"What would happen if the allies invaded France in 42" Topic

So the americans wanted to do this, but the british mabye beeing more seasoned, said it might be to early,

And if you look at the battles in afrika, Sicaly, Italy, alot of the troops would have had alot of trouble if you went right into France, not only that but looking at how hard the fight in France was in 44, imagien the untrained troops of 42 having to fight it?
Not only the troops, but the generals. With out the Afrika/Italy campaign to learn the ropes. I think they would be out of their depth in france.

Not forget about air superiority. Allies did not have that in 42. Imagian invasion of normady with out air superiorty?

So was the British right?

yes. – the British are always right – and don't you forget it! ;-)

Yup, probably too many U-boats about in 1942. Without pretty much total air superiority it wouldn't have been feasible.

I think it would a logistics nightmare, as they would not have had the quantity of goods needed for such a venture in place. Also the German U-Boat threat hadn't been neutralized
enough to support a resupply effort.

Take a look at Dieppe for a preview of what would have happened…

Damon.

It was called The Dieppe Raid. It didn't work.

The Yanks did not know what they did not know. North Africa and Sicily and Italy showed them. Good thing we learned.
Bismarck's joke about sending a policeman to arrest any BEF landing on the shores of Prussia would have been apt here also.

And we would have had Fredenhall as a corps commander too!

Can you say debacle, kids?

Dieppe, but much, much bigger.

Without Dieppe, Torch, and Sicily to learn from it would have been a disaster.

The Dieppe 'raid' was only described as such after the event, to save face. Part of the problem was that it was run by Mountbatten on the quiet, as he knew he would never have gotten approval from the Joint Chiefs. So he could only plan on using Combined Ops Cmd air and naval assets initially. By the time the Chiefs got to know about it, it was already taking on water….A complete and utter FUBAR…hence he was promoted out of trouble to the FE where he had no actual forces to command…

In his diary Allenbrooke records a conversation with Marshall around February 1942 when Marshall proposed a landing in the Contentin during the summer. The intention would have been to hold a beachhead over the winter. Marshall suggested that the US could contribute only 2 1/2 divisions to the landing. Allenbrooke was unimpressed, particularly when Marshall could not say in which direction allied forces would seek to advance when the bridgehead was expanded.

Mid 1942 was the high water mark for the Axis powers and as others have pointed out the US army needed to learn how to fight Germans. The peace time army was very small and inevitably it would take time to expand and train effective leaders. Short answer is a landing in France in 1942 would have been a disaster and a major set back to the allied cause. One also wonders what impact a bloody reversal at that stage in the war might have had on public opinion in the US.

Not pretty, that's for sure

The Dieppe 'raid' was only described as such after the event, to save face. Part of the problem was that it was run by Mountbatten on the quiet, as he knew he would never have gotten approval from the Joint Chiefs. So he could only plan on using Combined Ops Cmd air and naval assets initially. By the time the Chiefs got to know about it, it was already taking on water….A complete and utter FUBAR…hence he was promoted out of trouble to the FE where he had no actual forces to directly command…

What would have happened if the Allies had invaded *Norway* in 1942?

Allied air and naval superiority could have cut Scandanavia off from German reinforcements. With a friendly population, the Americans could have built a factory and used that to build up forces in Europe…oh wait, I'm playing Axis & Allies again.

Would have added a year or more to the war.

Sparker what on earth do you think the objective was, an invasion? The aim was to test the feasibility of seizing a defended port, and to demolish the facilities. The belief was that Dieppe could be held long enough for this to be achieved with an orderly evacuation possible afterwards.

It's official; I hate this damn Kindle Fire. Almost impossible to type with and a predictive text function that fails to recognise most of the words I use.

Land, hit specific targets, and withdraw; without any follow on forces.

Sure sounds like a raid to me…

Some Chicken if you finish the word it will appear in the predictive text. Click that and it will remember yourword for you.

Logistically it was not possible to invade in 1942. The intention (read desire) was for 1943, however the Med theatre for a number of reasons took centre stage in 43 and Overlord was pushed into '44.

There was a tension in the Allied camp regarding these two fronts as the British wanted to expand the Med front and the U.S. wanted a landing in France for reasons of making a direct and shorter drive into Germany. The U.S. felt that the British desire to run the med campaign was influenced by their 'imperial' agenda.

There is much to throw into the equation, the Russian front, training, resources, supplies, turning economies over to a 'total war' footing, the Battle of the Atlantic, Italy, sustaining the Med war etc etc

On the plus side, the Germans would be nowhere as well-equipped as they were in 1944. Facing a mix of French tanks, Panzer III and IV.

Much better to let the Germans bleed in Russia for two years.
What Dieppe showed was that the allies could not land and take a port. That meant landing across beaches and had the same risks as deterred the Germans in 1940, a storm in the channel and the invasion is a disaster. The British could have cut off a German invasion force in 1940 as has been said the Germans could o the same with U oats and air in 1942.

So it wold have been a disaster.

If I remember right, there would have been no where near that many German units recovering in France or much of any defenses on the beach.

Funny enough, this came up in a rather interesting discussion in my ILE(formerly known as Command and General Staff College) assignment for Op TORCH.

Let's see… I think the proper word is… debacle.

Yes, that's it.

Debacle.

Eric

The Yanks did not know what they did not know. North Africa and Sicily and Italy showed them. Good thing we learned.

Agreed. The US forces learned and learned quickly after the Torch landings and Sidi Bou Zid, which was impressive. It probably might not have have gone so well on a beachhead on mainland Europe…

I read this as "Aliens" at first. I thought that it would depend on what tech they had.

Sparker what on earth do you think the objective was, an invasion? The aim was to test the feasibility of seizing a defended port, and to demolish the facilities. The belief was that Dieppe could be held long enough for this to be achieved with an orderly evacuation possible afterwards.

No, and correct.

Land, hit specific targets, and withdraw; without any follow on forces.

Sure sounds like a raid to me…

Again, correct.

Thank you Gentlemen for your statements of the blindingly obvious.

If you are disagreeing with me that the term 'raid' was only used after the operation to cover up the scale of the fiasco, please furnish references to any documents or statement whatsoever made BEFORE the Operation describing it as such….

Gawd help me but I agree with Sparker!

Bloody shambles springs to mind as an apt term…..

What landing craft and troops could the US have delivered in 42? I was under the impression that it pretty much took until 1944 to have enough landing craft and all the other stuff to make an opposed landing.

Or would you prefer a comparison to Seelowe?

Charlie would have been dancing quite the Foxtrot, to abuse a Schlock Mercenary joke.

There was a genuine concern that Russia would fold, so can see why strategically it was contemplated, but with the strategic bombing campaign in its infancy, Luftwaffe would have had air superiority in France, and combined with U-boat campaign would have made things very tough, even if allies had had the land resources they had in '44, which they didn't.

If a major effort had gone into a failed landing, who knows what would have happened in Egypt – Rommel in Cairo, relieving pressure on Caucasus and pushing allies out of Med, solving axis oil problem in one go….

Messy

Always a dilemma when playing Third Reich / World in Flames / Hearts of Iron… I always find myself waiting another few months until 'x' is ready, or 'y' is finished.
I guess if I'd been in charge, the Red Army would have made it to the Channel while I waited for another 12 battleships to be built.

1942 impossible – not enough ships to ship the troops and not enough hardware, aircraft etc.

1943 is a closer call. Possible to mount an invasion but I think very chancy. I'd give the Germans about a 1 in 3 chance of winning in 1943. 1 in 100 in 1944.

It was smart to wait but not very fair on the Soviets (who were allies only by virtue of the common enemy) or on the occupied countries who had to suffer another 12 months of occupation.

Churchill supposedly wanted to delay even longer…but perhaps that is just propaganda.

Dippe was considered the test inorder to proof that the forces are not ready.

A more interesting Q is: how would to world today look like if the invasion would have been postphoned to 45???

Wow that is a big question.

Chances are the Red Army would have been well on its way to rolling right through Germany on its own anyhow by the end of '44. Op BAGRATION certainly went well enought…

Getting into wierd territory now…but would they have used the A bombs on, say, Hamburg and Nuremburg?

I know, no different really from firestorming Dresden and flattening Berlin, but still wierd….

"Always a dilemma when playing Third Reich"

In both IIIR and Hitlers War, I never saw a 42 invasion of Europe, it was just impossible given the available shipping, air cover and force ratios. I have seen the odd late 43 invasion, but the most popular choice by far was 44. The Allies just need ages to build up their industrial output before they can sustain the huge resource consumption required by a continental war, particularly if relying on overwhelming airpower to lead the way. Crushing the Luftwaffe is an expensive business.

One long shot but potentially viable option in the IIIR 1942 scenario was for the _Germans_ to invade Britain! Yes, I have seen it done. It was much easier in 2nd ed than 3rd ed. though.

wrt a 45 invasion, interesting idea. It would partly depend on the balance of forces allocated to each theatre. Hitler was determined to stop the Allied invasion while trading space for time in the east, so it is unlikely they would station many fewer forces in France, but operational reserves (e.g. IInd SS Panzer Corps, the panzer brigades etc) might well have been sent east rather than west.

The Germans couldn't hold France in 44 even with all the stuff they put in, the limited reserves they might have available in 44 in a 45 invasion scenario might slow the Sovs up a bit (or get fried trying to retake Budapest, as happened irl) but as Sparker says, the most likely scenario is the Allies link up with their Sov pals on the Rhine instead of the Elbe.

Was that the motivation for launching in 1944 rather than waiting until 1945 – to prevent the Soviets from grabbing most of Europe?
As far as I am aware, there was no detailed knowledge of the sheer horrors of what was happening inside Hitler's Europe, so I don't think that was a motivation? I might well be wrong on that, so please let me know.
Or was there a fear the Soviets would slow their advance / stop unless the Allies launched D-Day in '44?
Or was it simply a case of 'now or never' and a need to get on with it?

Martin Rapier

I can't remember ever seeing a successful one in 1942, but have seen all manner of things attempted.

I don't know that the 45 invasion quite hands Europe to the Soviets. Invasion of France is only feasible in the summer so there are eight months or so when the German general staff know that the Western Allies are not coming. That enables a Manstein to create a force to use in Russia. Although the Russians have huge superiority they don't perform that well when the Germans can manage to concentrate so we would have to allow a chance that Russian Front holds.
For example aren't there 300,000 troops in Norway? if so 250,000 of them could be moved East. Whilst Hitler may have lost it the Germans still have a lot of good generals and some good kit.
So no, I would not just say that a delay til 45 leaves the Russians on the Rhine.

42 would have been a long shot but it could have been attempted. There were enough ships and landing craft to do the Torch landings, after all. German defenses except around the ports were non-existant in 42 and since they weren't expecting an invasion there weren't all that many German divisions in France. The Allies had air superiority over the Channel, but the Luftwaffe could have still made a fight of it. US lack of experience would have been a major weakness. If they didn't make the Dieppe mistake of trying to land AT a port they almost certainly could have gotten ashore. Whether they could have stayed ashore is another question.

43 is a much, much better bet. There's a good book on the subject (I think it's titled "Second Front Now" or some such) which looks at the question in detail. The Allies are much better prepared. Landing craft are no problem, there are plenty of them available (when the decision was made to go to Italy instead of France, General Marshall was so peeved he sent huge numbers of them to the Pacific and that was the reason for the shortage in 44) The Husky landings in Sicily were actually larger than Overlord in terms of numbers of divisions put ashore on the first day. By 43 the Allies had total control of the air over the Channel. And the German Army was at a low ebb in the fall of 1943. Hitler's failure to fully mobilize German resources early on came to the crunch in the middle of 43. They had fewer men, tanks and divisions ready for action than at any point in the war until the very end. The divisions in France were mostly second line or rebuilding and there was virtually no armor. The Atlantic Wall was still mostly a fantasy. A 43 invasion of France probably could have worked.

As far as I am aware, there was no detailed knowledge of the sheer horrors of what was happening inside Hitler's Europe, so I don't think that was a motivation?

Jan Karski gave a detailed and accurate report from Poland to the highest levels of the Allied governments and command. It was known.

A desire to stop the V weapons had a part on the 44 decision

This thread reminds me of a story that I've heard over and over:
In the 1970s somewhere in Britain Sealion, the planned German invasion of England in 1940, was gamed out, by professions. The invasion failed, not at sea, or on the beaches as most would have predicted, but inland where the Germans were defeated by the Home Guard and what remained of the other Commonwealth forces after Dunkirk. The results, of course, surprised all in attendance, and completely conflicted with the conventional wisdom for how the campaign was expected to end.

The point here being, conventional wisdom says the Western Allies should not have invaded until 1944 and a 1942 or 43 invasion would have ended badly for the invaders. I'm curious how it would look if actually gamed out. Just as importantly, in my mind, I'm curious how often the Allies win when gamed out multiple times.

Many years ago I had the privilege of being at a reunion of The Saskatchewan Regiment survivors of Dieppe.
What they had to say about the landing, I cannot place on this forum as it would be bleeped out.

Needless to say the few who were there, were not impressed with the high command and all of them thought is was a complete waste. "Complete Balls Up" one said.

@Zippy….

I wrote a long post and deleted it but basically the allies knew – didn't much care – and there was little they could do anyway. It is hard for us today to imagine the depth and breadth of antisemitism pre-holocaust. It just wasn't an issue weighing heavily on the decision makers minds.

It is easy to embark on a throw of the dice in a wargame but when it is real lives you are dealing with you wait until the odds are stacked in your favour – unless you have no other choice.

1944 was about right. 1943 would have been too risky. They only had one go. Dieppe certainly had an influence too.

I don't think it hurt Allied war aims much by delaying until 1944. The Soviets were able to advance further and faster due to the German focus on Normandy/Bulge. No allied invasion then no sweeping Soviet advance in late 1944 – just a gradual grinding forward.

It would make an interesting what if but I think there are too many unknowns.

As for landing craft etc I understand a lot were smuggled to the PTO in violation of the Europe first strategy – which can't have helped.

If you are disagreeing with me that the term 'raid' was only used after the operation to cover up the scale of the fiasco, please furnish references to any documents or statement whatsoever made BEFORE the Operation describing it as such….

How about Allenbrooke's diaries?

13 May 1942 – "Main interest of morning's COS was examination of proposed large scale raid in the vicinity of Dieppe"

30 June 1942 – "Arrived there [10 Downing Street] to discuss the large raid which is to be carried out next Saturday morning on Dieppe"

19 August 1942 – "Back to Embassy to read recent telegrams about Dieppe Raid"

Skarper is right, except that the reason for not getting concerned by reports of the holocaust was not anti semitism, it was that the allies had priorities of their own. Those were always going to come first. The Germans were massacring people all over Europe and the allies were not scheduling invasions to prevent it. They were much more concerned not to lose the war and not to be the leader who launched a failed invasion than any humanitarian considerations.

The holocaust has become the exemplar of such crimes partly because its survivors and co religionists are rich articulate people, partly because the industrialisation of death makes such an horrific impression. We don't have pictures of dead Chinese being scooped up by dozers.

Jarrovian makes a good point about V weapons. I am sure that Germany's continued assault on civilians in the UK played a part in the decision to bomb places such as Dresden. The Germans had lost and should have surrendered, continuing the pointless killing put them beyond the pale.

"Was that the motivation for launching in 1944 rather than waiting until 1945 – to prevent the Soviets from grabbing most of Europe?"

I think the main desire was to engage and destroy the main body of enemy forces on the western front as soon as possible. But, as above, arranging a multi-million man invasion was a fairly large undertaking, so probably not wise to make a 50:50 throw in 1943:)

1942 is very interesting however, it is the key year in which the tide turned (to quote the big man). And the story started very badly – from the great Soviet disasters at Kharkov and in the Crimea to Gazala and the fall of Tobruk, to Battle of the Atlantic, Dieppe and the disasters in Malaya, Burma and the Phillipines. Clearly something happened however – by summer the Russians were causing the germans problems in the Don bend and Caucasus, the British were holding out in Malta and cutting the supply lines to North Africa and holding the Germans at the 1st Battle of El Alamein, the first 1,000 bomber raid took place over Cologne and the US won a stunning victory at Midway. Soon combined US and Australian forces had halted the Japanese advance in Papua New Guinea too. By the winter the tide turned completely at Stalingrad, El Alamein and the Torch landings.

The key factors were in my view the US joining the struggle and providng material to both the Commonwealth and USSR and the Soviets and British buying enough time in their winter counter-offensives of 1941-2 (Moscow and Crusader) to keep on fighting in '42. What 1942 shows clearly is that the Germans really had to finish things off in 1941, because time was on the allies side not thiers. The longer the war dragged on, with command of the Atlantic, Meditterranean and much of the Eastrern Pacific and Indian Ocean trading routes (the Japanese really had bitten off far more than they could chew), the allies had access to all the resources they needed to fight a long war, whereas the axis would gradually run out.

If you are disagreeing with me that the term 'raid' was only used after the operation to cover up the scale of the fiasco, please furnish references to any documents or statement whatsoever made BEFORE the Operation describing it as such….
How about Allenbrooke's diaries?

13 May 1942 – "Main interest of morning's COS was examination of proposed large scale raid in the vicinity of Dieppe"

30 June 1942 – "Arrived there [10 Downing Street] to discuss the large raid which is to be carried out next Saturday morning on Dieppe"

19 August 1942 – "Back to Embassy to read recent telegrams about Dieppe Raid"

Thanks mate, interesting point, and references I had completely missed, so I'm grateful.

However, I'm not sure these unofficial private diary entries completely blow my argument that the term 'raid' was introduced later to minimise the scale of the defeat.

The initial planning documents didn't describe it as such…

I can think of other interesting scenarios! What if the Germans has not wasted effort in invading and occupying Norway? Mauled their navy, tied up 350,000 troops, tied up several Luftflottes; only achieved marginal success against Murmansk convoys, which wouldn't have need to exist if the Germans weren't in Norway! The same effort would have probably won them Britain!