"Leningrad what if" Topic

As I understand it, the Finns didn't put too much effort into cutting off Leningrad from the north or cutting the Murmansk railroad (a good move on their part) – I have even heard rumors that they more or less cut a deal with the western allies to hold back.

Suppose they had completed the encirclement or cut the Murmansk RR – how would things likely have been different?
Would an early capture of Leningrad mean the fall of Moscow?
Or would the end result have been the same – but Finland would have been much worse off in the long run – perhaps absorbed by Russia?

I think both tasks would have been much more difficult than you suppose. I don't think either was really within the realm of possibility.

Leningrad was not supplied from Murmansk…

The Finns and Germans combined cut all the land routes to Lenningrad. The only route in for supplies was over lake Ladoga. Put another way, Lenningrad was cut off.

The Finns did I think launch limited attacks against the rail lines but the impact this would have had would have been on the Arctic lend lease supplies getting to the main part of the Soviet Union. The Arctic convoys only made up a small fraction of the total lend lease shipments.

Had the Finns cut all land routes into Leningrad then the Lake Ladoga ice road and sea supply route would have been useless. link

By halting at the old border on the Karelian Isthmus the Finns created a huge gap in the encirclement which could be used to supply the city. The Finns probably expected Leningrad to fall anyway when the halt order was issued but it is noteworthy that despite German demands the offensive in Karelia was never renewed.

Murmansk Lend Lease was supposedly 23% of the total. Since presumably the Persian and Far East routes were running at near maximum capacity, cutting Murmansk would have had an appreciable effect on Lend Lease received by the Soviets.

If Leningrad had fallen, that would have freed a German Army to be redeployed (even after considering the sector east of Leningrad still to be covered), which would have helped the Germans cover more of the front. German supply limitations through 1942 would probably mean that they could not have effectively conducted offensives with these forces, however.

The Finnish lack of intserest in attacking Leningrad has been debated and written about quite a lot here in FInland. I haven't really looked into it that much.

But I do know that the Finnish casualties from the '41 offensive were larger than the casualties from Winter War. Aggressive fighting for Leningrad would've meant even bigger rise in the casualties, especially since (large scale) urban warfare was not really what Finns were accustomed to.

Also, IIRC, it has been said that Mannerheim wanted to play it safe by not participating too much in the siege or harrasment of Murmansk railway (which was severed multiple times but obviously Soviets had repair crews that didn't dally in putting the railway back into shape)

Having run through these sorts of scenario several times in various boardgames (The Russian Campaign, Russian Front and Third Reich n particular);

a) it isn't that easy to completely encircle Leningrad, if the Russians decide not to allow it.

b) it isn't that easy to cut the rail line from Murmansk

However, the loss of either or both is indeed very damaging to the Soviet cause albeit probably surviveable (it takes a great deal to knock the USSR out).

They are sufficiently serious to present a serious curb to major Soviet offensive operations later in the war. It doesn't prevent them attacking, but they have fewer resources with which to do it so offensives have more limited scope and objectives.

I think Finnish war aims were to recover their territory lost in the winter war. They were supported by the western allies in 1939 and had no wish to be cast as an aggressor, so politically impossible for them to engage in offensive action of Soviet territory.

Actually, in 1941 Finnish forces advanced well beyond the pre-1939 borders, occupying a significant chunk of Soviet territory in the Eastern Karelia, between lakes Ladoga and Onega.

As for the Murmansk railway, if the Germans had really wanted to have it cut, they could have given a proper try themselves – there was quite a number of German forces located in Norway and northern Finland,

I think we shouldn't ignore the comment by Lonkka1Actual. I would suggest that as a Finn, he probably has a better idea as to what was going on in the minds of the Finish leadership than most of us.

As for the Murmansk railway, if the Germans had really wanted to have it cut, they could have given a proper try themselves – there was quite a number of German forces located in Norway and northern Finland

There's a really good book on this topic:

link

The Northern campaign was a wonderful microcosm of Barbarossa as a whole. The same lack of detailed planning, the same dispersion of effort (there were, IIRC, three different thrusts against the Murmansk railroad, instead of a single concentrated one), the same lack of realistic logistical planning, etc. Plus, there was no real coordination with the Finns, who pretty much did their own thing without much reference to what the Germans were up to.

Stratgic planning in the theater reflected the typical German attitude that the Soviets would fold quickly, so no long-term planning need be done. Just go swanning off into Russia and play it by ear.

Kind of sad, really.

Griefbringer is correct – Finns were able to get deeper into Soviet territory than old borders. As for the railroad, it was cut several times, first time in dec, 1941. However, as it was only at single point, Russians simply built a loop on their territory to connect the parts of the railroad. End of 1941 Finns were also able to cut White sea – Baltic channel. Russian military in Karelia was better prepared for June offensive, didn't suffer such terrible losses as the units on the western border and had some advantages as Finns had themselves in Winter War – terrain and some fortifications. Therefore the losses of Finns (and Germans) were high enough to consider starving Leningrad to death instead of the bloody assault….

Actually Griefbringer is a Finn too.
And who knows what the Finnish leaders REALLY were thinking at the time.

Anyhow, I seem to recall hearing decades ago about a document where they pondered the what-if scenario of Leningrad falling and apparently came to conclusion that as a result of that there were good chances that there would've been a domino effect and Moscow would've fallen too. Perhaps units freed from Leningrad could've added more oomph to puch to Moscow?

Interesting tidbit that has been locally debated in recentish years has been the claim that during the end of Winter War when peace negotiations were going on, the Germans discreetly hinted to Finns to agree on peace however hard the conditions were since after a little while the possible territory losses were all going to be reclaimed and then some…

I've read some Russian and a couple of Finnish translated books on WInter War and 41-45 war…My interest came while I was in the army at the location where some of the most bloody battles of 1941 and 1944 took place. One of my commanders was very fond of modern Finnish army, and WWII in Karelia.
Looks like there were common plans of Wehrmacht and Finnish army, as well as some political arrangements between Hitler and Finnish president Ruti (not sure about spelling) before the war. Finns were clever enough to distance themselves from Nazis on one hand and show enough good will to them to be able to hope for some possible territorial gains if the war was successfull. In German official announcement of the beginning of war, there was a special mention of "valiant finnish brothers" taking part in the assault. Finns sent a message asking not to mention them again in this context. "Great Finland" concept was there, but was never mentioned in diplomacy correspondence with US/UK. What I was surprised to find, is that there was a lot of resistance in both mid level army command and soldiers as well as public opinion to go beyond pre-winter war borders…at the same time some of the policies on occupied territories, especially in 41-42 were not much different from German approach. It is not easy to be between the hammer and the anvil….

And who knows what the Finnish leaders REALLY were thinking at the time.

Indeed – Finnish historians are still kept busy debating what was really happening in the Finnish political circles in 1940-1941.