"The first classical experience of participation by Soviet forces in combat operations abroad after the Second World War took place in February to October 1950 on the territory of the Peoples' Republic of China, where they served to repulse raids by Kwamuontang Aviation against the Chinese people.
On 14 February 1950, a treaty between the USSR and the PRC was signed, in accordance which the Soviet Union took upon itself the responsibility to "show aid to China" with all necessary means, including military. This took into consideration a military cooperation between the two nations, which had been going even during the Second World War. On that date, per Resolution No. 582-227ss of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a group of Soviet advisors was created to organize air defense for Shanghai.24
The decision to create a Soviet group of air defense forces in Shanghai was covered in Sino-Soviet negotiations in December 1949 and in early February 1950. During the course of these negotiations, Mao Zedong and Chou Enlai placed the question before I. Stalin and N. Bulganin relating to assistance by the USSR in the creation of a Chinese national air force and navy in order to seize Taiwan (Formosa), where the remaining forces of Chiang Kaishek had hidden themselves. The Chinese leaders attempted to receive Moscow's sanction to conduct secret diversionary actions regarding Taiwan via the use of "their" volunteers, as well as those volunteers "from the military members of peoples' democratic countries". But at the same time, I. Stalin did not agree to these requests. He only agreed to create a "Chinese naval cadre" at Port Arthur with a subsequent transfer of ships to China; have the Soviet General Staff prepare plans for an air assault on Taiwan; and send an air defense group to the PRC with the necessary number of Soviet advisors and specialists.25
Between 1950 and 1953, 3,642 advisors and specialists from the Soviet Army and Navy arrived in China. By 1966, this number had reached 6,695 personnel (including 68 general officers, 6,033 officers, 208 short-service soldiers, and 386 civilian workers). During this period 1,514 Chinese service members attended training in the military training establishments of the Soviet Union (including: Ground Forces, 97; Air Defense Forces, 178; Air Forces, 466; Naval Forces, 608; Rear Services, 99; and other branches, 66).
The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR had observations on the Kwamuontang Air Forces which were based on the islands of Taiwan and Chekoushangdao, and which had begun to conduct air raids on the cities of Shanghai, Nanking, Suchow, and locations where subunits of the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) were deployed near Ninbo. The most intensive bombardments were carried out against industrial objectives, electrical power stations, railroad junctions, and airfields. The PRC had no air assets with which to counter these air strikes. 70% of the antiaircraft units in the Shanghai area were found to be not combat ready.
Lieutenant General P. Batitskiy was designated as the commander of the Soviet PVO forces in Shanghai, and his chief of staff was Colonel B. Vysotskiy. Deputy force commanders were: for Aviation, Lieutenant General of Aviation S. Slyusarev; for Air Defense Artillery, Colonel S. Spiridonov, who was also commanding the 52nd Air Defense Artillery Division. Chief military advisor to the Peoples Liberation Army of China and military attache in that time frame was Lieutenant General P. Kotov-Legon'kov.
The combat formations of the group included: an operational group (group of forces command, command of the 106th Fighter Aviation and 52nd Antiaircraft Artillery Divisions); the 29th Guards Fighter (MiG-15), 351st Fighter (La-11), and 829th Mixed (Tu-2 and Il-10) Aviation Regiments; the 1st Guards Searchlight Regiment; the 64th Independent Radio Technical Battalion for Aircraft Acquisition (OTRB VNOS); independent radio technical and truck-mounted oxygen filling stations; the 45th Independent Signals Company; and an transport aviation group (using Li-2 aircraft).
On 25 February, Lieutenant General P. Batitskiy arrived in Beijing, where he was met by the commanding general of the PLA Air Forces, Chu De, to which he reported the consist and missions of the force grouping. Here they made the decision to also include four Chinese mixed antiaircraft regiments (the 2nd, 3rd, 11th, and 14th) into the force grouping. Afterward, the group staff made a staff ride of the airfields at the nodes of Shanghai, Nanking, and Suchow. On 27 February, the plan to concentrate the group in Shanghai was validated by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Army General S. Shtemenko. The plan to finish concentrating the forces was to be completed by 23 March 1950.
Between 9 and 15 March the following elements arrived in Shanghai: the operational group of the commander of Soviet forces; the command of the 106th PVO Fighter Aviation Division (IAD); the command of the 52nd Antiaircraft Artillery Division (ZAD); and the command of the 64th OTRB VNOS. The 351st Fighter Aviation Regiment (IAP) arrived at Suchow airfield from Dal'niy Airfield on 7 March, but between 16 March and 1 April six aviation flights from this regiment were moved to Jiangfang airfield (8 kilometers from Shanghai); three flights were set to provide cover of Suchow airfield, where the MiG-15 aircraft of the 29th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (GIAP) were being assembled, having been shipped to that location from the USSR by railroad. The personnel and aviation commandant equipment from the 286th Independent Aviation Technical Battalion arrived on 9 March. On that day, the 829th Mixed Aviation Regiment (SAP) operational group arrived in Nanking. During March and April, other Soviet units were also relocated onto Chinese territory.
By 22 March the command post was fully equipped, and from there centralized command and control of the forces was conducted.
In March the aircraft also began to arrive. 40 MiG-15 aircraft from the 29th GIAP arrived disassembled at Suchow from Novosibirsk via railway shipment. Between 10 and 14 March they were reassembled. By 1 April 39 aircraft were finished and relocated to their deployment area – Dachan Airfiled (10 kilometers northeast of Shanghai). At the same time, the 351s IAP was concentrated at Jiangfang airfield.
One week later, the following had arrived: the 829th SAP moved from Dal'niy airfield to Suchow; the 278th Motorized Technology Battalion had deployed to Dachan airfield; and the 286th to Jiangfang. Regarding the 300th Battalion, which had been sent to China in October 1949, they had been relocated from Beijing to Suchow.
After 23 March, the 1st Guards Searchlight Regiment occupied 19 positions in the Shanghai area, and could acquire aircraft in an area of 10-20 kilometers around each position and 20-30 kilometers from the center of the city.
The concentration and deployment of forces, combat technology and material means went according to plan. The main body of the officer staff of the group arrived in China by air, preceding the troops by 10-20 days, which put them in an advantageous position to solve a number of operational tasks.
In all, the Soviet Group of Forces consisted of: 118 aircraft (39 MiG-15, 40 La-11, 10 Tu-2 bombers, 25 Il-10 attack aircraft, and 4 Li-2 transports), 73 searchlights and 13 radar stations, 116 radio sets, 31 receivers and 436 vehicles.27
Aerial reconnaissance of the enemy was organized in the following manner. Four pairs of VNOS radar posts were set up (in Tsidun, Nanhoi, Haiyan, and Usyang) where they could keep continuous watch on the air during daylight hours and pass along observation data to the main VNOS post which would then inform the Group command post in Beijing and all other units. The VNOS radar post at Hun Tzyaolu, the aviation radar means at Dachan and Jiangfang airfields, the antiaircraft artillery division, and the searchlight regiment stood watch during the hours of darkness. Beside that, round the clock observation was carried out by the air posts of the antiaircraft artillery, all searchlight points, observers at the VNOS posts, intelligence personnel with the CPs of the Group and units, and Chinese VNOS posts.
During the period of deployment of the forces, landline communications were used in order to ensure that there was a minimal possibility that the enemy could listen in on the work of the radar sets and direction finding stations of the Group. In order to set up the combat telephone network, city telephone cable networks were used via Chinese communications nodes (they did not use those networks which ran through American telephone stations). During the period 7-15 March underground cable was laid from the command post communications node to the mainline cable of the city telephone network. To ensure the strictest secrecy, all of this work was performed at night. This guaranteed the access from the CP communications node to the international station in Shanghai and to the nearest Chinese telephone station. Radio communications were also only partially deployed. Control receivers operating within listening range of the enemy monitored the radio nodes of the antiaircraft artillery units. Radio networks were prepared for operations in case of a breakdown in the landline communications. Checks of the radio nets were performed twice a day at the lowest necessary power settings with short signals.
The staff of the Soviet force grouping had previously determined the size of the enemy air forces grouping, which consisted of four fighter, two bomber and two transport aviation regiments, one reconnaissance aviation squadron, and one special purpose detachment. In all, they numbered 361 aircraft: 158 fighters (including 110 Mustangs and 48 Thunderbolts), 65 bombers (21 B-24 bombers, 28 B-25 bombers, and 16 Mosquito bombers), 16 reconnaissance aircraft, and 1 transport. The Kwamuontang aircraft were primarily based at airfields on the island of Taiwan and the islands of the Chuashuan archipelago.28
In accordance with Order No. 0040 from the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR dated 16 February 1950, the region of operations for the Group was strictly limited: 70 kilometers northeast of Shanghai, Tsytsyyui, and more to the south of Hensha island, to the north coast of the gulf of Hangchow, and to the city of Hangchow.
Operations of the Group was based upon the actions of the enemy, and was divided into two stages…"
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