"Are you fearful of "gamey/movie" historical wargames?" Topic

Bandit:
Yes, I miss-typed something. It was two brigades to a division.

I am asking you to show me plans for such, I am not asking you to tell me that I would need to ask myself questions about the grain of the wood or the best match between the type of finish and the species of wood to best accept the finish.

Okay, understood. Well, first you are asking me to build a cabinet, but what is its design? Different styles and purposes require different plans--such as what specific parts of command are targeted. Second, you made some statements about what we don't know and can't model. I don't necessarily agree, so I needed a starting point with evidence. We are wanting to create mechanics that mimic how command worked, including subordinates' actions on the battlefield.

One thing I asked for in my challenge were example mechanics and the context I asked it in was modeling the choices and actions others, downstream in the command structure, would make without providing the player too great a level of control. You provided a large quotation from a British service regulation. Not off topic to be sure, but while this tells us how British officers were trained, it does not provide us a mechanic of the type I asked for.

Oh, you missed some important points then. It gives you a start:

1. What was quoted wasn't 'British Service Regulation'. It was a privately published book for officers on "how things were done" in the British Army at the time. It closely follows all such books, regardless of the country. Ney's Instructions are on google, and he relates the same thing.

2. There were a limited number of ways to do things, Nineteen to be exact. The reason being, everyone had to be on the same page to operate together.

3. The method of command for the Corps commander was the same as the Battalion commander. whether it is a Brigade or a Line [of 8 brigades], the orders issued by the Chief of either, as well as the mode of execution, would be the same; and in the same way would the whole again extend into Line. They used the KISS approach. "The [Dundas' British] Regulations wisely observe, the larger the body, the fewer and more simple ought to be the Manoeuvres required of it." That also means the options for action open to a Division commander were limited. That will limit any player options in moving subordinate commands.

4. Now, what latitude did subordinates have in their arrangements? Like a marching band, a battle line all had to be on the same page when maneuvering: "In proportion, therefore, to the extent of the line, must the latitude of acting, in cases of emergency, be extended to the superior officers—from the above, it will appear of what infinite importance it is that Commandants of Battalions should not only repeat the general instructions, but that they should also loudly announce it."

So, as long as a division or brigades were in formation with other divisions and brigades in a Corps, whether the front line or in support, latitude in acting fell under 'cases of emergencies', which are specified later in the work.

5. The method of control, whether a battalion or a corps was the regulating unit, which as noted in the example includes the commander of the entire Battle Line.

So we have a start to your question. Subordinates at all levels commanded using the same methods, and as subordinates were provided a set of 'emergency' contingencies that they could act on… so that everyone was on the same page and limited so the whole formation didn't fall apart as subordinates did whatever they wanted to.

In designing a game system to model this, I would first want to find examples of this working--and not working--in battle reports and narratives. I would also want to see what kinds of latitude division commanders had when not part of a larger Corps maneuver--while under their basic orders.

Regardless of what the Division commander's orders were, they were--in most all cases--operating in conjunction with other divisions, which also limited their options.

So, we have how orders were delivered, the maximum time it would take to deliver such orders to an entire corps, through the redundant system of shouted orders passed down the line and then perhaps detached officers. And that subordinates has a set of emergency contingencies they could act on.

If we accept that this is 'how things worked,' then we have STEP ONE accomplished. The next step is to see how it worked in battle. That is what will be modeled by any mechanics we choose.

I want to make sure we are together on this to this point before going on.

Best Regards,

Bill

Bandit:
Yes, I miss-typed something. It was two brigades to a division.

I am asking you to show me plans for such, I am not asking you to tell me that I would need to ask myself questions about the grain of the wood or the best match between the type of finish and the species of wood to best accept the finish.

Okay, understood. Well, first you are asking me to build a cabinet, but what is its design? Different styles and purposes require different plans--such as what specific parts of command are targeted. Second, you made some statements about what we don't know and can't model. I don't necessarily agree, so I needed a starting point with evidence. We are wanting to create mechanics that mimic how command worked, including subordinates' actions on the battlefield.

One thing I asked for in my challenge were example mechanics and the context I asked it in was modeling the choices and actions others, downstream in the command structure, would make without providing the player too great a level of control. You provided a large quotation from a British service regulation. Not off topic to be sure, but while this tells us how British officers were trained, it does not provide us a mechanic of the type I asked for.

Oh, you missed some important points then. It gives you a start:

1. What was quoted wasn't 'British Service Regulation'. It was a privately published book for officers on "how things were done" in the British Army at the time. It closely follows all such books, regardless of the country. Ney's Instructions are on google, and he relates the same thing.

2. There were a limited number of ways to do things, Nineteen to be exact. The reason being, everyone had to be on the same page to operate together.

3. The method of command for the Corps commander was the same as the Battalion commander. whether it is a Brigade or a Line [of 8 brigades], the orders issued by the Chief of either, as well as the mode of execution, would be the same; and in the same way would the whole again extend into Line. They used the KISS approach. "The [Dundas' British] Regulations wisely observe, the larger the body, the fewer and more simple ought to be the Manoeuvres required of it." That also means the options for action open to a Division commander were limited. That will limit any player options in moving subordinate commands.

4. Now, what latitude did subordinates have in their arrangements? Like a marching band, a battle line all had to be on the same page when maneuvering: "In proportion, therefore, to the extent of the line, must the latitude of acting, in cases of emergency, be extended to the superior officers—from the above, it will appear of what infinite importance it is that Commandants of Battalions should not only repeat the general instructions, but that they should also loudly announce it."

So, as long as a division or brigades were in formation with other divisions and brigades in a Corps, whether the front line or in support, latitude in acting fell under 'cases of emergencies', which are specified later in the work.

5. The method of control, whether a battalion or a corps was the regulating unit, which as noted in the example includes the commander of the entire Battle Line.

So we have a start to your question. Subordinates at all levels commanded using the same methods, and as subordinates were provided a set of 'emergency' contingencies that they could act on… so that everyone was on the same page and limited so the whole formation didn't fall apart as subordinates did whatever they wanted to.

In designing a game system to model this, I would first want to find examples of this working--and not working--in battle reports and narratives. I would also want to see what kinds of latitude division commanders had when not part of a larger Corps maneuver--while under their basic orders.

Regardless of what the Division commander's orders were, they were--in most all cases--operating in conjunction with other divisions, which also limited their options.

So, we have how orders were delivered, the maximum time it would take to deliver such orders to an entire corps, through the redundant system of shouted orders passed down the line and then perhaps detached officers. And that subordinates has a set of emergency contingencies they could act on.

If we accept that this is 'how things worked,' then we have STEP ONE accomplished. The next step is to see how it worked in battle. That is what will be modeled by any mechanics we choose. IF I am to answer your challenge: "was modeling the choices and actions others, downstream in the command structure, would make without providing the player too great a level of control." Before we can limit player control, we have to know what choices the real subordinates downstream actually had available--right?

I want to make sure we are together on this to this point before going on.

Best Regards,

Bill

KevanG:

Spearhead uses the command arrows and pivot restrictions on stands to restrict the players control, but this seems so stupid to even mention an example since every set of rules more than a draft two page playsheet has mechanisms of some sort that does this.

Kevan:
I agree that there are any number of mechanisms used in games to restrict players' control of subordinate units. It isn't that such game mechanics don't exist. The question is whether they actually mimic the actual limits faced by the historical commanders.

Bandit wants specific mechanisms, not just any old limit. For instance, any number of pre-20th Century wargames limit control through Command Points.. Different quality of leaders have different quantities to use during a turn, supposedly because not all subordinates would act and the commander had a limited number of staff etc. etc. That certainly are limits to what the player can do, but what does it mimic?

A real commander wouldn't sit down and say, "Well, I can successfully order only two of my four divisions at the moment, so which ones will move?" He would ask, like Archduke Charles at Wagram, "do I have time to get orders out to the whole army, which was a yes/no proposition, not a I have X number of corps I can order to move."

Nope, that wasn't the type of choices facing a Napoleonic commander. They would send orders to all four corps assuming/hoping that all orders were followed. I have never read where they decided "Send orders to II Corps because we don't have time to send orders to all four corps."

The question is whether the mechanics actually model something historical.

Best Regards,

Bill

"I have never read where they decided "Send orders to II Corps because we don't have time to send orders to all four corps."

hardly surprising since the whole turn concept is an artificial construct. WHat would more likely ocurr would be a dictation of an order written down by the four corp liason officers where the commander would order all the corp with their individual tasks, describing their interaction, have it read back to him, amend if necessary which would then be re-written twice each a least and 3 ADC sent to each corp with duplicate orders….Nobody would write that this ocurred on 'turn 4' after they started.

WHen muliple corp orders were given, the corp commanders were normally told beforehand, had standing or timed attack orders, often triggered by signal or awaited the order for commitment from reserve, and, lets be honest, were for strategic maneuvering. battlefield orders were different, when multiple corp orders would be a corp with a cava;lry corp suppoting it

Command structure is however a resource and has limits in relation to what it can acheive in a short space of time, so I would not say that a allocation of points or orders is not a good mimic of the use of resources. I found Maurice's card system especially gave a good mimic of that.

One aspect of the 'mimic' is not about how accurate it is, but if it gives a plausable value in the difference in command abiliies of the opposing forces and relates some level of appropriate difficulty to acheve an upper echelon command to the task. If both sides have equal abilities and have the same abstract system, It makes little difference to realistic replication of command problms.

What does matter is when any and all tasks are made equal or independant of the command ability of the opposition.

Black powder and blitzkreig commander suffer from these syndromes, in that it is as easy to do some complicated order like wheel 45 degrees to the left, advance a move and form square in echelon with militia as it is to advance the guards up a turn from their reserve position.

If you are actually trying to mimic the entire staff structure, then a deterministic yes/ no method with unlimited orders is just as good a way to do it, espcially if your turn is long enough that a message can travel on horseback the length of the table in a 'turn'.

March attack uses that system and makes it much more difficult to move committed formations…while Black powder makes it guaranteed. I would suggest that one could be more likely to mimic a commanders problems.

KevanG wrote:

hardly surprising since the whole turn concept is an artificial construct.

KevanG:
ALL simulations and games are artifical constructs, every last bit… They are a model, a representation of something else.

What would more likely ocurr would be a dictation of an order written down by the four corp liason officers where the commander would order all the corp with their individual tasks, describing their interaction, have it read back to him, amend if necessary which would then be re-written twice each a least and 3 ADC sent to each corp with duplicate orders….Nobody would write that this ocurred on 'turn 4' after they started.

And how do you know that? Of course they wouldn't write down 'turn 4', they would write down the day, hour and minutes… so both efforts are "keeping track."

WHen muliple corp orders were given, the corp commanders were normally told beforehand, had standing or timed attack orders, often triggered by signal or awaited the order for commitment from reserve, and, lets be honest, were for strategic maneuvering. battlefield orders were different, when multiple corp orders would be a corp with a cava;lry corp suppoting it.

Again, how do you know that? And if there is evidence for it, the question is how do you mimic that dynamic with game mechanics?

Command structure is however a resource and has limits in relation to what it can acheive in a short space of time, so I would not say that a allocation of points or orders is not a good mimic of the use of resources. I found Maurice's card system especially gave a good mimic of that.

Again, how do you know that? what gives you that idea the card system is a 'good mimic of' X? Do you know what a command structure could achieve in a short space of time? Would commanders actually parcel out orders based on some known limits, whether represented by cards or CPs? And how do you know they present the player with the same or similar problems with command?

One aspect of the 'mimic' is not about how accurate it is, but if it gives a plausable value in the difference in command abiliies of the opposing forces and relates some level of appropriate difficulty to acheve an upper echelon command to the task.

Either the mechanic or game system does what it is designed to do or it doesn't. I have no idea what the difference is between 'accurate' and 'plausable value' in this case. Either the mechanic acts like some aspects of historical evidence or whatever it was designed to mimic, or it doesn't.

IF there is no evidence whatsoever, then how could a game
be 'plausable'? If you do have some historical evidence, then the system either models it, or it doesn't, which is accurate [it hits the target it was designed to hit] and that is beyond plausable.

You can talk about 'plausable' events in history, but you have to have evidence somewhere to suggest it.

The bottom line is capturing the types of decisions [as far as we can discern] were faced by commanders, limits and all.

"And how do you know that?"

I guessed?

"Either the mechanic or game system does what it is designed to do or it doesn't."

Actually, It always does what it is designed to do.

Actually, It always does what it is designed to do.

Not when its a simulation game. ANY complex system can have all the parts right, and when it's run, doesn't do what it was supposed to. If a game always did what it was designed to do, then it wouldn't have to be play-tested half as much as a good game is…

Guessing is fine if you aren't interested in actual history, but you can't honestly claim a system simulates, copies, recreates, mimics, represents something from history or present reality based on a guess or two.

You got your ideas of 'how it was' to command from someplace… You aren't saying you dreamed them up one day.

Can't even make it four posts on any given subtopic.

Cheers,

The Bandit

McLaddie- you are quite right. I have a feeling you are frustrated with the "more commom rules' state of affairs -
There is a sea change coming.
RWP

I have a feeling you are frustrated with the "more commom rules' state of affairs -

RWP:
Not the rules themselves, but the assumptions and guesses they are built on, and then what designers and wargamers think they achieve.

There are a number of fun games and 'common rules' [which I play] that have nothing demonstratable to do with military history and combat.

Can't even make it four posts on any given subtopic.

Bandit:

Not sure what that means, other than you have a dozen "yes, but…" And yes, it is complicated.

If the rules are going to simulate history, even those restricting player control over his subordinates, then you first have to have some idea of the historical conditions and dynamics involved in subordinates operating under a corps commander. First Step.

Best Regards,
Bill

"ANY complex system can have all the parts right, and when it's run, doesn't do what it was supposed to."

No , It does what the simulation simulates, How 'right ' it is has nothing to do with the simulation design, just the simulation choices, which are not the same thing.

"You got your ideas of 'how it was' to command from someplace"

Sometimes, simulation is simple and the 'simulater' thinks its complicated because he sees unknown variables.

If you break it down to basics, You can simulate the entire system of command from prebiblical up to and includinng the invention of semaphore by the use of pencil and paper, which is the basic limit of technology. It could b an interesting exercise to invstigate that but We do not need to know the exact nuance of how any army actually operated a system, just how effective it was compared to others and anacdotale evidence that army A was better than Army B is enough to warrant a guess about how more effective it was in the model.

Playtesting is polishing up the anecdotal bits.

Gosh. It's hard to imagine a post more howlingly incorrect in so many different ways at the same time.

So Mr. Picky will content himself by demanding to know how many pre-biblical armies were commanded by means of paper and pencil.

All the best,

John.

"It's hard to imagine a post more howlingly incorrect in so many different ways at the same time."

And that post would be…?

Was the game fun?
Was the game outcome true?
Was the game reality?

Some answer, some play.

Was the game fun?
Was the game outcome true?
Was the game reality?

Some answer, some play.

And some ask rhetorical questions… ;-7

McLaddie,

If the rules are going to simulate history, even those restricting player control over his subordinates, then you first have to have some idea of the historical conditions and dynamics involved in subordinates operating under a corps commander. First Step.

You keep stating this but it is broadly accepted and has gone undisputed. The point is, was and has been, unnecessarily made because it is not contested and has never been during this conversation. If you were to spend as much time on following up "First Step" as you do restating that it is required this discussion might go somewhere. I am unclear as to your intention or your desire, perhaps you wish for me to spew out such a stream of evidence, facts and antidotes under the notion that once enough have populated this thread we will have accomplished the "First Step" and may move onto what is surely the second of many. Yet you must know as a participant that such will lead to endless discussion and debate and counter-examples by the masses who wish to participate and assist, their intent positive, it will none the less mean that due to the venue of this discussion and the theme of participation there can be no consensus, no conclusion en mass, thus meaning that the "First Step" will linger like an indefinitely night. I do not ascribe to you the desire to so mire the conversation in a combination of rhetoric and historical debate that my question will never be addressed but I can only conclude that regardless of whatever your intentions be the likelihood of progression on my question is low and whatever fair odds might have been they are compounded downward by the constant reference and reminder of undisputed points of the obvious.

Cheers,

The Bandit

For a great example of the gulf between what wargamers want, and what people can know from historical evidence, see this recent thread:

TMP link

…in which somebody wants to know what the dice-roll modifier should be for Austrian artillery.

He gets answered with a barrage of point-counterpoint about Napoleonic artillery history, and of course ends up no closer to knowing whether or not he should use that modifier. (Which is because, obviously, there is no way to answer that question, other than with opinions. There is no historical source that is going to tell you what you need to roll on a d6.)

Klumpenproletariat wrote:

For a great example of the gulf between what wargamers want, and what people can know from historical evidence, see this recent thread:

The question:

Is there any proof that the austrian artillery was so good that it should get a reroll for misses or be graded any higher then the french at any time from 1796 on to 1815.

You need to read the question again. Obviously, the poster is asking about Napoleonic artillery history, specifically evidence [you know, proof] concerning Austrian artillery.

…in which somebody wants to know what the dice-roll modifier should be for Austrian artillery.

Yeah, *should be*, determined by what? Proof.

There is no historical source that is going to tell you what you need to roll on a d6.

Particularly when you don't know what history prompted the rule in whatever rules set[s] is being referenced in the first place. What he gets is a lot of facts and opinions, which is what he asked for. No one could actually answer the question beyond a reasonable doubt when no one knows what rules are being referenced or what history the rules were built on in the first place.

Of course, because of that the entire discussion is dancing on air. Big surprise. But then the request was for evidence, not a final answer on Austrian artillery for all time for everyone…, let alone a simulation system.

You really, really want to ignore, cloud and deny any suggestion that gamers are actually interested in the connection between what the rules do and military history… you know, 'proof', stuff like that… to the point that you ignore the question altogether. Or say it is a useless effort.

And you point to folks as proof who don't know how to build simulations based on historical evidence and had no intention of doing so when providing the evidence and/or opinions asked for in the first place. Very annoying.

O.K. I read the first page or two of this thread, so the topic may of moved away from the original question.
But with regards to the first post asking the question- No I am not fearfull at all, it's a game, no way can a game represent real life.
Sorry if I have interupted the present talking points 'cause I haven't read them as we moved away from the the first question.
Aynsley

Klumpenproletariat,

Yep.

Cheers,

The Bandit

You keep stating this but it is broadly accepted and has gone undisputed. The point is, was and has been, unnecessarily made because it is not contested and has never been during this conversation.

Bandit:
It is hard to tell what is undisputed, but I am glad you broadly accept that notion.

If you were to spend as much time on following up "First Step" as you do restating that it is required this discussion might go somewhere. I am unclear as to your intention or your desire, perhaps you wish for me to spew out such a stream of evidence, facts and antidotes under the notion that once enough have populated this thread we will have accomplished the "First Step" and may move onto what is surely the second of many.

And you keep insisting I tell you how to design a simulation to portray subordinate options while realistically limiting player contol without any relation to content, i.e. history… what is going to be simulated.

Yet you must know as a participant that such will lead to endless discussion and debate and counter-examples by the masses who wish to participate and assist, their intent positive, it will none the less mean that due to the venue of this discussion and the theme of participation there can be no consensus, no conclusion en mass, thus meaning that the "First Step" will linger like an indefinitely night.

I wasn't interested in that kind of digression. So, you will accept the history I've provided for moving the discussion along and any other history I state without my having to establish where I got it or 'digressing'? Then we can move on.

STEP TWO: Describe what the evidence tells you about the dynamics of command. In this case, the system was basically the same throughout the army and each level had much the same restrictions within their command: battalion to Division commander controlled movement by the regulating brigade and established orders, and had leaway to:

1. Commit supporting lines in his command in one of three ways: Replace the line, cover the Front line retreat or move to cover the flank of the first line.

2. React to enemy attacks by halting temporarily, deploying into line, if in column, refusing flanks, and forming square.

3. A major concern for all levels were keeping in contact with other commands on their flanks within the scope of the orders. Always, the first order of business when 'contact' i.e. moving together, was to re-connect.

That means that once a division is given orders, it has a limited set of options in responding to battle situations, deviations from the Original formation and combat mission parameters, most being protective actions, a few being added pressure in an acttack, like committing the supports.

STEP THREE: Find evidence in the battle commentaries of these 'rules' being followed. One thing discovered is that almost always, divisional commands on the battlefield had objectives which had divisions moving straight ahead towards the enemy, that objective, whether Albuera, Austerlitz Salamanca, Waterloo, or Borodino. Moving a line of of any length made movement any way but straight once under artillery fire difficult at best.

Also here there would be a determination of how and when a Corps commander 'controlled' his divisions… that is, his limitations.

STEP FOUR: Create game mechanics that model those dynamics. I can give details. Obviously, if it is to be a fun game, that is an aspect of creating the rules.

STEP FIVE: Play through the rules to see if they work smoothly ,as designed, the way they were intended to, based on Step Three. [Play-testing would occur here too with fun being a consideration.] Once the game is working well, you test it against history.

STEP SIX: Validation, or 'play-testing the simulation' occurs. The game is, using a number of methods, tested to see if the final product works as a simulation of command. Does the system allow battlefield events to occur if the same decisions are made, etc.?

One thing that will always happen is issues and ideas at one step will take you back to previous steps, in a creative cycle, but each step has particular products.

I imagine you will want more explanation at different steps, but the real questions as far as player control of subordinates will be [assuming you accept the historical evidence] will be:

1. What kind of control did Corps commanders demonstrate over divisional subordinates on down the line??

2. Within th limitations of what divisional commanders were allowed to do, how often did they act in counterproductive ways for the division and/or Corps as a whole…and when?

3. If players are allowed to make decisions for divisional actions in combat [within the limits mentioned], how different would that be from what historically happened? In other words, would that player control unrealistically skew the dynamics? If so, then what kind of IA type rules could be created to mimic decisions within those limited response options?

Any solutions to the above will be tested against what we know of the actual battle actions of the commanders,just as the game system would be tested against lots of gamers' notions of fun.

And yes, I do have lots of historical information concerning those very questions or I wouldn't be able to delinate the steps the way I do… which is why it's important to know the specifics so each steps' goals can be specific.

I hope that's the type of response you were looking for…

Best Regards,

Bill

I wonder if one could create a 'historically valid' simulation that shows how fast, and to what extent, a simple TMP post can be morphed into something vastly more complex, and yet fail to address the original point?

I always used to rather fancy this course, at my old college, don't think I'll bother now.

link

Milites:

Well, if you took his course, say hello to Dr. Sabin when you see him. And this isn't whether you or anyone wants to bother. No need to.

At the moment, the question is whether it's possible at all, particularly with miniatures. The contra-notion here is that a 'hitorically valid' simulation game is impossible. e.g.

There is no historical source that is going to tell you what you need to roll on a d6.

Lots of resistance to the idea, but most all TMP threads beyond five posts 'morph' into something else, so that has nothing to do with the topic[s].

Of course, the original question involved Historically gamey/movie-like wargames. A number of folks weren't sure there was any other kind of wargame…. sort of made it difficult to respond in any meaningful way… creating that complexity.

McLaddie,

It is all you've said thus far:

1) Research the history
2) Build a system
3) Test the system
4) Revise the system
5) Repeat

Your reply doesn't answer my question, heck your reply doesn't address my question. Feel free to keep repeating yourself. I'll participate with you if I see your change your line of response with respect to relevancy.

Also, the people you claim are represented by this:

At the moment, the question is whether it's possible at all, particularly with miniatures. The contra-notion here is that a 'hitorically valid' simulation game is impossible. e.g.

Have yet to say it, only you have, you keep saying that is my view or someone else's view but I haven't expressed it. I'm decent at expressing my thoughts, please stop attempting to do it for me.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Has anybody figured out yet, how many times the Musashi will hit the South Dakota? I need a percentile roll.

Klumpenproletariat,

I hear you'll have to be more specific, wait I mean more general, wait I mean here are a bunch of questions I need to you answer before I will make any attempt to answer yours, which I said I would answer…

Cheers,

The Bandit

Bandit:
You said:

One thing I asked for in my challenge were example mechanics and the context I asked it in was modeling the choices and actions others, downstream in the command structure, would make without providing the player too great a level of control.

When I started with the what was to be modeled, the context, those choices and actions possible downstream, I said that was the first step-what was to be modeled--and I got the impression you wanted me to provide all the steps. There are six, not five.

If you want the specific mechanics for modeling the choices and actions of others, you need the specific historic choices available to those subordinates.

I am unclear as to your intention or your desire, perhaps you wish for me to spew out such a stream of evidence, facts and antidotes under the notion that once enough have populated this thread we will have accomplished the "First Step" and may move onto what is surely the second of many.

I simply asked you for the history to be represented, what those 'example mechanics' were supposed to model. It appeared you didn't want to provide that, so I did.

Were you expecting the 'example mechanics' without any relation to the historic command systems they're suppose to model? I didn't get that impression with the word 'context' in the challenge. Or were you assuming I knew the historical evidence you were thinking of and it didn't need to be mentioned?

At the moment, the question is whether it's possible at all, particularly with miniatures. The contra-notion here is that a 'hitorically valid' simulation game is impossible.

you keep saying that is my view or someone else's view but I haven't expressed it.

Bandit. I haven't said that about you that I know of. I quoted 'Klumpenproletariat' in posting that comment, not you and the comment was in response to someone else's comments. Why would you think I was referring to you?

I have provided the historical system to be modeled, the design steps those mechanics would have to pass through to be 'valid' and not just throwing out any old game mechanic as an example.

The historical and design 'context' you asked for as been provided and I have have always found that context comes before the particulars--if how the particulars 'fit' are to be appreciated.

Do you want those 'example mechanics' for the history I have provided, including 'realistically' limiting player control?

Best Regards,

Bill H.

McLaddie,

Me: I think we are in agreement that one cannot and will not simulate all aspects of a given something. The given something is the Napoleonic battlefield, more specifically a corps commander's experience attempting to exert command and control. Specifically, how do we handle the things we can't model, such as the choices of division commanders to change the placement and linear formations of battalions within their division while executing the broader base orders from their corps commander represented by the player without the player intervening in those choices but while representing the variety that occurred? And what is that based on? And how do we do it without giving the player more micro level control than is realistic under the circumstances?

McLaddie: Do you want those 'example mechanics' for the history I have provided, including 'realistically' limiting player control?

Sure do, I've asked for it, I thought it was clear in my original "challenge" and since I have clarified that yes, I am looking for the answer not the lead up.

If you're starting to realize that I don't want to answer my own question, yep.

Cheers,

The Bandit

One thing I asked for in my challenge were example mechanics and the context I asked it in was modeling the choices and actions others, downstream in the command structure, would make without providing the player too great a level of control.

Bandit;
I thought you were clear too: examples and context. I thought context is what the hell the examples represent historically/organizationally. I'm getting the impression when you asked for the context, that wasn't what you were thinking. ;-7 My examples have to be contextual to understand what they are designed to do.

I'll get those to you tonight.

Bill

McLaddie,

You are having trouble reading what I wrote, over and over again.

One thing I asked for in my challenge were example mechanics and the context I asked it in was modeling the choices and actions others, downstream in the command structure, would make without providing the player too great a level of control.

Please review what I wrote, here I will break it out for you further so it is in smaller pieces:

One thing I asked for in my challenge were example mechanics…

and then

…and the context I asked it in was modeling the choices and actions others, downstream in the command structure, would make without providing the player too great a level of control.

I never asked you for context, I was reiterating for someone else the context in which I had asked my question in.

Geeze man, what can I tell you but syntax matters.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Bandit:

Just to be clear:
You asked for in context "the choices and actions others, downstream in the command structure,would make,…"

Tough to respond with examples without first describing that command structure downstream in some detail and the choices and actions allowed others within it. That's what I did. That is particularly important within the context of players having 'too much control' compared to Corps commanders in that command structure. Syntax does matter.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

My retort to everything you have contributed to this thread:

xkcd.com/605

And with that, I am done with you. Post whatever you like, I won't be seeing it.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Examples of the choices and actions of others, downstream in the command structure, without providing the player too great a level of control.

Most armies' command systems were alike in that the Division and Brigade commanders has a set number of options they could make without higher levels being involved.

The battle array of divisions and/or brigades were pretty much set before those commands entered within artillery range. Those *could* be dictated by the corps commander or left to the divisional commander… brigades would form up according to their division's array.

1. So the Corps commander/ player can direct how a division will form, in line, a line of columns, two or three lines, and determine the combat goal[s] of the division, but once it entered artillery range or came under artillery fire [Which military men of the period determined was round 1000 to 1200 yards], the corps commander had little control after that. which is a good reason for the opponent to have artillery around to do that. There are a limited number [six] of variations for brigade and division array, line, column and mixes in one, two or three lines.

The game mechanic is that the player cannot change subordinate formations when it is under artillery fire…

2. A division commander maneuvered his division by the regulating battalion, by a flank or center. Each choice had its own strengths and weaknesses. This was usually determined by the divisional commander based on the expected combat. A center regulating battalion was best for a straight-ahead attack, but difficult to wheel at all. If the regulating battalion was on the right, the line could quickly wheel to the left, but not the right, and vice versa. ANY brigade in line formation would form columns and march to the new position if the wheel was more than 30 degrees.

The game mechanic has the regulating battalion determined by the combat mission

Once a division is in the combat zone, the division commander could implement the following changes:

1. Change the location of the regulating battalion

2. Commit any supporting lines by
*passing through the front line,
*covering the front line as it retired, or moving half or all of a supporting line
*[whether columns or in line formation] to the right or left flank—in any manner
from parallel to perpendicular to the first line, as long as the two lines remain
connected by one flank.

3. Form from column to Line, or back again, still in line of battle

4. Form square with some or all battalions. [Individual battalions can also roll emergency attempts. Units in column would have a better chance in such emergencies]
5. Refuse a flank with up to half the front line…
6. Call for support from another division with that combat mission without the Corps commanders' order

When a player wants a division to perform any of these six actions within range of enemy artillery, or closer, infantry or cavalry, the ability would be determined by

A. Line of Sight [If the division commander can't see a ‘new threat', he can't react to it. Obviously there are mechanics for that… which I will get to.]

B. a die roll of the division commander's abilities. Otherwise it doesn't happen.

C. Whether the Corps commander is ‘attached' to the division. In that case, the player can automatically do one or more of the above five options.

3. There are four division orders:
1. Hold: A defense of a specific position
2. ‘Demonstrate: [that is, keep the enemy occupied, such at a French brigade did in front of the Village at the Battle of Albuera.] That means the division has to have Infantry or Artillery units engaged, but does not have an objective to take. Again, some specifics for this mechanic are necessary.
3. Attack: That means that a particular objective to be taken has been identified. There is a straight-line axis of advance from the center of the divisional line to the objective that must be followed in the advance.
4. Support: This can be a division with a support order for either a Division attacking or attacking or holding, not demonstrating.

4. The corps commander can change orders based on distance and Line of
Sight… the roll being a ‘Situational Awareness' roll. A corps commander will usually be within a mile or 10 minutes by horse of any division commander, so the closer the commander, the better the chance that it will be delivered within that time.

5Basically there were two ways Division commanders ‘acted outside' of orders: A. They were slow or partial in carrying out the orders, OR
B. They changed the objectives and acted accordingly.

The division commander's abilities and personality determine when and if they do either. [The two categories of ability and personality]
Abilities: Poor, Average, Experienced, Talented] These affect movement, changes of formation and combat.
Personalities: [Poltroon/Political appointee, Cautious, Professional, Aggressive] These affect following orders.

Whenever a Player rolls for either a change of orders or to see it a Division commander initiates one of the six changes allowed, there is a chance of ‘acting outside of orders, much more likely with the Poltroon [A or B], Cautious, [A] and Aggressive [B] personalities, than the Professional. A subordinate can be a "Poor Professional or a Talented Poltroon.

The whole point of each of these rules separately or together is to portray the command structure… in what could and couldn't be done in maneuvering thousands of men together as well as limiting the control the player has over what the divisions do.

I can give more examples, give far more detail on the above, and/or explain the LOC rules in regards to limiting Division and Corps actions. And in some of these mechanics, card draws might be more fun and effective than die rolls… Any number of chance generators could be used.

I wanted to avoid being too verbose, even though the rules do need to be explained.

Best Regards,
Bill

Hey, thanks Bill – that post is brilliant. A great summary of what is happening at each level of command, and a an appropriately workable model for a command simulation.

Many thanks for taking the time to post the above.

Couple of suggestions / questions / observations regarding the model :

2. Division formations – managing reserve formations at Division level.

You have covered the 1st line and supporting line(s) within the Division.

There is the addition of reserve formations within each Division as well, as a possibility. The Corps commander can instruct any of his unengaged Divisions to form a reserve brigade.

The Reserve brigade is a different beast to the 1st / 2nd supporting line, in that it remains to the rear of the battle, and avoids combat & battle fatigue.

Once a Division is engaged, the Division commander can commit their reserve brigade as an action.

3). Division Orders

Possible additional modes for Division orders :

5. Break-off / Withdraw. Division is to extricate itself from engagement status, and withdraw to a designated rally point.

6. Attack Preparation. Bombardment and Grand Bande skirmishing preparation prior to a scheduled attack. This is a different mode of operation to a Demonstration order.

7. Rearguard. Fight a delaying action, keeping the enemy engaged whilst having the option to pull back. Different mode of operation to a hold order.

There are possibly a few extra modes of operation for Cavalry commands as well :

8. Support / Intercept. Similar to the regular 'Support' order for infantry Divisions, with the option of launching an attack against approaching enemy units.

9. Screen / Reconnoiter. To cover the advance of 1 or more Divisions.

Following on from that, what are your thoughts on artillery ?

Who should be in control of the guns ? (for the majority of Napoleonic battles anyway)

My thinking is that artillery during this period was a specialist arm, that required specially trained officers, and operated within it's own chain of command.

The Corps commander / player can allocate locations, fields of fire, and missions to various artillery units … but beyond that, their control was limited.

Its a great challenge to represent that separation of control over the guns, without the need to delegate the command to an extra player. (that would be ideal, but we dont always have the luxury of having extra players at the table just to delegate commands to)

Echo Steve, nice post. There are some choices involved with which mechanic to use for LOS and Iniative of Subordinate Commanders, but the intent and effect of reducing a player/commanders formation options at the corps level once the inital choice of formation has been comitted to are essential napoleonics.

Yep, some nice posts gentlemen…

and these were just what the discussion needed; some reference to non-gamey/movie-like rules – "hurrah!", I say !

Steve,
Re. the artillery batteries:
What kind action might a battery commander take?… I was just thinking if the commander (a corps general) sets the artillery a "mission", then surely its actions are dependent upon those orders?

Mike.

@MC -

Keeping it simple, the battery commander could be limited to these actions :

1. Perform bombardment fire on a specified target or area.
2. Provide tactical support fire to a body of troops that they are attached to.
3. Pull back to reserve, for refitting or resupply (or for keeping the guns safe)

The Corps commander / player should be able to specify where the guns are to the setup, and what the mission is. However the timing and execution of that mission, the choice of targets, and the decision to pull out … is up to the battery commander, not the player.

Sticky problem to pull off in a miniatures game, if you want something simple and workable.

I like the idea of delegating the operation of the guns to a 'non-player character' if you like. I have the opportunity at the moment to implement something like this in my project .. so just tossing around ideas at the moment.

Btw – thanks for publishing GM. Just bought a copy :) The material in there on Division formations, and the use of regulating battalions is excellent. Ill be adding those concepts into my little project too. Will be keen to get your involvement and feedback as it emerges.

Thank-you Steve,

Please check out my general`s initiatives rules.
I think that I have approached pretty much the same question that you are asking and come up with a simple method of initiative testing for situations in which the player believes that there are grounds for a subordinate to change his own orders.
This will not happen frequently because as you go down the chain of command it becomes harder to change those orders.

Also, I did have some solo-rules for use with GM; I`ll be re-working these shortly and when they`re ready again they may be of some interest not only for soloing but because they could be an aid in determining corps & divisional battle arrays and the missions of the supporting arms.

Mike.

Steve64:

Thank you for the encouragement. Considering that the military men faced all the questions we can ask, it isn't surprising that they created answers for the battlefield that were simple and restrictive so thousands of men could act together in chaos of combat.

There is the addition of reserve formations within each Division as well, as a possibility. The Corps commander can instruct any of his unengaged Divisions to form a reserve brigade.

The Reserve brigade is a different beast to the 1st / 2nd supporting line, in that it remains to the rear of the battle, and avoids combat & battle fatigue.

True. And that brigade can be given 'reserve' orders, which are pretty much 'stay put until called on.' There are a lot of questions I have concerning this, but that is what I have found so far.

Once a Division is engaged, the Division commander can commit their reserve brigade as an action.

I haven't found instances where part of a division being held out of the Divisional formations as a separate reserve…not saying they don't exist, but that I just haven't seen any examples of that. The whole point of the supporting lines was to act as a reserve moving in concert with the rest of division. What I have seen are 1. Divisions advancing into combat or defending all together, and 2. If any part of a division is held in reserve apart from the Divisional formation, it is the Corps or Army commander who has done that.

3). Division Orders

I can see your orders working just fine. I want it as simple as possible, so I would try to cover all those contingencies with the four. I hate writing orders, but definitely want that committment and lag-time inherent in pre-20th Century warfare.

Possible additional modes for Division orders :

5. Break-off / Withdraw. Division is to extricate itself from engagement status, and withdraw to a designated rally point.

I can see this one probably having to be a separate order, so five orders.

6. Attack Preparation. Bombardment and Grand Bande skirmishing preparation prior to a scheduled attack. This is a different mode of operation to a Demonstration order.

This can fall under 'Demonstration', where there is no objective other than to engage the enemy. A new order of 'Attack' at the appropriate time would be needed.

7. Rearguard. Fight a delaying action, keeping the enemy engaged whilst having the option to pull back. Different mode of operation to a hold order.

This 'might' fall under a demonstration order. I'd have to think about it. Six order types is the maximum I would want to see.

There are possibly a few extra modes of operation for Cavalry commands as well :

8. Support / Intercept. Similar to the regular 'Support' order for infantry Divisions, with the option of launching an attack against approaching enemy units.

9. Screen / Reconnoiter. To cover the advance of 1 or more Divisions.

That could be under 'Support' for 8 and 'Demonstrate' orders for 9, only tweaked to reflect cavalry operation.

I have found that once cavalry is formed up for combat and in artillery range, like infantry it was straight ahead with very little maneuvering. Positioning the cavalry outside of artillery range and the enemy is the crucial part. Whatever I did, I would want to capture how different cavalry was from infantry in use and maneuvering.

I am thinking that movement outside of the range of artillery and not in battle formation can move in column pretty easily. When the division spreads out in line outside of artillery range, maneuvering is over for the most part. This is true for both the Napoleonic Wars and the ACW.

From my experience, you create rules you thing will cover what you want to represent and then start combining, mixing and matching as well as trimming, while maintaining the level of simulation you want. I am still thinking through the original creation part. ;-7

Best Regards,
Bill

le Grande Quartier General:

Thanks. I should say that the example rules are for a wargame at the brigade level, more along the scale of Age of Eagles or SHAKO. I am still fussing with the LOS, but the general idea is this: Whether an officer at any level can act is whether they can see what is prompting the new actions.

So, once the Division has been formed up and moved in engagement range [that 1000-1200 yards], the divisional commander would have little reason change anything front or flank among his range of options unless something he can see changes…and that is true for the player. That or he receives new orders…

Personally, I hate the term 'initiative'. Either the commander is following orders, which isn't initiative, or he is doing something on his 'own intiative,' and not part of the orders. That isn't the way the term is used in most wargames. On the other hand, battlefield initiative is something won and lost by actions, not always a random event or something that happens TO commanders rather than something they do.

Best Regards,

Bill

Who should be in control of the guns ? (for the majority of Napoleonic battles anyway)

My thinking is that artillery during this period was a specialist arm, that required specially trained officers, and operated within it's own chain of command.

The Corps commander / player can allocate locations, fields of fire, and missions to various artillery units … but beyond that, their control was limited.

Steve:
Actually, any number of artillerists complained of the generals of infantry and cavalry who would order them to do something when that isn't the best use of the guns. for instance, I have incidents in both the Napoleonic wars and Civil War where generals ordered guns to keep firing without
any real targets to reassure the nearby infantry….

But I agree. Corps and Division commanders didn't designate targets and it was the artillery captain who determined how to fire and which targets would be chosen.

So, I think we have to approach artillery at this level from 'point and shoot' for every battery.

The most important thing Army and Corps commanders did was allocate batteries to missions and create fields of fire. Beyond that, artillery was firing Random Shot [including bounce], sort of 'interdicting' an area of the battlefield, Direct Fire at specific formations or positions, and Point-blank Fire/Canister.

Those types of fire were generally in conjunction to range. Any variation was often by orders from on high. On thing that is not portrayed very well is converging fire and angled fire [Say a 45 degree angle on an enemy line as opposed to a full flank target.] Generals always tried to set batteries to accomplish that. Such a set of game dynamics for artillery would be very different from what we see at the moment. [Different, not inherently better. Just capturing something different.]

Best Regards,

Bill H.

From my experience, you create rules you thing will cover what you want to represent and then start combining, mixing and matching as well as trimming, while maintaining the level of simulation you want.

I can see that in retrospect now. Tis always good systems engineering practice to incorprate the similar into the same subsystem, and keep the number of black boxes low.

Personally, I hate the term 'initiative'. Either the commander is following orders, which isn't initiative, or he is doing something on his 'own intiative,' and not part of the orders. That isn't the way the term is used in most wargames. On the other hand, battlefield initiative is something won and lost by actions, not always a random event or something that happens TO commanders rather than something they do.

I think "initiative" is a misnomer as well.

There is an intangible concept of who has the moral upper hand at a point in time. This is true of a battlefield, as it is of a bar room brawl, a stockmarket trading session, a boardroom meeting, a domestic dispute … or a football match. In all cases, it is difficult to describe objectively, but is more often than not quite decisive to the outcome.

In complex systems where things are all happening at the same time, points emerge where one party or the other gets to dictate the immediate flow of events to others. We have all seen it happen at one time or another. This is what I understand by the wargamers use of the term "initiative".

We could use another name – "Impetus" or something similar.

So, I think we have to approach artillery at this level from 'point and shoot' for every battery.

The most important thing Army and Corps commanders did was allocate batteries to missions and create fields of fire. Beyond that, artillery was firing Random Shot [including bounce], sort of 'interdicting' an area of the battlefield, Direct Fire at specific formations or positions, and Point-blank Fire/Canister.

That is my current approach for the simulation.

The player (Corps commander), gets to site the guns and lay out fields of fire. The guns are given 1 of 3 missions – OR – ordered to retire to reserve.

Once committed to a mission, this cannot be changed. New missions can only be issued to guns that are currently in reserve positions.

The 3 missions are :

1) Bombard enemy position at given location, for a specified duration. The guns will make every attempt to fullfill the mission, and then retire to reserve automatically when done. They may abandon the mission and retire if approached by the enemy, or if they start taking counter fire. Nor will they magically switch targets outside of their field of fire.

2) Tactical support. The guns will maintain relative position with the supported unit. They will fire automatically at the nearest enemy threatening the supported unit. If attacked, they will either retire, or stand and defend the battery. Under extreme circumstance, they will abandon the guns (temporarily) and seek shelter in nearby squares. This decision is out of the players control. If out of ammo, they require a player action to pull them back to reserve for resupply, otherwise they act autonomously.

3) Counter battery over a designated area. Guns will observe a field of fire, and wait for enemy guns to open up to aquire a target of opportunity. From there on its the same as Mission 1) above, until they are done.

Guns in Reserve. Guns will prepare for action and be at the ready for further commands. Big firing bonus in the first rounds of shooting for guns at the ready that come out of reserve.

So basically, the player gets to specify a few basic parameters, and from there the guns are under autonomous control. They shoot and inflict casualities automatically from there on, until the (non player) artillery commander decides that he is done with the mission for whatever reason.

Once the gunnery missions are delegated, the player is then supposed to put their full attention on their lines of infantry – keeping them dressed, and pushing them home to fullfill the main mission. Whether the guns help or not is a function of how well those gunnery missions were delegated in prior 'turns'.

Not perfect, but its better than player controlled "tank" units zipping around a 19th C battlefield I think.

There is a possibilty of allowing some players / commanders to have 'Artillery Commander' special abilities. (Napoleon himself ??) This would allow the player to make decisions at the battery level, if they care to attach.

Other commanders / players who attach to artillery and try to give direct orders will just end in an argument with the battery commander.

My 2c on artillery on the Napoleonic battlefield anyway. I do need to read more though.

Not sure any simulation requires suspension of disbelief. It a simulation attempting to cover a pre-drfined bit of reality. It can still be exciting without having to provide suspention of belief. On of the issues none simulatorts seem to struggle with is that a simulation is often a very simple part simulation.

UshCha:

I missed your comment, sorry. That suspension of disbelief is present in any wargme, but here are some other examples:

A researcher using a computer to simulate two galaxies colliding viewed on a monitor.

A training program where participants use verbal skills in management scenarios.

A Urban Tactical exercise where squads of soldiers with laser-tag equipment assault fake buildings.

Now, in each case, for the simulation to work, to be useful, each user has to act as if the pixels on the screen, the pretend scenario, the fake combat is real for them to be useful--that is, to simulate.

If the researcher said, "All I have is a thousand little lights dancing around to represent billions of stars--it's nothing but resisters and silicon chips"; or the participant says, "This is just play-acting, there are no written scripts in real life"; or a soldier stands up from cover and announces "This is stupid, the lasers aren't real bullets and this isn't real combat", each effort, each simulation isn't going to work.

To work, the researcher has to relate to the computer program 'as if' it shows something real for the research to be meaningful. The participants have to think and act 'as if' the scenarios are real, and the soldiers have to act 'as if' it is real combat for the training to work.

I do agree that simulations can be accurate, functional and still very simple. They just don't simulate a lot, just a little.

Best Regards,
Bill

Steve,
I have the same three types of option for artillery fire;
tactical fire is the default option, and the other two, bombardment and counter-battery are specifically ordered missions, and as such, they are timed.
On occasion artillery batteries were directed by their generals without complaint; check out Davout`s direction of artillery at Auerstadt in his journal – he ordered almost all their dispositions. But a Senarmont, or a Smola could also do the special artillery leadership thing if they were present with the army too!
Mike.

I don't know… I've read and studied similar things myself for 25 years. Having served in uniform for 13 years the one thing I've consistently noticed virtually nothing in reality matches up with what comes out in the research. The one exception is most first hand accounts at the lowest echelons.

Going back to the origional post, I don't fear anything played on the table. It's more of a question of whether I am enjoying the game and the people I'm playing with. The amount of "fact" I let into the game is just enough to define a genre and I stop when it becomes too cumbersome or we "stop feelin it".

I think defining the perfect game is like seeking a perfect woman – we're all going to describe a different gal the longer we talk. At the end of the day I don't care how well researched a game is, it's more about how well do we as the players connect with the rules, the minis, and each other.

I've read and studied similar things myself for 25 years. Having served in uniform for 13 years the one thing I've consistently noticed virtually nothing in reality matches up with what comes out in the research. The one exception is most first hand accounts at the lowest echelons.

Gabriel Landowski:
Nothing? What does that mean outside the lowest echelons? Particularly if what is 'researched' are those experienced officers explaining what was done?

It's more of a question of whether I am enjoying the game and the people I'm playing with. The amount of "fact" I let into the game is just enough to define a genre and I stop when it becomes too cumbersome or we "stop feelin it".

Well, a wargame designer would be very interested in what constitutes that 'feelin it' and how it is enhanced. That is part of the topic here. Whatever you are feeling with game play is formed by that 25 years of study and those 13 years in the military, right?

I think defining the perfect game is like seeking a perfect woman – we're all going to describe a different gal the longer we talk.

Nobody here is talking about perfection, any more than we are talking about the perfect game or the perfect 'feelin it.' We are simply kicking around how to represent different aspects of military operations with game mechanics. Perfection hasn't been mentioned…

We are simply talking about how command worked during the Napoleonic wars [not perfectly, but based on what we can know] and how to incorporate that into game mechanics… Of course, doing it in a workable and meaningful fashion.

At the end of the day I don't care how well researched a game is, it's more about how well do we as the players connect with the rules, the minis, and each other.

Well, I can understand that, and believe me, no one here is asking you have to care about research at the beginning, middle or the end of the day, or anything else for that matter. As a wargamer, research probably has little impact on playing the game. We are simply talking designing wargames, something we care about.

I certainly agree how the players connect with the rules is very, very important. How do you design for that? That is part of the discussion here too. Considering how much gamers know of Napoleonic warefare, and what they don't know, research is probably a necessary evil for a designer if those players are going to 'connect' with the rules.

Best Regards,

Bill