"The Luftstreitkrate Builds a Bomber Doctrine, 1914-1918" Topic

Starting from Scratch: The Luftstreitkrate Builds a Bomber Doctrine, 1914 – 1918 Professor James S Corum
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Page 61

"When World War One began, everyone thought that it would be over after a few months and a few big battles. The role that aviation would play in such a war had been considered in some detail by the two major air powers of the pre World War I era, Germany and France. Both nations had airships and balloons a decade before the war but the airplane force of France and Germany and the other European powers had been created between 1909 and 1914. Airplane and airship development had been impressively rapid and numerous experiments had been made to mount machine guns on airplanes and drop bombs from airplanes and airships in order to turn the new technology into a true fighting weapon. At the same time, the primary use of the airplane and airship was to conduct tactical and long-range reconnaissance and the airplanes had been proven especially
successful at this in four years of manoeuvres and experiments.

The reconnaissance mission of the airplane was certainly important for obtaining the operational edge over the enemy in the expected grand campaigns and almost all of the aircraft of the German Army were specifically assigned to support armies and army groups. The priority for good information for the ground armies in turn pushed the development of suitable aircraft for the mission. The reconnaissance aircraft (almost all planes) favoured by Germany in 1914 was a sturdy, fairly fast (100mph),
manoeuvrable two-seat biplane with a moderate range. Such aircraft could take off from rough landing fields near the army headquarters, fly up to 40 miles behind the enemy lines, observe enemy troop deployment and movement and return to army headquarters with the information. Such light aircraft could be fitted with a few light bombs dropped by the observer, but had little capability to contribute directly to combat operations in 1914.
Yet, in the Fall of 1914 little happened as anticipated. On the Western Front the great powers became locked in a bloody stalemate. On the Eastern Front the Germans had delivered a sharp blow to the Russians at Tannenberg but the Russians still had a huge army and was still a grave threat to Germany. In short, Germany had to look at the prospects of a long war. German airmen began to think in earnest about developing a bomber force that could drop heavy bombs deep behind the enemy lines upon vital
targets that would disrupt the enemy war production, demoralise his population and damage the logistics upon which the field armies relied."

> the two major air powers of the pre World War I era, Germany and France

Somehow many people always ignore Russia, but for their defeat at Tannenberg and later doom.

Russias airforce was larger then the Germans at the start of the war, and with the Ilya Muromets they had a strategic bomber already under construction – of some 80 built and used in the war only one was ever shot down.

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It took the Germans and British well over two years to build planes with similar capabilities.

Also ahead of France, Germany and Britain by at least a year were the Caproni designs of Italy.

very interesting article. Very few ww1 aviation literature (books or articles) focuses on the grand strategic aspect of the air war. Most covers an individual or squadron or specific aircraft. My current book "Great War's Finest: A Study of The Central Power's Air Services" covers the air war in relation to how it affected the war on the ground, which is what really mattered. The aviators did not go into air combat just for the sake of it. The book covers the air war and how the Fliegertruppe supported the ground troops from the Marne Campaign of August/September 1914; the allied spring and autumn offensives of 1915; Verdun and The Somme 1916; The Grand Reorganization of October 1916; Spring/Summer 1917; Fall/Winter 1917; German Spring-Summer Offensives of 1918; and the "100 days" allied offensive to the end of the war. Throughout the narrative of how the air war was being fought will be a history of the ground war to give the reader insight as to why the Fliegertruppe leadership made the decisions they did in trying to overcome the numerical inferiority they constantly had to deal with. In separated parts are similar histories of the Eastern Front; Italian Front; Balkans; And Turk-Middle Eastern Fronts covering the German/Austro-Hungarian/Bulgarian & Ottoman Empire Air Services. Appendices have 3-5 pages histories of every squadron (Jastas/Schustas/FA/FA(Artillerie)/etc 3-5 page histories of top aviators, aviation staff officers, commanding officers, aircraft producers and 3-5 page histories of all notable aircraft used by the Central powers Air Services. Notable sources used are from the FERKO and WILLIAMS COLLECTIONS at UT-DALLAS special collections department which have tens of thousands of after action reports/aviation staff officer memos/squadron diaries/etc which have never been published in English. The book will have over 250 color profiles; 300 photographs; 50 original maps; and 50 graphs/charts/tables showing statistical data never previously presented.