"Battle of the Huertgen Forest: A Failure of Battle Command?" Topic

Do you agree with the reasons given as to what went wrong and why it did? Was General Cota one of the reasons? Robert

Major General Cota and the Battle of the Huertgen Forest: A Failure of Battle Command?

"In early 1944 he was considered one of the best and Brightest brigadier generals in the entire United States Army. Because of his service as the chief of staff of the 1st Infantry Division in North Africa and his subsequent work with Combined Operations in Britain, he was considered the Army's expert on amphibious operations. He became a key planner for Operation Overlord (the invasion of Europe), was made the Assistant Division Commander for the 29th Infantry Division and then earned the US Distinguished Service Cross and the British Distinguished Service Order at Omaha Beach on June 6,1944 for his actions and his decisive leadership. As a reward for his consistently superior performance, he was given command of the 28th
Infantry Division, which he then led across France to the German border and the Siegfried Line. He justifiably earned the reputation as a ‘fighting general' but when his division
was destroyed in November 1944 during the Battle of the
Huertgen Forest, so too was the reputation of its division commander, Major General Norman D. Cota.How could one the U.S. Army's best and brightest commanders be defeated by enemy forces that had just spent three months retreating across France,Belgium and Holland? What went wrong and how did it happen?"
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Cota like several US senior officers during WW2 seem to have been promoted above their abilities and their men suffered for it.

He was a good "Assistant Divisional Commander" and maybe thats where he should have stayed. He seemed overwhelmed once he was in sole command (without a senior above him), and unable to grasp the situation on a divisonal level, either in attack (Huertgen) or defence (the bulge).

And before you all jump to his defence, don`t forget he took the 28th from Huertgen to Wiltz/Clervaux and they were destroyed all over again. During the early hours of December 16/17 he became almost paralysed unable to give clear of consise orders to his subordinates.

If the Division you command is destroyed not once, but twice, you have to accept the blame.

And there is this from a previous thread I made,

"In September of 1944, Major General Leonard T. Gerow, the V Corps commander was relieved of command in combat to return to the United States and testify before the Army's Investigation Board on Pearl Harbor. The board eventually found General Gerow partially responsible for the American defeat at Pearl Harbor. After testifying before the board General Gerow returned to Europe where he resumed command of V Corps. The timing of the board, the nature of its findings and its effect on him disrupted his confidence and capability to command. In the month he was absent from the front his corps as well as the overall Allied situation had changed. The Allied armies were logistically culminated; short of trained combat personnel and facing determined German resistance. The findings of the board also stung him personally and affected his relationship with superior officers. His embarrassment coupled with mute resentment towards the investigations findings would prove disastrous in the coming month. Less than three weeks after his return from testifying, V Corps initiated a series of attacks to secure the Ruhr River dams in western Germany. These dams were crucial to subsequent allied advances into northern Germany. These attacks were launched into a heavily wooded area known as the Huertgen Forest. The attempt to seize this area was met with fierce German resistance and heavy U.S. casualties. His tactical effort during this offensive was his poorest performance of the war. He was uncharacteristically remote from his subordinates, micromanaging, and physically absent from the battlefield. Prior to the Huertgen his was one of the most successful corps commanders in the U.S. Army in Europe. His corps landed on D-Day at Omaha Beach, fought through the hedgerows of Normandy, liberated Paris and was one of the first units to enter into Germany. The battle for the Huertgen was a dark blemish on an otherwise distinguished career. The timing of the Pearl Harbor Investigation and his terrible performance in the Huertgen was not a coincidence. His unsatisfactory accomplishment during the Huertgen was related to the investigation. Less than a month after his failed attack, the Germans launched their final counter-offensive of the war. The Ardennes Offensive was his moment of redemption. Gerow was one of the first leaders to recognize the nature of the Nazi attack. During the battle he was energetic, resourceful and very effective in blunting the German assaults. He was present on the battlefield when needed, he was quick and adamant about requesting support and he made rapid and inventive decisions that greatly contributed to the corps success and the ultimate Allied victory."
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I hope this is not a diverting question. Kaos's Hurtgen PDF mention's Gen Cota's "task force" command in Normandy(p 6). This seems to have been an impromptu collection of forces. Did the US (or British) do this frequently in ww2? Was this command structure comparable to the kampfgruppe the Germans regularly used?

I strongly recommend the volume "Three Battles" in the US Army Historical Series (the famous "Green Books"). One of the three battles is 'Schmidt', which was the pivotal village in the Hurtgen Forest debacle. It is a VERY detailed look at the fight (some great scenario potential here).

The bottom line is that the 28th was given an impossible mission and disaster would have resulted no matter who was in command. True, Cota did not do a very good job, even allowing for the mess he was handed, but it's hard to see how anyone else could have done much better.

Yes

I suspect the same can be said of the Bulge scenario, where the divisions there were thought to be in a "safe sector", and spread overly thin.

Given the overwhelming forces arrayed against them, it is not very surprising that they were wiped out in short order.

I suspect that unfounded optimism was part of this – after the slog in Normandy was the race through France – a large number of Allied soldiers – including a lot of officers – thought the war was all but over; the degree to which German resistance hardened as they closed in on the German borders was not expected

Bradbeer's indictment of Gen Cota and his division command in combat is unconvincing with the narrative presented. Within the constraints of the terrain, his mission and his resources Cota's actions to organize reinforcements generally had a positive (but temporary) tactical effect. He sent his staff forward to maintain communications, and intervened himself at a critical point. US armor seems to have fought well enough when and where it was committed. For supply and communication what alternative was there to the Kall River trail? It is unjust to describe the rout of the defenders of Schmidt and Kammerscheidt after being isolated and overrun in the German counterattack as loss of control of his division. Indeed Cota continued to reorganize his forces to the end of the battle.

Interpreting Rudi's post above, the reason the Americans were defeated is that the Germans whipped them. They had a superior prepared position and intervened more effectively. That is a failure of the US corps and army command.

How poisonous was the command situation under Hodges? Surely Eisenhower and Bradley were there to show their low confidence in Hodges, and probably reinforce their confidence in Cota?

The 28th did an excellent job in the first days of the Bulge, considering how spread out it was, and is the primary reason that the Germans did not get to Bastogne before the 101st AB.

It fought again in the Alsace vs. Operation North Wind.

The 28th did an excellent job in the first days of the Bulge, considering how spread out it was, and is the primary reason that the Germans did not get to Bastogne before the 101st AB.

But at enormous cost and with little attempt at any sort of defence in depth. The 2 responses to the assault seemed to have been to tell everyone to stay where they were whatever the cost and any time they could scrape together a few troops and a platoon of tanks send them forward with orders to attack and push the Germans back. As a result positions were held long after they had been bypassed and inadequate attacks mounted into the teeth of the German onslaught leading to high losses. Those troops pulled back in time could have imposed even more delay on the Germans.

I read a book on the Hurtgen debacle, "The Green Hell", and the impression I got was that it was a defensive position that could have been avoided and skirted, but that Cota and other Officers felt this need to conquer it. If they just went around it, the Germans would eventually have pulled back and abandoned it. It was a very good book and revealed the stupidity of the whole affair!

@Fred Cartwright,
Pretty hard to reform you defenses into a defense in depth while already under attack,Remember the Germans were pretty much stopped across the line on the first day leading most to believe the attack wasn't a serious offensive but instead just a spoiling attack in response to the drive for the damns in the north. You might want to read "The Alamo of the Ardennes" to get a better understanding of what actually happened early in the bulge.

@FireZouave
Yeah "Green Hell" written by Charles Whiting(a.k.a Leo Kessler) not exactly a unbiased writer. His main purpose seems to have been to critic US Generals using information that wasn't know at the time the battles were fought. His idea the the Huertgen could have simple been bypassed is ok as long as you know there weren't many troops there to begin with. but is there had bee larger numbers there as was believe at the time the easily could have cut off any bypassing forces.

jdginaz, interesting points. I didn't know that! Politics and hindsight make good points for whatever the agenda, right!

Better quality troops fighting from +3 terrain.

Here is the Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt. US Army Historical Series that ScottWashburn mentions,

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Robert

Cora didn't pick the Huertgen attack he was ordered to do so as a diversionary attack for a large attack to the north. However when that attack was postponed they failed to cancel or postpone the 28th division attack. So when they attacked they were the only attack happening within hundreds of miles. With no other fighting to blunt the Germans were able to throw the entire 116th Panzer Division and an infantry division in to stop and then counter the attack. If the 28th Division had attacked at the same time as the main assault it is unlikely there would have been any German reinforcements available to retake Huertgen Forest.

In the Bulge the division was refitting with a mix of battle fatigued troops and green replacements and covering a wide front. They had no ability to fight a defense in depth. Cora's division was destroyed twice because they were placed in impossible positions. His leadership may not have been perfect but I don't think even perfect leadership would have prevented those loses.

In the Bulge, each regiment of the 28th was covering a front that should have been covered by a division. No wonder it couldn't form a defense in depth!

IMO it looks like the US underestimated what the ferocity of the German defense would be.And was overconfident in their own forces and abilities. And were definitely weren't aware of how bad the terrain was going to be in the area. Cota perhaps was of the same mindset of those above him in these aspects. Robert

Pretty hard to reform you defenses into a defense in depth while already under attack,Remember the Germans were pretty much stopped across the line on the first day leading most to believe the attack wasn't a serious offensive but instead just a spoiling attack in response to the drive for the damns in the north. You might want to read "The Alamo of the Ardennes" to get a better understanding of what actually happened early in the bulge.

Thanks, but I've already read it and quite a lot else. Even harder to do defence I depth when there seems to be no plan for it. No fall back positions, no response to an attack other than to hold in place.
It should have been pretty obvious by the end of day 1 when the Germans kept coming and positions were being bypassed that it was a bit more serious. By the end of day 2 it should have painfully clear and yet there was little attempt to pull back from the positions that were being overrun and saving those men while there was still time.

In the Hurtgen the 28th's three regiments were forced to attack in three completely different directions. They were out of contact with each other after the first hour and never regained contact until they retreated out again. Considering that the 28th had relieved another division (I forget which one) which had tried to do the same attack earlier and with less success, the 28th can hardly be held to blame.

In the Bulge, the bottom line for me is that for two days, one US division held off the entire German 5th Panzer Army and saved Bastogne. Not too shabby!

Operational Performance of the U.S. 28th Infantry Division,
September to December 1944
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Casualties.

Office of Medical History – THE FIGHT FOR THE HÜRTGEN FOREST
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It's always easy to critic Commanders when your using the 20/20 hindsight information that they didn't have at the time and as Scott said were were they going to get the forces to build that defense in depth? Tell us where would have been a good place in the line to abandon in order to get that depth?

Tell us where would have been a good place in the line to abandon in order to get that depth?

Not talking about abandoning, but pulling back in a timely fashion. You know the sort of thing that allows a smaller force to impose delay from successive blocking positions. It was standard NATO doctrine against a superior attacking force!
How about Clervaux for a start. Fuller requested permission to withdraw on the 17th, but it was denied. That led to the loss of the whole garrison.

In the Bulge, the bottom line for me is that for two days, one US division held off the entire German 5th Panzer Army and saved Bastogne.

Much of that delay was the Germans own doing. Difficulty in getting the bridges in and Bayerlin's delay in pressing on to Bastogne when the way was open.

Pulling out in "a timely fashion" would have meant pulling out before the attack even began. Throughout the Ardennes, US troops that held firm did very well while those that tried to do a 'fighting withdrawl' generally got overwhelmed in short order.

And since NO ONE on the Allied side was aware of the magnitude of the attack until the end of the 16th it's unrealistic to expect any order to retreat to come before the 17th and it was already too late at that point.

And no matter how much trouble the Germans may have made for themselves, it was the men of the 28th division who stood in their path and who fought and died gallantly and bought the necessary time. Second-guessing them at this late date is pointless.

Pulling out in "a timely fashion" would have meant pulling out before the attack even began.

Not at all. On the 17th Fuller sugested destroying the Clerf bridges and pulling back to a position on the high ground west of Clervaux from where the roads leading into Bastogne could be controlled and further delay imposed without sacrificing his garrisons. He was turned down by Cota with a "Hold at all costs!" order. You see that's the whole point of having a plan of what to do if attacked in overwhelming strength. You can then impose maximum dealy while keeping your force intact as much as possible. I admit judging the time to make such a withdrawal takes skill. I reckon Fuller got it right. He was there on the ground and Cota decided to overrule him.

US troops that held firm did very well while those that tried to do a 'fighting withdrawl' generally got overwhelmed in short order.

Really? US troops in St Vith executed a withdrawal in the face of the Germans very successfully. There are a number of other examples. Perhaps you could give a few where troops withdrawing were overwhelmed? And I mean a proper fighting withdrawal not the sort of panicked semi rout as practiced by 14th Cavalry Group.

Second-guessing them at this late date is pointless.

Well that seems to be the norm for TMP as half a dozen recent threads on this very board demonstrate. Or is it not permitted to criticise US Generals?

"Or is it not permitted to criticise US Generals?"

I have no problem with criticizing nor doing so. Robert

As I recall, Fuller first requested the pull-back during the night of the 16th-17th. At that time the full magnitude of the German attack was still not recognized at division corps or army level. Cota did authorize a retreat later on the 17th but garbled communications prevented Fuller from getting the message. By then the Germans had bypassed and surrounded most of the 110th's strongpoints. Those that did try to fall back were mostly overrun before they could get away.

The defenders of St. Vith had the advantage of being concentrated, organized and aware of what they were facing. They were able to pull back successfully. I was thinking more of the retreat from Wiltz and the small task forces sent out from Bastogne to delay the Germans. They did delay them a bit, but all those forces were gobbled up without doing much of anything in return. Probably more American were lost in those actions than had been lost during the 110th's heroic stand on the 16th & 17th.

And I have no problem at all with people criticizing American generals. They made plenty of mistakes. But they were mostly redeemed by the blood of the GIs who had to live and die with those mistakes.

During this discussion of Cota's performance in the Ardennes, we might do well to recall that the US Army in 1944 had no established doctrine for defensive warfare. The field manuals of the day, and the officer's training curricula, went so far as to describe the construction of defensive positions, and the planning of defensive fires. And no further.

There was no doctrine and no training in how to conduct a "withdrawal under fire". There was no doctrine and no training for what "defensive positions in depth" might be (why does the general care how deep our foxholes are?). There was no doctrine and no training for "delaying from successive positions".

If a commander wanted to give orders that he would expect his subordinates to understand and to know how to execute, he was pretty much limited to "defend this position until relieved" or "withdraw to this new position, prepare defenses, and defend until relieved". Anything else, and he would be reliant upon the improvisational skills of his subordinates … which would lead to what we arm-chair critics might call "loss of control of the division".

This is one of the reasons that US Army troops in WW2 were so much more prone to routing than British troops. It was not a question of the quality of the men. US troops regularly did quite well in the bravery department. But when you ask troops to withdraw in the face of the enemy, and they have no training or doctrine in the conduct of an orderly withdrawal from contact or in delaying from successive positions or in the conduct of a rearguard, then you get random behaviors that often include poor performance.

Let us not apply the skills and doctrines of the US Army of today, or even of the cold war, to the commander on the spot in 1944. He had to work with what he had.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Good point, Mark 1; we were supposed to be on the offensive -- let the Hun worry about falling back!

As I posted earlier IMO it looks like the US underestimated what the ferocity of the German defense would be.And was overconfident in their own forces and abilities. And were definitely weren't aware of how bad the terrain was going to be in the area. Cota perhaps was of the same mindset of those above him in these aspects. Robert

A Dark and Bloody Ground--the Hürtgen Forest and Roer River Dams 1944-1945
Excerpts from A Dark and Bloody Ground--the Hürtgen Forest and Roer River Dams 1944-1945, published by Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas, 1995, 4th Printing, 2004.
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Mark 1, very good post! Not wanting to hijack the thread but exactly the same could be said of the Soviet army in 1941 – all their training was aimed at the counter attack and fighting the defensive battle on the enemy's soil.