it here, the rules I use consider inital ranging, effect and ammunition, rate of fire vs fatigue, and formation and morale when considering the sitation and use of artillery. It has to be sited and used judiciously to have the impact one would desire from it- this also makes terrain on the table top VERY important to model well.

Bandit, Brechtel – fascinating, and very useful too.

I agree on looking pretty! Its half the interest. I was thinking maybe good artillery rules could make formation changes, while important and visible (as we all grew up pouring over lovely oil paintings of massed squares repulsing cavalry charges etc.) less critical. Also means I can buy more of those fabulous Westfalia guns!

Archeopteryx,

I am primarily concerned with the problems of representing these things in game mechanics. I think Kevin would tell me that artillery should be far more free to move than it is in most games (he'd likely be right) and that it should be far more powerful / effective when firing (he'd likely be right). The problem is that if I take the mobility and power he suggests and apply them I get WW2 tank tactics in a Napoleonic wargame. My view is that Kevin isn't wrong but that there is more too it that I don't know about…

Cheers,

The Bandit

During the SYW, artillery was organized in a single army park and large groups of 20-50 guns in a single 'battery' could be seen on the battlefield, but they were too often stationary and too far from where the battle developed.

Gilbert and others during the 1760-1780s advocated smaller numbers of guns per army, but grouping them in large arrays, as as B says, there were any number of battles saw different nations employ large numbers of guns across the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period.

The main problem was coordinating it. Like infantry and cavalry, if the troops didn't practice large operations [multiple companies of guns] and the army had no formal procedures for doing so, it made it difficult to achieve in battle no matter how many generals wanted to. That tended to be the basic problem of the Allies.

Considering the square yards and maneuvering room required to move and position a single battery, multiplied by 2, 3, 8 or more units, it required planning and practice to accomplish effectively… or at all.

From reading about Napoleonic battles, it seems that artillery never was the apperant battle winner.

A few battles like Austerdad, the french use of artillery seemed to have given the french the advantage.

But at borodino it seems it just killed thousands of people during the enite battle.

Sure when you kill half a division of russian infantry by long range fire before they even get into close action, it will mean the divison is more brittle and so easier defeated. So in that way it did give an advantage. But borodino was just a bloodbath with out any clear winner.

Same at Waterloo the artillery fire on the British squares racked up thousands of killed and wounded, but the squares did not break.

So I say Napoleonic artillery had to be there or you would loose the battle, but it didn't normaly lead to a victory, just lots and lots of dead.

French employment of artillery at Friedland in 1807 was the de facto main attack and was the key to the French victory as it demolished the Russian center.

Lauriston's large battery at Wagram in 1809 performed not only fire support, but took up position to allow both Massena to redeploy his corps to meet a tactical emergency and to support Macdonald's main attack. That combination won the action along with Davout's taking the Austrian position on the French right flank and turning that flank.

At Lutzen in 1813 the same thing happened. The decisive action of the battle was the French artillery attack on the allied center, which again destroyed it.

The French artillery at Ligny led the main French effort and literally blew open the Prussian center.

The American artillery at New Orleans in 1815 was the biggest killer on the battlefield and was decisive in the win.

If you would like to take another look at Borodino you might discover that the French artillery dominated the battlefield and was one of the factors which pushed the Russians out of their initial positions and forced the Russian withdrawal.

The close support of the French artillery of the French infantry attacks on the allied line actually was demolishing allied infantry units formed in square because there were still enough cavalry available to keep the allied infantry formed in squares. This took place after the failure of the French cavalry attacks.

You are correct in stating that you couldn't win a battle without it, but it is also true that if artillery was used both in mass and as an offensive weapon, battles could be won with it.

B

I think artillery is one of many elements that Napoleon skilfully brought together to make his armies so effective, but I wouldn't overemphasise it. Artillery grand tactics played little role for the French at Austerlitz for example, and in his early campaigns in Italy he was quite short of artillery. How innovative he was, and how much he was building on wisdom already developed by French and Austrian generals I really wouldn't like to say.

Bandit poses a very interesting question, even if it diverts a bit from the OP. I think the problem for representing artillery on the tabletop is the compromises we make about representing time and movement. Artillery bombardments often took more than an hour, at no doubt a rather steady rate of fire. Wargames are usually predicated on something much more frenetic. A similar problem afflicts representation of skirmish tactics, which similarly burnt up time. These things can be represented (though often aren't) in grand tactical rules where the turn length is 30-60 mins. Much more difficult in tactical rules.

From reading about Napoleonic battles, it seems that artillery never was the apperant battle winner.

I disagree a bit with this. I think that the evidence you provided is inconclusive.

But at borodino it seems it just killed thousands of people during the enite battle.

But borodino was just a bloodbath with out any clear winner.

Just because artillery does not *necessarily* result in a stalemate battle being a victory doesn't mean artillery did not win any battles.

What would you say the impact of artillery was Wagram?

Cheers,

The Bandit

One aspect not yet mentioned is that large quantities of artillery were often held in reserve. This is why Russian artillery, while numerous, was not a decisive factor in many battles. At Waterloo, as well, most of Wellington's artillery was initially held in reserve.

Holding artillery in reserve was a common practice, particularly by the French. Even Senarmont at Friedland deployed only 30 of the 36 guns he had, and kept six in reserve for his cannonade.

And for the same reasons infantry and cavalry were held in reserve… only more so because of ammo.

Comments like Gunfreaks "Sure when you kill half a division of russian infantry by long range fire before they even get into close action, it will mean the divison is more brittle and so easier defeated. So in that way it did give an advantage. But borodino was just a bloodbath with out any clear winner.

Same at Waterloo the artillery fire on the British squares racked up thousands of killed and wounded, but the squares did not break." lead me to conclude that casualties as a game value is NOT the be-all/end-all in game design mechanics. So what would be?

I have proposed that it's the unit's leadership's ability to maintain control over the men= Unit Cohesion. I believe it is true that most casualties produced in a battle was from artillery. But it remains fairly obvious that "casualties" taken by themselves, are not good indicators for a unit's ability to function.

I further suggest that the effects of artillery upon the leader's ability to keep their men focused and on line, is what must be held as the value set for our games. Combat results that reflect the added difficulty in keeping men under orders when taking fore they cannot respond to had to have been difficult at best!

Look how some sets of rules allow for positive modifiers to pass a morale check (required to see if the men charge) for being behind hard cover instead of making it harder to get the men to move out into the danger zone- instead of staying safe and behind cover! "yeah, we're right behind you, Sir!" haha!

So think more about the results of fire on the functioning of the unit rather than how many casualties are being sustained this 15 minute turn…As Gunfreak has pointed out, the actual numbers mean less than the effect the casualties have on the unit's ability to remain functioning as desired. (And there should be a kind of "50 Shades of Gray" in that , too!)

Just a suggestion to further discussion….

I'm in the school that believes artillery is often under-rated in many rules sets. IMHO it was very often a battle winner or at least set up the battle to be won by the other arms or was able to wrench a draw from the jaws of defeat on many occasions.

To the list of evidence already presented to support that argument I would add:

- Marengo – it was the fire of Marmonts massed batteries near the end of the day that so staggered the Austrian Grenadiers as to set-up a situation for Kellerman's cavalry charge and the assault of the 9th Legere to turn the tide and win the day

- Auerstadt – the performance of Davouts III Corps artillery was quite extraordinary and out of all proportion to their numbers. Not only did their fire repeatedly bolster and protect the infantry and shoot down the many Prussian assaults but their fire support maintained morale long enough for the III Corps to outlast the Prussians. The Prussian rank & file didn't lack for courage but were poorly served indeed by their guns

- Eylau – does anyone believe the Russians would've lasted as long as they did and achieve a draw without the devastation their artillery caused?

- Aspern-Essling – the massed Austrian batteries under Colonel Smola were able to contain the French breakout from the bridgehead and decimate the French cavalry who possibly otherwise would've overwhelmed the Austrian center. Their fire alone perhaps didn't win this battle of attrition but they bought time for both the Austrian infantry to build up the pressure and to convince Napoleon he had to try another day.

One of the key reasons I like LFS III as a rules set is because, of the simpler sets around today, its treatment of artillery restores a balance with the infantry and mounted arms

My 2 cents.

Nick

Nick,

Do you feel that is also true of previous versions of LFS? Also, care to share a general description of how they achieved that in your opinion?

Cheers,

The Bandit

For my 2 cents, Artillery firepower and mobility is underrated in wargames rules, often quite deliberately so.

Lets not forget that at Borodino the Russian Horse Artillery reserve was never employed as its commander became a casualty early on – this would have made quite a difference! At Waterloo the British were protected to some extend by a reverse slope – even then they appreciated the French Cavalry Charges as a bit of light relief from the hard pounding of the guns!

Take Black Powder, the ruleset I am most familiar with…In order to meet their design criteria of being able to play a big game in an evening with sufficient time left for an ale and a curry, the designers have deliberately under powered artillery firepower (although they've made it pretty nimble). Canister is give a third the range of musketry, and long range artillery less than 3 times the range of musketry! Well and good for what they have achieved, and of course they invite you to tinker with these ranges, which my group has – For a 6 Pounder we have equated canister/grape to musketry range, doubled it for effective range, and quadrupled it for long range.

But this still a poor representation of range – 4 times effective musketry range is still only about 400 yards! However we have found that it tends to give a good representation, holistically, of the effect of artillery in the battles we recreate. We also tinkered with 'Grand Battery' bonuses, to reflect the additional, logarthymic effect of massed batteries. I believe that only Empire rules reflected this effect…

But to my mind the biggest effect of artillery that is undervalued in most rulesets is its affect on friendly morale. I'm sure having your assault 'fired in' by a battery of 12 Pounders on either flank ought to give at least a 'plus 1' to any attacking units morale!

BTW, as well as the estimable Kevin Kiley's work, if you can get hold of it, the late, great Paddy Griffith's Altmark publication 'French Artillery' has a great treatise on Senarmont's Artillery charge at Friedland…

Sparker,

Artillery firepower and mobility is underrated in wargames rules, often quite deliberately so.

I think that is true & common.

Can you elaborate on how this:

the designers have deliberately under powered artillery firepower (although they've made it pretty nimble).

through this method:

Canister is give a third the range of musketry, and long range artillery less than 3 times the range of musketry!

achieved this:

In order to meet their design criteria of being able to play a big game in an evening with sufficient time left for an ale and a curry,

Note: I'm not giving you a hard time about Black Powder, while I've played it I am not familiar with with design goals so I don't know how A is represented by B and leads to C.

BTW, as well as the estimable Kevin Kiley's work, if you can get hold of it, the late, great Paddy Griffith's Altmark publication 'French Artillery' has a great treatise on Senarmont's Artillery charge at Friedland…

Just got Kevin's book recently actually, I'll have to keep an eye out for Paddy's – thanks for the tip.

Cheers,

The Bandit

The Artillery cannonade at Friedland and Lutzen certainly damaged the Russian/Allied center--severely, but it wasn't 'destroyed'. That required a subsequent attack of cavalry and infantry to actually complete its 'destruction.'

As to the power of artillery. All the many ordinance tests of the period show a fairly consistant comparison between artillery and infantry fire. Clauswitz also notes this comparison in his On War.

The fire from one six pounder would put as many balls through a target at 400+ yards as a 200-250 men could put into a target at 100 yards. Meaning: A a six to eight gun battery could throw as much fire power as 2.5 to 3 battalions four times as far within the frontage of a single battalion.

And that is not counting solid shot at longer ranges. Most all rules give a artillery battery the fire power of a single battalion…or 100 to 125 men per gun.

There are a lot of reasons that artillery were not utilized well or to their full potential. However, there is no reason to believe that the firepower ratio between infantry and artillery in the near-ideal conditions of an ordinance test would not hold true in the far from perfect conditions of the battlefield.

McLaddie,

What you are saying seems to chime with my understanding. That an effective "combined arms" approach in the Napoleonic era would have guns doing the shooting (and causing most casualties before melee), allowing skirmishers to clear the way for the infantry to provide shock effect with volley and bayonet, and the cavalry reserve to deliver the coup de grace and conduct the persuit

Which are the best rules for representing this (rarely achieved) panacea? I know RtE deals with reduced artillery firepower by simply having a different figure scale (1:2 for artillery, 1:20 for infantry and cavalry) – so while weak you have relatively more of it. But if we want the real flavour of Napoleonic warfare, then surely most pre-melee casualties need to be from artillery. And while I understand die4minis point about cohesion, if not decisive, artillery can surely weaken units so that they are put at a disadvantage against stronger units when bayonets are fixed?

I am disagreeing that the artillery and skirmishers would doing the shooting – good infantry fire was important as well, as for example at Austerlitz – or how the Wellington beat constantly the French, it is more than just pure skirmishing, which according to contemporaries did not achieve anything but was only a supporting tactical tool – as was artillery as well.
There is always the dilema of theory versus reality, in theory also the musket had a devastating effect – and a battle should have ended after 5 vollies, the same for artillery, still massed batterie needed to be supported or they could be overran by cavalry or infantry as well.

The Artillery cannonade at Friedland and Lutzen certainly damaged the Russian/Allied center--severely, but it wasn't 'destroyed'. That required a subsequent attack of cavalry and infantry to actually complete its 'destruction.'

The evidence suggests/proves otherwise. The infantry had their way cleared by the artillery at both battles into the enemy center, which was destroyed and their casualties were very heavy from the concentrated, close range artillery fire.

The decisive action of both battles were the artillery attacks by Senarmont and Drouot. The Russian center at Friedland was ‘gutted' and the allied center at Lutzen was wrecked. In both instances, primary sources maintain that whole regiments were virtually wiped out by the close-range artillery fire. The only logical conclusion that can be stated is that the respective centers of the enemy armies were destroyed.

Friedland Sources:

‘The position of the enemy showed 4,000 dead on this spot alone. I lost the chief of my staff, Colonel Forno, killed by a ball at the end of the action. I have had three officers and sixty-two gunners hors de combat and a charming horse wounded under me, I fear I shall not be able to save him.-Senarmont in a letter to his brother on 26 June 1807 after having inspected the center of the Russian line, the target of his attack.

From Friedland by AF Becke:

‘Senarmont unfailingly selected the correct target to engage. At first he employed his 30 guns in counterbattery work, and concentrated them in turn on the dispersed Russian batteries he silenced their batteries by a heavy converging fire from his superior number of guns. Then limbering up he went into deadly range and blew away the Russian infantry with his case shot.'-41

‘Senarmont's achievement with his 30 guns made clear to the military world that a new era had dawned for the artillery arm and from that time onward field artillery tactics became a subject for serious study.'-42

‘The case shot attack at Friedland was a glorious triumph for the French artillery and once more they were the pioneers in artillery tactics, and Napoleon was quick to see how much was involved in this particular development. Henceforward the case shot attack became a recognized feature of the Napoleonic; and when the action was ripe for the decisive stroke, the foe had staked his last reserve and his powers of endurance were slackening, then the batteries of the Guard Artillery would dash to the front, just as Senarmont had done at Friedland, and unlimbering within case shot range they proceeded to tear a breech in the opposing battle line which the Guard, horse and foot, would storm at the ciritical moment.'-42

‘Senarmont does not deserve praise simply because he massed 30 guns, but because he seized the right moment to do so and then concentrated their fire on the right target. In his able and eager hand the artillery succeeded where the infantry had failed; closing up to the Russian infantry he placed an overwhelming barrage on the selected spot until all resistance had been broken down and the French infantry were once more ready to attack, then the guns ceased firing and the infantry immediately delivered their assault. Senarmont following up with his guns to bring aid to them should they once more meet with opposition they could not overcome single-handed.'-43

‘Never before Friedland had the massed batteries of a corps maneuvered offensively to open a way, by their fire, through the opposing army. On June 14 1807, the artillery arm at last had taken its proper place in battle; at last it had become a separate arm…'-43

From The Czar's General: The Memoirs of a Russian General in the Napoleonic Wars by Alexey Yermelov, edited by Alexander Mikaberidze:

‘Around 6:00 pm Napoleon arrived and the entire French army too. With a forest concealing their movements, masses of French gathered against our left; a battery of 40 guns was deployed (53) on the edge of the forest and a fierce cannonade began. (54) Because of the range, the artillery fire was direct and our rearguard's cavalry greatly suffered from it.(55) The rearguard was soon retreating as well. The army began withdrawing to the bridges. The only way to reach the main bridge was through the city itself. Chaos reigned in the narrow streets and this was further increased by the enemy artillery. Based on the direction of the enemy columns, it was obvious that they intended to cut us off at the crossing; to delay them, the Life Guard Izmailovsk and Pavlovsk Grenadier regiments made an attack, but that same ghastly battery halted their gallant assault and the regiments turned back.'-98, 100

Footnote 53: ‘According to Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, ‘The Russian gunners were surprised by the sudden appearance of the French 36-gun battery' and failed to react in time.'

Footnote 54: ‘General Alexander Antoine Senarmont, chief of artillery of Victor's corps, recalled, ‘The Russian batteries, deployed on the opposite side of the Alle, fired on our flanks; some of them were at very close range, including one battery, on the hill near the river turn, which decimated our ranks.'

Footnote 55: ‘During the battle, General Senarmont organized two companies of 15 guns, which six pieces in reserve, and placed them on both flanks of General Dupont's division. As the French advanced, Senarmont outpaced the infantry and opened fire at Bagration's troops from close range. His guns initially fired at 600 paces, then moved as close as 300 paces. The Russians tried to capture the French battery, but the French virtually wiped out entire regiments; the third battalion of the Life Guard Ismailovsk Regiment alone lost some 400 men out of 520.'

From A Miltiary History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars by Vincent J. Esposito and John R. Elting:

‘Senarmont, Victor's chief of artillery, already had moved forward with twelve guns to support Dupont. Judging these insufficient, he secured Victor's permission to take the I Corps' remaining twenty-four guns. Leaving six of these in reserve, he formed the remaining thirty into two fifteen-gun batteries, one on each flank of Dupont's division, and accompanied its advance. Approximately 150 yards from Bagration's front, the narrowing terrain compelled him to combine the two batteries. At 120 yards, he halted. Ignoring the heavy Russian artillery fire, Senarmont blated Bagration's infantry with canister for twenty-five minutes, knocking over 4,000 of them and sending the rests streaming back into Friedland's choked streets.'

‘In this bloody respite, Ney-fairly frothing at the mouth in his fury-damned and led his corps in a howling assault. Dupont had followed Senarmont…Bennigsen desperately committed his last reserve, putting in the infantry of the Russian Imperial Guard against Dupont, and ordering the Guard cavalry against Senarmont's flank. Senarmont swiftly changed front, blowing the Czar's picked cavalrymen off the battlefield with two quick volleys. Simultaneously, Dupont met, and broke, the Russian Guard infantry with the bayonet, seizing the temporary bridges across the Muhlen Fluss. Crossing to its north bank, he surged down the Konigsberg road into Friedland, supported by the guns of Senarmont's reserve. Senarmont pushed closer to the village, raking its streets and bridges, both of which were jammed with retreating Russians. Other French artillerymen, meanwhile, had concentrated howitzers south of Friedland, supporting the infantry attacks with high-angle fire into the Russian masses…-Map 81

‘…Senarmont had introduced a new school of artillery tactics. Competent generals had massed their artillery for years; Senarmont had used these massed guns to seize the initiative, pushing them aggressively forward in advance of the French infantry to dominate the decisive point on the battlefield with their firepower.'-Map 82

From Swords Around A Throne by John Elting:

‘It was in 1807 at Friedland that General of Brigade Alexandre de Senarmont, Chief of Artillery of Victor's I Corps, introduced a new artillery tactic combining massed fire power and maneuver. Competent generals had massed guns into large stationary batteries for close to a century, but here Senarmont pushed thirty guns forward to within 120 yards of the Russian infantry and, ignoring heavy Russian fire, smashed at them with canister for twenty-five minutes, killing and wounding some four thousand and gutting the Russian center. Possibly the mnost spectacular example of this maneuver was Drouot's advance with seventy guns at Lutzen in 1813.-262

Further primary source information on Senarmont's artillery attack and the damage he caused the Russian center, the I Corps after-action report is printed in La Sabretache (if anyone is interested, I'll be happy to look up the volume and page number) and Senarmont's after-action report (and the two are not the same document) can be found in Grands Artilleurs by Maurice Girod de l'Ain.

Lutzen:

This account of the action of Drouot's artillery attack followed by an infantry attack by the Guard clearly describes the damage to the allied center from close-range artillery fire of a large battery of about 80 guns:

‘The Emperor ordered four Imperial aides [general officers] to accompany the troops of the Guard selected for the attack. I accompanied General Berthezene at the head of the Fusiliers of the Guard. This brave general and his fine troops had earlier attacked and routed the enemy from their positions around Kaja; the men comprising the Fusiliers were all veteran soldiers, and their discipline and elan were no match for out adversaries: the Fusiliers were supremely confidant of victory.'

‘The signal to advance being given, our brigade moved out, and eventually passed by the left flank of the grand battery. The discharges of these pieces were deafening, and the smoke covered the field, obscuring our view. Our battalions were formed in attack columns of two pelotons width and rapidly traversed the ground already devastated by the day's fighting. We passed over the wreckage of entire regiments which had been cut down by our guns. At times, the enemy dead and wounded were so thick that our men's feet did not touch the ground. My horse hesitated often as it looked for firm footing.'

‘The enemy could not withstand our advance. They fired a few, sporadic volleys, broke ranks, and fled before our bayonets. His Majesty can be pleased with the soldiers of the Guard who carried this attack into the heart of the enemy line.'-General Flahaut

This description of the carnage in the allied center certainly describes a position that had been destroyed, describing ‘the wreckage of entire regiments.'

B

'There is always the dilema of theory versus reality, in theory also the musket had a devastating effect – and a battle should have ended after 5 vollies, the same for artillery, still massed batterie needed to be supported or they could be overran by cavalry or infantry as well.'

'a battle should have ended after 5 vollies…'

Really.

Seems like an oversimplification of the issue.

Regarding artillery and being overrun, Senarmont defended himself very well at Friedland, defeated a Russian cavalry counterattack with artillery fire.

Drouot at Lutzen being attacked by allied cavalry caused heavy losses to the attacking force, but the survivors did reach the French gun line, which the French Guard artillerymen defended their gun position and Drouot himself being wounded. French Guard cavalry, the Grenadiers a Chevl, did come to the rescue and ejected the allied cavalry from the gun position.

B

The evidence suggests/proves otherwise. The infantry had their way cleared by the artillery at both battles into the enemy center, which was destroyed and their casualties were very heavy from the concentrated, close range artillery fire.

The decisive action of both battles were the artillery attacks by Senarmont and Drouot. The Russian center at Friedland was ‘gutted' and the allied center at Lutzen was wrecked. In both instances, primary sources maintain that whole regiments were virtually wiped out by the close-range artillery fire. The only logical conclusion that can be stated is that the respective centers of the enemy armies were destroyed.

Okay, if the center of the Russian line was "virtually wiped out", then who did Dupont meet that met stiff resistance from in his subsequent attack on the center of the line, on his drive to the city…? Oh, right: "Simultaneously, Dupont met, and broke, the Russian Guard infantry with the bayonet, seizing the temporary bridges across the Muhlen Fluss." This being the same Russian Guard suffering under Senarmont's guns, or a different Russian Guard?

No doubt there were entire regiments of Russians wrecked under the cannonade, and Senarmont later says he counted, what 4,000 or more dead before his guns. [the equivilent of four regiments?] No doubt that that the damage, in material, men and morale was very great. No question about it. That it led directly to the final victory. No question there either.

I just think that people can get carried away with descriptions [both then and now] of the carnage, using such imprecise but colorful words as 'gutted' and 'devestated' to describe the results, forgetting the fact that it required French infantry and cavalry to finish the job of 'virtually wiping out' the Russian center at Friedland and the Allied lines at Lutzen.

I have always wondered why Victor received far more recognition from Napoleon for the engagement than Senarmont, even though the artillery attacks were done with Napoleon's permission and the subsequent action observed by him.

Simple

You might want to take a look at the positions of the Russians and where Bagration's command was in relation to the Russian reserve, which was employed to counterattack Senarmont and Dupont.

These units were not part of Bagration's command, which held the center and left of the Russian position.

And I believe that Senarmont was later promoted to General of Division for his performance.

Perhaps you should actually investigate the action(s) as the material is readily available and the sources provided in the posting should help you.

And you are incorrect in assuming that infantry and cavalry had to 'finish the job' at both battles. Senarmont, as shown, wrecked the Russian center and the remaining troops were routed because of the artillery pounding they took. And for Lutzen, according to Flahaut, all that remained of the allied center as the infantry marched through it was dead and mangled bodies, so think on the ground that the troops had to march on them to get through the mess.

You've been given the information. If you choose to accept it, then that's your prerogative. If you don't agree, however, instead of making comments on verbiage and semantics, you might want to back up your supposition with factual material, which you have not done.

B

I am disagreeing that the artillery and skirmishers would doing the shooting – good infantry fire was important as well, as for example at Austerlitz – or how the Wellington beat constantly the French, it is more than just pure skirmishing, which according to contemporaries did not achieve anything but was only a supporting tactical tool – as was artillery as well.

VW:
You've picked two examples where there wasn't much artillery to begin with. And Wellington's reverse-slope tactic certainly had as one rationale the great advantage in artillery held by the French.

There is always the dilema of theory versus reality, in theory also the musket had a devastating effect – and a battle should have ended after 5 vollies, the same for artillery, still massed batterie needed to be supported or they could be overran by cavalry or infantry as well.

Certainly artillery couldn't win by itself, as you point out. It isn't that artillery fire in practice didn't have the effect it could in theory or compared to ordinance tests. It has to do with the basic comparison between infantry fire and artillery fire, a ratio of effect very consistent in ordinance tests, that would hold, no matter how real battlefield conditions degraded the power of each arm.

There is also every reason to believe that the performance of an artillery crew was more consistent than that of infantrymen volleying. That is not to say that musket fire, both skirmishing and volley, weren't effective, but at far shorter ranges than artillery. And certainly artillery didn't win battles because it couldn't take and hold ground like infantry and cavalry could.

Artillery had it's strength and weaknesses. The question is what they were and how to represent them. Back in 1985 when my Wagram boardgame "Napoleon's Last Triumph" was published by Simulations Canada, I gave artillery the firepower I mentioned. Two things: No one said that artillery was too dominate and players tended to use artillery in a more historic role because of it.

is it possible that terrain effects such as undulations, small hills and dips, etc that are present on the battlefield are not represented well in tabletop games? This might cause real world examples of artillery to differ in performance than when simulating them on the game board.

'Certainly artillery couldn't win by itself, as you point out.'

That is at the very least, debatable. Senarmont's attack at Friedland was the de facto main French attack of the day, as the planned one by Ney's corps was initially defeated. Senarmont proved that artillery was a maneuver unit. At Friedland Senarmont's artillery was the decisive arm on the field.

'And certainly artillery didn't win battles because it couldn't take and hold ground like infantry and cavalry could.'

It seems to me that Senarmont certainly did that at Friedland-advancing under fire over disputed ground, establishing itself on ground of Senarmont's choosing 120 yards from the Russian center, and then defeating with artillery fire a Russian cavalry counterattack.

Then Senarmont advanced again to fire on the Russians in Friedland.

That certainly sounds like taking and holding ground on the field.

B

"What would you say the impact of artillery was Wagram?"

Can't say. Have not read about Wagram in detail, only short summaries.

The only battles I've read in real details are, Austerdad, Eylau, Borodino, Leipzig, Salamanca and Waterloo. So those are the only ones I can talk about with some confidence.

Again Eylau is another battle, sevral 40+ gun batteries killing a few gazilion on both sides, yet the battle was a stale mate.

I'm not saying artillery could not win a battle, again I'm sure Davout would have lots Austerdad with out great use of artillery.

I'm just saying thats not the rule. It was on special ocations, I still say most of the time, artillery was primaraly the main reason for extreme castualties and not victories.

Also when we are talking about wargames, remember many play divisional games mabye a corps pr side. This limits artillery.

Naturaly if you got 2 diviisons pr side fighting, that would be 20 000+ infantry, pluss yet only 16-40 guns pr side.

Naturaly these battles/games are mostly musktery duels.

Thats the way it was in real life, when you read about campaigns, between each major battle, there were often sevral "actions" and these actions are often the size of a wargame, and there you often had only 1 or two batteries pr side.

So I would say atleast in divisonal style games, artillery is not underpowerd, simply not numerus enough to have the same effect as on a full battle.

Again Eylau is another battle, sevral 40+ gun batteries killing a few gazilion on both sides, yet the battle was a stale mate.

Right, but had the entire French VII Corps not broken up in front of those two Russian grand batteries – the Russians probably never would have recovered, all the units they jockeyed to hold Davout's flank attack back until the Prussians arrived wouldn't have been available. Thus artillery potentially moved the battle from a Russian loss to a stalemate…

Cheers,

The Bandit

In the past Semarmont attack has been discussed to length. We had members then that are Russian and sourced Russian records.

Sparker, these same Russian stated that the Russian used all of the artillery reserve at Bordino and sighted Russian records.

Bandit, I never said it wasn't imporant, but you know perfetly well there is a HUGE diffrence between winning and not loosing.

It's always eaier to do defence then offence.

So your points about both Borodino and Eylau, do not change the fact, that most of the time, artillery was not a battle winner. it's much easier to make a huge battery for defence, then one for offence, much easier to stop an attack with massed artillery then couase a rout.

Yes, canister when given a chance to fire at formed bodies of men standing still (more often than not provided by Russian generals) was devastating. But they weren't machine guns. Mass batteries blasting away major formations doesn't happen all that often. At longer ranges, using shot and shell, the effects were much less, though given time (an hour or two, or perhaps more) casualties could accumulate.

There are two ways that this devastating power of canister could be countered: skirmishers and (depending on the lie of the land) closing the ground quickly enough so that the artillery could only get in one or hastily-aimed shots (canister needed to be aimed – though it doesn't look that way on a typical tabletop).

Neither tactic was particularly effective against grand batteries, but these are slow to put together, and you could often get your troops out of their firing line in time. I get the impression that at Leipzig all the respective sides' big batteries could see was each other, most of the time… though this is not a battle I know in detail.

If rules reproduce this dynamic, they are starting to get to grips with how battles really worked in this era.

There are some technical problems though. The use of skirmishers to neutralise artillery takes time and tactical skill, the former of which is typically in short supply for an evening game on the tabletop. By the same token long range bombardments often take too long. And if you are trying to replicate longer timescales, you have to factor in fatigue, ammunition loss and fouling of weapons.

but you know perfetly well there is a HUGE diffrence between winning and not loosing.

As I understood your contention is was that artillery didn't decide a battle. In a purist sense I suppose that is true of everything right? Nothing works in a vacuum, that said, I think that changing a battle from a loss to a stalemate does decide the battle, it shifts the outcome from one to another.

Friedland is a neat battle because it is just full of unique things all clustered together. Lannes isn't overwhelmed because of the management and mismanagement of the skirmishing to the southwest. That allows Napoleon to consolidate the army. The French infantry attack under Ney stalls, then an offensive artillery action by the French cripples the Russian center and they begin to cave in.

much easier to stop an attack with massed artillery then couase a rout.

No argument but I don't believe that results in your conclusion. I'd encourage you to dig into Friedland, it is an amazing example of offensive artillery used aggressively against an all-arm opposition.

My great question about Napoleonic artillery is, when you do the math on its supposed mobility and firepower it seems weird that it wasn't used 100% of the time as the primary force (offensive or defensive). I am curious as to the 'why' behind that.

Napoleon thought that given enough ammunition he could have changed the first day of Leipzig and won the battle. I don't know how that would have impacted the larger picture but based on the success his guns had on the first day it doesn't seem like lunacy that it would have changed events (if not reversed the battle's outcome).

You said you are familiar with Leipzig – opinion?

Cheers,

The Bandit

Here is a good thread

TMP link

I think the Bandit nailed it. The dilemma in wargame design is always, that if you give a weapon/unit its full theoretical potential, which was ususally – if ever – only fulfilled in very few situations, it will be used to that potential every time. I have seen many games/rules where guns had their theoretical optimal killing power and movement capacity – you then just rack them in a line and advance them while firing, end of game. Senarmont was great, but we do not want to see that every time – so the rules have to make it hard to use a given weapon to its full potential – that is the challenge of design.

What some people forget without support artillery was very vulnerable, Senarmont was support by two battalions of infantry.

Drouot at Hanau had 50 guns, but without a cavalry charge of Nansouty those would have been ran over by Bavarian infantry and cavalry.

In case wargame rules give a battery of 50 guns such an advantage that they cannot be captured if they are not supported – then they are wrong.

In case artillery was so powerfull, why wasn't Drouot able, despite all canister and theoretical mathematics to stop the Bavarians on his own??

What some people forget without support artillery was very vulnerable…

Drouot at Hanau had 50 guns, but without a cavalry charge of Nansouty those would have been ran over by Bavarian infantry and cavalry.

Strong point.

Senarmont was support by two battalions of infantry.

So in the case of Senarmont @ Friedland – what did those two battalions do? I ask because to the best of my knowledge, the guns stopped the Russian Guards & Grenadiers and turned back the Life Guard cavalry that attacked him. I'm not aware of the two battalions "supporting him" doing anything. Not saying you're wrong, saying from the accounts I have read, I am unaware of the role they played.

In case wargame rules give a battery of 50 guns such an advantage that they cannot be captured if they are not supported – then they are wrong.

Indeed. That is kinda the problem.

Cheers,

The Bandit

We have to accept that we lose quite a bit due to lack of scale. In a large battle we could commit our artillery, but at that point in time we may not use it elsewhere. Moreover, we may not easily use it again.

The relative ranges count, but only if we take into account the relative ubiquity of infantry fire vs artillery fire. A battery can smash a target more thoroughly than an infantry battery, but struggles to hold ground. So we have infantry all over the place (cheaper and better able to hold ground).

Imagine giving a twist to our wargames. Artillery gets the opportunity to move quickly and fire devastatingly, but there is a likelihood it won't be available again. What would the effect be? Trying to concentrate artillery at the right time and place, keeping a reserve…might be more historic behaviour? But wouldn't fit with the game aspect and would clash with those who want us to prove our mechanisms simulate the micro as well as the macro.

That certainly sounds like taking and holding ground on the field.

It would if the Russian center had advanced and then lost that ground to the artillery occupying it or the Artillery had taken ground that the Russians had held. The artillery certainly got close to the Russian line.

Basically the only thing they 'took' was fire and a cavalry charge. Dupont's division is what took the ground from all the descriptions I have read.

Senarmont's artillery apparently fired around 2,500 rounds at Friedland, of which around 350 were canister. Based on all the hype, I would have thought that the majority of rounds fired would have been canister. Either the records of ammunition consumption are wrong, or the reports and secondary sources are exagerated.

This description of the carnage in the allied center certainly describes a position that had been destroyed, describing ‘the wreckage of entire regiments.'

I've read all those and don't doubt the descriptions of carnage. I also don't doubt the rest of the descriptions. There were still enemy ranks standing, certainly demoralized, defending the Russian Position in the center. There is no suggest that the artillery took the ground and the Russians were still defending it. It required the French infantry to make the center to break ranks and flee.

In this bloody respite, [interesting description of a decisive attack] Ney-fairly frothing at the mouth in his fury-damned and led his corps in a howling assault. Dupont had followed Senarmont…Bennigsen desperately committed his last reserve, putting in the infantry of the Russian Imperial Guard against Dupont, and ordering the Guard cavalry against Senarmont's flank. Senarmont swiftly changed front, blowing the Czar's picked cavalrymen off the battlefield with two quick volleys.

‘The enemy could not withstand our advance. They fired a few, sporadic volleys, broke ranks, and fled before our bayonets. His Majesty can be pleased with the soldiers of the Guard who carried this attack into the heart of the enemy line.'-General Flahaut

It is still a question of what the artillery did and didn't do. Senarmont's artillery didn't chase the Russian infantry and cavalry into Friedland. It did give significant support to the French infantry and cavalry that did. The fact remains that there was still a Russian center present when Dupont attacked…so wasn't completely destroyed, virtually wiped out etc. etc. And there have been many situations where the enemy has run after sporatic volleys, so

It isn't an issue unless you are interested in what the artillery did and didn't do in relationship to the infantry and cavalry in defeating the enemy, driving them away, taking ground, routing them etc. etc.

It's the old saw:
They were destroyed.
How destroyed were they?
They were sooo destroyed, they couldn't find two gaiters between them. Bada-boom

"Bennigsen desperately committed his last reserve, putting in the infantry of the Russian Imperial Guard against Dupont, and ordering the Guard cavalry against Senarmont's flank. Senarmont swiftly changed front, blowing the Czar's picked cavalrymen off the battlefield with two quick volleys."

Bandit- at what range did Senarmont first spot the approaching Russian cav and how great of an adjustment did he have to make on the ground to do this?

Any idea on a set of war game rules where this might possibly take place? I cannot think of any at all.

Though gamers often use them interchangeably, there is a difference between "massed" guns and a "grand battery." Massing guns began in the early 18th Century, but other than being part of the gun line the individual batteries were not centrally controlled by a single officer.

A grand battery consists of a number of individual batteries amalgamated into a distinct unit under the command and control of a senior artillery officer (in France a general) who dictates its location, directs its fire, determines its movement and sees to its supply.

It cannot be emphasized how few of these were formed. Senarmont formed Grand Batteries at Friedland and Ocano. When Napoleon saw Senarmont advancing his only comment was, he's going to lose his guns.

After 1809 Napoleon increased the number of guard artillery batteries and placed them under one or two generals, foot and horse. So from 1812 on it is possible for games for the Guard to form "Grand Batteries" under the command of Guard artillery generals.

As for the Allies, historically the gamer is out-of-luck. The Russians campaigned with a lot of guns but using them is another matter. Before Borodino Kutaisov had studied and theoretically understood Senarmont, he was even a general, then he led an infantry charge and got killed. After, save perhaps for Bennigson's army at Leipzig, the artillery was tied to the infantry and cavalry.

The Prussian and Austrian artillery officers as the British were colonels or less and did not have the authority to take guns from the infantry or cavalry and mostly to the same extent did Austria have the same problem.

After 1809 Napoleon increased the number of Guard Artillery batteries which thereafter were often committed under the command of the Guard Artillery General, often Drouot. It was used at Lutzen, Leipzig and a number of 1814 battles where the Guard was present. In 1815, it was used at Ligny but curiously the massed batteries on the French left under the command of St. Maurice did not contain the Guard artilley.

To represent this in a game generals capable of commanding artillery grand batteries need be identified before the game starts. Batteries need be commanded by divisional commanders and if beyond command may not move. If taken from infantry, batteries must remain in the command of the army artillery general. Divisions from which supporting foot artillery is removed loses one morale grade for all infantry.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

Bob Coggins

'It is still a question of what the artillery did and didn't do. Senarmont's artillery didn't chase the Russian infantry and cavalry into Friedland. It did give significant support to the French infantry and cavalry that did. The fact remains that there was still a Russian center present when Dupont attacked…so wasn't completely destroyed, virtually wiped out etc. etc.'

If you're going to comment on the situations, I would recommend at least reading the supporting material that is posted and then look into the sources referenced. You haven't offered any sources for your views; you've merely made conjectures for which you have no historical basis.

'Senarmont pushed closer to the village, raking its streets and bridges, both of which were jammed with retreating Russians.'

This is from the material offered earlier. It clearly demonstrates that Senarmont did not stop after destroying the Russian center, but took the ground and moved forward. Bagration's command was crushed, and that portion that faced Senarmont was destroyed. That is quite clear from the material posted.

If you don't agree, then offer sourced rebuttal instead of merely posting opinion because you disagree.

B

Brechtel198,

Thanks for the post and the suggestion. I am aware of what Senarmont did and did not do at Friedland, but my post wasn't about Friedland so I didn't go into details on that battle. I was about the difference between massed batteries and Grand Batteries and how wargame rules should deal with them.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

Bob,

I believe Kevin was replying to Bill.

forwardmarchstudios,

at what range did Senarmont first spot the approaching Russian cav and how great of an adjustment did he have to make on the ground to do this?

According to James Arnold (Napoleon's Triumph):

• Senarmont began the combat at 400-500 yards (approximately 1/4 mile), fired two salvos.
• Advanced 200 yards (to between 200-300 yards from target) and fired 20 salvos.
• Advanced 20 within 120 yards.
• The Russian infantry (Life Guards & Grenadiers) advanced against the guns and were unable to close to contact.
• Russian cavalry (I *think* it was the Life Guard dragoons but someone can correct me) charged Senarmont's guns.
• Two salvos of canister repelled the Russian cavalry.
• Lahoussaye's cavalry division (dragoons) then attacked the Russian cavalry and drove them into Friedland through the Russian infantry.

So according to Arnold's telling of events (which is based on Senarmont's letter to his brother 12 days later as well as other sources including Derode) Senarmont doesn't adjust his facing, or at least it is not dealt with. As best as I can tell from that account, Senarmont would see the Russian cavalry at something like 100-150 yards distance since they were originally formed behind the infantry.

Any idea on a set of war game rules where this might possibly take place? I cannot think of any at all.

Not sure what you're asking here, are you able to elaborate or rephrase?

Major Snort,

No idea regarding the ammo, Arnold's description (which is all I've easily at hand but does quote Senarmont for what that is worth) is only of canister being fired on the Russian infantry & artillery though he does note Senarmont's guns performed some counter-battery fire and a specific munition was not denoted.

Kevin,

It clearly demonstrates that Senarmont did not stop after destroying the Russian center, but took the ground and moved forward. Bagration's command was crushed, and that portion that faced Senarmont was destroyed.

Arnold is not a primary source by any stretch and I am not taking the time to research what sources he used. Nor do I mean to represent Bill's position since you directed this to him. But I read Bill's point to be that "destroyed" is descriptive not quantitative and Arnold notes Lahoussaye's cavalry and some of Villate's infantry moving forward specifically saying that Lahoussaye's cavalry pushed elements of the Russians Senarmont had been fighting into the town of Friedland – at that point Senarmont starts firing into the town.

My point is, you're reading primary sources and Arnold is reading primary sources: He seems to conclude that 'destroyed' meant 'combat ineffective but still present,' you seem to conclude that 'destroyed' meant no longer present. My question to you is if your conclusion is correct, who did Lahoussaye's cavalry contact or do you believe Arnold to be in error that Lahoussaye's cavalry struck the elements of the Russians Senarmont had been shooting?

LORDGHEE,

Thanks for the link, I remember that thread happening but that's about it – time to re-read!

Cheers,

The Bandit

Bandit-

Thanks for the breakdown!

I meant a ruleset where the described events could actually occur in the context of a game. I like for anything that did occur to at least be possible in a game- a lot to ask for any rules writer and probably impossible to achieve, but it gives me something to puzzle over.

My question about the distance of the cavalry when the engagement started had to do with the relative speed of the repositioning of the guns compared to the deploying/charging guard cav.

If you're going to comment on the situations, I would recommend at least reading the supporting material that is posted and then look into the sources referenced. You haven't offered any sources for your views; you've merely made conjectures for which you have no historical basis.

Kevin:
I have read them. I stated as much. I pulled sections of your quotes/sources to point out my observations. That is clear enough.

'Senarmont pushed closer to the village, raking its streets and bridges, both of which were jammed with retreating Russians.'

This is from the material offered earlier. It clearly demonstrates that Senarmont did not stop after destroying the Russian center, but took the ground and moved forward. Bagration's command was crushed, and that portion that faced Senarmont was destroyed. That is quite clear from the material posted.

Another example of you not reading what I am saying. I never said anything about Senarmont 'stopping' anywhere. And if he 'destroyed' the Russian center, who did the French attack afterwards, driving them into the streets of Friedland?

Again, Senarmont did great damage, but it was infantry and cavalry that completed any destruction. Drouot did great damage, but it was infantry and artillery that made the Allied infantry break and rout. The same for the Russians.

If you don't agree, then offer sourced rebuttal instead of merely posting opinion because you disagree.

Why, when your own sources and quotes above provide more than enough to make my point?…which I repeated for you, something you seem to be ignoring.

The clear picture is that Senarmont and Drouot aggressively moved artillery closer several times to enemy lines, executing severe damage on the enemy, and then French infantry and cavalry drove the enemy away and took the ground. Senarmont didn't stop, but fired on the town, while losing half his artillery crews.

You seem to feel the evidence has the artillery completely destroys the enemy, takes the ground they were defending while the Infantry and cavalry stand around watching.