"Mobility of artillery in different armies" Topic

I am exploring how mobile artillery was in various armies. The French during the Glory Years (1805-1807) would sometimes send both horse and foot batteries forward with their infantry in attack (Ney's assault at Friedland I believe is an example of such) while Russian foot artillery was far more sedentary.

Can anyone give me some background (or point me towards some sources that would be helpful) on what nations had artillery that was mobile enough to advance with an assault?

Cheers,

The Bandit

The Russians were one of the first to have horse artillery. They 'introduced' the concept to Frederick during the SYW.
Considering we are talking about 25 years of warfare, it is not easy to generalize about any one aspect

Zhmodilov's two volume "Tacitcs of the RUssian Army in the Napoleonic Wars" is a wargamer's delight and does a good job of covering the development of Russian artillery with numerous battle examples.

The British Royal Horse artillery got a late start, but they were one of the first to incorporate the drivers and gunners into a single permanent unit [1795]. Not even the French did that until much later.

The Austrians had lighter guns and their own method of transporting artillerymen, so it is hard to say that one nation's artillery was more sedentary… The Russian problem was command, not the quality of their artillery, per se.

Best, Bill

The French during the Glory Years (1805-1807) would sometimes send both horse and foot batteries forward with their infantry in attack

Given the fact there is no reason to suppose that French artillery was significantly more mobile than any other nation's, it is therefore possible for the artillery of any army to accompany an assault. After all, artillery that is not within range of the enemy is not much use at all.

Whether it did so or not is down to the tactics and deployment of the specific army rather than to capability.

Whether it did so or not is down to the tactics and deployment of the specific army rather than to capability.

Well, I am not asking the question from the stance of "were there enough horses, were the guns too heavy?" I am asking from the stance of how they were employed, which is to say, "in practical were they mobile enough that they did advance with the assault?"

After all, artillery that is not within range of the enemy is not much use at all.

To be clear, I am not saying the artillery remains out of range, but it can be in range and left behind or it can be carried forward.

Cheers,

The Bandit

in practical were they mobile enough

Yes.

that they did advance with the assault?

Depended on the tactical situation and the doctrine of the particular army.

but it can be in range and left behind or it can be carried forward.

Artillery that gets "left behind" will be masked by the advancing troops unless positioned on a hill such that they are able to fire over their heads.

artillery of all nations could accompany infantry when assaulting – this was a common practise already in the 7YW

I remember reading that the French had artillery advance between the squares of the middle guard against the allies at the end of waterloo. I don't remember ever seeing anything saying how they would have switched between moving and firing.

*Gentlefolks*, pray continue. I'm interested in 1st Empire French AND their adversaries and as I've written here before, I'm eager to read your LEARNED discourse (SANS the snarky… PLEASE!)

SO MUCH knowledge here!

Thanks!

Charlie

Field artillery of the period consisted of foot artillery, horse artillery, and mountain artillery.

Horse artillery usually used the same field pieces that were used by the foot artillery.

What has to be looked at regarding the basic question is the doctrine of the different nations and how they employed their artillery in combat.

While every major nation, and some of the smaller ones such as the United States, all had doctrinal publications, the only European army that had a doctrinal publication for employment above the battery/company level was the French. And this was the 1778 manual by Jean de Beaumont Chevalier du Teil, De l'Usage de l'Artillerie Nouvelle dans la guerre de Campagne, published in English as The New Use of Artillery in Field Wars: Necessary Knowledge.

To study the French method of artillery employment and then compare that to what other nations did is crucial to any study of the artillery of the period.

The previously mentioned tactical study of the Russian army, with excellent sections on their artillery arm, by the Zhmodikov's is also necessary for understanding as it clearly demonstrates the Russian reaction to the superior employment of the French artillery arm against them, especially in 1805-1807.

What also has to be looked at is the command and control of artillery in the field both on campaign and in combat. It isn't a question could the field pieces themselves being mobile enough to be moved around the battlefield, all or most of them could easily enough, the question is how they were employed.

The French used their artillery offensively and in mass, Napoleon first massing a 30-gun battery at Lodi in 1796. That progressed through the artillery arm and the French artillery generals of the 30-gun main attack by the artillery chief of the I Corps, Senarmont, at Friedland in June 1807. Senarmont not only conducted the French main attack against the Russian center, but he advanced into point-blank range with his 30 pieces of different calibers and blew out the Russian center in twenty minutes. Those tactics, not employed by anyone else, was done on other fields by other French artillery generals.

The French were also willing to lose guns if it gained them a tactical advantage. Large artillery batteries used offensively changed the nature of artillery on the battlefield and, depending on the tactical situation, was used through Waterloo in 1815.

B

Thanks Brechtel198! Just the LEARNED info neophytes like me are looking for!

Charlie

Kevin,

Thank you for the details.

In your opinion / to your knowledge and in general terms, what nations used artillery offensively in a mobile fashion similar to the French?

My primary interest is if horse and / or foot batteries moved forward with brigades & divisions during an assault and if they halted at any given point prior to contact.

My secondary interest is if a large gathering of guns moved forward offensively similarly to Senarmont at Friedland.

Both of these interests are "per nationality" i.e. which armies did and which didn't. My current impression is that Russian foot artillery was static once the guns were dropped but I am unaware of how the Austrians, English or Prussians used them and my understanding of the Russians lacks depth.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Not looking to "HiJack" this thread… But was the US Army's "Light Artillery" (Horse Artillery) c. 1806, based on French practice? English practice? (fwiw, I SEEM to remember US LA was Winfield Scott's first command(?) AND he *was* a noted Francophile viz. military doctrine.)

Thanks in advance for your considered opinions!

Charlie

At Talevara, three brigades of British Royal Horse [18 guns]artillery moved forward to attack the flank of the French attack in much the same fashion as Senarmont did frontally at Fiedland two years earlier. The action is detailed in Ayde's Artillery Manual of 1809.

The Russians used massed artillery in several battles including Eylau and Friedland, 36 or more, defensively.

It all is a matter of what is considered 'massed' or large numbers. Marmont in Italy 1797 brought forward several batteries of horse artillery to take on an Austrian gathering of 24 or more guns.

Best, Bill

'Massed' would generally mean more than one battery/company.

The British horse artillery at Talavera was not used in the same manner as Senarmont's attack at Friedland. Good artillerymen would usually attempt to get on a flank so as to enfilade the enemy's line in order to produce more casualties. That isn't the same as taking the tactical initiative and initiating an attack with artillery being the supported, vice the supporting, arm. Senarmont did that at Friedland and ruined the Russian center. Drouot did the same thing at Lutzen with 80 pieces. The attacking infantry literally walked over the remains of ruined regiments.

The allies never adopted the French artillery tactics introduced by Senarmont. The Russians used their artillery defensively and did assemble large batteries. But they never used it to attack, only to defend. Through the wars their artillery command and control was never equal to what the French developed. Neither the Prussians or Austrians used their artillery offensively in large numbers, and the Prussian command and control of artillery, and the manner in which it was distributed in the field armies was poor-there was no artillery reserve at the army level (which the Russians finally did adopt). The Austrians did assemble the largest single battery (about 200 pieces) at Essling in 1809, but though heavy casualties were inflicted on the French, the French held and the Austrian temporary firepower advantage was not used by Charles.

Unfortunately for the British, they never fielded enough artillery to have the tactical flexibility of the French with their artillery employment. The British artillery was excellent, though they believed the French horse artillery was superior to theirs, and their gun carriages, limbers, and caissons were superior in design to everyone else's (from 1808 on).

Artillery won battles for the French from 1807 on and that cannot be said for any other artillery arm of the period.

The US artillery arm was definitely influenced by the French and one of the best artillery manuals of the period, American Artillerist's Companion, was written by a French artillery officer. One British officer's comment on the American artillery performance in 1814 along the Niagara frontier was 'We thought you were French.'

B

Kevin,

Are you aware if any of the Allies had their brigade & divisional batteries advance with an assault and then drop at close range to fire in just before the infantry made contact or "leap frog" forward with an assault in a fire, limber & move, fire, limber & move system?

Cheers,

The Bandit

The US artillery arm was definitely influenced by the French and one of the best artillery manuals of the period, American Artillerist's Companion, was written by a French artillery officer. One British officer's comment on the American artillery performance in 1814 along the Niagara frontier was 'We thought you were French.'

B

Thanks "B"!

Charlie

The British horse artillery at Talavera was not used in the same manner as Senarmont's attack at Friedland. Good artillerymen would usually attempt to get on a flank so as to enfilade the enemy's line in order to produce more casualties.

The difference was that the British 'charge' was at flank of the attack as opposed to Senarmont's frontal assault. In both cases the artillery companies acted in concert, advancing beyond the infantry lines to engage the enemy in a moving advance.

The allies never adopted the French artillery tactics introduced by Senarmont.

Senarmont didn't 'adopt' it that much either. I guess it would be a matter of what unique qualities are present in these artillery tactics you are talking about here.

One more time!

I can see were this is going.

So I will be the first one to say:
Bricole! Bricole! Bricole!

And now back to a great day for all.

Sanarmont repeated his massed battery tactic at the battle of Ocana in Spain, November, 1809. French cavalry moved in to this the Spanish cavalry, and part of the French wheeled to hit the Spanish infantry in the flank. The guns continued to pound the Spanish center, and the finally broke.

Senarmont went on to command the artillery in the siege of Cadiz, and was killed on duty. He was buried at the time at a church at Chiclana Barossa (near a British infantry victory against troops of the French I Corps.

I will NOT take the bricole bait!!!!

GdeP

'At Talevara, three brigades of British Royal Horse [18 guns]artillery moved forward to attack the flank of the French attack in much the same fashion as Senarmont did frontally at Fiedland two years earlier. The action is detailed in Ayde's Artillery Manual of 1809.'

There were no RHA troops at Talavera in July 1809. Wellington had three RA brigades (batteries/companies), which were foot artillery, and two KGL artillery brigades (batteries/companies). See Oman, A History of the Peninsular War, Volume II, page 646.

The first RHA units reached Wellington's army only in 1810 When two were assigned to the army-one to the cavalry and one to the Light Division.

There were two more in 1811 and five by 1813, but never more than that in Wellington's army in the field.

More Royal artillery units were assigned to the failed Walcheren expedition than Wellington had on hand in 1809. See MES Laws' Battery Records of the Royal Artillery 1716-1859.

There was no Senarmont-like action by the allied artillery at Talavera. Half of Rettberg's KGL battery, two Spanish 12-pounders and some Spanish horse artillery from Albequerque's command did engage in flanking fire from the heights on the French right flank, but it was not anything like what Senarmont engaged in at Friedland.

'The difference was that the British 'charge' was at flank of the attack as opposed to Senarmont's frontal assault. In both cases the artillery companies acted in concert, advancing beyond the infantry lines to engage the enemy in a moving advance.'

What you're describing didn't occur at Talavera, regardless of the fact that no RHA was present to accomplish it as you described.

B

'The difference was that the British 'charge' was at flank of the attack as opposed to Senarmont's frontal assault. In both cases the artillery companies acted in concert, advancing beyond the infantry lines to engage the enemy in a moving advance.'

'Senarmont didn't 'adopt' it that much either. I guess it would be a matter of what unique qualities are present in these artillery tactics you are talking about here.'

Don't you have to 'move' to 'advance?' Your statement there makes little sense and is either confusing or merely an obfuscation.

Senarmont's artillery attack was the first of its type. He 'had introduced a new school of artillery tactics. Competent generals had massed their artillery for years; Senarmont had used these massed guns to seize the initiative, pushing them aggressively forward in advance of the French infantry to dominate the decisive point of the battlefield with their firepower.'-A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars by Esposito and Elting, Map 82.

What the allied artillery did at Talavera was nothing like this. Senarmont was the de facto French main attack (after Ney's failure to attack the Russian left flank). And it was done on Senarmont's initiative-he was not ordered to do it and it caught both the Russians and the French by surprise.

And infantry supported Senarmont, not the other way round.

n a letter to his brother on 26 June 1807, twelve days after Friedland, Senarmont stated: 'the position of the enemy showed 4,000 dead on this spot alone. I lost the chief of my staff, Colonel Forno, killed by a ball at the end of the action. I have had three officers and sixty-two gunners hors de combat, and a charming horse wounded under me; I fear I shall not be able to save him.'

See Grands Artilleurs by Girod de l'Ain.

Senarmont destroyed the Russian center. Yermelov remarked that 'the French virtually wiped out entire regiments.' One regiment lost 400 of 520 on the field.

Senarmont's action was the decisive one on the field.

And as previously noted by another poster, Senarmont again used his artillery aggressively at the Battle of Ocana, though not as the main effort there, but an economy of force action on the French right flank.

The French would repeat the new tactic, or a derivation of it, at Raab and Wagram in 1809; Lutzen in 1813, and Ligny in 1815.

B

Brechtel,

Bill may be mistaken about the RHA being at Talavera, but maybe it would be easier to check Adye rather than just denying that such a thing occured at that battle?

link

'Are you aware if any of the Allies had their brigade & divisional batteries advance with an assault and then drop at close range to fire in just before the infantry made contact or "leap frog" forward with an assault in a fire, limber & move, fire, limber & move system?'

All armies would displace their artillery if necessary, but none that I know of undertook actions such as those of Senarmont, Drouot, or other French artillery generals.

B

'Bill may be mistaken about the RHA being at Talavera, but maybe it would be easier to check Adye rather than just denying that such a thing occured?'

Bill is mistaken, as shown, as there were no RHA units at Talavera. And I've shown the references I used-Oman and Laws, both of which are accurate. The description of allied artillery at Talavera in Oman has absolutely no resemblance to what Bill described and the only horse artillery on the allied side was Spanish.

B

Brechtel198 how the hell do you know all this stuff?

Yes, I know there were no RHA at Talavera, but Bill's description is in essence correct, as described in Adye's work. Check the link provided above which will take you to the relevant page.

I've checked it and there was no allied artillery assault against the French at Talavera, especially not one along the lines of Senarmont, et al.

First, who commanded the allied artillery, as there was both British (KGL) and Spanish artillery involved. And the KGL was only a half battery.

Again, see Oman which I submit is a much better reference.

B

'how the hell do you know all this stuff?'

I read a lot? ;-)

B

And as Ralph Adye died in 1808, I wonder where the version of Talavera came from? I have a couple of Adye's editions-the one of 1813 and I can't remember the other one.

B

Kevin,

Was there not a British massed battery of some 75 guns under Alexander Dickson deployed at a critical point of Vittoria?

Rod

Brechtel wrote

And as Ralph Adye died in 1808, I wonder where the version of Talavera came from? I have a couple of Adye's editions-the one of 1813 and I can't remember the other one.

Adye's work was updated by William Granville Eliot, who was at Talavera. You shouldn't be in such a rush to try and discredit anything that you do not agree with.

Let's not go there. I'm not attempting to discredit anything or anyone. I happen to think very highly of Adye and his work.

The problem is, that not too much is said on Talavera and nothing in Adye indicates that an artillery attack of any type took place. What did happen is that some KGL and Spanish artillery got on the flank of the French and opened fire. It was not a decisive moment in the battle and it was nothing like Senarmont's artillery assault (firing, displacing forward, firing, and continuing to displace until in almost slingshot range of the Russian center, destroying it and a Russian cavalry counterattack with artillery fire alone).

That didn't happen at Talavera. And it isn't a problem of disagreement, it's a matter of researching the topic and figuring our what happened. The initial analogy put forward by Bill was incorrect-that is the issue.

B

Rod,

Yes-Dickson (whom I believe is one of the best artillerymen of the period and who was given a bag of worms for New Orleans in 1815) massed a 75-gun battery at Vittoria and displaced forward at least twice in support of the allied infantry.

He faced 76 French pieces on the 'next ridge' and engaged any and all targets to his front.

His battery consisted of 54 British pieces, 18 Portuguese, and 3 Spanish pieces.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Just read some Russian memoires about the 1812 campaign and one would see not that much difference to the French.
The French employment of guns supporting infantry attacks, as at Austerlitz were pretty conservative stuff.
As to the cherished Senarmont, of course he did not attack alone with artillery but was backed up by infantry – at least two battalions which would cover the artillery – when in need.

Adye was still considered the Author of the 1813 update of The Bombadier and Pocket Gunner by Eliot.

And yes, there were no Royal Horse Artillery at Talavera. I recently read Ross's RHA memoirs and recently finished editing a book on Dickson for a friend. Ross arrived in Spain two days after Talavera…and that stuck in my mind. [Lots of things seem to get stuck there.]

In any case, the British artillery performance of Baynes, Sillery's [Lane commanding] and Lawson's six and three pounder brigades were all given medals for their actions at Talavera. Sillery's company the title 'Talavera'. In vol. 34 of The Journal of the Royal Artillery, pp 503-508 there is a detailed account of the officers and action and a map provided by a KGL artillery officer, William Unger who was at the battle.
It was the source of Eliot's map in Adye. What is interesting is that the author of the Journal article, Major Leslie of the RA, says the list is of the three companies assigned to the brigades of cannon. The idea of a 'battery', self-contained and employing the same weapons over a campaign wasn't common at the time--in any army.

That the artillery officers were given medals for their action is significant because Wellington generally paid scant attention to the artillery and rarely mentioned them in his dispatches. Even rarer was a positive comment.

So, in the action the overall artillery commander [Whose name isn't stuck in my mind at the moment] organized the artillery 'charge' as it was called.

The 18 guns of the three brigades moved far foward of the British infantry line, deployed at the oblique from the advancing French and drove them back. Quite 'aggressive' in anyone's book. Gutsy enough to get medals for it…

So like Senarmont, the overall British artillery commander organized a similar 'charge' of multiple 'batteries' well beyond infantry support and drove off the enemy. The only real difference is that the Russians, unlike the French, took a lot longer to drive off, and thus unlike the British, Senarmont advanced his guns repeatedly instead of once like the British. Certainly, an accomplishment, but not a totally unique French use of artillery.

It is one thing to say the French did it better and quite another to say no one else did or could.

The construction of British artillery perhaps aided rapid movements, even for foot artillery when speed was required,such as in the manoeuvre at Talavera. The following link provides some interesting info. Sir AD, answering the questions, is Alexander Dickson.

link

Artillery won battles for the French from 1807 on and that cannot be said for any other artillery arm of the period.

Senarmont destroyed the Russian center. Yermelov remarked that 'the French virtually wiped out entire regiments.' One regiment lost 400 of 520 on the field.

Senarmont's action was the decisive one on the field.

K:

It was? It won the battle? So, what about the Russian 70 gun artillery grand battery at Eylau months before that wrecked Augereau's corps, smashing the French center? Augereau's official count was 929 killed and 4,271 wounded. One regiment, the 14th Ligne, was unable to retreat and fought to the last man refusing to surrender. That didn't stop the French? It wasn't decisive?

For four hours the French centre was in great disorder and in imminent danger. With his centre almost broken, Napoléon resorted to ordering a massive charge by Murat's 11,000-strong cavalry reserve. Afterwards, his only active Corps was Davout's on the right. Sounds fairly decisive to me.

There are any number of great French artillery actions, many of them 'decisive' in one way or another, but there were any number on the part of the Allies too, such as Talavera, Vittoria, and Eylau.

There is no question that the French artillery arm was magnificent, but most all of its tactics and accomplishments weren't uniquely French, even in 1807. It is one thing to have a skilled and talented football team with an impressive string of wins, and quite another to claim that no other team uses the split "T" formation.

Best Regards,
Bill

As the original poster I want to clarify the focus of the thread is offensive artillery use, not defensive. While defensive artillery fire may be both useful and decisive, it is not what I'm asking about.

All armies would displace their artillery if necessary, but none that I know of undertook actions such as those of Senarmont, Drouot, or other French artillery generals.

This becomes difficult for wargames to balance it seems. If the Russians are allowed to displace their divisional guns during an infantry advance and continue to haul them forward and fire in turn, the results wouldn't seem to mimic history at all since heavy or light the 12 gun batteries will have a lot more firepower than the 6-8 gun full batteries or 3-4 gun half batteries the French used.

Able to speak to how one might address this at all?

Cheers,

The Bandit

'So like Senarmont, the overall British artillery commander organized a similar 'charge' of multiple 'batteries' well beyond infantry support and drove off the enemy. The only real difference is that the Russians, unlike the French, took a lot longer to drive off, and thus unlike the British, Senarmont advanced his guns repeatedly instead of once like the British. Certainly, an accomplishment, but not a totally unique French use of artillery.'

Merely displacing forward is not a 'charge.' What distinct advantage did the British gain from their artillery maneuver?

In reading Oman on Talavera there was no mention of three British artillery brigades moving forward under the orders and direction of a single artillery commander. And the result of any allied artillery company/battery/brigade had nothing even close to matching what Senarmont accomplished.

The results of Senarmont's action has been given, along with the innovation in tactics. And Senarmont moved forward by bounds in order to get closer to the Russian center to be more effective.

And then there was his smashing of the Russian cavalry attack against his left flank.

And the point is that the infantry did support Senarmont, as he was the French main effort-this time the artillery was not in support of anyone else but was the main maneuver element on the field.

An excellent account of Friedland with emphasis on Senarmont is 'Friedland' by AF Becke.

B

Hehehe.
This thread is a good illustration of why neophytes should understand the LEARNED wisdom of the "Was Napoleon a Jacobin?" before venturing into less esoteric discussions.

Contemporary military technology and doctrine was quite fungible. Did French artillery have some special sauce? If they had, everyone would have copied it, just as they copied hierarchical command structure, skirmishers, column tactics, … boatmen in the guard, or the way the French started arming all their light cavalry with lances. And we could all read about it, rather than engage in vague hand-waving anecdotes about Senarmont.

The big picture is that French artillery contribution was quite modest. In the signal victory at Austerlitz we see a 18th century concentration around the Stanton, some standard patterns on the northern flanks, some derring-do in the center by the French in the west and the Leib Guard in the east, and some late usage in the pursuit both for and against. Most of the stuff was hitched up and moving as this was an atypically dispersed and mobile battle.

The "massed" guns came out the of 18th century French doctrinal debates and referred to guns taken away from the battalions and gather in small companies. Everyone was doing this by 1805. (Although there was still a need for local infantry control, hence Napoleon's introduction of regimental (brigade) guns.) Grand batteries were another thing altogether, and driven largely by the Allies. They first showed up at Eylau, where they wrecked Augereau's corps, although they did not make nearly the impression that the Austrian guns at Aspern-Essling did. Napoleon gathered as many pieces as he could and Wagram turned into the first of many artillery duel bloodbaths. Guns no longer supported the battle line of infantry battalions. Rather infantry battalions supported the battle line of guns. This negated the French advantages with their infantry as enthusiasm and initiative (which the French did have) didn't count for much under a distant bombardment.

How to model all this on the tabletop is a whole other question.

Lieutenant Colonel Robe was the British artillery commander who 'charged' with the three 'batteries.'

Merely displacing forward is not a 'charge.' What distinct advantage did the British gain from their artillery maneuver?

Kevin:
;-7 What did Senarmont do but 'displace forward?' He certainly didn't melee the Russians. What advantage? You know artillery Kevin. Firing on the oblique at advancing infantry at close range? What distinct advantage indeed. The oblique was a greater advantage compared to firing straight ahead like Senarmont.

In reading Oman on Talavera there was no mention of three British artillery brigades moving forward under the orders and direction of a single artillery commander. And the result of any allied artillery company/battery/brigade had nothing even close to matching what Senarmont accomplished.

No, Oman doesn't mention it. And yet I provided two sources that did, with maps. I'll bet that Oman never, ever mentions a battalion leader or the overall British artillery commander in any battle… and yet ever battle had them.

And from your own account of Senarmont's 'charge' on the Napoleon Series, you have Dupont's division and Senarmont in support responding to the reversals suffered by Ney's Corps… in other words, a defensive action. That Dupont and Senarmont turned it into a successful offensive action is laudable, but as Hew Johns points out, doctrine and battle actions are 'fungible.'

You write K:
Not satisfied with the range, Senarmont ordered his trumpeter to blow another call. Alert section chiefs ceased fire, while gun teams galloped up to retrieve the guns. Limber up, mount, displace forward. At 150 yards the terrain narrowed so that both batteries had to combine into one.

How do two batteries and 16 guns combine into 8 guns? Never mind. Your description is one of Senarmont getting closer to the enemy to improve the range… the definition of 'displacing forward.'

That is what the British did, move forward, very close to the enemy, to gain a better angle and a more 'satisfying' range. I am not sure that you can call it a 'new tactic' because Senarmont displaced again to improve the range even more against an enemy which wasn't advancing.

No one is denying that Senarmont's 'charge' was a remarkable feat. No one is saying the all Allied artillery commanders had Senarmont's skill or such an aggressive quality, let alone the benefit of the uniform quality of the French artillery.

However, Allied artillery officers did use similar tactics to Senarmont and the French artillery service from time to time, in part or in combination. And there are lots examples which haven't been mentioned. What about the Russian artillery that so stung Ney's advance at Bautzen that he turned to attack it, failing to close the trap that Napoleon had set?

Best Regards,
Bill

This becomes difficult for wargames to balance it seems. If the Russians are allowed to displace their divisional guns during an infantry advance and continue to haul them forward and fire in turn, the results wouldn't seem to mimic history at all since heavy or light the 12 gun batteries will have a lot more firepower than the 6-8 gun full batteries or 3-4 gun half batteries the French used.

Well, I think the problem is three-fold here:
1. The Allies were often on the Defensive, so offensive uses were limited in scale if present at all.

2. While a single Allied artillery company was quite capable displacing forward, the organization of the army [Say brigade guns instead of divisional] made multiple company advances more problematical.

3. The two most read languages in Napoleonic history are English and French. German and Russian are not anywhere as well known, so comparative narratives are difficult to construct. Often the English and French accounts leave out or downplay [if only by being unaware of what the enemy were doing and why] what the Austrians, Prussians and Russains actually did. Zhmodikov's volumes on the Russian Army tactics give several examples of artillery working in tandum with infantry and cavalry on the offensive, particularly in Volume two.

As the original poster I want to clarify the focus of the thread is offensive artillery use, not defensive. While defensive artillery fire may be both useful and decisive, it is not what I'm asking about.

Then how were guns used 'offensively'? As far as I can tell they were either used to provide fire support infantry and cavalry attacks, attempting to advance with them while keeping a fire lane open… not an easy thing to do, even on a game table, or in grand battery, used to pound the opposing forces, an action that at first glance is hard to differentiate from a defensive grand battle like the Russians' at Eylau.

I thing the coordination between the three arms is also an issue. In most armies, the artillery often was either treated as subservient to the Infantry or cavalry commander, or the artillery companies acted almost independently of the other two arms. Of course, by 1812 both of the three arms were far more integrated than 1800, with national differences, of course. [For instance, the Prussians were as good at that coordination as the Russians…after 1812]

In any case, all of those issues can be represented in game rules without forcing individual batteries or divisional assets to move or limber slower than the French.

Best, McLaddie

"All armies would displace their artillery if necessary, but none that I know of undertook actions such as those of Senarmont, Drouot, or other French artillery generals."

This can only stated by a person who has no clue about German – nor Russian source – a one sided unbalanced view which leads to a distorted picture.

Then name the German or Russian sources and quote from them to prove your point or de-construct Kevin's point.

I have often reflected upon how my inability to read or write in another language has affected my wargaming.

'The idea of a 'battery', self-contained and employing the same weapons over a campaign wasn't common at the time--in any army.'

What is that somewhat esoteric comment supposed to mean? The artillery company/battery/brigade/troop was how the artillery fought. That was the basic tactical organization of the artillery.

And, yes, artillery companies, et al, did employ the same field pieces over a campaign, or longer, unless those pieces were replaced because of being damaged (Boulart has an interesting story to relate on that subject) or worn out.

And the term 'battery' in the French service of the period did not denote the company-sized artillery unit-the term 'company' was used. An artillery battery could be any emplacement of at least one piece to many.

Sincerely,
M

For wargaing rules – I suggest almost identical mobility of foot artillery while on horse artillery – due to the ammunition waggons – French would be slowest.

Here is my problem with each of the following wargaming methods of differentiating (or not) between the artillery of different nations:

• If there is no difference in allowed mobility and a 12# gun is a 12# gun then a Russian 12 gun battery should be radically stronger than a French 6-8 gun battery resulting in the Russian player being able to use their divisional artillery to advance with an artillery spearhead.

• If everyone's artillery was able to keep up the pace of infantry while assaulting then their artillery is fast enough to perform the task and arbitrarily making any nationality's artillery slower introduces a problem that didn't occur historically.

Following from those two points, we could end up with systems were either the French are arbitrarily sped up since we know it was common (my impression) for divisional artillery to displace forward with an assault and other nationalities are arbitrarily slowed down to prevent what we think was less common.

At Leipzig did the Russian divisions attack while forward displacing guns? I've asked so many questions citing the Russians because of the size of their batteries and the inherent coordination / spacing problems they would potentially present, less nimble than smaller batteries one might think though I am uncertain if that were true.

Cheers,

The Bandit