"For a distant observer, commenting on alternatives to the DDG Flight III would be difficult without the well written documents by Congressional Research Service writer Ronald O¡¯Rourke. His Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress lists most of the program¡¯s considered possible alternatives, reducing the scope of the issue to selecting evaluation criteria and identifying a specific solution. Besides the considered options there is also a recommendation that could broaden the scope of the discussion:
Conduct a thorough [Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)] in accordance with DOD acquisition guidance for its future surface combatant program to include:
(c) implications of the ability of the preferred ship to accommodate new technologies on future capabilities to determine the most suitable ship to carry [The Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)] and meet near-term [Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)] requirements and provide a path to far-term capabilities;
(d) implications on future fleet composition;
With the gradual disappearance of frigates from the Navy¡¯s service, the truncation of DDG-1000 to three units, and LCS under critics¡¯ fire, Arleigh Burke is slowly becoming the sole ¡°can-do-all¡± class of surface combatant. There is an interesting critique of a homogenous ship class force structure related to the history of the Canadian Navy, with the judgment rendered thus:
¡°Force structure planners should be aware that the history of the RCN shows that naval flexibility cannot be derived from a uniform fleet.¡±
The author, Kenneth Hansen further elaborates his thesis in another article, concluding that ¡°If the strategic context is complicated, changing, or uncertain, a diversified fleet structure is required.¡± Armed with such knowledge, let¡¯s step back and reconsider Navy assumptions for its old Future Surface Combatant Program. This envisioned:
• – A DD(X) destroyer for the precision long-range strike and naval gunfire missions;
• – A CG(X) cruiser for the air defense and ballistic missile defense missions; and
• – A smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter submarines, small surface attack craft (boat swarms), and mines in heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas.
Many things have caused the cruiser as originally conceived to become unaffordable, the destroyer (DDG-1000) has grown to the cruiser¡¯s price and size, and LCS is suffering badly from a lack of operable modules. But the concept itself is not dead. The original requirements, changed under the pressures of the economy and a drive for efficiency, asked for an AMDR with a relative capability described as ¡°SPY+30.¡± The new solution for DDG Flight III has a relative capability of ¡°SPY +15¡å, called in a GAO report ¡°marginally adequate¡°. At the same time Ronald O¡¯Rourke reports states:
As part of the [Maritime Air and Missile Defense of Joint Forces (MAMDJF)] AOA, the Navy identified that DDG 1000 can accommodate a SPY+25 radar. As part of a technical submission to the Navy, BIW, the lead designer for DDG 1000 also identified a possible design for a 21-foot radar on DDG 1000. The Navy did not include a variant with this size radar in the Radar/Hull Study…"
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Amicalement
Armand
makes flight stands for 1/300 scale aircraft.
