"When, if ever did AWI militia obtain bayonets?" Topic

I'm new to AWI and trying to bring myself up to speed. Was wondering when, if/when AWI militia were equipped with bayonets. Were they scarce throughout the war? Did certain units have them, but most not? None early war, everyone late war? Sorry, know it might be kind of hard to answer, thanks for any help!

New England militia had a fair sprinkling of FIW veterans. My guess is that many had bayonets and knew how to use them.

Later in the war, a lot of militia who were discharged or time served Continentals. Did they have bayonets? Probably.

Some militia were quite well trained (Pennsylvania Associators) and wore uniforms and drilled. Almost certainly.

The tricky part is determining how many. But then, that is your question, isn't it?

In John Galvin's book: "The Minutemen" he lists weapons and accoutrements on hand for the Mass militia. IIRC, there were bayonets for about 25%.

My guess is that they obtained them soon after they realized they needed them.

For about 99% of the time, a bayonet is a useless contraption that gets in the way of the musket drill and only makes a passing fair tent peg. That is, if you have a tent. Also the musket has to be modified with some sort of locking nob at the muzzle. Civilian weapons would not have one. The standing militias, as John suggests, would be outfitted for a military drill, and very likely would have had some sort of military musket. More informal civilian musters would have weapons of all sorts, and very unlikely to have a locking nob. Also, given the nature of the otherwise useless bayonet, I think the 25% is a very good, if a bit generous, working number. BTW, the 1% of the time you would need a bayonet only works to the soldier's advantage if he has been trained to use it.

I believe I read somewhere stating that militia needed to be armed with either a bayonet or hatchet. Thus, those who abandoned the hatchet, probably obtained the bayonet.

ilodic.

Militia did not always have to rely on their own personal weapons – at times (e.g. prior to Eutaw) they were issued a 'stand of arms' from continental or state sources; a bayonet is a standard part of a stand of arms.

Militia did not always have to rely on their own personal weapons – at times (e.g. prior to Eutaw) they were issued a 'stand of arms' from continental or state sources; a bayonet is a standard part of a stand of arms.
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Very true. The old notion that all militia had were hunting pieces and powder horns is a load of you know what. A lot of Northern Militia had military arms,ie, older pattern Brown Besses WITH bayonets,and cartridge boxes. A lot were uniformed. Now,most of these units were in or near large urban areas. I'd say the hunting rifle types were more rural,and in the South.

Bob C.

Several units of Massachusetts militia had bayonets at Concord Bridge.

Socket bayonets also make a very good candle holder; and in more modern usage a good bottle opener!

Well done, spontoon. Yes to both extracurricular uses of the otherwise useless object! Especially the bottle opener. Still boils down to knowing how to use a bayonet, or having the discipline to stand in formation as the other side comes close enough. I spent quite a bit of time mastering the French bayonet drill. Very like fencing. The American drills had nothing remotely similar.

Having bayonets and knowing how to use them are two different things. I suspect most militia knew how to use them as a cooking implement rather than as an implement of war.

So I think the essence of your question is how much "physiological edge" does the bayonet add to the average militia man? Rules often make a distinction between non-armed and armed with bayonet, but that does not answer the key question of discipline. In the 18th c., a soldier might be more afraid of his sergeant than of the enemy. If he turns and runs, the soldier of the disciplined unit knows he will face certain death at the point of a spontoon, and might choose the less certain death facing an enemy in hand-to-hand combat.

General Greene knew and understood this delicate balance. He was wise enough to ask the possible of his militia forces. Two volleys, and you can go home for the day. This avoided the problem of hoping they would stand against formed troops with a higher level discipline. Expect them to leave, and plan for it. Now, many men in militia units were old Continental troops decommissioned and returning to service. I think we can only gauge morale on a unit from how it performed at a specific time and place, as it might vary wildly from year to year. Did they actually cross bayonets with the enemy, even if they had them? Not likely, but there are exceptions.

Hard to say, since most militia systems relied on the soldiers supplying their own weapon, which probably did not include bayonets – which was yet another reason for them to run when the British would charge them.

All through the war states struggled to supply their continental units, state units, with militia coming up a distance third. Safe to say few, if any, militia would have bayonets. They were after all… militia.

Recently,a member of my unit was able to procure an original brown bess bayonet at a yard sale,it seems the previous owner thought it was to be used to secure lawn hoses as a sprinkler,"5 dollars,sorry about the rust!".

A New York City gunsmith in 1776 was advertising "bayonet muskets" in the newspaper, so they were available to some early units, but the NYC militia was rather fancy, until the hoi poloi joined.

Getting one guy a bayonet, perhaps not a problem. Getting an entire regiment bayonets (and muskets) was. I seem to recall reading in McGuire's book about one of the senior Maryland offices missing Brandywine as he was off trying to fit out the state militia with muskets.

"Having bayonets and knowing how to use them are two different things. I suspect most militia knew how to use them as a cooking implement rather than as an implement of war."

Depends on the timeframe…by 1780 or so many militia units had a core of former Continentals, who may or may not might have had experience with a bayonet.

db

Good point Dave, but I have to wonder if an entire regiment of militia would have stood, even with veterans mixed in. Guilford tends to make me think no. Perhaps the state line troops were a bit better.

I think one needs to be wary of is attaching too much meaning to the various labels. Continentals, state line, militia; In theory there were qualitative differences between these troops. In reality perhaps not. The American third line at Cowpens consisted not only of the pick of the Maryland Continental line, but also some militia troops. At Guilford Courthouse Campbell's rifles were nominally militia, yet performed as well as the Continentals they were serving with. OTOH the poor performance of the 2nd Maryland at Guilford Courthouse and Buford's Virginians at Waxhaws was probably in part due to them being relatively new units.

As Dave mentions by 1780-81 you start seeing militia units leavened with some former Continentals. You also start seeing militia that had as units acquired a fair amount of experience. Would they have stood and fought British regulars in the traditional 18th century manner? I think some would and others wouldn't.

Too many variables to consider – the overall leadership of a militia unit, the men in all the various companies (this company may be better than that company), how well supplied, how well armed, etc.

By definition they were militia, so I think that kind of sums it all up. I know the first line ran pretty fast at Guilford, the second stood a little longer, but did not stand.

My own reading leaves me to believe that the value of militia was how it would surround any advancing British army and make their life miserable when trying to forage for supplies, always having to be on guard, etc. I can't think of any battle where they faired well against regulars, other than the early ones in 1775.

Anything else seems like arguing over the difference between a D and a D minus. Well, some were Fs, so there is that too. :-)

The expression "a stand of arms" was in vogue at the time; this could mean simply a musket and bayonet, or it could mean the musket and all its tools usually including the sling, the cartridge box and supporting belt, and the bayonet (although the scabbard and its belt were often excluded even from the fuller definition).

Anyone issued a "stand of arms" or who purchased one would therefore have a bayonet. Anyone who simply purchased a musket from a gunsmith, would not generally speaking.

The expectation that militia en masse would be able to act on an 18th century battlefield in a manner similar to regulars is what lead to Camden. There are a number of smaller actions, especially in the south, where militia units stood up to British regulars or well trained provincials. There are also larger battles where individual militia units did so. However this was not generally militia's way of fighting.

What Morgan did at Cowpens was to figure out how militia fighting the way they fought best could be used in a larger action. Their role was not to stand and beat the British back. Their role was to break up the British advance so that the American regulars behind them could defeat it. This was in some ways similar to what Morgan's rifles had done at Saratoga.

I'm not sure whether Greene had as good an appreciation of this as Morgan, and this is one reason he lost at Guilford. Of course another is that he was fighting against better commanders.

@SM. I have vague recollections that some regulations permitted militia to equip themselves with either a bayonet or a tomahawk, or bayonet, sword or tomahawk. Assuming this isn't early senility it would suggest that arms for a militia member might be a little broader.

Militia, by definition, usually brought their own arms when called to muster. There was such a shortage of weapons during the war it is unlikely that any states ever issued stands of arms to militia units, as regulars came first, then state. The point being, militia brought whatever they had. The militia were only called to muster once of twice a year, outside of emergency call-ups. This greatly limited their ability to fight on anything beyond their own local company/platoon – and forget maneuvering as a battalion.

I'm not sure I'd rate Tarelton a bad commander so much as a rash one at Cowpens. Then again, there were some issues with his troops, and IIRC, he seemed to blame some of the loss on the use of open order – which ignores the fact that the formation has been used successfully in other engagements.

I still think the main value of militia was that they filled up the countryside around the British, making it virtually impossible to win the war – at least with the few troops they had at hand.

In regards to rifles, Washington (who had considerable frontier experience) was not a fan. The riflemen never again achieved the kind of success they enjoyed at Saratoga – though the reasons can be debated. The use of rifles was somewhat widespread on both sides, but usually saw its best use between the lines during non-battle times.

But back to militia. A good argument could be made that the war dragged on as long as it did with Congress'refusal to raise more permanent troops, instead relying on militia. I believe Washington felt this way as well. The Continentals showed they could go toe to toe with the best British troops, at least later in the war. I think the English were disdainful of the militia as it usually ran, perhaps why Cornwallis didn't try to outflank Greene's line. I think he also hoped to smash the troops to pieces now that they were there before him. Perhaps he felt all of Howe's and Clinton's fancy outflanking movements simply allowed the rebels to exit instead of getting pinned.

>Perhaps he felt all of Howe's and Clinton's fancy >outflanking movements simply allowed the rebels to exit >instead of getting pinned.

Brandywine is a good case in point--the turning maneuver was nearly flawless, but it didn't trap Washington's force. They still took off in the end.

@ Bill N.

Yes, this was particularly true of the Minutemen in the New England colonies, where the Militia had evovled into a serious military organisation through 1774. And these were generally men who had either bought their own weapons, or been provided with them from a non-military source in a previous time.

Where a "stand of arms" was provided from an official source, much later on in the war and possibly to equip the militias of less well organised colonies, a bayonet would normally be considered part of the package.

Interesting question.

Bayonets were needed early in the war.

Not all Continental Regiments had bayonets.

For example, at the trial of Major General St Clair (published by the NY Historical Society)some regimental returns of arms were produced. These concern mid-1777 (June)at Fort Ticonderoga (and nearby). There is some variation in bayonet and musket numbers.

For example (have added together the good and bad of each):

Cilley's 1st New Hampshire – "Arms" 411 with 360 bayonets

Scammell's 3rd New Hampshire – "Arms" 422 with 413 bayonets

Seth Warner's Regiment – "Firelocks" 180 with 47 bayonets

Hale's Regiment – "Muskets" 370 with 359 bayonets

Marshall's 10th Massachusetts – "Muskets" 326 with 162 bayonets

Francis's 11th 10th Massachusetts – "Arms" 406 with 270 bayonets (this is a detailed return which also notes only 294 "iron ramrods", 50 "gun slings" and 160 "bayonet belts"

Brewer's 12th Massachusetts – only lists muskets 247 (yet 121 of these were bad).

Have included the actual words used (all return used the single word "bayonet" for this item). – R

The Acton, MA minute company had bayonets at Concord because it's commander, Isaac Davis, was a blacksmith and fitted bayonets to each of his Soldier's firelocks.

As far as militia goes, it would be a real variable.

With regard to Continental or State Troops, I think you might be on firmer ground saying they were equipped with such.

Not that being equipped means being competent in the use of said pointy thing.

Eric