"Galahad redux: an assessment of Merrill's Marauders" Topic

Galahad redux: an assessment of the disintegration of Merrill's Marauders

"The China-Burma-India Theater was the least decisive major arena of World War II. General Joseph Stilwell was tasked to perform concurrent diplomatic and military miracles in pursuit of Allied victory. His mission of keeping a reluctant China in the war depended upon opening a ground line of supply and communication, to augment the "Hump" air routes that linked India and China. To do this, the Japanese had to be driven from North Burma. Training and equipping Chinese troops to accomplish this mission required several months. On the eve of the Chinese attacks in October 1943, a lone American infantry regiment debarked in Bombay, India. By August 1944, this ill-starred force had won accolade and suffered disbandment. During its brief, frenetic history, this first U.S. ground combat unit to fight on the Asian land mass in World War II, was known variously as Shipment 1688, Force Galahad, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), and Merrill's Marauders. This organization's participation in the North Burma Campaign lasted five and a half months and culminated in the capture of Myitkyina. The seizure of Myitkyina and its airfield permitted Allied transports to fly around the Himalayas instead of over them, and contributed greatly to the success of subsequent offensives to break the blockade of China. Although it was an achievement of high Galahad paid a price. The battles in Burma involved many enemies: the Japanese, the environment, and the morale of the Marauders themselves Galahad Redux is an attempt to analyze the disintegration of Merrill's Marauders, by emphasizing the intangible, subjective factors present in the leadership environment. The focus is on the disbandment of the 5307th in August 1944. The causes of the unit's less of integrity are related through the perceptions of five men who were there. Their recorded testimony makes it clear that poor discipline, the effect of rotating commanders, a feeling that the unit was not good enough, a lack of attention, and broken promises led to a complete breakdown of morale in June 1944. As morale faltered and failed, esprit, discipline, and fighting efficiency withered, until there was but a shell of a unit remaining. In a sense, Galahad was not disbanded; it had already ceased to exist. Having been provided the tools of was, the Marauders lost their heart in the fighting. The true validity of any examination of the intangible aspects of combat power lie in the eye of the beholder. Subjectivity may lead to varying interpretations of events not clearly explained by the historical record. Broken promises can be viewed as the principal cause of Galahad's collapse. One man, General Merrill, played the leading role in enunciating and abrogating the two promises that struck most directly at the unit's heart. It is possible that he chose expediency over integrity at a critical point in Galahad's history. Re-telling the Marauder story one more time hopefully reinforces two aphorisms that are deeply embedded in American military traditions. One is that soldiers' minds are as important as their numbers. The other is that force of character is a commander's greatest strength."

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Thanks, Kaoschallenged, for the article. I have always believed that unit cohesion is the sum total of unit leaderships knowledge and experience; the knowledge and experience of the men; and how long have the men served under these leaders. The ensuing lack of dicipline must squarely be placed at the feet of the leader.

Promises were broken to the men. They had already performed way beyond their original mission in an outstanding manner. Had the powers to be honored their original committment to the men, additional units, based upon the 5307th's model, could have been raised and survivors could have passed along valuable lessons learned. Instead, the unit was treated as being disposable during a time when 5 or 6 additional such units could have made a bigger difference at the time. Throwing leaders into a situation where the men have a greater collective experience than the leaders is a lesson not really taken to heart, here.

Either the replacement less senior leaders were headstrong type A or they were ineffective as battlefield leaders in this environment. When dicipline breaks down, junior and informal leadership types will try to run the show witout respect to overall plans and coordination. This results in a huge loss of combat efficiency as the unit is now composed of lots of small groups with cohesion, while the larger organization can no longer control the total efforts of the men. In other words, the unit ceases to exist and function as a "unit" with a common goal.

Stillwell, IMHO, failed to recognize this erosion and take steps to counter the effects. Merrill appearantly did not posess sufficient personal courage to fight for his men's broken promises. Despite being a courageous combat leader, he allowed his unit to fall apart. Perhaps it is fair to say that he was forced into a situation that he was not properly prepared to lead from?

Such studies can be found in history and is root and cause as to how any unit functions in a stressful situation. Despite poor morale amongst the men, they still carried out their missions until the change of leadership (and lack of support by top leadership) allowed their demise. A military organization should be aware of politics, but remain functioning as a military unit. Their Japanese opponents seemed to have to the end.

Excellent points, though I would add that most of the fit (and recovered) survivors of the 5307th were absorbed into the similarly-roled 'Mars Force'. This was a divisional-sized long-range penetration force comprising two US regiments and one Chinese regiment. Mars Force operated ahead of the main NCAC force during their last offensive iin late 1944/early 1945. I have very few details on Mars Force, but I can't believe that having absorbed the 5307th, Mars Force didn't benefit from experience and lessons learned from the men of the 5307th.

The 5307 is held in high regard by Infantry units in the US ARMY. The US ARMY Ranger Regiment traces it's linage back to the 5307 … And some of tactics and techinques in the Ranger and US SF handbooks can be traced to the Marauders … and used effectively in Korea, Vietnam, etc. …