"Fighting in Built Up Areas" Topic

Two questions:

1. Do you think defending a built-up area (not an isolated farm or house converted into a strongpoint) was actually an advantage during the Napoleonic era or did it actually give the advantage to the attacker?

2. What are the best primary sources for fighting in built-up area during the Napoleonic Wars?

Regards

I've read articles (can't remember where, sorry) that claim that a village or small town that has not been specifically fortified (walls loopholed, streets barricaded) is not a terribly good defensive position for armies of this period. Why? Well, there are several factors. First, you simply cannot mass as many muskets per yard of front as you could in the open field. Not even close. So even though your troops are relatively immune from enemy musketry, you cannot generate enough firepower to stop an enemy attack. Second, because of the buildings your troops are split up into small groups. Napoleonic line infantry aren't trained to fight this way. Command control becomes a serious problem and since you can't generate the firepower to stop an enemy attack from penetrating into the village, once your troops see enemy troops pushing down streets into their rear, your troops are likely to panic and retreat before they can be cut off. Well trained light infantry are probably less prone to this problem. Finally, the buildings and narrow streets severely restrict the defender's ability to launch an attack outside the town. An attacker can maneuver outside musket range with impunity because the defender would need to move out of the village and reform his ranks before he could make any threatening move and that takes a considerable amount of time.

Built-up areas are more obstacles than defense positions.

Or so I've read :)

Interesting analysis, Scott. Good ideas.

It explains a lot about the seesaw nature of town fighting, such as Ligny or Plancenoit.

OTOH, generals loved using villages and large stone buildings as strongpoints. So there must have been countervailing advantages.

What I've never seen, is a horse-n-musket game that was capable of representing the substantial numbers of units that could get sucked into town fighting. Twenty-four French battalions in the little village of Blenheim? Two entire infantry divisions inside the Hougomont compound, barely 400 meters wide?

"OTOH, generals loved using villages and large stone buildings as strongpoints. So there must have been countervailing advantages."

***

Well, I suppose that if the defenders had enough troops to pack the streets full of men then many of the disadvantages I mentioned go away. At that point an attacker would probably shy away from a head-on attack and direct his attention elsewhere just deploying enough men and guns around the edges to discourage any sortie by the defenders. At this point the village basically becomes 'impassible terrain'.

I think the defences of Hougomont and La Haye Sainte at Waterloo were significant in the final outcome of the battle.

Hougomont and La Haye Saint were somewhat different than a typical village. Both were enclosed fortresses and well suited to defense. And in the case of Hougomont, its importance was because the French became obsessed with taking it more than any significance it possessed in its own right.

both BUA at waterloo were built up for defence the evening before – loop-holing and barricading and whatnot.

at which point, they become defendable and effectively fortified.

it appears from my readings that while the whole battalion might be used to attack a village, when it came to defending it, it might only be one company left holding the town, with the rest deployed behind – to minimise casualties from bombardment, and because the extra bodies were pretty useless.

which would also explain the see-saw we often see over towns.
Blenheim is a red herring both because packing in the extra battalions was a monumental mistake, and also because what happened 100 years earlier is a vey poor guide to what was happening in the Napoleonic period.

if anything, it was the experience of Blenheim which gave the lesson to defend a village with as few actual men as possible, and retain the rest for retaking it after inflicting as many casualties as possible on the attackers.

the osprey on French tactics is quite good on this, and if you can get it, I also recommend Bressonet's tactics which covers the fight for hassenhausen in some detail

Reading descriptions of the fighting in Fuentes de Onoro village in 1811, it started with charges by very narrow columns (I would guess not much more than a section frontage, about 8 men) then became house to house, not unlike a very modern Built Up Area battle. Control of the village see-sawed back and forth between the two sides.

Rod

Try "War to the Death: The Sieges of Saragossa 1808-1809" by Raymond Rudorff.

A number of manuals and treatises from the Napoleonic era describe how to defend and fortify a village or BUA. For instance, Scharnhorst's "Military Field Pocket Book" written in the 1790s and very popular, has an extensive section on fortifying buildings and villages.

A Frenchman, Lary, wrote what was one of the best single volumes on light infantry operations in 1803 discusses defending and attacking villages and buildings.

Most all Napoleonic battles saw fighting in villages, at times open and in other situations walled. Methods for defending and taking villages are discussed in a number of places during the period.

Bill

I always found it difficult to understand Napoleonic fighting in a built up area, as opposed to modern day tactics. Then I read The Glory Years by Scott Bowden which has a very interesting description of the tactics used.

As I recall it was based on a strongpoint defence, often a church or large building, which was held by elite troops, such as grenadiers. The outskirts of the village was lightly held, and the attackers formation broken as they pushed the screen back. The attack was halted at the strongpoint, and a counter attack by the remainder of the defenders drove the attackers back. Once the village was secured the light screen was put back in place, the strongpoint reinforced if necessary, and the remainder of the defenders withdrawn into reserve ready for another counter attack.

He implied that a village was a great advantage to the defenders. And such battles as Waterloo and Fuentes de Orono would seem to prove he is correct.

Glory Years covered the battle of Austerlitz in great detail, and I took it with me for a week's holiday walking the battlefield. It all made good sense to me as I walked around the villages of Tellnitz and Zokolnitz, identified the strongpoints concerned and read his (and other) descriptions of the fighting in the actual location. I could easily imagine the ebb and flow of the prolonged fighting in both built up areas.

I have found it difficult to incorporate this in my actual Wargaming. I have one set of rules for fighting at the edge of the village, and another for fighting inside the build up area. I allow a counter attack through the garrison rout if there are troops in place.

Reading the book, and walking the actual ground concerned, has given me a much better understanding of how the combat could go on for hours and hours than I had previously.

But I still think it is one of the most difficult things to recreate on the wargames table.

I don't think it is any more difficult than a number of tactical processes of the Napoleonic period…

The dynamic of one side becoming dissorder in pushing out the other side, and as pointed out, the command system being complicated by the dispersal of the troops in a town…particularly European villages. the exterior of the village and then the church or central buildings of the village around the common or plaza would be the only structures with a decent field of fire.

They in turn, disordered, would be pushed out by fresh enemy troops, who in turn would be disorder… and so it goes. Without sufficent reserves and the ability to cut off enemy reinforcements, the process could go on for quite a while.

That dynamic has been captured by a number of rules, Age of Eagles comes to mind, but there are others.

@McLaddie,

That is quite interesting regarding Age of Eagles. I think that most rules I have played have simply given a positive modifier for the defender being in a town and left it at that, thus making towns and villages a straightforward advantage for the defender.

Regards

I second spreewaldgurken – from what I have read it is amazing just how many troops one could get into a BUA – on the wargames table – no chance rules forbid the amount of men oas at Blenheim and Hougomont!

I think that 'get 24 battalions into a BUA', particularly regarding the little village of Blenheim needs some context AND what that means over several hours of fighting.

The idea of 12,000+ men duking it out in a village less than 500 yards on a side calls up the image of 12 clowns fighting it out in a phonebooth.

Actually what happened was that with one brigade the British attacked barricades built between the village and the river first and then attempted to take the village with another two brigades in separate assaults, both which failed. The French general Clérambault, overreacted after the violence of the two attacks and sent all the reserve battlaions into the village, some 10,000 men. "The men were so crowded in upon one another", wrote Mérode-Westerloo, "that they couldn't even fire – let alone receive or carry out any orders."

Marlborough, spotting this error, now countermanded Cutts' intention to launch a third attack on the village, and ordered him simply to contain the enemy within Blenheim; no more than 5,000 Allied soldiers were able to pen in twice the number of French infantry and dragoons.

In the end it wasn't really a situation where the fighting actually occurred in the village of Blenhiem at all.

the trick for rules, I think, is to properly differentiate between somewhere you have just marched / run into
- which you really only want to defend with a company because of the difficulties,

and somewhere which you have time to barricade, and whose walls you can loophole, and where the men feel they are remaining long enough for it to be worth going upstairs, or to start loop holing the walls.

and again from somewhere which has proper fortifications.

all tree are different, and result in a different level of defensive protection – and a different number of defenders.

BUA have very special effects on the grand tactics of the surrounding area. A BUA is a good place to anker a line, because you will not be flanked easily by cavalry and you are somewhat protected by artillery. On the other hand it can be difficult – as mentioned – to bring the same level of fire to the enemy, as when he advances against you in the open. At the same time, BUA also act as magnets for attack. If you take a BUA, the line is broken, and it was a historically good point orderwise to attack, since it was well defined geographically.

I think (as does our home rules) that BUA should be divided into towns/villages and fortress-like structures (with the notorious Mont St. Jean structures in the last), both with the possibility for defence preparation. The dynamics of a fortress is either you have it or you don´t, whereas towns have a seesaw effect.
The defensive bonus of a town should be quite small even with preparation, so that it in most instances is the side with the last unit to commit that wins. Fortresses on the other hand are hard to break and often require many attampts before the defenderes potrentially ar evicted.

Another effect of BUA is their potential as artillery magnets. We have special rules that prevents different batteries from coordinating their fire unless they are part of the same artillery command or the target is a BUA.

Bear in mind the difference between a village and a strongpoint.

A village cannot in its entirety be fortified. Most villages are built for ease of access and egress – thus difficult to defend. Hence attacks over villages see-sawed, until one side finally gave up or accepted defeat.

Therefore defence was usually centred on one or more strongpoints. These were the more defensible features such as churches, wall manor houses, etc., either within a village or as stand alone features.

The church as Plancenoit was an example of a strongpoint within a village, while the Brabant farms found at Waterloo were stand alone strongpoints.

Possession of a village did not always present the defender with a distinct advantage. However holding one or more strongpoints did, as these were good places to break up enemy attacking formations and detract troops from the enemy's main effort.

Both villages and strongpoints also acted as pivot and deployment points, were fresh attacks could be mustered out of sight and in relative safety. Thus when la Haye Sainte fell the French were able to launch attacks from its vicinity. If Hougomont had fallen this would have permitted the French to do the same or even pivot and turn Wellington's right.

Again another reason to hold them, even at cost, as it denied the enemy such opportunities. (And probably why the French continued with attacks upon Hougomont – they realised its tactical value.)

DB

@DB,

How do your rules (mechanically) handle the difference?

Regards

One interesting point made by Lieven in "Russia Against Napoleon" is that all villages are not created equally. Most of the villages in Russia and Poland were composed of simple wooden structures that conferred little benefit (if any) to the defenders. In contrast, many of the villages the Russian troops later fought over in Saxony had many stout stone structures surrounded by walled gardens and fighting over these was much more intense and prolonged. Most rules I have played just give a flat benefit for defending in built-up areas. Seems like some situational modifiers are in order.

Ww,

Generally I'm reluctant to come in from GdeB angle, (my natural English reserve I suppose).

But as you asked…

1) Standard Villages attract a +2 morale and melee modifier. (This nullifies any "being charged -2 modifier" when the defenders take their to stand morale test.)

2.) Only 50% may fire out – reflects the poor/broken nature of BUAs inhibiting formed volleys.

3) The +2 melee modifier nullifies the attackers +2 charging modifier. Thus a combat for a standard village is 50/50. (troop quality aside.) And reflects the ebb and flow nature of such fighting.

4) Fortified positions, (churches, etc.) incur a +3 melee modifier and the attacker does not claim a charging modifier – thus they are hard to take. (There are also sapper rules if you want them!)

5) All villages incur a -4 hefty modifier from fire, thus troops are protected both in and behind.

So, with General de Brigade, you have the all three built up areas types, a) Farms and Wooden Villages = cover only. b) Villages = the 50/50 mentioned above & c) Fortified positions, churches, etc., that provide significant advantages to the defender.

Larger villages can consist of differing sections, so Plancenoit could be two village sections and one church (fortified) section.

DB

A village cannot in its entirety be fortified. Most villages are built for ease of access and egress – thus difficult to defend. Hence attacks over villages see-sawed, until one side finally gave up or accepted defeat.

David B.:
I have to agree with Twiningham: Not all villages are created equal. Many villages in central and western Europe had:

1. A large number of stone buidlings.
2. Walls and fortifications, even smaller villages. And for that reason were not built for 'easy access' from without. One overturned cart or wagon and the street was fortified.
3. Had stood for a long time cramming more and more people and buildings within the walls so that many villages had very narrow streets, winding all over, often with overhanging balconies and rooms.
4. Streets meandered all over, rather than being straight, so once in, it wasn't necessarily easy to find a way out or around.

In Spain and Russia not so much, but Italy, definitely, adding to that highly cultivated land all around, producing it's own barracade effect…

Napoleon III built wide avenues in Paris *primarily* to reduce the chance that revolutionaries [a family occupation in Paris] couldn't easily blockade the streets. [See "Les Misérables"]

So, it would be interesting/fun to see such differences in villages and their defensive capabiities represented by more than stone/wood or big/little designations all johnny-on-note BUAs.

Interesting topic. I am plaining to do Plancenoit in 15mm. Was it considered a good defensive position? How did the French utilize it as defensive position?

It is always interesting to look at the difference between the Tactical (villages may or may not help me in the fight) and operational (villages are at communication's nexi).

At the tactical level there has been some studies that show that defending a BUA is actually a disadvantage (admitedly, slightly more modern than we are refering to here)! However, the operational imperative to hold the communication link means it must often be done.

DB's point about strongpoints, combined with thistlebarrow2's description of the fighting shows a different approach to just defending a BUA. It also allows us to look at Wellington's choices at Waterloo. He had to defend two operational level objectives (the communications link to Brussels and beyond that to the sea and his lateral communication link with Blucher). He could have achieved this by fortifying Waterloo, but this could have lacked tactical flexibility, had him potentially fixed by a small force while Napoleon bypassed him and recognises the disadvantage of holding a BUA. Instead he identified a low ridge that allowed him to cover the key communications links across a broader front that prevented him being fixed or outflanked. Moreover, this ridge had three areas that could easily be turned into small strongpoints. Each, while potentially vulnerable, would have to be taken or supressed to allow the enemy to attack the main ridge in its area.

@Rallynow – I'd suggest that Plancenoit was an higher level tactical objective (the roads the Prussians needed to use to get to the French ran through it) so had to be held. Tactically, it had a few good strongpoints. The way that the French appeared to use it was in line with Thistlebarrow2's description above. Although it is arguable that their reserve that was committed when the enemy was disordered was actually the Guard!

To answer number 1 id build on McLaddie's argument and cite the Sieges of Saragossa in Spain. Granted the Spanish lose the second time but it takes the French resorting to destroying whole blocks in order to win and months of siege. So advantage defender if relief comes in time.

Some reflections from Vitoria.

Yet another type of BUA is more a small field system than a proper BUA. Most of the hamlets at Vitoria (not including the town itself, of course, or the more substantial Gamarra Mayor) are reported by Fortescue as being just a handful of dwellings – but with a lot of small, walled enclosures (orchards or similar in many cases, I think). A number proved quite important in the evolution of the battle, and a large proportion of the French battle casualties arose from their defence…with significant losses inflicted on the British in most cases.

The French clearly preferred to concentrate their defence on these features, rather than the ground between them (though this was swept by artillery).

This type of BUA does seem to have offered the defender some advantage, though they couldn't be turned into strongpoints a la Hougoumont – and the Allies found they could not ignore them.

Vitoria city, on the other hand, was not prepared for defence at all. It was surrounded by rambling suburbs and so probably indefensible without a lot of advance preparation.

Gamarra Mayor seems to have been a much more conventional west European village, with a classic seesaw fight for its occupation – with the French ultimately being able to hold off superior numbers for several hours. One interesting aspect of this battle was that the French successfully stormed it over a narrow bridge leading into a narrow street. The allies clearly had not had enough time to consolidate their defence.