"Could/should we have attacked the Soviets in '45? " Topic

It is also a bit of a leap of faith to claim those lynchings as Government act in the way that Stalin's murder of millions was.
It would be naοve to think that some local law enforcement officers / judges or whatever didn't turn a blind eye to such things, but the idea that this was some sort of official policy is ludicrous.

Mark all interesting stuff and I agree with much of your assessment of the skill of the Russian ground forces. The only thing that gives me pause for thought is the air factor. German commanders coming from eastern front experiences were consistently suprised by the air power that the western allies could field. The Russians would not have experienced anything like it. Even at its peak the Luftwaffe couldn't put anything like that amount of air support into a battle. How long would it have taken the Russians to adapt to that? Who knows. As for the heavy bombers lacking the range to hit strategic targets I think they would have been used for interdicting behind the front lines (thus minimising blue on blue risks). They could certainly keep Russian airfields under constant attack and it doesn't matter how good your low level performance is at zero feet all fighters are easy targets for a large bomb! :-) Similarly any significant collection of Russian artillery is going to disappear under a carpet of bombs. Certainly if the allies attacked the first order of business for the air forces is destruction of the Russian air force and artillery before you launch the ground troops into the assault.
Whether the Russians advantages on the ground would have outweighed the air advantage the allies had is a tricky call. Once you get into the vast distances in Russia airpower is much less important and harder to maintain.

"I don't know about you, but all of this discussion makes me want to dust off my WW2 models."

hypothetical 45/46 conflict has been a relatively popular sub-genre of WW2 for quite a while.

Personally I find it too much like fantasy and prefer the more realistic fantasy of 50s/60/70s/80s WW3 stuff.

Back to the OP, I suppose it depends what the war aims of such an attack are. Operation Unthinkable was aimed at the liberation of Eastern Europe, which did not seem either excessively ambitious nor massively unreasonable at the time.

Aiming for the occupation of the USSR, the overthrow of the Soviet government etc would have been a very strange thing to do at the time, and most likely not achievable in any case even if it was politically feasible. Nuking Russia to liberate it hardly seems a very sensible approach.

While it seems to be the modern fashion to randomly invade other peoples countries, including those of former allies, in 1945 such behaviour was the prerogative of the Axis powers, and we'd just spent six years and millions of lives defeating them.

The tone of much of this thread actually makes me despair for both TMP and humanity in general, although Elenderil has already gently hinted that virulent anti-communism, a belief that overwhelming firepower is the solution to all the worlds problems and that ones own economic, social and political system is better than anyone elses might not be shared by everyone.

I'll go and sit in my corner now.

Lots of interesting stuff on this thread…I do like a good what if.

So if it came to blows what is the situation with the various eastern european countries under soviet domination would the Poles raise up(what would the Poles in the soviet armed forces do)? how about the Romanians wasn't their army still intacted (if horribably under equiped)? The Ukranie and Balkan states are still full of anti Soviet partizans. What about Hungry the Czechs and Slovakia?

What about allied forces in the Med is there enough to put together a diversionary attack in the Blacksea (Crimean mark 2)?

Greece is interesting. Churchill was determined that Greece would not fall into the Soviet camp, as Yugoslavia seemed to be heading. He'd tried a lot of madcap things to keep the Eastern Med in the allied camp from 1940 onwards (support for Yugoslavian pro-allied camp, the disasterous intervention in Greece in 1941, wooing Turkey to at least ensure neutrality, the under-resourced and hopeless Rhodes/Leros campaign after the Itlaian capitulation in 1943, support for the Yugoslav partisans, creation of the Balkan air force etc.). He was partially influenced by his WW1 experience, when the Sebs held off the Germans in Yugoslavia with British support, and during that war the allies had provided troops to keep Italy in the war, as well as the disasterous Dardanelles camapign.

Strategically he was making sense, from a UK perspective the Med was crucial to sustain trading links with India and increasingly to keep the UK's oil supply lines open from the Gulf, Iran and Iraq. He saw Soivet Russia as closing up the Eastern med in the post-war years, through control of the Adriatic and Greece, and while he wanted to limit Soviet influence in europe, in Greece and Yugoslavia that coincided with UK domination of naval power in the med (Warsaw Pact control in Greece and Yugoslavia would have gifted the Soviets naval bases in the Med). As it was, patrially through the level of support provided to Yugoslavia by the UK during the war, Tito kept a kind of neutrality, and through intervention in the Greek civil war (which was very unpopular with the left in Britain), kept Greece in the western camp. There were also abortive covert attmepts to undermine communist power in Albania in immediate post war period (scuppered by the traitor Kim Philby), again related to the threat of providing the USSR with naval bases in the med, and also very concerted action to get turkey into NATO….

So where it was a strategic imperative, methods were used to try to limit Scoiet influence post war (by both the UK and US)…. Some sort of escalation of those actions would probably be a good scenario for a post war scuffle.

I remember reading once (I think in a book of WW2 army lists bizarrely) that Stalin seriously considered invading Turkey at the end of the war, but thought better of it due to depletion of the Red Army infantry.

I've not heard any more about this – anyone?

'Well, I'll never be buying from Rapier…'

People can boycott whoever they like but it seems a petty response to a historical argument.

Hitler admired US segregation laws, elimination of Native American populations, British exploitation & supression of India, Australian 'processing' of Aborigines, & the British & US concept of concentration camps.

Indeed, American abuses of black Americans pale compared to Germany's wartime atrocities, but of course a more realistic measure is to consider Nazi Germany's peacetime atrocities on 'excluded' sections of its population.

Thanks for your comments Mark 1, very interesting!

Found on one anti-soviet site in Ukraine that there was a plan to attack Turkey from Iran territory (in order to get some territorial gains on behalf on Armenia)
Not sure is this story is true as I have not found any documental support on the subject.
According to Yalta huge amounts of soldiers and tanks/artillery were moved to Far East to start offensive against Japan in August.
However, there was a moderate amount of Soviet troops staying in Bulgaria. Know that for sure, as my grandfather was there till end of 1946…

5) Italy was on the road to recovery and forming a new government.

This statement made me smile. Could have been written just about any day in the last 65 years.

Nice call! That one started my Friday off well!

SParker said…

Should we have – Yes! The reason Britain went to war in the first place was to free Poland! Morally, we should have fought on until that at least was achieved.

However, Deleted by Moderator for example.

I read the offending statement on his profile and still could not figure out why Sparker got DH'd. Seemed pretty benign to me. And he does make a good good point too.

'Well, I'll never be buying from Rapier…'

People can boycott whoever they like but it seems a petty response to a historical argument.</q?
Hardly an "argument". More like outright hostility.
No one is required to purchase anything from someone who vehemently dislikes you.
There is too much other stuff out there.
I have boycotted more than one company on TMP whose "spokesman" was obnoxious and, dare I say it, anti-American.

As have I. Most of the time I can ignore it, but when somebody seems to REALLY hate me as an American I see no reason to support their business in any way.

James Wright posted that the US only had two nukes… Sorry, James, but the US was not bluffing: they had two additional nukes, ready to be deployed. They have been de-commissioned, and are currently on display at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Museum, Dayton, Ohio USA.

They are duplicates of the two which were dropped, one being a cigar-shaped, Uranium bomb, and the other is more spherical in shape, formerly containing a Plutonium core. If you get the chance, the Museum is most definitely worth your time, and money, to tour. The bomb casings are on the floor, behind ropes. They have plaques explaining what they are, and what they were for, in front of each. The US was prepared to incinerate two additional cities if Japan failed to surrender. Fortunately, that was not necessary. Cheers!

The US Army suffered exactly ONE operational level offensive during the entire war (the Ardennes offensive, or "the Bulge" if you prefer).

Also Operation Northwind, in Alsace.

As for the Allies surrounding German forces, don't forget the Ruhr Pocket! That eliminated about a third of a million soldaten.

As for Soviet penetrations and pockets, easier to pull off on the wide Eastern Front against the over-stretched Germans than in narrower Western/Central Europe against Allied forces in reasonably good shape and with air superiority, if not supremacy.

As for Soviet penetrations and pockets, easier to pull off on the wide Eastern Front against the over-stretched Germans than in narrower Western/Central Europe against Allied forces in reasonably good shape and with air superiority, if not supremacy.

I think the point Mark was making is that the sort of reactions we see from US forces when attacked while working well against the Germans in the Ardennes would have proved disasterous against the Russians. The airpower is the wild card. Best chance for the west IMHO would have been a preemptive strike taking out the Soviet airforce on the ground. That would give the western airforce the ability to bomb and strafe without opposition. That might have been enough of an edge to tip the balance in their favour.

If the Soviets had entertained this ludicrous scenario, perhaps those dumb Commies would have been well aware of the effectiveness of the Allied Tac Air and taken suitable counter-measures. Don't also forget there is no real stand off weaponry available, apart from abysmally accurate rockets, so Allied losses would have been savage, given Soviet anti-air doctrine was for every soldier, who was able, to fire at the aircraft. Not like the Germans who ran for cover, letting only the specialist troops engage the attackers.

I think Mark 1 gives a suitable riposte to an increasingly Flag waving discussion, though social psychologisst might suggest some of the responses are concurrent with a nation beginning to doubt it's global role. We had James Bond to soothe our loss of Empire, you have the imaginary victory over the Red Army in 45, whatever floats your boat.

Having lived in a Communist country, albeit at a young age, I feel the attempt to compare the USA's social injustices to those of the regime of Stalin are facile, disingenuous and quite frankly insulting.

Most of the time I can ignore it, but when somebody seems to REALLY hate me as an American I see no reason to support their business in any way.

Ditto
Rapier if you are going to spew such hate against America you should first look at you own empire and second make up a sock puppet
I've deleted him out of My bookmarks

Mk1 – one point you and others leave out in all of this is the presence of 'reformed' Wehrmacht (Heer) units in the Allied stable. Which was part of the OP.

Presumably if the Allies thought German units could be rearmed and used against the Soviets, someone in the command structure might have consulted the officer corp on Soviet tactics and capabilities. Particularly if the Allies were the aggressors. In point of fact. I seem to remember that a lot of the German officers who fought on the Eastern Front were debriefed by the Allies post-war.

Now there may have needed to be some actual experience of Soviet tactics to bring the point home, but having at least a theoretical knowledge of what they might face would make some difference.

Then there would be the German units – not sure how many could be 'raised,' but I imagine some knowledge of what had happened in East Prussia would help in recruiting. I have also read that the French Foreign Legion had a massive proportion of Germans post-war. A fair percentage of whom joined to fight Communists.

At any rate, I am not that sure that your scenario of Allied surprise and consternation at Soviet tactical expertise is entirely correct.

Quite a few of the Postwar documents on the Soviets were either written by or with information given by German officers who commanded on The Eastern Front . Mainly Generals goragrad. Robert

Milites – being aware of it and having experienced it are 2 different things. Presumably German units transferred west were aware of allied air power and yet it still seems to have caught them by surprise with devastating results at times. I agree with your basic point though the Red Army had the operational doctrine that could have defeated the western allies.

Goragrad – all of that takes time. If the scenario is a continuation of the war by getting stuck into the Russians asap as suggested by the OP then none of that happens. You probably need at least a year. The OP mentions nothing about reformed Wehrmacht it is basically Patton's view that you should just keep on going when you run out of Germans and hit the Reds.

The Gray Ghost

In my experience of such things, the minority of Britons who harbour an irrational hatred of America also hate their own one-time Empire / history / heritage with a similar vehemence.

Fred, you are correct on the OP, I was thinking of Patton. Seemed my recollection is that he wanted to do so.

I seem to remember that a lot of the German officers who fought on the Eastern Front were debriefed by the Allies post-war.

Goragrad – all of that takes time.

Time … a willingness to learn … and teachers who know their material.

The US Army in 1942 showed a particularly arrogant side to any offers of tactical suggestions based on British experiences against the Germans to that point. The American attitude was pretty much "if you knew what you were doing, you would be winning!"

Now imagine the American attitude to German generals telling them how to fight the Russians …

Really. You think that German advice would have been readily received and absorbed? Really?

And perhaps with good reason. I have read many of the German accounts of Soviet tactics and military capabilities. They seem to have had little awareness, or perhaps little willingness to admit, that they were being out-maneuvered again and again on a grand scale.

German situation reports and appreciations of opposing forces, when compared with Soviet records of preparations and maneuvers, show that the Germans had little actual understanding of how the Soviets maneuvered. German maps often misplace Soviet divisions and corps, missing entirely the concentrations that posed the greatest risks, and placing them instead in locations that they had left days prior.

The German view of the Soviet military arts was highly colored by the experiences of the early war. Mindless obedience and stoicism are the primary attributes that the Germans gave to the Soviets in their post-war writings.

They also refer, repeatedly, to the overwhelming numbers deployed by the Soviets, particularly of infantry, even in timeframes where the balance of infantry forces ran in the range of 1.5- or 2-to-1. That is because, even with this minor level of advantage, the Soviets managed to mask their concentrations well enough to repeatedly muster 5-to-1 or even 10-to-1 advantages AT THE POINT OF THEIR ATTACK. The Germans never understood this.

What is clear is that the German tactical commanders knew that they would be out-numbered when the Soviets attacked, and that any success by the attacking force, even a minor success, would be quickly re-enforced with great vigor. They knew that speed of response was critical. Local decision making, based on sound doctrine, was the key. That doctrine focused on defense in depth, with a mobile reserve that immediately counter-attacked any penetrations.

The western allies would not have had Hitler ordering them to stand fast, but they also would not have had any tactical doctrine for dealing with the nature of a Soviet offensive, and their decision-making cycle, when confronted with the unfamiliar, was based on high-level conferences and development of a consensus among disparate commanders with divergent personal agendas.

That would have been a disaster in the face of the Soviet emphasis on high momentum of operations. They would have appeared much like the French did under the assault of the Germans in 1940.

There was nothing fundamentally wrong with the French troops, or the French tanks, or the French artillery, or the French air force in 1940. Some things they did better than the Germans, some things not as well. But there was no fundamental imbalance in force quality, and the French army was larger. But the French command focused on high-level coordination of effort, and had a wholly inadequate communications infrastructure.

Once you are able to get inside your opponent's decision-making cycle … once you are able to make event 2 and event 3 happen before he has developed his response to event 1 … then coherency is lost. The front line collapses and rear echelons go into panic mode.

For the French in 1940, by the time all of the units that were to coordinate received their instructions from higher command levels, those orders no longer made any sense. Without coherent orders, the front line troops fought un-coordinated actions and were overwhelmed, and the rear echelons went into self-preservation mode.

The same would have happened to the Western Allies in 1945.

The difference is that the US Army was more resilient, and learned and adapted faster than the French. But it took severe negative events to shake the Americans from their prior ways to new ways. They learned fast, but the lessons were typically expensive.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

I think the Russians were well area of operating under enemy air superiority, given their experiences of 41-42. As for the all conquering Allied airpower I recall two quotes, "an eggshell with a hammer, tethered to one fixed point by an invisible line" and.

Q "What's the definition of air superiority?"
A " A tank at the end of the runway"

As for lack of experience, what about the US soldiers to air attack? What happened if at key points the Soviets placed most of their air assets and launched an all out air offensive? How would a US Division react to being attacked by several regiments of IL-2's?

As for US strategic assets operating from the UK, in support of an attack against Uncle Joe, using former Nazi soldiers, I doubt any UK Government would approve of that. Don't forget for many UK civilians the war had been experienced directly, I'd think quite a few airbases would be attacked by Communist sympathisers and fifth columnists, either by direct or indirect action. Finally, if German units had been in the Allied TOE the average Soviet soldier would have needed little motivation to fight, again, experientially, the Soviet understanding of the war was far different, as they'd fought a power who wished to enslave and exterminate them.

an irrational hatred of America

I don't understand why some people here feel personally hated? I could criticize some countries politics – including the USA – that doesn't mean that I hate the country or any its citizens. I've been an ACW re-enactor during some years and it was great fun so I certainly don't hate the USA.

the French in 1940

I agree with Mark1 …and I don't feel "hated" by this… :-)

Patrice,

If you read what Rapier wrote it was pretty strong stuff. He wasn't just making a point, he clearly had an axe to grind about the US. Basically, comparing the United States with it's segregation policies in the South and Indian reservations with Stalinism and the death of tens of millions of Russians by an oppressive dictatorial regime is, to say the least, offensive. The words that he used and how he used them were not necessary in a friendly discussion over the stated question of this posting.

I seem to remember reading that the Germans had a 1.7 to 1 edge in combat effectiveness to the Western Allies. I believe the same article said the Germans had a 2.4 to one against the soviets. So that's still a western edge of 2.4 to 1.7. I think that works out to a 1.4 West over the Soviets.
Also, the West was much or flexible that the Soviets. Remember, almost every American infantry division has a tank battalion and a Tank destroyer battalion attached. And the infantry is fully mobile, trucks for everyone, especially the guns (no horse limbers).
In terms of the War in the East, it means the Americans have 60 panzer divisions compared to what the Germans were fighting with.
And all interviews with the Germans stated they preferred to face Soviet guns to the Western allies. The Russians had nothing like the basic fire control systems the the American had, no TOT barrages and no proximity shells, which were just coming into the Armies inventory in Dec of 44. Air burst make a mess of infantry over ground burst.

Here's some numbers I found comparing allied forces to the USSR.

USA 91 divisions were mobilized during the war: 68 infantry divisions, 1 mountain division, 16 armored divisions, 5 airborne divisions, and 2 cavalry divisions. 61 of these were in Europe.

Source link

UK 33 divisions. 23 infantry, 8 armoured, 2 airborne divisons.

source link

This isn't including reserve and home defence divisions.

France 34 divisons. 14 infantry, 3 armoured divisions, approximately 20 colonial divisions from North Africa.

Canada 8 divions. 6 infantry, 2 armoured divisions.

I might be off a bit on some of the numbers but I'd say about 130 divisions total in Europe. The soviets had over 500 rifle divisions and 50 armoured divisions. I haven't taken time to find the exact numbers and locations. But even with the differences in division sizes I'd say the soviets have a bit more than a 1.4 to 1 edge on the western allies.

Air superiority is helpful but planes by themselves don't win wars. You still need boots on the ground. Even against the Germans the allied airforces were taking heavy losses. The russians had better ground air defences and air force. Every country was already having problems finding replacements for the front line divisions.

To me it looks like a no win situation for everyone involved if we (the western allies) and the USSR had gone to war. The west may have been able to win in the long run mainly due to North America being relatively safe from attack but it would have been even bloodier than fighting the Germans. I don't see how the allies could have accepted the losses neccessary to take on the USSR after 5+ years of war.

If one side or the other had been stupid enough to attack I'm sure the other would had retaliated to the maximum but what would the cost have been? What would have been gained? Stalinist USSR and it's satellite states weren't a good place to be but things slowly got better as the revolutionary hard core died off. Would killing another 20 millions russians and other eastern Europeans, most of whom weren't responsible for the various atrocities have made things better? Not likely I'd say. So I guess my point was, in answer to the OP "could we have attacked the USSR in '45", maybe be not likely with the political situations and war exhaustion unless it was the soviets attacking first. "Should we have attacked in '45". No, the costs would have be horrendous because I just can't see the soviets rolling over and giving up easily. Moscow by Christmas didn't work from Poland in '41 and wouldn't have worked from west Germany in '45. Would another several years of war in central and eastern Europe have been an improvement over 40+ years of communist rule for the majority of people there?

The number of divisions raised during the war doesn't really give the whole story re what was left at the end of the war, as many had been disbanded or converted to other tasks. In the case of the British, they ended the war with the following formations still in the field, with virtually nothing left in reserve:

NW Europe:
3x Armoured Divisions
1x Specialist Armoured Division
5x Independent Armoured Brigades
8x Infantry Divisions
2x Airborne Divisions
2x Commando Brigades
2x Independent Infantry Brigades

All that was left in the UK at the time was training formations that had been scraped bare of replacements for the front-line formations.

Commonwealth/Allied European Formations in NW Europe:
2x Canadian Armoured Divisions
2x Canadian Independent Armoured Brigades
3x Canadian Infantry Divisions
1x Polish Armoured Division
1x Polish Independent Parachute Brigade Group
1x Czechoslovak Independent Armoured Brigade Group
1x Belgian Independent Infantry Brigade Group
1x Netherlands Independent Infantry Brigade Group
1x Norwegian Independent Infantry Brigade

Italy:
1x Armoured Division
4x Independent Armoured Brigades
2x Specialist Independent Armoured Brigades
4x Infantry Divisions
1x Commando Brigade
1x Independent Parachute Brigade Group

Commonwealth/Free European Formations in Italy:
1x South African Armoured Division
1x Polish Armoured Division
3x Indian Infantry Divisions
1x Indian Independent Motorised Infantry Brigade
1x New Zealand Infantry Division
1x New Zealand Armoured Brigade
1x Greek Mountain Brigade
1x Jewish Infantry Brigade

British/Commonwealth Formations in Burma/India:
3x Indian Armoured Brigades
2x British Infantry Divisions
8x Indian Infantry Divisions
1x Indian Airborne Division
2x West African Infantry Divisions
1x East African Infantry Division
1x Independent Indian Motorised Infantry Brigade
2x Independent East African Infantry Brigades
1x Commando Brigade

N.B. Some of the formations in Burma (3x Indian Divisions, 1x West African Division & 1x East African Division) were being withdrawn to India in 1945 due to the impossibility of keeping them supplied at the front line.

There were also another dozen or so Indian divisions across India and the Middle East on training and garrison duty.

What this means is that while the UK might have theoretically raised the 23x Infantry, 8x Armoured and 2x Airborne Divisons listed above, by May 1945 they only had 4x Armoured Divisions, 14x Infantry Divisions and 2x Airborne Divisions capable of undertaking combat operations (plus 9x Independent Armoured Brigades, a few Infantry Brigades, 5x Specialist Armoured Brigades and 4x Commando Brigades). However, two of the Infantry Divisions were already in Burma and the 6th Airborne Division, along with other units, was on its way to Palestine and the Far East. Some of the 'Italy' formations were also embroiled against communists in Greece, as well as being engaged in a tense standoff with Yugoslavia over Trieste.

Of the Allies; would Canada, New Zealand and South Africa have maintained their forces in Europe for such a war? The two Polish Armoured Divisions would have been reliable, but the Czechoslovak Armoured Brigade, already riven with communist dissent, would have been downright mutinous. The Indian formations would have been required for continued operations against Japan (as well as shoring up the Middle East against Soviet intentions there), while the other Allied forces would have been busy securing liberated territory and expanding their armies. In the case of the Netherlands, their priority was to regain their lost colonies in the Far east.

Excellent post, Mark; one could also add that the growing clamour for independence in India would have made the use of Indian Army/Nay units anywhere in the world after the surrender of Japan, problematic.

Thanks for the clarification, Mark. I knew I was overstating the allies strength including some units that weren't available or severly understrength. I just couldn't quickly come up with the numbers I wanted.On the ground we were way over matched by the Soviets in early '45. I'm doubtful air superiority would have tipped things entirely in our favour and gaining that superiority would have been costly.

I've always wondered about the British/Commonwealth manpower shortage, considering that they then controlled the second-most populous country in the world (India, which included what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh), not to mention numerous other colonies.

What's up with that?

I've always wondered about the British/Commonwealth manpower shortage, considering that they then controlled the second-most populous country in the world (India, which included what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh), not to mention numerous other colonies.

India contributed about 3 million troops to the allied cause. All volunteers. Not a small amount. To raise more would have required conscription which would have been politically unacceptable and would have caused more trouble. As it was some Indians threw in their lot with the axis.

Having the manpower was one thing. Getting it to where it was needed, equipping it as a full fighting division and supplying/supporting it on the front line was entirely another. A vast proportion of those three million were operating a gigantic logistical operation that spanned nearly half the globe, east and west of India – and even that wasn't enough. As mentioned above, Slim was forced to withdraw several divisions from Burma (around half of 14th Army) in 1945 simply so he could keep the rest supplied and driving toward Rangoon.

I was working from memory earlier, but if you're interested, I'll dig out a book and detail how many Indian divisions were active in the Middle East in 1945 (I've no idea off the top of my head and can only remember the ones active in Italy, Burma and Eastern India).

Sorry, my memory was a bit crap re the 'dozen or so' Indian garrison divisions. Most of those had disappeared by 1945, or existed as 'ghost' formations to give the Axis powers the impression of strength in the Middle East (e.g. one 'GOC Division' in Iraq was actually a Lt Col).

The Indians actually only had one Armoured Division in Syria/Lebanon, an Infantry Division in Ceylon and two Infantry (Training) Divisions in India. All the other Indian divisions across the Middle East had disappeared by the end of 1944, leaving only the odd independent infantry brigade, Line-of-Comunication security and logistical units.

So assuming 'Operation Unthinkable' kicks off, the Soviets would pretty much have a free hand to rampage across Persia, Iraq, Syria and Arabia; with only a single Indian Armoured Division and a load of rear-echelon troops to stop them from grabbing all the oilfields and possibly even exploiting as far as India and/or the Suez Canal.

Just FYI the U.S. were going to produce 1 more uranium bomb and 12 plutonium bombs by Nov.1 to be used in Olympic. The surrender of Japan in August stopped production until 1946. The greater possibility was that the Russians would attack the Allied forces in Germany after consolidation of East Germany. Had the U.S. not had nuclear weapons that possibility increased. The ability of the U.S. to project nuclear power via the B-29 was a show stopper for the Sov's.

And Rapier if you aren't goosestepping and Heiling Der Furher, your welcome.

Having the manpower was one thing. Getting it to where it was needed, equipping it as a full fighting division and supplying/supporting it on the front line was entirely another.

So what the Commonwealth had was not a manpower problem, as often stated, but a logistics problem.

An country can safely put 10% of its population into the military before you start to lose cohesion in the economy. If your really efficient or brutal you could get to 15% I assume. (Numbers from my college military history classes). By 1945 the Soviet Union had lost 13-22% of its entire population dead. This does not include prematurely wounded. I read somewhere their rifle platoon were down to squads.
And if war broke out, they would need to make up the lost industrial capacity provided by lend-lease. Though I'm sure they could force labor from occupied countries.
By 1945 Great Britain had lost .085% of it population. The US was 1/3 of one percent. The out, from the numbers is obvious. It would come down to who had the greater will. The Soviets would have a edge simply because one one persons will mattered.

So assuming 'Operation Unthinkable' kicks off, the Soviets would pretty much have a free hand to rampage across Persia, Iraq, Syria and Arabia;

I don't think the Turks would have just sat there. They were pretty weak, but where were the Soviet suppose to get the troop to fight them over some terrible terrain. Plus you just gave the Western air force and maybe even the navy a base of operations close enough to Russia to matter. Though I would convert about half the strategic bomber to ground forces.

The Soviets share borders with and were already occupying large areas of Persia/Iran, having mounted a joint invasion with the British in 1942. They wouldn't have to fight their way through Turkey.

They also had enough forces and stores in the Far East (three Fronts, expanded from 0.5 Million to 1.5 Million men during June/July 1945) to mount an overwhelming offensive against Japan in 1945, so if the Western Allies were stupid enough to suddenly turn on the Soviets in Europe, what's to stop some of those forces being re-directed to mount a drive on the Persian and Iraqi oilfields, followed by Suez?

The Allies had virtually nothing left with which to defend the Middle East – everything in Europe (including Italy) would be fully engaged with the Soviets, while the war with Japan was still raging and tying down forces in Burma and the Pacific.

Fascinating, Mark! So really all the Russians would need to do then is to defend in Europe & cut the Middle East to pieces. Warm water ports & access to oil fields. Sounds like game over …….

Hello all TMPers I am the owner of Rapier Miniatures.
I would like you all to know any opinions expressed in this or any other threads are not those of Rapier Miniatures as a company only of an individual who should be posting news articles on our behalf not starting WWIII. (He is currently sitting on the naughty step)
We have no anti-American feelings/policies and anyone familiar with our expanding ACW ranges will know we have a keen interest in American history.
We apologise for any offence caused.

Paul

Paul,

Apology accepted. Thanks for letting us know.

Paul, good to hear that. I thought Rapier was a one man business and had decided not to deal with you. As company policy I think it would be a good idea to limit any use of the company name to further the companies interest. If an employee wants to get involved in a thread such as this tell them to use their own account and keep the company out of it.

So how do 1 million men be in Asia, German and rampage through the Middle East at the same time?
They didn't have any extra men. Their platoon we squads by this point. They'd lost about 25% of their total population.
And all that American Lend-lease would be going to Turkey, which could put One to one and a half men into the field, based on population.

As I said above, half a million men were already in the three East Asia Fronts at the start of 1945, even though the USSR was not at war with Japan at the time. Those three fronts were reinforced to a total of 1.5 million during June & July 1945. Most of these men came from newly-trained formations and the last strategic reserves in central USSR.

Japan was in no condition to declare war and/or launch an offensive against the USSR, so those million men could have been diverted to the Middle East instead of to the Far East. Japan wasn't a serious threat to the USSR in 1945 – it could happily have waited wait until the USSR had dealt with the western Allies' stupidity, as presumed in this thread.

Why send them to get ground up in Europe, when Russia could fight yet another deep, defensive war across eastern Europe, while waiting for Winter, while simultaneously removing the British Empire's oil?

I've no idea what the USSR already had in Iran or along the southern border, but I'd put money on it already outnumbering the British/Indian/US forces in the region by quite a wide margin before those additional forces were added.

Er, you do know that British/Commonwealth platoons were also severely understrength in 1945, do you?

Again, why would Turkey get involved?

> They didn't have any extra men. Their platoon we squads
> by this point. They'd lost about 25% of their total
> population.

This statement takes a particularly western post-war view of the Red Army of World War 2.

Yes, the Soviet Union lost a tremendous number of people. A tragically high number, that makes western (and in particular US) losses pale by comparison. More Soviet civilians were killed in 48 hours in one ravine outside Kiev than the Brits lost in the entire blitz.

And yes, Soviet infantry forces were under-strength in Europe at the end of the war.

But we make a grave mistake when we connect these two issues and say that the Red Army was out of troops. It wasn't.

The population that the Red Army could "recruit" from grew by more than 50% from Kursk (mid-1943) to Berlin (mid-1945). So saying they took so many casualties that they ran out of troops by the end of the war is simply not true.

The great loss of population was from June to December of 1941, when the Soviets lost about 35% of their population. Not as casualties, but in territories overrun by the Nazis. That population was no longer available to the Red Army. During that same time the military casualties amounted to almost 100% of the pre-war manpower of the Red Army.

Now tell me, with those catastrophic losses, how much evidence is there that the Soviets ran out of men in January of 1942?

The low point of the available manpower pool was actually July of 1943. Ukraine, Belorus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Baltic states were under Nazi control, not Soviet control. And wartime casualties had about doubled from the January 1942 numbers.

How much evidence is there that the Soviets ran out of men in July of 1943?

By 1945 that had all been reversed. The Red Army was actively conscripting not only from the recovered Soviet territories but from Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the Rumanian army (which had fielded about 1 million troops on Nazi Germany's side in 1943) was fighting on the Soviets' side.

Yes, Soviet infantry units in Europe were understrength in 1945. Don't read the wrong message there. They were understrength because the Soviets allowed them to be understrength. A larger proportion of manpower was going into the armored and artillery formations. Even in the infantry formations there were increased numbers of support weapons, which were generally fully manned. It was the PBI that always got the shortest straw on manpower.

And, much as with the western allies, as the end of the war came into sight the conscription process slowed. Not because it had to, but because it could.

The population of the Soviet Union, as measured pre-war, and then post-war, is meaningful for many things. But it is not meaningful for assertions of how many soldiers the Red Army could muster at war's end. They could muster as many as they needed … certainly more than they mustered at the height of the war.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Soviet population did not grow in 44 and 45. They lost 25% of their pre-war population, Poland included. That from the information that has come out since the 1990 from the Soviet archives. I don't care how many casualties your willing to take, at some point you can't grow food, make rifles or even spears.
I sorry, but your ideas just don't stand up to facts. You have to able to still run a country while you fighting or everything breaks down.
The Soviets units in German were already falling to platoon levels when the entered Poland.
That's it for my contribution. I'm obvious arguing with a war gamer and not a historian.

Oh get over yourself. Did you not read what I wrote above? I'm dealing in factual, actual fighting formations, not something hypothetical.

Regardless of the demands for manpower in the main theatre of war in Europe, the Soviets still had half a million men in three Fronts watching the Japanese, PLUS an occupation force in Iran PLUS at least a million more men somewhere 'in the middle' that had not yet been committed to Europe and were therefore free to be transferred East during June & July 1945 for their offensive against the Japanese (which commenced in August 1945). This was all done without reducing manning levels in Europe.

Those are the facts.

In any case, it probably would not have taken a million men to deprive the British Empire of its oil and cut the Empire in two – the 'soft underbelly' of the Empire was virtually undefended.

I'm not inventing men out of thin air. I'm just pointing out that those men that were used against Japan during the summer of 1945, could just as easily have been used against this stupid neo-con thrap-fantasy. I'm also pointing out that they didn't have to be ploughed into the main theatre of war in order to knock one major Ally out of the equation.

Of course it all depends when this stupidity is meant to commence. In May-August 1945, while the Western Allies are still fighting Japan and before the USSR transfers those men East? Or after August, when the Soviets have already committed all those men against Japan, but when General Winter is about to arrive?

You've also not explained (as a Historian as opposed to a mere Wargamer like myself), why Turkey would get involved; despite twice making that assertion and twice my asking 'Why would they?'.