Help support TMP


"Avoid another Battle of Java Sea." Topic


7 Posts

All members in good standing are free to post here. Opinions expressed here are solely those of the posters, and have not been cleared with nor are they endorsed by The Miniatures Page.

Please don't call someone a Nazi unless they really are a Nazi.

For more information, see the TMP FAQ.


Back to the Modern Naval Discussion (1946 to 2015) Message Board

Back to the WWII Naval Discussion Message Board


Areas of Interest

World War Two at Sea
Modern

Featured Hobby News Article


Featured Recent Link


Featured Ruleset


Featured Workbench Article

Storing Projects

Containers for when you need to sideline that project you've been working on, or maybe just not lose the bits you're not ready for yet.


Featured Profile Article

Report from Bayou Wars 2006

The Editor heads for Vicksburg...


Featured Book Review


1,583 hits since 9 Mar 2013
©1994-2026 Bill Armintrout
Comments or corrections?


TMP logo

Membership

Please sign in to your membership account, or, if you are not yet a member, please sign up for your free membership account.
Tango01 Supporting Member of TMP09 Mar 2013 10:50 a.m. PST

Interesting article.

"The battle has lessons for today's military planners.
On December 8, 1941, an Allied naval officer might reasonably have thought to himself "It's not that bad.Really, could be worse." The United States Navy (USN) could still pack a punch, and it could rely on assistance from the Royal Navy, the Royal Dutch Navy, and the Commonwealth navies.

Over the next three months the Japanese would take advantage of Allied confusion at every level to win a series of devastating victories over Allied naval forces. The Battle of Java Sea, fought on February 27, 1942, marked the high tide of Japanese naval power in the Pacific. Poor organization, strategic confusion, inter-service competition, and national infighting doomed an Allied task force to destruction at the hands of the Imperial Japanese Navy, opening the door to the conquest of Java and the rest of Southeast Asia. Indeed, the Battle of Java Sea is the nightmare that American naval planners have when they hear terms like "offshore balancing."

The World of December 8, 1941

The United States Navy remained potent. At Oahu, five American battleships lay sunk or aground, but the port facilities at Pearl Harbor remained in good condition, and the aircraft carriers of the Pacific Fleet had avoided damage. Three battleships escaped with only light damage, with a fourth undergoing regular maintenance in the Puget Sound. Three fast carriers, twelve heavy cruisers, eight light cruisers, and fifty destroyers remained ready for action, a force which could potentially cause huge problems for the Japanese. Reinforcements were on the way; USS Yorktown would join the Pacific Fleet in late December, with USS Hornet arriving in March. Other ships were forward deployed; the Asiatic Fleet included one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, and thirteen destroyers.

From its bases in Singapore and Colombo, the Royal Navy also remained in fighting shape. The most powerful surface unit in the Pacific was HMS Prince of Wales, the fast battleship that six months earlier had inflicted the mission-killing blow on the German Bismarck. Support for Prince of Wales included the old battlecruiser Repulse, four light cruisers and five destroyers. Much more help was on the way. Two fast and one slow carriers would arrive in Ceylon in the months after Pearl Harbor. Jutland veteran HMS Warspite was working up in the Puget Sound at the time of the Japanese strike. By March, the Eastern Fleet would include four Revenge class battleships, seven cruisers, and sixteen destroyers. The loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse on an ill-conceived mission to intercept Japanese forces invading Malaya severely dented, but did not destroy, British naval power in the Far East…"
Full article here
link

"…America is in the throes of yet another debate about grand strategy, with terms like "deep engagement" and "offshore balancing" coming to characterize complex sets of policies towards allies and antagonists alike. Although the precise nature of the terms varies along with the preference of the author, Deep Engagement advocates tend to prefer robust, forward deployed U.S. military capability of the sort that we currently enjoy. Advocates of offshore balancing argue that the United States can significantly draw down its military and political commitments and rely on normal balance of power politics to ensure that no state gains complete control over the Eurasian landmass…"
Full article here
link

Amicalement
Armand

Tgunner09 Mar 2013 11:39 a.m. PST

Interesting article Armand, thanks for posting it. This is why the US conducts perodic exercises with her allies in the region. But I have to wonder how effective these exercises are.

Tango01 Supporting Member of TMP09 Mar 2013 12:51 p.m. PST

Glad you hade enjoy it my friend.
You give a valid open question…

Amicalement
Armand

GarrisonMiniatures09 Mar 2013 4:27 p.m. PST

One possible way of mitigating any potential communication problems would be to ensure that as many ships as possible had the appropriate multilingual deck officers allocated as a matter of course.

Tango01 Supporting Member of TMP10 Mar 2013 12:34 p.m. PST

Good point GarrisonMiniatures.

Amicalement
Armand

ScottWashburn Sponsoring Member of TMP11 Mar 2013 12:09 p.m. PST

Very interesting that the Allies had so much potential naval strength. Few folks know that as early as February 1942 the US had eight fully operational battleships with escorts organized as "Task Force One" stationed on the west coast.

Deadone11 Mar 2013 3:05 p.m. PST

Very interesting article.

It's interesting that some of the issues between differing allies objectives pops up in modern wars too – look at ROE on some ISAF forces in Afghanistan or different level of involvement during Libya.

It's actually a large weak spot – in Kosovo, the USA flew numerous missions that were not sanctioned by NATO high command because NATO high command had to take into account vetos by member nations.

And in Mali, there have been some comments by French officials that they do not want other support as especially many European countries actually prohibit their troops from fighting in these sort of operations and they end up serving as glorified security guards.

Sorry - only verified members can post on the forums.