"Austrian line skirmishers" Topic

When did Austrian line infantry begin to deploy skirmishers from their third rank? Were any line regiments capable of skirmisher deployment in 1809?

Plenty of stuff in this thread for you, and stuff to argue over until the cows come home: TMP link

Regards

Ok thanks! It looks pretty clear that at least some, maybe all, Austrian infantry were capable of deploying skirmishers from the third rank in 1809. Although it also seems their skirmishers weren't very good.

The Austrian line infantry 'began' deploying skirmishers from their third rank in 1794. the Austrian Coberg-Saalfeld did in Flanders in 1794. Coberg's army in Holland deployed line troops extensively as skirmishers. So did the Prussians under Brunswick during this time.

Coburg's 1793 Instructions specifically turned these third rank "Zug" units into attack squads, which were very effective when combined with light cavalry in clearing French skirmishers. [From Tom Hollin's Osprey book on the Austrian Infantry.]

Duhesme, in his book on Light Infantry,(p. 102) gives a graphic description of the Austrian light infantry tactics as it was experienced by him':

"In spring 1794, as already said, the Austrians opened the campaign in the north with the siege of Landrecies, they put up measures, which were suitable to weaken and to exhaust the French élan, which had been so disastrous for them in the past. They concentrated the observation army around that place, put into fortifications, placed big reserves and advanced the advance guards as far as possible. These well commanded advance guards did contest the terrain only as long as possible to inflict losses in time and tirailleurs. By that they drew us from one position to the other till to those they really intended to defend. Then they let us disperse our last battalions and let us exhaust ourselves, whose fire was broken by their fortified lines. Fresh troops emerged in most splendid order from them, placed themselves as tirailleurs into our flanks, and attacked as such with big advantage our disordered and exhausted soldiers and disarrayed units of whose majority couldn't even rally around their colours. Fortunate for those divisions, where a cautious general had retained a reserve which was able to cover the retreat and to prevent a rout."

In fact is was done so often that Archduke Charles, in his 1796 Instructions, insisted:

Archduke Charles says about it in his Observationspunkte 1796:

"The war in Flanders, on terrain so irregular that it was not possible to attack in closed line, had the unfortunate consequence for the army of upsetting the ideas on the true method of attacking the enemy, held not only by the private soldier but by the officer as well. Even by the line infantry, attack 'en tirailleurs' is almost the only method used on the most important occasions, or at least the attack degerates into this as soon as the heat of battle reduces the original order of the advance."

He also says

"If when attacking a village or wood it be considered useful to employ a few companies [he is referring to line troops] or scattered tirailleurs, it should be impressed upon the men that as soon as the company commander has the drummer beat the alarm, they must gather by him without the least waste of time, and reform in rank and file."

Quoted in John Cook's First Empire #39 'Skirmishing and the Third Rank Part I'.

This admonishment by Austrian Commanders to refrain from deploying too many skirmishers is a constant one, from 1796-1814. It wouldn't have been felt necessary if line troops weren't "too often" been used as skirmishers.

How good the Austrian line were at skirmishing depended on the particular troops, the period of the war discussed and the tactical situation.

the Austrians were quite renowned for their skirmishing screens, especially in the Revolutionary wars.

This is form an article of Geert van Uythoven

1) Duhesme (p. 102) gives a description of this tactic as it was experienced by the 'receiving side': "In spring 1794, as already said, the Austrians opened the campaign in the north with the siege of Landrecies, they put up measures, which were suitable to weaken and to exhaust the French élan, which had been so disastrous for them in the past. They concentrated the observation army around that place, put into fortifications, placed big reserves and advanced the advance guards as far as possible. These well commanded advance guards did contest the terrain only as long as possible to inflict losses in time and tirailleurs. By that they drew us from one position to the other till to those they really intended to defend. Then they let us disperse our last battalions and let us exhaust ourselves, whose fire was broken by their fortified lines. Fresh troops emerged in most splendid order from them, placed themselves tirailleurs into our flanks, and attacked as such with big advantage our disordered and exhausted soldiers and disarrayed units of whose majority couldn't even rally around their colours. Fortunate for those divisions, where a cautious general had retained a reserve which was able to cover the retreat and to prevent a rout."

IIRC Gill states in his 1809 trilogy that the Austrians were very poor at skirmishing compared to the French and that the organisational (and could we say institutional)system at the time could not handle the kind of initiative required for skirmishing. However, I have also read in Gill and others that the Austrians could hold their own against the French when skirmishing.

Great comparison then to vW's quote. Food for thought as to what happened between revolutionary wars and the 1809 campaign…

I suggest picking up Osprey Warrior 24 Austrian Grenadiers and Infantry 1788-1816 – provides detail and illustrations of Austrian battalions deploying skirmishers etc.

Marcus Maximus:

I think there are a number of things that play into this quesion:

1. The Austrian army of 1794 was much different in organization and manpower in 1800 and 1805 and 1809. The army had been at war for eight of the intervening 15 years. Like the French army, that took a toll on the quality and experience of the army.

2. Such generalizations as Gill's about the Austrians being poor at skirmishing compared to the French doesn't explain, the how or why, let alone what that means on the battlefield. The Austrian infantry wasn't as good as the French, but that doesn't tell us much…

3. Circumstances and different quality troops within each army produced different outcomes when they met.

Here are some 1809 accounts:

Source: Anon.: "Geschichte des kaiserlich-östreichischen 7. Linien-Infanterie-Regiments Großherzog Toskana [former 'Von Schröder']", in 'OMZ' 3. Band, 8. Heft (Wien 1824) pp. 195-196:

"During the fierce fighting at Ebersberg (3 May), a division [i.e. 2 companies] of the regiment, commanded by Captain Siegler, had the opportunity to distinguish itself. The enemy tried to cross the ditch moving through the suburbs of Ebersburg, in order to cut off the battalion of Wiener volunteers fighting in the city, commanded by Major Graf Salis. When Captain Siegler noticed this, on his own account, left the second line and charged the enemy, throwing them back, taking 150 prisoners, and liberating the battalion 'Salis'. The captain received, for his brave voluntary deed, the Order of Theresia from the Capitel."

At Teugen-Hausen, described in the same volume:

"Also not meeting any resistance further up, FML Lusignan's force had marched between the woods and he had arrived on the hill just beyond with the lead battalions of his brigade, which was deployed in battle order, when the sounds of a lively firefight could be heard from the direction of Teugen. Austrian skirmishers and patrols from the brigade, who had descended the slope to Teugen, together with sharpshooters from the Peterwardein Grenzers, who had advanced through Roith and across the Buchberg, had run into French units there. FML Lusignan now hastily despatched the forward closed up units onto the north-eastern slope of the Buchberg and positioned his main battalions, which were only now slowly advancing through the woods and gradually reaching the line, together with their battery to the north of the woods".

Elsewhere, in Volume IV, of Krieg 1809 there is yet another description of IR7 deploying skirmishers at Urfahr from the third rank, also to reinforce the jäger and grenzer.

The Austrian history of the 1809 battle Krieg 1809 is filled with examples of line troops skirmishing in conjunction with Grenz and Jagers or by themselves. I was fortunate enough to get my hands on a copy of volumes II and IV--in German, of course, but the parts I did translate gave many examples. Here are some:

1. The third Zug of several line regiments are thrown foreward at the beginning of the battle (page 224, volume II )

2. The IR33 deploys skirmishers during the engagement at Landshut, later together with IR3 they repeatedly deploy skirmishers at the orders of GM Radetsky.(vol. II) Note who ordered it…

3. In volume II and IV, there are numerous instances of line regiments reinforcing Jager and Grenzer skirmish lines which are advancing or in firefights with the French.

4. At Znaym,

"The advanced pickets of the Mittrowsky IR10 engaged, and were supported by their battalion, and covered by a 12 pdr position battery, obstructed the enemy's advance, until one battalion of Kollowrath IR11, and two pieces of ordnance came up commanded by Lieutenant Loffler." Later, "a second battalion was detached to this height, and a chain of riflemen formed, to force those of the enemy back into the village."

Carl Varnhagen von Ense, an officer in IR47 Vogelsang, left an account of his regiment at Wagram in Die Schlacht von Wagram, last published in 1909. In this he describes how his regiment was lying down to avoid enemy cannon fire when "almost all" the company commanded by Hauptmann von Marais was deployed as skirmishers. The company "dissolved into skirmishers, behind willow tree trunks and high corn", and then later "The skirmishers were called back from the Russbach and stepped back into line."

And from the same account:

"To the left, and not far from the fifth Corps the first was formed in two lines on the heights before Brenditz; it occupied with one battalion the entrance to the ravine on its right flank, and the neighboring vineyards with riflemen and Jagers."

These accounts all describe line infantry skirmishing. How well they did can be questioned, but there is no doubt that it was done.

Gentlemen,

What a wonderful exchange of well-researched and clearly presented viewpoints.

So refreshing to have actual sources quoted.

I am also pleased and relieved that my Austrians can cope with the conclusions above without needing to rebase any at all.

I hope that you all have a happy 2013.

Paul

McLaddie and Geert van Uythoven found and translated a lot of examples of Austrians as skirmishers in the past, from the Revolutionary Wars onwards.

Not abour 1809 but earlier – see how flexible the Austrians used battle field tactics :

17 April 1794: The after action report of GM von Petrasch
(Bericht des Kayserlichen General-majors von Petrasch)
Translation by Geert van Uythoven
Note: On 17 April 1794 , the Allies started their spring campaign with an all out attack on the French armies near Lanrecy. The attack was executed by eight columns, made up from Austrian, Dutch, and Anglo-Allied forces. The Duke of York commanded the 4th Column, consisting of Austrian and Anglo-Allied units. His advance guard, led by GM Abercromby, consisted of the Husaren Regiment "Erzherzog Ferdinand" (Austrian, 5 squadrons, Colonel Devay), a squadron of light dragoons (British), Freikorps O'Donell (Austrian, 10 companies), and 4 'cavalry guns'. These troops were supported by a brigade of three Austrian grenadiers battalions, commanded by GM Petrasch.
Source: ‘Von D', "Feldzug der verbundenen Armeen in Flandern, im Jahre 1794", in ‘Neues militairisches Journal' 9. Band 18. Stück (Hannover 1798) pp. 297-302. The notes are by ‘Von D.'
"After the grenadier brigade had marched into the bowl behind the first windmill, I received the order to deploy a battery consisting of an 18-pdr, two 12-pdr's, and a 6-pdr, and to bombard the enemy redoubt with these, while at the same time to the left a similar battery was deployed, to enfilade the enemy redoubt. At the same time, the advanced grenadiers had to endure a heavy cannon and howitzer fire, which however was without much effect.
While the battery was firing, I received order from the Duke of York to storm the redoubt with the grenadiers. I formed another battery of four 6-pdr's which was followed by the ‘Manessy' [grenadier] battalion 1) at a distance of 80 paces, in such a way that the battery was on my left wing, and a such was covered by it. The third rank covered my right flank as reserve, until the arrival of the English artillery to this purpose, which arrived almost immediately and advanced resolute."
1) One of the three grenadier battalions that was under the orders of the general.
"The ‘Ulm', and the ‘Rouviere' [grenadier] battalion followed at a distance of 300 paces as supports. I moved into a dip of the terrain, with much covered the troops for the enemy fire, as long to the right, hoping to gain the flank [of the enemy].
Then I observed that the enemy had abandoned the grand redoubt, and mostly continued firing with his cavalry guns, of which three were aimed at my battery, at the first shots disabling a 6-pdr cannon. Soon his fire slackened, and it seemed that his intention was to occupy the redoubt at the entrance of La Haye Mandresse village, to prevent our advance any further."
At that moment, I took the 'd'Alton' grenadier division 2), and stormed to the redoubt and the entrenched entrance of the village, and arrived before the enemy. At the same time, with the utmost violence, Captain Reinwald and Lieutenant-Colonel Bousgutgnon with the ‘Wartensleben' division, forced the entrenched entrance of the forest, and captured it.
The captains that had stayed with the third rank in reserve: Von Debaut with ‘Wartensleben'; Graf Spork with ‘d'Alton'; and Graf St. Julien with ‘Joseph Colloredo' (the latter being wounded during this event), turned the flank of the enemy, and with the in the meanwhile advanced battery which had deployed in the enemy [grand] redoubt, the enemy was wedged in, and despite its heavy musketry was forced back, pushed back trough the forest with great force, and pursued.
2) The third part of one of the three grenadier battalions, apparently the ‘Manessy' [battalion].
3) From every Austrian infantry battalion, the third rank is formed in a division of 2 ranks, which follows the battalion and serves as a reserve, or acts on its flanks… in either formed or as skirmishers.
"On the other side of the forest, at Bequigny, the [grenadier] battalions, the artillery, two divisions of the ‘Erzherzog Ferdinand' Hussars under Major Löper, and Lieutenant-Colonel O'Donnell with part of his Freicorps, reformed again. After the arrival of the English Lieutenant-General [Major-General?] Abercromby the supports were ordered to remain in Bequigny, while the light troops were ordered to push through the woods to Bohain [village], to ascertain if the enemy had abandoned this place, which was also done by Colonel Devay [with the ‘Erzherzog Ferdinand' Hussars] from the other side. Because the enemy had fled to St. Quentin an Guise, the advance guard occupied Bohain at daybreak, and I advanced to the heights behind them as support." [Italics mine]
signed) von Petrasch
Generalmajor.

To be fair to Gill I generalised not him, and the quotes McLaddie you have quoted are detailed in some form by Gill in his trilogy for the 1809 campaign. I forgot to mention IIRC that the French at the time of the 1809 campaign felt that the Austrians were poor at light infantry tactics as well, yet as far as I am aware the Austrians did skirmish a number of times successfully. McLaddie your points from the Krieg underline this point admirably and perfectly. Also the Austrians use of Grenze, Border and even Landwehr as light troops is telling, but it is not the whole story (I suspect a lot of those trops were formed with wars with the Turks an irregular armed and organised force and for invasions of the homeland).

I think the issue with some of the views made about poor Austrian Light Infantry tactics etc is that the view of the French and of some of the Austrian observer's at the time, is not aimed at the tactical level but more at the higher command the lack of insight and initiative in using light troops. Having said that, not all Austrian Generals were afflicted by this lack of intuition, the light troops were used skilfully at a number on engagements see Wagram and Aspern (engaging the enemy in wooded / BUA with formed troops in support some distance back or covering the large open areas).

vW that excerpt is brilliant. IIRC the use of the third rank is illustrated and detailed in the Osprey Warrior book on the Austrian Grenadiers and Infantry. I will have a peruse later today to confirm.

In the 1809 campaign, at a wargame level, I tend to derive good light troop use via an initiative mechanic based upon a number of factors, as I'm not totally convinced that all Austrian Generals were useless at light infantry tactics as is, not all French were great at light infantry.

On a personal note I wish I could read German and French more fluently and confidently, but reading works from Gill and having great members on TMP like McLaddie and von Winterfeldt etc is making that a less of a priorioty for me now.

Great researched points and very useful in helping to debunk some myths and yet open up more questions for further analysis.

@Marcus Maximus

Please note how flexible the Austrians acted in the Revolutionary wars, in case they were outnumbered they used their third rank to form ad hoc units to act either as second line or reserves and or also being employed as skirmisers.

Later in 1807 when Erzherzog Karl wrote the Exerzierreglment for the infantry the third rank was to be used to enable line units to use their own skirmishers if needed.

Marcus Maximus:

Glad to be of help. That's one thing the TMP is for. I do get antzy when the discussion gets to 'poor Austrian Light Infantry Tactics' because we don't know what that means in 'on the ground' events. I think I can safely say that Austrian tactics in general were poorer than the French, and that had a lot more to do with the general officers than any particular tactics.

unfortunately, the critics, both French and Austrian, don't give any specifics as to what brought them to that conclusion. Whenever I read primary sources concerning Austrian, or any Allied army concerning skirmishing, there are times the Allies kick butt, and sometimes they don't. It is hard for me to generalize enough to say one side was better at it than another. I am more than willing to defer to those men who were there, but as a wargamer, it would be nice if they'd explain themselves. ;-7