"Myth of Robert E. Lee" Topic

I agree with everything vtsaogames says above.

Ultimately, Jeff Davis was the primary reason for Confederate defeat, and his first mistake was firing on Fort Sumter.

Whenever there's a discussion of why the south lost, I'm reminded of a quote from the late, great Jack Palance as ex-Confederate Capt. Quincey Whitmore in Chato's Land:

"They had more… more men, more guns, more food, more luck. You know, when I look back at it, I know now that it was there for the seeing… except we didn't see it."

Pretty much sums it up. It took the Union a couple years to get its war machine tuned up but once it did, nothing could keep it from steamrolling the Confederacy. IMHO, regardless of the competence of its leaders, the south lost before it ever fired on Fort Sumter

CHuDWah;

I know the South saw that they were overmatched by the North. They could do the math. They placed their hope in discouraging the North to quit before they were buried by the North's massive numbers of everything.

And the first two years of the war in the east tended to suggest that they might be able to pull it off.

Generals like Lee wrote about it and realized it was a race against time to force a favorable result.

I think we can say that the Confederacy lost the war in the West, BUT, they had a chance to win it in the EAST. If Lee had continued to win major victories there, Northern (and international) opinion almost certainly would have eventually turned against the administration and a negotiated peace based on Southern independence could have followed. Lee came very close to that in 1862 but was stymied at Antietam, and then came close again in the summer of 1864 at the height of the Overland campaign. There the Union (and the presidential election) was probably saved by good news from Sherman at Atlanta. It is vital to remember that military events were intertwined with public opinion. Lee was a master at giving the Confederate people what they wanted--big victories that killed lots of Yankees. It has been argued by Gary Gallagher that because Lee understood this link between the civil and the military, the ANV became THE major unifying institution of the Confederacy and kept most of the population supporting the war for four very long years. However, this success inevitably came at a frightful cost in manpower which eventually could not be sustained.

Billy Yank

What I came away with is the notion that after the battle of Antietam Lee should have been relieved of his command (perhaps "promoted" to a desk job) while McClellan should have faced a court-martial followed by a public flogging. Obviously the respective administrations cannot be expected to have Omnipotently known that Lee blundered his army into what should have been a hopeless situation and that he was only saved by the fact that he faced a criminally incompetent foe.

Yes, and yes.

There's no military reason other than McClellan's tactical incompetence that Lee's army made it off the battlefield.

McLaddie:

No doubt the south realized they were overmatched – the Hollywood dialog might have been more accurate as "except we ignored it." But their hope of discouraging the north was a forlorn one. Confederate apologists claim the war was a defense of states rights but it was about slavery. That's the "right" they were defending – read the "Declaration of Causes" documents issued by four of the secessionist states (Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina and Texas). Neither the south nor the abolitionists would give on the issue. Lincoln was an abolitionist but his first concern was restoration of the union. He would not compromise on the latter and, given political pressure, could not compromise on the former. Although it took the Union a while to get it together, the point is the south was doomed from the start because the north wouldn't/couldn't quit and it had the resources to win by attrition, if nothing else.

But their hope of discouraging the north was a forlorn one. Confederate apologists claim the war was a defense of states rights but it was about slavery.

CHuDWah:

I wasn't talking about 'why' they were fighting, [slavery was certainly a core issue] or whether the South actually had a 'fighting chance' of winning. I was simply identifying what many Southerners, knowing the industrial might and overwhelming numbers the North enjoyed, was their best chance of success overall. From what I have read, they were right in seeing international recognition and breaking the Union's will to conquer as their best hopes of success.

The odds for them accomplishing those goals is anyone's guess, but from the sounds of it, Mr. Alexander hasn't identified them.

CHuDWah:

I think one of the things the Confederacy had going for it in the war was the divisions within the U.S. Yes abolitionists were committed, but research suggests that abolitionism wasn't that strong, even in the north. Also even within abolitionists there was a group that was content to say "good riddance" when southern states started leaving. Part of the genius of Lincoln was his ability to build and hold together a coalition so that the U.S. actually devoted enough of its resources to win the war.

One argument that I have with Jackson's Total War idea was that it would have more likely united the U.S. against the Confederacy than it would have caused the U.S. to seek peace.

McLaddie and Bill N:

I hope I'm not beating a dead horse but this is an interesting discussion. I do understand what you're saying and I don't disagree. What I'm saying is:

1. The south would not give up slavery.
2. Lincoln would not give up reunification. Although he was an abolitionist, he would have agreed to a compromise that preserved slavery, at least in some form, if the union was restored. But that would have been political suicide because…
3. The abolitionists would not give up, well…abolition. They might have tolerated the Confederacy as a separate nation of slaveholding states but they would not allow them back into the union as such.

To achieve his reunification objective, Lincoln had no choice other than prosecuting the war to force the south to abolish slavery and return to the union. Yes, there was northern opposition, even among abolitionists, but he was able to pull it off in spite of that.

The Confederacy may have pinned its hope on international assistance. But the countries that might have helped had already abolished slavery, at least nominally. Some had trade relationships with the south and rendered unofficial aid in the form of materiel, etc (although the Union blockade decreased the effectiveness of that). But they would not risk international disapproval by recognizing a slaveholding country.

So, the north (or at least Lincoln) would not quit the war and the south did not have the domestic or international resources to win. That's why I say the Confederacy was defeated before it ever fired the first shot. It may have known it was overmatched but it was shortsighted in underestimating Union resolve and overestimating international intervention. Maybe the "except we didn't see it" quote is accurate after all.

All this is far afield from the OP but it is relevant. Lee (as well as other commanders on both sides) made mistakes and his mistakes may have hastened the Confederacy's demise. But the point is, he did not single-handedly lose the war.

CHuDWah:

Understood and generally agree. I think that Lee simply didn't face the same situation that say Grant did.

Lee didn't hasten the end of the war. If you look at the territory won on the western front over the course of the war compared to the eastern front, Lee did about as well as could be expected. If the West hadn't been lost, neither would the Eastern Theatre.

That isn't to say Lee didn't make mistakes. He admits a number of them. All the generals made them. The problem was his situation was one where his mistakes had a heavier pricetag than say Grant's. And Lee had to win big and continue to win big for the South to have any chance of success. He had to take bigger risks and with the South's shortage of men and material, each failure told far more than the Northern Generals.

After one year of war, Lee has Antietam and Grant Shiloh. The death of Johnson and the arrival of Buell saved Grant's bacon. There was no help for Lee.

Two years into the way Lee has Pickett's Charge, lossing 6,000 men in about an hour. Six months later, Grant has Cold Harbor and loses 7,000 in twenty minutes, and then does it again with 2nd Cold Harbor. [Talk about not learning from one's mistakes… at least Lee didn't have more than one Pickett's Charge…] Not much is said about that other than Grant earning the moniker "Butcher", because Grant and the Union could 'afford' mistakes like that, which Lee couldn't.

Different situations, different strategic demands.

Bill

"As my history teacher and Civil War nut told us, the North was fighting the war with both hands tied behind it's back, at least early on – if the south had seriously threatened the North the gloves would have come off."

I believe the quote is from Shelby Foote.

In the pictorial history of the Civil War that accompanied Ken Burns's film documentary, for example, Shelby Foote pronounced the Confederate bid for independence doomed from the start. "I think that the North fought that war with one hand behind its back," observed Foote. If the Confederacy ever had come close to winning on the battlefield, "the North simply would have brought that other arm out from behind its back. I don't think the South ever had a chance to win that war."

In my opinion the south had several avenues for winning the war. Diplomatically through recognition by Britain and France followed by a mediated peace or some form of military aid beyond blockade running, perhaps even direct war between the USA and Britain. Although the British government's policy was to remain outside of the conflict it could have changed this course at any time as it almost did over the Trent affair. I'm not saying the good old USA couldn't have won a simultaneous war with Britain, France and the CSA but it would have been hard pressed to do so. Napoleon III's France was eager to make a deal with the CSA in return for help in Mexico, but would not do so unless Britain were also on board. Perhaps he could have been convinced otherwise. The wisdom of striking an alliance with the eras biggest loser is perhaps another question.

It could have won politically simply by having George McClellan elected president in 1864. In order for this to happen the northern public would have had to have been displeased with the Lincoln administration. Any number of scenarios could have brought this about. Imagine that the rebel army were to decisively defeat the union army and proceed to cut off Washington DC. In a panic the Lincoln government abandons the city for New York. Even without physically capturing the city it strikes a mortal blow to the Lincoln government's standing in the eyes of the people. Lincoln understood the symbolic importance of losing the capitol and retained a large garrison army to guard it through most of the war.

Had Lee marched to Baltimore or even to Philly and burned it to the ground, it would have had grave political repercussions for Lincoln. I know that wasn't Lee's style. And before you say that it couldn't have been done, who would stop it? The same union army that almost always moved at a snails pace? All the militia men that would have been thrown in Lee's way? They would have been slaughtered. How can folks accept the reality of Sherman's march through Georgia without supply lines yet think a rebel army couldn't make the modest march to Philadelphia? The only thing I can imagine even slowing it down would be burned bridges.

I would say that the south lost because it lacked guile. Jefferson Davis was at heart a straight forward army man. He faced a former rail road lawyer, enough said. The Lincoln administration, and I think to a degree unimaginable in a modern president Lincoln himself, continually adapted to the real political situation as the war progressed. Davis did not. He clung to the twin ideas of foreign intervention and loss of northern public support for the war. When these were obvious failures he did not adapt.

The CSA was a lot less overmatched than George Washington's forces in the Revolutionary War, and won a lot more battles too. Yes, it could have worked, and almost did – the south didn't have to win, all it had to do was stay in existence long enough.

What doomed the Confederacy was the diplomatic failure to get French or British military support – not so much ground troops, but naval escorts to break the federal blockade

I think we can identify the main chances the Confederates had to win, what the actual odds of them actually winning can't be determined, particularly when it involved so many different groups and how they would react in different circumstances.

Whether Shelby is right or not, whether the South had a better chance than Washington's forces we will never know.

What doomed the Confederacy was the diplomatic failure to get French or British military support

I'd modify that slightly: What doomed the Confederacy was the mistaken idea they were ever going to get it. France never intended to do anything if Britain didn't and Britain was never going stand behind a slave holding State.

The Trent affair was putting down a marker on international commerce and freedom of the seas upon which Britain was completely dependent. Once that had been sorted out, politics in Britain ensured there would be no intervention.

The British might have been interested in making a few Pounds out of the war where possible but the transfer of cotton production to India meant the South had nothing to offer and failed to grasp the fact.

We tend to discuss these matters in terms of 'what ifs'.

What if McCellan had been elected – he wasn't. What if the British and French intervened – they didn't.

Personally, I think it more realistic to examine what the combatants knew at the start or things they could be certain of as events unfolded in order to judge if the South could have won rather than use speculation.

Those in the South with more brain than bluster knew that they needed to win and win quick. With every day after Bull Run the strategic chances reduced and they were left hoping things would turn up that didn't. You can't win a war trusting things will turn out for the best.

I personally would not blame Lee for the South's defeat – not because I see him as a paragon of military virtue – if there had been someone with half a brain in charge of the Union at Antietam, we wouldn't be having this discussion but because there were so many reasons to loose that were outside the control of anyone man.

I personally would not blame Lee for the South's defeat – not because I see him as a paragon of military virtue – if there had been someone with half a brain in charge of the Union at Antietam, we wouldn't be having this discussion but because there were so many reasons to loose that were outside the control of anyone man.

;-j If there had been someone with half a brain in charge of the Union, Lee wouldn't have stood and waited at Antietam. He would have cut his losses and run after his complete set of orders were discovered. He says so.

Let's see we have one side who's economy was industrialising at a rapid rate during a time rapid technological change. They had a larger population and a higher GDP.

The other side had had planatation agriculure dependent upon exports – and no indiginous sea power.

An economist, like myself, will tell you that that scenario is not going to end well for the South…..

How can folks accept the reality of Sherman's march through Georgia without supply lines yet think a rebel army couldn't make the modest march to Philadelphia? The only thing I can imagine even slowing it down would be burned bridges.

You answered your own question. To get to Philly, Lee needed to cross the Susquehanna. The Federals burned the bridge in Jubal Early's face, and Lee's only pontoon bridge was back at Falling Waters on the Potomac.

Also, the AoP wasn't always slow. It did some powerful marching on the way to Gettysburg.

An economist, like myself, will tell you that that scenario is not going to end well for the South…..

Sort of like the AWR and Vietnam war… ;-7 Economics are critical and often decisive, but not the only telling factor. That's the problem here. The factors are telling, but not wholly predictive.

I do not have a good idea of how easy it would be to cross the Susquehanna river but here is a tid-bit I found on its wiki entry:

"During the Civil War's 1863 Gettysburg Campaign, the commander of the Department of the Susquehanna, Union Major General Darius N. Couch, resolved that Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia would not cross the Susquehanna. He positioned militia units under Maj. Granville Haller to protect key bridges in Harrisburg and Wrightsville, as well as nearby fords. Confederate forces approached the river at several locations in Cumberland and York counties but were recalled on June 29 when Lee chose to concentrate his army to the west."

From this I gather that the river is fordable. I would assume that it would be low enough to cross by the month of July. Of course, it could also serve as a trap once you were across if those fords were blocked by the Union army.

If Lee had attempted a march on Philadelphia I imagine the Union response would have been to transport every able bodied man from all theaters by rail to the area to block him. Could they have gotten there in time? Would denuding the west have turned the tide there in favor of the Confederacy? I can only assume it would. Would militia have posed any kind of threat or impediment to the ANV? I admit there are a lot of what ifs here, but interesting what ifs and within the realm of possibility.

Upon further digging on the net I gather that the Susquehanna was in flood at the time so fording the river is out.

"in June 1863 John Gordon led a brigade of Georgians in Jubal A. Early's division during the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania. His brigade occupied Wrightsville on the Susquehanna River, the farthest east in Pennsylvania any organized Confederate troops would reach. Union militia under Col. Jacob G. Frick burned the mile-and-a-quarter-long covered wooden bridge to prevent Gordon from crossing the river, and the fire soon spread to parts of Wrightsville. Gordon's troops formed a bucket brigade and managed to prevent the further destruction of the town."

Maybe attempting a crossing of that broad river, pontoons or not, would have been a bad idea. Best stick to threatening Baltimore or Washington.

This thread is worth a read:

link

If there had been someone with half a brain in charge of the Union, Lee wouldn't have stood and waited at Antietam. He would have cut his losses and run after his complete set of orders were discovered. He says so.

He's just gone up in my estimation as a Poker player! :o)

"Thank you Gray Ghost.

I apologise unreservedly to all for any inference that I made in my earlier post about revisionist historian applying to Mr Alexander personally, in view of his impressive Service and Combat record.

(Dontcha hate it when people confuse you with the facts!)"

Surely his service history, or otherwise is irrelevant? What he writes and how he uses his evidence is what is important, not his background.

Britain was never going to intervene on the side of the Confederacy as long as Slavery existed. Some Brit politicians were favourable to the concept of self-determination, and thus favoured the aspirations of the South, but the British people were firmly against Slavery and would never have supported a government that wanted to support it. Brit industry was happy to trade with the South; industry and commerce, of course, has no conscience or morality. But intervene? Never. Of course, if the North's maritime policy had continued vis a vis the Trent affair, the UK may well have used military force against the North, but only in defence of it's maritime trade, not in favour of the CSA.

I'm not going to enter this debate directly but I only want to point out one quote. This is of Gen George Pickett when asked, after the war, why the South Lost. He said "I do believe the Yankees had something to do with it."

The point of that is not to delve into this issue or that issue, but I want to bring up a very hackneyed cliche- that "Victory has a Thousand Fathers, but Defeat is an orphan."

But wait…

If truth be told, most often defeat has a thousand fathers too, though they all decline paternity. Up and down the line history is a concatenation of human mistakes or correct guesses and all, more or less, share in the blame equally. If the South did not choose to see the material discrepency, keep in mind that it was not one, but millions who did not care to see it. If many trusted (vainly) in European intervention it was a myth many bought into. Likewise in the North there were misconceptions and mistakes-- There is, in fact, blame enough for all.

At some point we have to get beyond this endless recapitulation and re-evaluation and just accept it as it was. Here, let me ask this.

Does it really MATTER where the war was lost or who lost it? If you could find such a culprit, we're not going to dig up his coffin and beat on his bones? Is there any point in speculating what the country might have looked like had the South won? Yeah it might be nice to think that if Sherman hadn't marched to the sea great gran-pappy's plantation would still be a standing- well you hope- ants, termites, dry rot, mildew and the wastage of years are more implacable than Billy Sherman, and then who could you blame?

If there is a lesson to be learned from the Civil War it is that as McPherson says in "Battle Cry of Freedom" by the 1860's the issue of slavery had worked its tendrils into everything and no issue, from expansion in the west, internal developments, tarriffs, industrialization banking, social intercourse etc,immigration, labor movements, could be talked of without recourse to slavery, and the arguments had become so polarized by the slavery question that all possibility of compromize, all possibility of deal making, all flexibility had gone out of the American political system. What ensued was a terrible and destructive war, the war of the thousand fathers as it were.

It is a timely reminder to us today where daily, the flexibility, tolerance and ability to make a deal likewise seems to be draining out of the American political system and everything is becoming a single issue on which no compromise anywhere except the complete surrender of the otherside can be tolerated, and each side demonizes the other.

Yes, I think such questions are worth asking. It is worthwhile exploring not only what did happen but what might have happened had someone made a different decision. If for no other reason than to see what we narrowly missed, be if for good or ill.

if i could have made one "easy" change for the south. Get someone between Lee And Davis to actually run the war

DonL:

Yes, it worthwhile.

link

Gentlemen. I just attended the annual Ed Bearrs lecture at BRCWRT. On the Second Day at Gettysburg despite the loss of command and control which caused the detour to Round Top and Devil's Den (not the Confederate objectives)the Confederate army came so very close to winning the battle of Gettysburg in the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield having chewed up almost everything Hancock had available, it wasn't funny. Longstreet called it the finest four? hours of battle of the ANV he had ever seen. No wonder he was so reluctant on the third day to order Pickett's Charge. Not Lee's best decision IMHO. So if Lee's objective to move north up the pike and not east had been followed to the letter, if Ewell had attacked Culp's Hill at the time of Longstreet's assault y'all would be speaking Southern. No longer do I believe that Chamberlain saved the Union at Little Round Top, but it's a great story none the less.I also think Lee did wonders with his lieutenants. (Prima Donnas). Hey, I lived in DS Freeman Hall at college. I've got to believe that.

He won a lot of battles he shouldn't have. Other than that the south had no shot.

"y'all would be speaking Southern"

that made me laugh. :-)

The real reason the South lost the Civil War – U.S. Grant.

Very true, that.