"Tactical Question" Topic

I am hoping for a little expert help. When a regiment went into battle did the companies/platoons ever operate on their own or were they always under the direction of the regimental command. While I am mainly historically interested I am also interested in how to represent a single battalion/regt against another single batt/regt. If anyone has sources as well I will take those as well.

Thanks in advance

Read this book:
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Spring's book focuses on the British and argues that in many situations it was impossible for central control to be exerted over the whole battalion – the looseness and shallowness of the typical 2-deep, open-file linear formation (18-inch file intervals) meant that a battalion's manpower was teased out over *hundreds of yards*. ie, 500 men in two ranks required *250 yards* of frontage, rather than just over *100 yards* for a battalion in three ranks and with closed files.

To be specific, he shows that in fighting in broken (ie wooded) country at battles like Brandywine the inividual companies of the big flank battalions (grens and LI) especially operated in a semi-autonomous fashion, with company commanders (even NCOs on occasions) perhaps taking their lead from the company/companies at the centre of the battalion ('follow my leader'), but leading their men in the way they saw fit and exploiting immediate tactical circumstances. He shows that at Brandywine LI coys manoeuvred semi-independently of each other and, when they got into a fix at Birmingham Meetinghouse, were rescued by a coyfrom a grenadier battalion. Spring also argues that this phenomenon was not just restricted to the flank battalions but also happened in the ordinary line battalions on occasion, for example at Guilford Courthouse – such was the verdict of Roger Lamb, who was a veteran of much fighting.

Companies were certainly detached for various tasks, even within a battle – such as garrisoning or screening a wood.

Typically it would be the flank companies though (even in the 18th C) when there was an expectation of the enemy army being near by.

I would expect this to be even more so in north america, since the army size was so much less and the area was so much greater.

If Springs book has examples in the Americas of this happening on an actual battlefield, that would be interesting to know,
although I am slightly doubtful of a batallion or regiment being dispersed other than for garrison or skirmishing work on what we would recognise as a battlefield with armies forming up on it.

During the atack on the second line at Guilford Courthouse, Sergeant Roger Lamb got separated from his regt, the 23rd. Helping himself to the cartridges of a slain Guardsman, Lamb was shot at by nearby parties of rebels. What happened next, he later described in his published 'Journal of Occurences':

"Glancing my eye the other way, I saw a company of the Guards advancing to attack these parties. The Reader may perhaps be surprised at the bravery of troops, thus with calm intrepidy attacking superior numbers, when formed into separate bodies, and all acting together; but I can assure him this instance was not peculiar; it frequently occurred in the British army, during the American War."
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Spring quotes Lamb's extract, and others like it. Lamb was a veteran of several hard-fought campaigns and knew his business.

Spring's book gives many examples of the coys of a battalion operating only loosely in concert, with the respective company commanding officers taking responsibility for the tactical direction of their men, whether it be a Queen's Rangers ensign ordering his advancing company to stop and lie down whenever he perceived the rebels were about to fire, or a British LI coy officer commanding his men using commands blown from his whistle. He also quotes instructions from generals commanding armies requiring their infantry to operate in this fashion, like Burgoyne/Philips' instructions to the infantry on the Saratoga camaign.

Spring's book is fantastic – compulsory reading for anyone interested in the AWI; as, too, is Urban's "Fusiliers" which looks at other aspects of how the British Army operated in that war.

Independent action was less usual for the components of the main part of a battalion (the 8 centre companies), but not unheard of; most larger British infantry battalions operated in wings, but the converged grenadier or light battalions, which were 6-700 strong, often broke down into smaller groups of 4, 3 or even just 2 companies (the latter being a "grand division" which was a key fire/manoeuvre unit). Confusingly, you will find primary accounts using terms like company, platoon and division interchangeably, according to the author's preferences/education, or perhaps the prevailing custom in his regiment at the time. BEar in mind that there was no official drill book at this time, and even the fairly commonly used 1764 Manual of Arms was widely interpreted.

The memo Spring quotes from Phillips, was post-Saratoga. The Saratoga army definitely used Howe's tactics, but the memo was much later in the war, and appears to have been used by Phillips when he commanded the raid into Virginia (on which he died). There's some evidence he may have shared his ideas with Cornwallis before they (almost) joined up, but it is quite possible Phillips had the basic ideas whilst in captivity.

BTW, the Guards company Lamb spotted may have been the Grenadier Company which, like the Guards Light Company, remained with the Brigade and was not detached to a "flank" battalion. These two companies, both 100-120 strong, acted independently of the two "battalions" (themselves I think only 150 all ranks each), during the battle. The Grenadier Company formed the reserve for one of Cornwallis's two wings.

What they all said. :-)

Modern desciptions of battles focus on the regiments or battalions involved. But I note that the after battle reports written in that period count the involved infantry in companies and the cavalry in squadrons.

This tells me that there's a different methodology in use and yes, individual companies were getting fed into battles.

Before the opening of the Saratoga campaign, in May 1777, Phillips gave orders to Burgoyne's infantry regarding the tactical employment of a battalion in broken, wooded ground. The orders included the injunction "that each company should be led to consider itself as a small, distinct body and [to] exercise in various evolutions independent of the battalion, with every possible view for single companies being taught to depend upon themselves."

Using the 'Look Inside' option, you can search for key words or phrases in books on Amazon. For Phillips' orders of May 1777, see pp. 183-84 of Spring's book:
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Thanks for correcting my error there.

I have read Spring's book, but don't recall that passage (hence my assumption that it was his later memo about close order formations supporting open order formations). I obviously need to re-read the book. Now, if only I could remember where I'd put the damn thing…..

Spring's book is a must read for the AWI.

To state the obvious, a "center" company in the SYW bn was only an adminstrative unit that had no tactical roll. On ocaision, the bn would detach a group ad hoc for certain tasks.

That's not quite the case for the British. While the manuals called for 16 even platoons to be created out of the whole 8 companies (this was called leveling), Braddock was one of the first to throw that idea away, and make the company the basic fighting element as well as the administrative one.

These reforms were carried further during the war, especially in Mourdant's camps, until they spread throughout the army. The company then became the basic fighting element as well as adminitrative, using its own two platoons as fire elements. This is well covered in Houlding's book and I believe Brumwell's book. I hope I spelled the later correctly.

I can't comment on other armies of the time though.

Further to what historygamer says, British battalions in the SYW were 2-3 times as large as those in the AWI (which were usually around the 300 R&F mark), so the number of firing units had to be kept low in order to give each one a reasonable-sized "punch" when it shot, hence the view that the British fired by divisions, rather than platoons.

I haven't read the Blue Book for a while, but IIRC Steuben confirmed the use of synonymous companies/platoons within the Continental infantry arm. The French formed the fusilier companies of each battalion into four divisions (each of two platoons?), although I've seen conflicting reports as to whether they had four or six fusilier companies. Most of the German troops in the AWI used the Prussian model of five musketeer/fusilier companies (this is after the grenadier company was detached) which were reorganised for battle into four divisions, each of two platoons.

Under von Steuben, Continental Army Companies were purely administrative units (for drawing pay, rations etc.); in battle, the battalion was told off into firing platoons as described above.

Were they? I cannot recall coming across any account of them being "told off" in this manner prior to action.

Most answers so far relate to the American War of Independence, while the OP doesn't specify a period.
So for the 1740s and 50s, and the European theatre, I'll just add that such detached operations would have been rather less frequent in open battle. Regulars were husbanded for their musketry, most effective in full battalions properly aligned. Tussling in broken ground was what Freikorps, Jäger or troupes légères were for.

In their absence, grenadier companies would have been the most likely to be detached as flank guards or storming parties if required, unless converged with those of (an)other regiment(s) anyway for the whole campaign. The French also had the practice of a "picket company" formed from drafts of all the other companies, so as to spread the risk of any special endeavours, from guard duty to storming a position.

Of course, there'll be exceptions to confirm this rule, such as the clearing of Croats from the Lobositz vineyards by Prussian regulars.

My answers related directly to the F&I period – straight out of Houlding's great work, "Fit for Service."

The old system of Bland and the Duke of Cumberland's "New Exercise" were quickly discarded as being impractical on the battlefield. This is when the company, in the British army, became the tactical, as well as administrative unit.

In regards to using the hat companies – there are few historys recorded at that level, but it would not be unreasonable for hat companies to perform all sorts of duties, depending on their situation.

Landers Company, 1st Battalion 60th RAR (re-enforced?) was sent with Major Grant, several 77th Highland companies, and some provincials to attack Fort Duquesne in Sept 1758. It fought as an independent unit – as unfortunately did the entire force, which led to their defeat. I am sure there are numerous examples of companies working on their own, or at a smaller level, to cover all kinds of assignments -we just don't have great visibility over them as few books are researched to that level, and few enlisted men left diaries from the time period as they probably couldn't write.

Were they? I cannot recall coming across any account of them being "told off" in this manner prior to action.

Yes, they were. Some things are so mundane, they don't get written down. Not many accounts of latrine duty exist, but we know they did it.

Perhaps 'told off' is not the correct term, but the men were of necessity arranged into front and rear ranks, tallest to shortest, so that taller men were able to fire over the shoulders of their shorter comrades in the front rank with giving them flash burns or ruptured ear drums. Remember, unlike figures on a base, troops in ranks were in physical contact with each other.

Hey, I've shot at those guys, or I should say, my men have. What unit is that? Is that 1st VA? Looks like Marshal in the front rank there. :-)

Yep. That's the fightin' First ;)

See you at Gunston Hall next month?

Yep. :-)

Viper: you did not specify whether you were looking for information about the American Revolution/AWI or mid-18th Century conflicts in Europe. It makes a difference in the answer that I would give you.