"Deployment Doctrine" Topic

I am looking for source material and researched opinions regarding deployment doctrine of the major nations during the Napoleonic Wars: France, England, Russia, Prussia, Austria.

Specifically one key fact:

When grand tactical formations (brigades or divisions) deployed for battle did they default to doing so in battalion lines or battalion columns?

I have a couple of disclaimers:

Disclaimer #1:
To be clear I am not asking about how they attacked, I am completely disinterested in debating if the French meant to come to contact with British lines in Spain while formed in column or if they meant to reform into line after having moved up. I am looking to determine what the battalion formation of choice was for each nation when a division broke out of road column and deployed for battle.

Disclaimer #2
Lastly, I am not looking for the corner case scenarios but for the default doctrine that was rehearsed. I'm aware that cases existed when there was extraordinary attention to initial deployment such as when Napoleon personally laid out the deployment of one of Davout's divisions in preparation for a night attack river crossing somewhere in Poland in 1806. I'm not looking for those examples.

My present understanding is:

French deployed with battalions in column 1805-1815.

British* & Russians** deployed with battalions in line 1805-1815.

Prussians deployed with battalions in line 1805-1807 but column from 1812-1815.

Austrians deployed with battalions … in column?

Any assistance as to verifying these understandings would be excellent as would any clarification as to what year any shifts were made.

* Did the British actually aways deploy in line or is there just a high correlation between them deploying for defense and them deploying in battalion lines?

** Did the Russians deploy battalions in line at Austerlitz in 1805? Were they deploying in line or column in 1813-1814?

Cheers,

The Bandit

As far as I can tell, the Brits deployed in column during the 1815 campaign. At least at Waterloo, they did not appear to shift into line until close combat was imminent. Even to the point where the 92nd Highlanders were caught trying to convert from column to line by the lead battalion of Marcognet's division which was in line-a reversal of the Spanish norm with the Brits in column decimated by the firepower of the French in line.

I believe that all nations from 1809 onwards deployed depending on circumstances. Usually one deployed in line when the risk of enemy artillery was high. I believe, that the russians stuck most with columns in the later campaigns. Prussians often deployed even landwehr in line (katzbach) when threatened by art. I think the evolution is from linear army, where all deployed as standard in line, into modern army, where column was an option.

For the Prussian regulations from 1809 onwards see here:

link

I have been wondering about this as well.

Per Oliver's Link- it says a lot….
"by laying out clearly and exactly how a Brigade was arranged and how its separate troops cooperated together, not merely as a pamphlet to Brigade commanders, but written straight into the Infantry Regulations every officer in the army was to carry. Here was regulated where each battalion stood, its distance from each other, and even its formation. In any future war the Prussian officers could be in no doubt where their particular unit was supposed to be, who it was to follow, and its role in the Brigade."

Above summarizes the transition most armies evolved into, with French leading ( started during Rev.WARS IIRC) followed by the British then the Russian 1807, Austrian/Prussian 1809 etc.

I think there will be others joining in who know this much better will be able to clarify with further detail and back-up.
But if this helps…
The approach I have taken from all my research is:
A) that the line was still the main element of attack and defend at close quarters <200 yds.
B)The column was the form of movement to minimize march distance a line had to make to contact. The need was to minimize time between "out of range" and contact to reduce losses on the way. Deployment was <500 yds from the enemy with French typically pushing the envelope at <300. Ancient regime armies were at ~1000 yds and reason for the "slowness impression" and why Austerlize rolled out the way it did. The issues affecting when and if to go to line also depended on:
1) terrain
2) training/ number of conscripts
You have much examples of well train units (IE. 57th "les terribles") attacking the fleches in column due to the terrain not allowing use of lines and then the 1813 campaign where both sides had many units remain in columns because the troops effectiveness to move while in lines inhibited such action and was left to most defense positions only.

The area I do not see clear info on and is also under much debate is "the the brigade self support" IE a) formed in two lines of battle – 1 regt behind another and thus both brigades of the Division formation are abreast or "is to be supported" IE b) a Brig supports the lead Brig within the Division formation.
It seems that in "b" the brigade can maneuver easier with all units abreast looking to their right and finally at the "lead battalion" who dictates the maneuver, where as in "a", this is not so easy.
MG

The first problem is are they on the offence or defense? Regardless I think the standard for everyone for the entire period was into line unless they had specific orders to do otherwise or encountered terrain problems. For example I think mixed order for the French was done on a battle by battle situation and was not an official doctrine for a specific period. A French army on the offence in certain periods might very well be deployed in column, on the defense probably in line.

I've studied a lot of battles and it seems to me that most armies are deployed in lines. Columns are not as common as I once thought. A rough guess would be 80% in line, 20% other formations.

I don't think you will ever get a complete answer to your question, as so much was done under the orders of the residing commanders on the field.

Yorck points out, in his writings, that one of the goals of a commander on the field is to force his opposite number to go from column to line. By doing so the units in line have limited their ability to maneuver. Thus anchoring themselves to a point on the field and allowing the other side the opportunity to maneuver around them.

One thing to bear in mind is that infantry in line was far more vulnerable to cavalry than infantry in column. If a cavalry threat exists or may exist, the column offers the best chance of survival for all troop qualities whether on offense or defense. If both sides have significant cavalry threats, I would not be surprised to see the infantry of both sides in column.

The problem is if a column confronts a line within effective musketry range. It seems fairly rare that a column manages to convert to line once a line puts effective fire on a column. And if the column doesn't convert to line, the line will win unless the line doesn't want to fight and simply retreats.

It is the rock, scissors, paper problem all over again.

Didn't Napoleon have a formation with a line in the centre and a column on either flank. It would probably require 3 battalions.

it is not just infantry in line, the French doctrine would have at minimum two lines or three lines – it is not an isolated line but backed up by other lines in the rear, these battle lines could be depolyed in line or column or part in line or colums.

von Winterfeldt,

I understand that there would be multiple waves of battalions, most nations deployed in two most of the time, sometimes three, the Russians sometimes each grand tactical formation deployed in a single wave but was paired with another that formed a 2nd wave behind it.

That part I've got, but then I am trying to determine how flexible the formation chosen for battalions was, my understanding was there was a default that was used unless someone specified otherwise and I am seeking to broaden that understanding.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Sorry, there isn't any Codex book on the topic.

Is there any rule set, which by the working of the rules, makes players set their forces up in multiple lines of columns?

The best way to see the British "norm" is to look at memoirs. I have analysed hundreds of "tactical snippets" in these and there is absolutely no doubt that the most frequent reference, by a very long way, is to the British being in quarter distance column as a manoeuvre formation on the battlefield.

So the British entered the battlefield in march columns, condensed these into columns of companies at quarter distance (ie 5 or 6 paces between successive companies) for tactical movement on the battlefield, then formed line just outside musketry range to attack or defend, or square to defend against cavalry. In a static defensive position battalions in the front line would be in line whilst those in the second line would remain in quarter distance column until deployed.

If lines moved they normally put quarter distance columns on their flanks as an anti cavalry protection (the quarter distance columns could form square in a fraction of the time it took a line to do). The 2nd Division failed to do so at Albuera and its leading Brigade was annihilated, the 4th Division at that same battle did protect its flanks with quarter distance columns and had no such problems.

Siborne's description of Waterloo has almost the entire British Army in quarter distance column as its default formation at the start of the Battle of Waterloo.

Rod

Rod, I can only concur with your observation. There are many snippets that refer to "we wheeled into line " or "we brought up our right shoulders and gave the French a volley". One benefit of the column at quarter distance is the ability to extend it to full distance and wheel into line facing to the flank.

I suggest that this would allow the line to form in the best position to oppose the advancing column.

There are indications that cavalry used similar formations. Column of half-squadron seems to be mentioned often.

Bandit:

Q:
I am looking to determine what the battalion formation of choice was for each nation when a division broke out of road column and deployed for battle.

For the French, after some debate, the column of divisions was preferred formation.

Not a direct question and not to be too "picky" here because it is necessary to understand source material that may be quoted: deploy means to convert to line formation.

Deploy more literally means to unfold and the British would however use the "processional" method of FORMING a line to the left from open column at full distance.

So, for example, if a source tells you that division "x" was "deployed" at Austerlitz, then the source is telling you that they were in line formation.

Regards,

Mike.

British infantry was preferably deployed before entering effective artillery range, which was judged to be 1200-1500 paces. Sometimes, because of terrain difficulties or the presence of enemy cavalry, columns would be used when within effective artillery range. Columns could also be pushed closer to the enemy if the terrain covered them from fire.

The regulations used both during and after the Napoleonic wars spelled this doctrine out:

When a considerable corps of troops has to act offensively it must form in line at latest within 1200 or 1500 paces of a posted enemy unless the ground particularly favours, and covers from the fire of his artillery; the enfilade of which is what chiefly prevents bodies in column from approaching nearer

The veteran officer John Gurwood summarised these same tactics in the introduction to Wellington's General Orders, showing that the principles laid down in the regulations had been followed:

It was a principle in Lord Wellington's army never to expose a column to the fire of artillery: the column, therefore, invariably deployed or formed to the front in line, previously to getting under fire…. The column, and all other shapes into which troops may be thrown, in relation to the ground over which they may have to pass, are with us merely preparatory movements to the formation of the line, which offers the greatest front of fire, and which is always the English formation of battle, excepting only where there is a chance of an attack by cavalry.

The principle of not exposing columns to effective artillery fire can also be found in memoirs. James Leith Hay wrote about the 5th Division in the manoeuvering in the days before the Battle of Salamanca:

The 5th Division, unaware of the near approach of the enemy's cannon, had halted to obtain water from the river….The first discharges from the enemy's cannonconvinced General Leith that retiring in column under this fire would be attended with considerable loss: he, therefore, directed the brigades to deploy as quickly as possible; which being accomplished, the shot plunged over the lines, occasioning but few casualties.

The concern about artillery fire against columns can also be seen in Colville's report to Picton after the Battle of Vitoria:

The advance of the brigade soon made it the principal object of the enemy's attention in that quarter. The ground over which I had to advance was much intersected with banks and drains and otherwise intricate, so that the deployment I made (as early as possible on account of the enemy's cannonade from the heights opposite) did not admit more than a battalion at a time

There is no easy answer to the question of default formations as far as the British are concerned. Troops would be retained in column if obliged to by enemy cavalry, difficult terrain, or if cover could be provided from fire. Advances across large tracts of open ground swept by artillery fire would normally be conducted in line.

Maj Snort Wrote:

Advances across large tracts of open ground swept by artillery fire would normally be conducted in line.

Really? Here is an extract from the memoirs of Private Wheeler of 51st Light Infantry at Salamanca:

"In the afternoon we broke into open column of divisions right in front and marched up the rear of our enemy. This was not a very agreeable job as the enemy were cannonading the whole length of their line, and our rout lay within range of their guns. The fire at length became so furious that it were expedient to form grand division, thus leaving an interval of double the space for their shot to pass through".

They were clearly advancing through artillery fire in column not line.

Rod

MichaelCollinsHimself wrote:

Deploy more literally means to unfold and the British would however use the "processional" method of FORMING a line to the left from open column at full distance.

The processional method of deployment was when a column of several battalions, all at full distance, marched up to a battlefield, then wheeled at 90 degrees across its front, continued marching until all battalions were in place, then halted, and every battalion did a simultaneous wheel of its component elements to form line. If such battalions were headed by their senior, or grenadier companies, then this march would be made to the left of the battlefield with the wheel to the right. Such a march could well be in the original Column of Route "fours" or possibly with frontage increased to section or even half company, but always remaining at full distance. The final turn into line was made by each of these march elements ("fours", sections or half companies) simultaneously wheeling to the left.

This processional method of deployment was not used by the British (or anyone else) after the mid-18th century. During the 7 Years War the Prussians had invented deployment on the head of columns using the "en-tiroir" (ie like a chest of drawers) system or the diagonal march (also known as "fantail" or "eventail" system, often indicated by the order "Right shoulders forward". These methods work from short columns (ie half distance, quarter distance and close columns) whilst processional deployment requires full distance columns.

Neither the British, nor anyone else, used full distance columns once within artillery range of the enemy. Everyone closed up to half distance, quarter distance or close columns because line and squares could be formed more quickly from such short columns.

The British always formed quarter distance or close columns on Napoleonic battlefields and always formed line or square from these on the head of the column, and not by processional deployment, the latter being a system they had abandoned 50 years earlier.

Rod

Rod,

The 51st Light Infantry did not attack the French at Salamanca and Wheeler is almost certainly describing movement in the zone outside of 1200-1500 paces, catching some long range shots. This movement could well have been in parallel to the enemy lines. The fire was almost certainly coming from the flank as the formation of grand divisions "doubled the space" for the shots to pass through. This sort of manoeuvering would always have been in column.

The major frontal attacks by the 4th and 5th division crossed the artillery zone in line.

Rod wrote

The British always formed quarter distance or close columns on Napoleonic battlefields and always formed line or square from these on the head of the column, and not by processional deployment, the latter being a system they had abandoned 50 years earlier.

Rod,

While the British may have used quarter distance columns for all the reasons that you note, they did also use open columns at full distance as well. The parallel march before Salamanca had been performed largely in open column at full distance (the French using the same formation), and Pakenhams attack at Salamanca used the same formation. There are dozens of examples of full distance columns in action.

The quote you provided above from Wheeler notes that they were in open column, which without any further clarification invariably refers to a full distance column (see the regulations for examples of this).

Major Snort wrote:

While the British may have used quarter distance columns for all the reasons that you note, they did also use open columns at full distance as well. The parallel march before Salamanca had been performed largely in open column at full distance (the French using the same formation), and Pakenhams attack at Salamanca used the same formation. There are dozens of examples of full distance columns in action.

The parallel march before Salamanca was effectively a march in Column of Route by both armies, and a very unusual occurance as all who mentioned it in their memoirs record.

I am convinced that Packenham's advance at Salamanca was in quarter-distance columns, which deployed on the head of their columns, in a "fantail evolution" by "right shoulders forward", as described by Grattan, whilst still marching forward. They would have been mad to have been in full distance columns so close to the enemy, and it would have been totally contrary to all of their doctrine.

The original question by Bandit was to ask what was the default formation for various nations, once they had broken out of march columns. He suggested this was line for British. I pointed out that this was not so, and that the default formation for British was quarter distance columns, which could then form line or square quickly as required.

The British 1792 Regulations are like a cookery book, containing many recipes, some of which may be used hundreds of times and some not at all. On the whole the Regulations do not give tactical advice as to when any one particular formation should be used, but there is one exception, and that is Section 178 (10) which states:

"If a battalion is marching in open ground, where it is necessary to be prepared against the attack of cavalry – It may move in column of companies at quarter distance, …….When the column HALTS, and is ordered to FORM THE SQUARE, the first company falls back to the second; the last company closes up to the one before it : ……Those last named [centre] companies having been told off each in four sections, WHEEL up by sections, 2 to the right, and 2 to the left (the 2 rear companies at the same time closing up, and facing outwards)."

This quarter distance column was therefore the British Army default for all movement on the battlefield when there was an enemy cavalry threat, as was normally always so. Sometimes Close Columns were similarly employed, but never full distance columns.

By way of proof that this regulation doctrine was actually employed, some quotes from memoirs are below:

A Boy in the Peninsular War – Robert Blakeney.
P56 – Retreat to Corunna – "The square was immediately reduced, formed in columns at quarter distance and retired"
P186 – Barossa – "Forming column of quarter distance we proceeded quickly down the hill towards the pine forest"

Personal narrative of a Private Soldier in the 42nd Highlanders.
p128 – Salamanca: "Our Division was formed in close column".

History of Peninsular War Vol VII – Oman.
P361 – Orthez – quotes William Brown 45th Regt: "The general halted…drawing us up in close column."

The Vicissitudes of a Soldier's Life – John Green.
P89 – Salamanca Forts – "We reached the end of the village in close column".
P100 – Salamanca – "We formed column of quarter distance"

Peninsular Sketches – Maxwell – Vol I.
P277 – Badajoz – the 52nd, 43rd and 95th closed up …to columns of quarter distance."
P278 – Badajoz – The Third Division moved forward … in columns at quarter distance".
P321 – Salamanca – Our Division was …in column of quarter distance, with fixed bayonets ready to form square."
P345 – Salamanca – We moved in open column…then closed to column of quarter distance.

Peninsular Sketches – Maxwell – Vol II.
P21 – March to Madrid – Fortunately the road continued very wide, which enabled us to march in column of quarter distance with screwed bayonets and ready to form square."
P23 – The Seventh Division was already formed in close columns on the other side of the river.
P43 – Vittoria – The Light Division…drew up in contiguous close columns."
P142 – Bayonne – The 92nd…appeared on the high road in close column, bayonets fixed, and the bagpipes playing in its front."
P324 – Albuera – It has been understood that Colonel Colburn wished to move to the attack with the two flank regiments in quarter distance columns."
P324 – Our Brigade came up…we closed up into quarter distance columns…and deployed.

Soldier's Glory – Sir George Bell.
P55 – Salamanca confrontation – My Regiment was formed in quarter distance column on the brest of the hill, ready for action."

Memoirs of a Sergeant of the 5th Regiment of Foot – Stephen Morley.
P112 – Salamanca – We …formed into close column."

Waterloo Letters – Siborne.
P275 – Letter 120 – Maj Gen Adam – "The 3rd Brigade.. formed by Battalions in columns of companies at quarter distance".
P288 – Letter 124 – Lt Gawler – "The 52nd halted in close or quarter distance column of wings".
P343 – Letter 147 – Capt Garland (73rd) – "During the early part of the day, before we formed square, we were in column of quarter distance"
P373 – Letter 163 – Maj MacDonald (1st Foot) – Quarte Bras – "the 3rd Battalion Royal Scots…formed in column at quarter distance"
P396 – Letter 174 – Lt Drewe (27th) – "We formed column of companies at quarter distance"

You said:

There are dozens of examples of full distance columns in action.

Can you provide a similar list. I have spent years researching actual battlefield tactics from memoirs but have not found "dozens of examples". In fact there are hardly any.

Rod

MichaelCollinsHimself,

What I am talking about is the deployment of grand tactical formations, i.e. brigades and divisions unfolding from march column into lines, typically in 2-3 waves of lines, of battalions. The battalions within the brigade or division would be formed in lines, columns or squares depending on the circumstances but I believe there was a default that each nation trained on and that is what I am trying to arrive at a better understanding of.

So to respond directly, I don't think I'm miss using the word deploy, I'm just not asking about battalions deploying, I'm asking about brigades and divisions deploying.

Rod & others,

I am finding the discussion quite helpful.

For point of reference I'm going to define two terms just so I can easily use them in a general fashion going forward:

Engagement – within artillery range but outside the touch of skirmishers or musketry

Combat – short range artillery, skirmishers become a threat, eventually closing down to musket range

As I understand it the consensus is that after grand tactical formations (brigades, divisions) deploy into waves, battalions will change from column to line at roughly the time they transition from engagement to combat.

Were there any nations that didn't have battalions in some form of column when they initially deployed their division or brigade? Was the evolution of the battalion from column to line always done after engagement but before combat?

Cheers,

The Bandit

Russians 1811-1815 typical formation for an infantry division:

The 4 battalions of 2 regiments of Jägers (1 brigade) in skirmish order to the front (the distance sent out to the front, and whether one or 2 chains of skirmishers, and the degree of cover of flanks depending on situation and commander's preference).

In the first line of battle, the 4 battalions of 2 regiments of (heavy) Infantry (1 brigade) in column. Most commonly (e.g. Borodino), in "attack column" : a column formed on the 2 center platoons (of a total of 8 platoons), at the distance of a quarter platoon (about 6 paces). If the terrain was constricted, the column would be fornmed on the frontage of a platoon. 1 compnany of artillery (12 pieces) would unlimber and prepare firing positions. In the attack, it was generally expected that a bayonet attack would be delivered without deploying. The 4 battalions could be formed on a fixed line, in checkerboard or in echelon, with spacing between them either quite small or more than the frontage of a battalion. It was envisioned that the 4 battalions would typically advance or defend together.

In the second line of battle (back 150+ yards from the first line), roughly similar to the first line of battle. However the second company of artillery would likely stay limbered and the Infantry battalions might be sent to specific tasks instead of advancing together.

If they were still under command of the division (not too common in reality), the 2 combined grenadier battalions (each of only 6 platoons) would typically form with the second line of battle.

Rod wrote:

Can you provide a similar list. I have spent years researching actual battlefield tactics from memoirs but have not found "dozens of examples". In fact there are hardly any.

Rod,

Yes, I can provide a list of the British using open columns on the battlefield, but without the context of the entire passages or at least great chunks of them it would be rather meaningless.

There are several different reasons why the troops in the quotes you provide are in quarter distance or close column -preparing to storm a fortress, advancing through a village street or down a road enclosed by hedgerows, imminent danger of cavalry attack, assembly prior to deployment after advancing up a narrow track, etc. I do not dispute that quarter distance and close columns were used, but they were in no way the default formation for troops in what Bandit refers to as the engagement zone.

Open columns would often be used when traversing the battlefield from flank to flank, or moving laterally to plug a gap in the line, as the 9th regiment did at Busaco, wheeling into line to their right within 100 paces of the French, or to put the troops into an outflanking position, as Pakenham's division did at Salamanca. There are absolutely no references to quarter distance column being used by Pakenham at Salamanca, with all eyewitnesses stating that the troops were in open column until they had fully outflanked the French, when they wheeled into (formed)line.

Open columns had also been used by Anstruther at Vimeiro presumably to protect the flanks of his brigade by wheeling outwards if required. Anstruther wrote:

[I] Drew up my brigade [viz., second battalion 9th, 43d, 52d, 97th], amounting to two thousand four hundred men, as follows: 97th in front, in prolongation of the front of General Fane's brigade ; 52d in line, in echelon to the left flank of 97th: 9th in open column behind, on the left flank of the 52d; 43d in open column behind right flank 97th.

There are many more examples. One important point to note is that the term open column without any indication of the distance between divisions invariably meant full distance column in British military terminology. For example in the section in the regulations entitled Exercise of the Battalion:

The column will close to half, quarter and close column, and again take OPEN distances either from the front or rear division

Might be slightly off topic but isn't there a rule set out there that doesn't allow infantry to fire when formed up in column? What do Nap gamers think of this as a rule?

Here a French instruction of 1795, for the Armée d'Italie (in French only):

link

The fifth part of the French 1791 infantry regulation contains some info as well.

Bandit,

I think that your terms "engagement" and "combat" could help to clarify any answers, but I think that another term, perhaps "reserve" would also be useful.

When troops entered the battlefield in march column, they might not be positioned in the front line initially and could be held back. The default formation here would often be close or quarter distance column, often positioned with very little lateral interval between the battalions. This was referred to a "contiguous column".

Thus at Albuera, the British 4th division entered the field on the morning of the battle having marched from Badajoz. The division left the road and formed in contiguous columns in rear of the second division until required. The second division in the front line were in line, still outside the engagement range.

When the 4th division were required on the right, they moved there behind the front line in columns and deployed into line to face the French cavalry, still outside the engagement range. According to Charles Broke Vere, only one battalion was retained in quarter distance column on the right flank. Many secondary sources have the Lusitanian Legion in column on the left flank. When called on to advance across the engagement zone into combat, the battalions moved in line, the flank(s) still protected by the column(s). This is reasonably typical of British infantry movements when operating in open terrain.

Thank you both Rod and Major for putting me in the picture more clearly!

StanleySteve

many sets do this to simplify play and cut out one of the most gamey fiddles in modern rules.

Typically, you fire at one target unit on its own (a gross simplification that people like)

so without such a rule preventing columns firing, players will cram 3 columns into the same space as a line occupies,

it then fires with the same effect as a line – but with only one columnm being vulnerable to responding fire, and thus ensuring that the other two get to charge into melee unharmed.

rather than lots of complex rules around this, its just quicker to say columns cannot fire.

simplifies things down to a simple
line = shooting
column = charging
squares = cavalry

sort of rock scissors paper.

How good such an approach is, I leave to you, but in my experience, that is why such rules exist – simple has become simplified, and all that matters is a quick fun game.

Same thing with squares not moving at line speed and not firing – a quick fix to stop players forming a cavalry proof 'orde mixte' with a square on each end and lines in the middle.

Russians 1811-1815 typical formation for an infantry division:

The 4 battalions of 2 regiments of Jägers (1 brigade) in skirmish order to the front (the distance sent out to the front, and whether one or 2 chains of skirmishers, and the degree of cover of flanks depending on situation and commander's preference).

In the first line of battle, the 4 battalions of 2 regiments of (heavy) Infantry (1 brigade) in column. Most commonly (e.g. Borodino), in "attack column" : a column formed on the 2 center platoons (of a total of 8 platoons), at the distance of a quarter platoon (about 6 paces). If the terrain was constricted, the column would be fornmed on the frontage of a platoon. 1 compnany of artillery (12 pieces) would unlimber and prepare firing positions. In the attack, it was generally expected that a bayonet attack would be delivered without deploying. The 4 battalions could be formed on a fixed line, in checkerboard or in echelon, with spacing between them either quite small or more than the frontage of a battalion. It was envisioned that the 4 battalions would typically advance or defend together.

In the second line of battle (back 150+ yards from the first line), roughly similar to the first line of battle. However the second company of artillery would likely stay limbered and the Infantry battalions might be sent to specific tasks instead of advancing together.

Seroga

Thank you for the description. A few questions, if I may:

(1) What are your thoughts on the precise location of the artillery with the first line?
(2) Would the artillery in (1) be a light company or position company?
(3) Would the artillery in the second line be a light company or a position company?
(4) Where would the Division's third artillery company be positioned?

Allan

Allan,

Noting that were are talking about "most typical" or "default" or "canonical" and that there were many many variations ….

1. The Russian artilery companies were composed of 6x platoons, each of 2 guns of the same type. Between 2, 4 or 6 firing positions would be constructed (each of 3, 2 or 1 platoons, respectively), depending mostly the lay of the land and expected enemy movements. These could be in front of the formed battalions of the first line of battle (especialyy if a defensive battle was envisoned), or on its flanks, or both. The 2-piece platoon was the in some sense the key tactical unit for the artillery, just as the platoon was also the key tactical unit for the infantry.
2. Light company (not really so "light" : 8x 6-ilber canon and 4x 12-lber unicorn, possibly plus 1 each overcomplement mounted on the companiy's spare carriages).
3. Same as No. 2.
4. The battery company (8x 12-ilber canon and 4x 24-lber unicorn) could often be taken into larger batteries under the command of a general of artillery. A typical Russian corps would have 2 infantry divisions' battery companies and an attached horse artillery company, making a nice 36+ gun battery just with corps' assets. This was by no means universal. Another variation (especialy for a defensive battle) was to use the battery company in the prepared positions with the division's first line of battle and take one of the light companies into an reserve behind the main deployments of Russian forces.

A note : one of the more marked "issues" with Russian foot artillery of the period was its use in the advance. The horse artillery was rather good at going forward in direct support with the troops (either infantry or cavalry). But with one company dug in and the other back with the second line of battle and the third company often collected into a special battery or reserve, actually getting the artillery forward in good time and position to support an infantry advance in a larger battle was not one of the Russian foot artillery's best skills. With the foot artillery in smaller actions and with the horse artillery generally, this co-ordination was more likley to be successful.

A comment : It is interesting to me that, not unlike the British who developed a"canonical" method of receving the French in line with a large volume of fires and then executing a bayonet counter-attack, the Russians' canonical method was to receive the French with the combined fires of ~1/3 of their troops (the Jäger) and a rather "heroic" amount of artillery, and then execute a bayonet counter-attack should the French reach the defending artillery's prepared positions. Both the British and the Russians tended to attempt to shield their infantry from French preparatory artillery fires : the British by the use of reverse slopes and/or prepared infantry positions, the Russians by using substantial tactical depth in their deployments. With larger numbers of men, the Russians did not so much need to form a "thin green line", but the overall intention seems to be similar.

Agree with Seroga. Noting that has been discussed contitutes "most typical" or "default" or "canonical" and that there were many many variations. "Doctrine" as we think of it did not exist during Napoleonic times. In fact, the idea of uniformity in action above the brigade-level other than following commands was a fairly new idea. There were the drill regulations and everything else was in the pervue of 'genius', something that couldn't be regulated. Lots of discussion of that during the latter part of the 18th Century.

That is part of the challenge. The commanders had the conventions and lots of building blocks of formations to work with, providing some flexibility in meeting different battlefield situations. For instance, while the Prussian manuals described how a brigade should form on the battlefield, because of any number of reasons, besides the commanders' deciding to do something different, you'll find lots of variations to that convention on the battlefield.

There were 'how to do it' [regulation] manuals for the battalion or lower, but each army and corps commander had their own ways of doing things, such as Ney, Marmont and Davout and the Duke of Brunswick. That is why they wrote their Instructions. We have texts from a number of French, British, Russian and Prussian generals. Then there were army-wide instuctions like the Russian 1812 "Day of Battle" directive that went out to all officers, though both Russian Army commanders wrote their own instructions at the time. Wellington did the same thing, but used General Orders instead of formal instructional texts.

And there were any number of other books written by various officers recording how operations were conducted at higher levels, brigade, division and Corps. I know of several French, Prussian and British publications.

For instance, there is Cunninghame's 1804 The Tactic of the British Army (1804), particularly p.59-60 and 70 will be of interest concerning your question. A good portion of the book consists of diagrams of maneuvers for multiple brigades. He uses a model of 24 battalions in six brigades.

You can find it on Google Books:
link

Best Regards,
Bill

This may be of interest as well

1498. — MANOEUVRES A FAIRE EXÉCUTER PAR LE CORPS D'OBSERVATION D'ITALIE.
Au Général Comte Bertrand, Commandant Le Corps
D'observation D'italie, A Trieste.
Paris, 2 mars 1813.
Monsieur le comte Bertrand, recommandez aux généraux qui commandent vos divisions qu'on fasse faire aux troupes l'exercice à feu deux fois par semaine; que, deux fois par semaine, elles tirent à la cible, et enfin que trois fois elles fassent des manœuvres. On leur fera faire les colonnes d'attaque par bataillon; on les fera charger en colonne d'attaque et en se déployant sons le feu de la première division et faisant feu tout en arrivant sur la ligne de bataille. On formera également la colonne d'attaque, tandis que la division du centre commence le feu de file et se déploie sous le feu de file. Après cela, on fera une charge de cent pas, battant la charge simplement et sans fion ni variantes, et on fera faire feu de file à tous les pelotons, à mesure qu'ils viendront se placer sur la ligne de bataille. Vous ordonnerez aussi qu'on fasse souvent la manœuvre de se mettre promptement en bataillon carré, en ployant derrière les dernières divisions du bataillon, à distance de peloton et en faisant feu de file. C'est la manœuvre qu'il est le plus nécessaire que les colonels connaissent bien, car la moindre hésitation peut compromettre la troupe.
Enfin ordonnez que chaque compagnie de voltigeurs soit instruite à former promptement le carré et à faire sur-le-champ feu de file, afin qu'étant en tirailleurs ils puissent promptement se réunir et résister à la cavalerie. Faites donner la poudre nécessaire pour ces exercices, et annoncez que ce sont ces manœuvres plus particulièrement que je ferai faire devant moi.
Napoléon.
D'après l'original comm. par M. le général comte Henry Bertrand.
Même lettre au général Lauriston et au maréchal duc de Valmy.
books.google.com/books?id=h6xCAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA329

1509. — ORDRES CONCERNANT LES MANOEUVRES DE L'INFANTERIE : FORMATION DES CARRÉS, DE LA COLONNE D'ATTAQUE; PLOIEMENT ET DÉPLOIEMENT.
AU GÉNÉRAL COMTE BERTRAND, COMMANDANT LE 4e CORPS DE LA GRANDE ARMÉE, A VÉRONE.
Paris, 27 mars 1813.
Le carré se forme indistinctement sur toutes les divisions d'une troupe en ligne, parallèlement ou perpendiculairement à cette ligne, et selon les circonstances et la nature du terrain; il y a, à la suite .de l'Ordonnance, une instruction sur ce point, donnée, je crois, en 1805, qui ne laisse rien à désirer; mais il importe de la rendre familière aux troupes et de faire serrer les serre-files sur le troisième rang, le carré étant formé et la cavalerie cherchant à l'enfoncer, Il convient qu'une compagnie de voltigeurs ait toujours une réserve sur laquelle elle se ralliera, quand elle ne pourra résister à une charge étant en en tirailleurs.
La colonne d'attaque se formera toujours d'après les principes de l'Ordonnance; mais, si la ligne devait se porter en avant dans cet ordre, la première division, ou division de tête de chaque colonne, croiserait la baïonnette, et, arrivées à la hauteur où la ligne devra s'arrêter, ces mêmes divisions de tête ouvriront leur feu de deux rangs, et les colonnes se déploieront sous la protection de ce feu.
Je désire dans cette manœuvre plus de promptitude que n'en indique le règlement, c'est-à-dire que chaque peloton doit commencer son feu en arrivant sur la ligne, et qu'il faut supprimer les guides.
Si l'on se trouvait dans le cas de se remettre en colonne d'attaque, le feu étant établi sur toute la ligne, on pourrait de même le faire sous la protection du feu des divisions de tête; mais alors le chef de chaque bataillon fera prévenir, par son adjudantmajor et ses adjudants, les chefs des pelotons des ailes du mouvement qu'ils devront exécuter, le roulement pour faire cesser le feu ne devant pas être ordonné. La charge ne doit jamais se battre qu'en présence de l'ennemi ou à la manœuvre, et toujours de la manière la plus simple, c'est la plus imposante. L'instruction sur le tir à la cible est bonne; il faut s'attacher à faire tirer beaucoup, individuellement, et donner un léger encouragement aux plus adroits.
D'après la minute. Archives de l'Empire.
books.google.com/books?id=h6xCAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA387

Seroga
Thank you for that summary. I am particularly interested in the idea of Russians using jaeger and artillery as a mobile bulwark. Thinking about it, the Russian deployment at Craonne 1814 typifies this (using two lines of artillery, IIRC) though flank protection provided by the sides of the Chemin de Dames may have influenced this.
Allan

Bill
The Google link is broken. Do you have an updated link?
Allan

Allan:

Hmmm. That's strange. Try this:

link

If that doesn't work, go to Google, under books, and put in Tactics of the British Army and you should come up with Cunningham's book

Best Regards,

Bill

That's working!

Thanks Bill.

Allan