"Kershaw's view of Gettysburg " Topic

This is Brig.Gen.Kershaw's report on the 2nd Day at Gettysburg.

I thought it gives a nice view of what it was like to be a Brigade Commander and what you needed to be aware of as one during a battle in the Civil War.

Worth thinking about in our games.

"After some little delay, the major-general commanding returned, and directed a countermarch, and the command was marched to the left, beyond the point at which we had before halted, and thence, under cover of the woods, to the right of our line of battle.

Arriving at the school-house, on the road leading across the Emmitsburg road by the peach orchard, then in possession of the enemy, the lieutenant-general commanding directed me to advance my brigade and attack the enemy at that point, turn his flank, and extend along the cross-road, with my left resting toward the Emmitsburg road.

At the same time a battery of artillery was moved along the road parallel with my line of march. About 3 p.m. the head of my column came into the open field in front of a stone wall, and in view of the enemy. I immediately filed to the right along and in front of the wall, and formed line of battle under cover of my skirmishers, then engaged with those of the enemy, these extending along the Emmitsburg road.

In the meantime, examining the position of the enemy, I found him to be in superior force in the orchard, supported by artillery, with a main line of battle intrenched in the rear and extending to and upon the rocky mountain to his left far beyond the point at which his flank had supposed to rest. To carry out my instructions, would have been, if successful in driving him from the orchard, to present my own right and rear to a large portion of his line of battle. I therefore communicated the position of things to the major-general commanding, and placed my line in position under cover of the stone wall.

Along this wall the division was then formed, Semmes in reserve to me and Barksdale on my left, supported by Wofford, in reserve. Artillery was also placed along the wall to my right, and Colonel De Saussure's Fifteenth South Carolina Regiment was thrown beyond it to protect it. Hood's division was then moving in our rear toward our right, to gain the enemy's left flank, and I was directed to commence the attack so soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging around toward the peach orchard, and at the same time establishing connection with Hood, on my right, and co-operating with him. It was understood he was to sweep down the enemy's line in a direction perpendicular to our then line of battle. I was told that Barksdale would move with me and conform to my movement.

These directions I received in various messages from the lieutenant-general and the major-general commanding, and in part by personal communication with them. In my center front was a stone house, and to the left of it a stone barn, both about 500 yards from our line, and on a line with the crest of the orchard hill. Along the front of the orchard, and on the face looking toward the stone house, the enemy's infantry was posted. Two batteries of artillery were in position, the one in rear of the orchard, near the crest of the hill, and the other some 200 yards farther back, in the direction of the rocky mountain. Behind the stone house, on the left, was a morass; on the right a stone wall running parallel with our line of battle.

Beyond the morass some 200 yards was a stony hill, covered with heavy timber and thick undergrowth, extending some distance toward the enemy's main line, and inclining to our left, and in rear of the orchard and the batteries described. Beyond the stone wall, and in a line with the stony hill, was a heavy forest, extending far to our right. From the morass a small stream ran through this wood along the base of the mountain toward the right.

Between the stony hill and this forest was an interval of about 100 yards, which was only sparsely covered with scrubby undergrowth, through which a small road ran in the direction of the mountain. Looking down this road from the stone house, a large wheat-field was seen. In rear of the wheat-field, and between that and the mountain, was the enemy's main line of battle, posted behind a stone wall.

Under my instructions, I determined to move upon the stony hill, so as to strike it with my center, and thus attack the orchard on its left rear. Accordingly, about 4 o'clock, when I received orders to advance, I moved at once in this direction, gradually changing front to the left. The numerous fences in the way, the stone building and barn, and the morass, and a raking fire of grape and canister, rendered it difficult to retain the line in good order; but, notwithstanding these obstacles, I brought my center to the point intended.

In order to restore the line of the directing battalion (the Seventh South Carolina), as soon as we reached the cover of the hill, I moved it a few paces by the right flank. Unfortunately, this order given only to Colonel [D. Wyatt] Aiken, was extended along the left of the line, and checked its advance.

Before reaching this point, I had extended an order to Colonel Kennedy, commanding Second South Carolina Regiment (my left center regiment), then moving in magnificent style, to charge the battery in their front, being the second battery mentioned above, and which most annoyed us, leaving Barksdale to deal with that at the orchard.

Meanwhile, to aid this attack, I changed the direction of the Seventh Regiment (Colonel Aiken) and the Third (Major [R. C.] Maffett) to the left, so as to occupy the rocky hill and wood, and opened fire on the battery. Barksdale had not yet appeared, but came up soon after, and cleared the orchard, with the assistance of the fire of my Eighth South Carolina (Colonel [John W.] Henagan), on my left, and James' battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel [W. G.] Rice), the next in order of battle. This brigade then moved so far to the left as no longer to afford me any assistance.

In a few minutes after my line halted, the enemy advanced across the wheat-field in two lines of battle, with a very small interval between the lines, in such a manner as to take the Seventh South Carolina in flank. I changed the direction of the right wing of the regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel [Elbert] Bland, to meet the attack, and hurried back to General Semmes, then some 150 yards in my right rear, to bring him up to meet the attack on my right, and also to bring forward my right regiment (Fifteenth South Carolina, Colonel De Saussure), which, separated from the command by the artillery at the time of the advance, was now cut off by Semmes' brigade. Its gallant and accomplished commander had just fallen when I reached it, and it was under the command of Major [William M.] Gist. General Semmes promptly responded to my call, and put his brigade in motion toward the right, preparatory to moving to the front. I hastened back to the Seventh Regiment, and reached it just as the enemy, having arrived at a point about 200 yards from us, poured in a volley and advanced to the charge. The Seventh received him handsomely, and long kept him in check in their front. One regiment of Semmes' brigade came at a double-quick as far as the ravine in our rear, and for a time checked him in their front. There was still an interval of 100 yards between this regiment and the right of the Seventh, and into this the enemy was forcing his way, causing the Seventh to swing back more and more, still fighting at a distance not exceeding 30 paces, until the two wings were doubled on each other, or nearly so.

Finding that the battery on my left had been silenced, I sent for the Second South Carolina Regiment to come to the right, but by this time the enemy had swung around and lapped my whole line at close quarters, and the fighting was general and desperate. At length, the Seventh South Carolina gave way, and I directed Colonel Aiken to reform them at the stone wall, some 200 yards in my right rear. I fell back to the Third Regiment, then hotly engaged on the crest of the stony hill, and gradually swung around its right as the enemy made progress around our flank. Semmes' advanced regiment had given way. One of his regiments mingled with the Third, and, among the rocks and trees, within a few feet of each other, a desperate conflict ensued. The enemy could make no progress in front, but slowly extended around my right. Separated from view of my left wing by the hill and wood, all of my staff being with that wing, the position of the Fifteenth Regiment being unknown, and the Seventh being in the rear, I feared the brave men about me would be surrounded by the large force pressing around them, and ordered the Third Regiment and the [Fiftieth?] Georgia Regiment with them to fall back to the stone house, whither I followed them

On emerging from the wood, I saw Wofford coming in splendid style.

My left wing had held the enemy in check along their front, and lost no ground. The enemy gave way at Wofford's advance, and, with him, the whole of my left wing advanced to the charge, sweeping the enemy before them, without a moment's stand, across the stone wall, beyond the wheat-field, up to the foot of the mountain. At the same time, my Fifteenth Regiment, and part of Semmes' brigade, pressed forward on the right to the same point. Going back to the stone wall near my rear, I found Colonel Aiken in position, and at the stone building found the Third South Carolina and the regiment of Semmes' brigade. I moved them up to the stone wall, and, finding that Wofford's men were coming out, I retained them at that point to check any attempt of the enemy to advance.

It was now near nightfall, and the operations of the day were over."

A great report! Thanks for posting it.

It is rare to get such a detailed report that describes the ground and the precise movements of the troops. So many of the official reports are short, hastily written, and very incomplete. This one is a gem.

As a reenactor who has occasionally commanded a brigade, I could readily put myself in Kershaw's boots. I was particularly struck by this part of the report:

"In order to restore the line of the directing battalion (the Seventh South Carolina), as soon as we reached the cover of the hill, I moved it a few paces by the right flank. Unfortunately, this order given only to Colonel [D. Wyatt] Aiken, was extended along the left of the line, and checked its advance."

Oh, how familiar that sounds! :) You try to do one little thing and others see and just assume you want them to do it too, even though you did not!

I was also struck by just how 'hands-on' Kershaw was. It appears that several times he went around the regimantal commander and issued orders directly to the troops.

Fascinating stuff.

I was also struck by just how 'hands-on' Kershaw was. It appears that several times he went around the regimental commander and issued orders directly to the troops.

Scott,

I've always thought Brigade command was a tough gig.

You have three to five Regimental commanders who are probably rank amateurs and there you are, responsible for Direction and the conduct of the primary combat element!

As likely as not getting poor direction from above and having to respond to anything and everything at the sharp end!

I'm guessing the "hands-on" was not only necessary at times but no small part of the reason that 60+ Brigade commanders were killed on both sides!

Also, who wants to be the regimental commander who "missed" the order to advance? I mean, you can clearly see another regiment advancing. I must have missed the order over the noise. Forward, march!

Yeah, you can see that one happening – you just have to go!

Also, who wants to be the regimental commander who "missed" the order to advance? I mean, you can clearly see another regiment advancing. I must have missed the order over the noise. Forward, march!

Cleburne:

That's pretty much the SOP for both armies, and the way it works in the above report. You follow the directing regiment/battalion when you don't hear the order. The line moves, so do you.

*I think* is missing some of Kershaw's OR report. For instance, he was ordered to keep his left anchored on Emmittsburg Road while keeping contact with Hood's Division's left flank. The problem was that Hood kept moving his division to the right, stretching Kershaw until his brigade basically broke in two. The same problem happened to Robertson's brigade and the movement brought Hood's two supporting brigades out of the woods too far to the left of his front line. Hood really wanted to take the hills.

In any case, a regimental commander would not miss the order because of two standard operating procedures. 1. The brigadier gave the order to the directing battalion and the entire order was called down the line through each regiment, and 2. Even if he didn't hear the order, the fall back was to follow to the regiment on the flank nearest the directing battalion.

However, that wasn't foolproof as Kershaw relates.

In order to restore the line of the directing battalion (the Seventh South Carolina), as soon as we reached the cover of the hill, I moved it a few paces by the right flank. Unfortunately, this order given only to Colonel [D. Wyatt] Aiken, was extended along the left of the line, and checked its advance.

What happened is he order the directing battalion to move a few paces by the right flank [trying to keep in contact with Hood] and as SOP, the battalion called out the order and all the other regiments took up the call, 'extended along the left' which meant the line stopped moving forward, checking its advance, and shuffled to the right.

So even such a simple and quick method of relaying commands can still go wonky.

Here is the first part of the report:

According to Kershaw [8-3 bn-2-3-15-7 South Carolina]:

"In the meantime General Hood's division was moving in our rear to the right, to gain the enemy's flank, and I was directed to commence the attack as soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging around toward the Peach Orchard, and at the same time establishing connection with Hood on my right, and coöperating with him. It was understood that he was to sweep down the Federal lines in a direction perpendicular to our line of battle. I was informed that Barksdale would move with me and conform to my movement; that Semmes would follow me, and Wofford would follow Barksdale.

To give some idea of how hard that was for Kershaw as Hood stretched out his attack, here is the beginning of Roberston's report, the Brigade that Kershaw was supposed to link to:

Robertson's Brigade [3 Arkansas-1-4-5 Texas] Robertson reported on his brigade:

"The division arrived on the ground in front of the position of the enemy that we were to attack but a few minutes before we were ordered to advance. I therefore got but a glance at the field on which we had to operate before we entered upon it. I was ordered to keep my right well closed on Brigadier-General Law's left, and to let my left rest on the Emmittsburgh pike. I had advanced but a short distance when I discovered that my brigade would not fill the space between General Law's left and the pike named, and that I must leave the pike, or disconnect myself from General Law, on my right.

Kershaw had to fill in that space and he was ordered by McLaws ot anchor on the Pike.

And just to give another view of the order that Kershaw gave his directing battalion, but was picked up by the entire brigade:

From a survivor of the 2d SC:

"Then the order was given to double-quick, and we were mad and fully determined to take and silence those batteries at once. We had gotten onto the level land of the Federal guns when the next fussilade [sic] of grape met us. We were now so close to the Federal guns that they seemed bewildered and were apparently trying to get their guns to the rear.

But just then—and ah me! to think of it makes my blood curdle even now, nearly fifty years afterwards—the insane order was given to ‘right flank.' Of course no one ever knew who gave the order or any reason why it was given. General Kershaw denied being responsible for it, but somebody must have been.

Here Kershaw denies ordering the entire brigade, and no one knows who passed it on. SOP, All brigade officers were expected to shout it out down the line, so it would be difficult to idenify who started it.

Why, in a few moments the whole brigade was jumbled up in a space less than a regiment behind a rocky, heavily wooded bluff with the right flank in the air, close to that historic scarecrow, the Devil's Den and also little Round Top, quite near, with our left flank disconnected and wholly unsupported for a mile or more." ["Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade at Gettysburg", by J.S. McNeily (21st MS), Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, v14 (1914), 246]

Bill,

That's odd. I copied it from the OR!

Mind you I had been doing a 'word search' while looking for something else, so it probably started where the word first occurred and it just looked like the original start!

Anyway, well spotted!

Trajanus:

Yeah, I can imagine. I've done the same thing. it was just the first paragraph of the report. No biggie. I messed up the quoting in the last post it seems, but the last part is all of the same report with my comment in the middle.

There's a view of this consequences of this ‘right flank' from the other side, in Gottfried's "The Artillery of Gettysburg".

Robert Carter, 22nd Mass, walking the field soon after the battle noted: "Masses of Kershaw's and Wofford's brigades had been swept from the muzzles of the guns, which had been loaded either with double-shotted, or spherical case, with fuses cut to one second, to explode near the muzzles. They were literally blown to atoms."