"The Paradox of Written Plans & Orders" Topic
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ratisbon | 16 Oct 2012 3:49 a.m. PST |
Bill, Thanks for your response. I disagree with a number of your historical conclusions. It is also evident you are not familiar with and do not understand the application of the command radius system, yet you continue to misrepresent it as if you are. The question is not what generals felt but what they wrote and did. Foy, amongst many generals who addressed the subject of command on the battlefield, wrote formations are commanded by voice. Thus the need to keep them close. However, on occasion, senior officers deployed formations beyond their immediate control, not out of command, and so too does the command radius system allow gamers to do the same. When this occurs, those formations mostly perform less efficiently. Thus, based on what senior officers wrote and did, I concluded one of the reasons formations were kept close was control. You appear to have concluded otherwise. When you wrote, "At the Corps level, you didn't find that commander staying in some central area equidistant to all units, not even on a theoretical basis or as something mandated norm by military treatises," you got it wrong. A senior officer's base in the command radius system is a signifier for a commander's center of control, defined by the diameter which describes the circle. Within the scale time of the turn, his exact location within the circle is unknown and irrelevant. What is relevant is the area described by the circle, which marks absolute control. The only time the precise location of a commander need be known is when the base is directly attached to a combat unit, in this instance losing the command radius breaking the chain of command, or when his base is contacted by an enemy unit. Your statement, "I gave the examples of Soult and Jena, or Wellington and Blucher because they weren't centrally located the vast majority of the time. With your suggested radius ranges, all their forces would have been out of command at different points in the battle, more than a few most of the battle," reinforces that you and I differ regarding Soult, Jena, Wellington and Blucher. On the battlefield, most orders travel no more than a mile or two and the majority less. Yet, many gamers treat them as if they were being sent to China. The major cause of delayed orders and "activating" orders was the inability of officers to make up their minds, or those receiving the order didn't like or agree with it. Activating an order is a matter of drill and doctrine not a matter for a board discussion. This process is built into command radius because all of this activity is not only automatic but also beyond the control of the gamer, at the level he plays the rules. One of the tasks of a designer is to build-in things which an army does automatically, from the perspective of the level of command at which the gamer plays. A miniatures wargame is about making command decisions and arriving at outcomes, not about forcing gamers to deal with process that generals did not have to think about such as delivering orders during a battle. Not only do those rules which force the gamer to address those processes which should be built-in fail to simulate but also as they slow or make play difficult thus failing as games. In a previous post, you attempted to use Soult at Austerlitz to support your incorrect belief that using command radius he was incapable of commanding both Vandamme and St.Hilaire. Now you have lumped Soult in with other historical examples incorrectly applied to the command radius system. Let's have a look. At Austerlitz, when Napoleon verbally ordered him to advance Vandamme and St.Hilaire up the Pratzen, Soult immediately rode the few minutes' distance to his division generals and verbally ordered them to advance. This took much less than the scale length of a turn. As a corps commander he didn't have to activate the troops or send out scouts or deploy skirmishers. That process occurred automatically. I have no idea why you continue to make an issue of Jena. The written orders, which were operational, not tactical, were discussed in depth in earlier posts in this topic. The Anglo-Allied front from Papalotte to Hougumont was 4000 or so yards. Using the command radius system, Wellington's command diameter is a scale 3600 yards extended by the Orange's radius of a scale 800 yards or 4400 yards. Thus, using the command radius system, the entire front was in Wellington's immediate control. Yet you write it was not. I can only conclude you are not familiar with the command radius system. When Wellington sent junior aides or staff officers with orders he would on occasion jot a note to reinforce their authority. The important orders were most often delivered personally and verbally. As for Blucher, I should be very surprised if he wrote or dictated any orders during any battle. During the Fall 1813, 1814 and 1815 battles, Gneisenau had command of the army on those all too frequent occasions when Blucher went off on his view halloos. I wouldn't be surprised if he wrote orders in Blucher's absence to cover his rear. To reiterate, contrary to your implication regarding the command radius rule, formations beyond the immediate command of their superior are not out of command! Let me repeat, not out of command! Rather they are beyond the immediate control of their superior within the scale time and distance of the rules. In such instances they operate on their initiative, which they must first test to determine how well they continue to execute their orders. I think the evidence supports that written orders during a battle were rare. You think otherwise. We disagree. Even were they not rare, written orders are process and should be built into the command rules. For amusement, I am interested in seeing one of the one plus page orders to which you refer. And this does not include Friedland, where orders were written during the 3 hour lull between the morning and afternoon battle. Finally, you and I are boring the other members with this never ending discussion. If you desire that I respond to further questions of comments please email me or post them on the NBs site. Bob Coggins rratisbon@comcast.net.
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McLaddie | 16 Oct 2012 5:25 p.m. PST |
Bob: I appreciate your position, and willingness to discuss this. I don't know that we are boring folks, but the nice thing about this venue is that if others are bored by the discussion, it's by choice. They don't have to read it. I know that there are some threads I never read just for that reason. And if you want to cross-post to the NB group, we can. As the discussion started here, so I see no reason to not continue it here. I going to try and address all your points here. In a wargame, the expectation is that the dynamics on the table and the challenges faced by the player have some relation to the same dynamics and challenges faced by the original participants, whatever level of command is being represented. The command radius, in any manner you want to describe it, literally or figuratively, absolutely or vaguely, wasn't part of a commander's concerns on the battlefield. At the campaign level, you bet. Distances became a real issue of hours and days. Not on the battlefield. The question is not what generals felt but what they wrote and did. Foy, amongst many generals who addressed the subject of command on the battlefield, wrote formations are commanded by voice. Thus the need to keep them close. Foy said a number of things about command. He spoke about the size of a battalion and how its size related to how far a battalion commander's voice could be heard. He also spoke of command for brigadiers being by voice, which they were, but in a different context. When a brigadier wanted to move his brigade, he gave the command by voice to the colonel of the directing/guiding/regulating battalion and that order, by voice, was called out down the entire length of the brigade by officers. That was the basic method of command. Any set of regulations of any nation describes this fundamental relationship. Dundas called the regulating procedure ‘the core principle' of maneuver. Battalions kept ‘in command' by following the regulating battalion, or the battalion on the side closed to the regulating battalion. They became ‘out of command' and less efficient by losing that connection to adjacent battalions. Divisions worked much the same way, with a brigade acting as a guiding unit for the other brigades. Obviously, to do that there had to be LOS for those brigades. That was being ‘in command.' Being in command was determined by the physical formation of the constituent parts of the formation. The brigadier or divisional commander ‘controlled' his force by controlling the directing battalion or brigade. In most cases that is where you would find them, by the directing unit. Those commanders weren't thinking about some ‘radius' or how far away the end of their line was, or if the line was too long, the end would be ‘out of command' and less efficient. Regardless of the distance, the troops were ‘in command' and responding to their commander if they remained moving on the directing unit. No matter how close they were, if the line broke, part of that force was now ‘out of command' and their first order of business according to regulations and convention, was to ‘reattach' to the rest of the force. A formation was beyond a divisional or brigade commander's ‘immediate control', they were not in formation, not guided by the regulating unit[s] and thus not in the division or brigade commander's control
at all. However, on occasion, senior officers deployed formations beyond their immediate control, not out of command, and so too does the command radius system allow gamers to do the same. When this occurs, those formations mostly perform less efficiently. From all that I have read, senior commanders, both Corps and Army, deployed most of their army ‘beyond their immediate control', if we mean by voice. There is not any indication that troops ‘beyond their immediate control' performed less efficiently, whatever you mean by that.
Thus, based on what senior officers wrote and did, I concluded one of the reasons formations were kept close was control. You appear to have concluded otherwise. Oh,yeah—by keeping formations IN formation, which kept them close and in control. It was one of the reasons. But representing that by some theoretical ‘command radius' doesn't describe how, where or when troops were in command—at all. Senior commanders did not concern themselves with some radius from their commands. That is simply not mentioned in any fashion that I have found. LOS was an issue, but often getting a wider vantage point took them far away from the ‘immediate control' of their forces; getting a view of a particular part of the battle or their command took them out of the ‘immediate control' of their forces. However, you don't see the rest of the command suddenly becoming less efficient moving and in combat because of it . So, if we are to continue this discussion, why don't we simply quote what those regulations, reports say and senior officers wrote? That way there will be no question of where we are getting these ideas. When you wrote, "At the Corps level, you didn't find that commander staying in some central area equidistant to all units, not even on a theoretical basis or as something mandated norm by military treatises," you got it wrong. A senior officer's base in the command radius system is a signifier for a commander's center of control, defined by the diameter which describes the circle. Within the scale time of the turn, his exact location within the circle is unknown and irrelevant. What is relevant is the area described by the circle, which marks absolute control. Bob, what is the difference between a ‘signifier' and a theoretical basis, when you admit the location of the command marker and radius doesn't indicate his location? I'd love to know how you determined what marks the area of ‘absolute control.' If you are talking about brigade and division commanders, they had no radius and their control ‘radiated' from the directing unit. If you are talking about corps and army commanders, there is no radius of ‘absolute control' and I can't imagine how you determined that form the records. The only time the precise location of a commander need be known is when the base is directly attached to a combat unit, in this instance losing the command radius breaking the chain of command, or when his base is contacted by an enemy unit. Well, in the real world, on the battlefield, it was very important that higher and lower commands know the ‘precise' location of a commander, so there were specific places for them to be found
always, or it would ‘break the chain of command.' I have given you the locations for the brigadier and divisional commander. I can also do that for corps commanders. It had nothing to do with some imagined radius. On the battlefield, most orders travel no more than a mile or two and the majority less. Yet, many gamers treat them as if they were being sent to China. The major cause of delayed orders and "activating" orders was the inability of officers to make up their minds, or those receiving the order didn't like or agree with it. Activating an order is a matter of drill and doctrine not a matter for a board discussion. This process is built into command radius because all of this activity is not only automatic but also beyond the control of the gamer, at the level he plays the rules. While I agree that most orders, when given by corps commanders didn't have much distance to travel. Army commands could have several miles to travel. And yes, activating an order is a matter the military system in play. However, how this is ‘built into' the command radius isn't clear at all
But don't explain it, as the ‘command radius' is a mythical thing with a long history of rationalizations in the wargaming community. Simply put, it is a circle around a command where you are either in or out. If you are out, by rule or die roll, you are out of command. That simply isn't the way things worked on the battlefield, in any shape or form. It doesn't provide the player with anything like the command and control issues faced by pre-WWI armies. The 'command radius system' was originally an effort to make players keep units within reasonable distances without ever addressing WHY units stayed within those particular distances. One of the tasks of a designer is to build-in things which an army does automatically, from the perspective of the level of command at which the gamer plays. A miniatures wargame is about making command decisions and arriving at outcomes, not about forcing gamers to deal with process that generals did not have to think about such as delivering orders during a battle. Agreed. So the question is what those generals had to think about. A ‘command radius' in any form was NOT one of those things.
Not only do those rules which force the gamer to address those processes which should be built-in fail to simulate but also as they slow or make play difficult thus failing as games. "Those rules?" Certainly we want rules that present the real command challenges in an easy and playable fashion. Using fake restrictions and distinctions because they are ‘simple' and playable is not the answer when attempting to represent Napoleonic command.
At Austerlitz, when Napoleon verbally ordered him to advance Vandamme and St.Hilaire up the Pratzen, Soult immediately rode the few minutes' distance to his division generals and verbally ordered them to advance. This took much less than the scale length of a turn. As a corps commander he didn't have to activate the troops or send out scouts or deploy skirmishers. That process occurred automatically. Yep. And then he rode with his command. Do you know where in relation to that command? I was talking about during the battle when St. Hilaire went off to the right, leaving the rest of the corps facing east. Where was Soult? And how about afterward, when St. Hilaire marched even farther south? Where was Soult? Did St. Hilaire become less efficient because of the distance from the rest of the corps? I have no idea why you continue to make an issue of Jena. The written orders, which were operational, not tactical, were discussed in depth in earlier posts in this topic. Well, for instance, authors such as Chandler and Bressonet describe those orders as battle orders. They are tactical because they include the tactical placement of artillery and skirmishers and tactical targets for them. They are tactical because they give the goal for the entire day as reaching ‘the plains' beyond, which were less than two miles from the starting positions of the corps he addressed the orders to. That's way.
The Anglo-Allied front from Papalotte to Hougumont was 4000 or so yards. Using the command radius system, Wellington's command diameter is a scale 3600 yards extended by the Orange's radius of a scale 800 yards or 4400 yards. Thus, using the command radius system, the entire front was in Wellington's immediate control. Yes. First of all, why do you think Wellington's command diameter is better than two miles? Why that number, but Orange only 800 yards? What, he didn't have horses for his ADCs? And of course, the main reason I said it is because Wellington mixed up the commands, so that I Corps and II Corps troops were intermixed and some troops from one corps much further away than 800 yards from others in the same corps. I get the feeling that you draw circles around whatever size battlefield you have and voila la, the magic command radius. So Napoelon's command radius at Austerlitz, which had a six mile front will be much bigger than Borodino with a three mile front. Terrific how that works out every time. Or do you just give a command radius that will cover all battles and call it good?
Yet you write it was not. I can only conclude you are not familiar with the command radius system. I have played several ‘command radius systems' including NB. I very familiar with how the rules work. However, historically, there was no ‘command radius system' in any shape or form, simplified, theoretical or aboslute during the Napoleonic wars. It simply does not mimic the actual command methods or the challenges they created.
When Wellington sent junior aides or staff officers with orders he would on occasion jot a note to reinforce their authority. The important orders were most often delivered personally and verbally. The ‘joted notes' seem to have been pretty important orders
As for Blucher, I should be very surprised if he wrote or dictated any orders during any battle. During the Fall 1813, 1814 and 1815 battles, Gneisenau had command of the army on those all too frequent occasions when Blucher went off on his view halloos. I wouldn't be surprised if he wrote orders in Blucher's absence to cover his rear. Now we are talking about ‘why' the orders were written
not if. To reiterate, contrary to your implication regarding the command radius rule, formations beyond the immediate command of their superior are not out of command! Let me repeat, not out of command! Rather they are beyond the immediate control of their superior within the scale time and distance of the rules. In such instances they operate on their initiative, which they must first test to determine how well they continue to execute their orders. Okay, now we are mincing words. In the rules it is called ‘out of command' if they fail their test. So they are out of ‘immediate control' and suffer a loss of ‘efficiency' in movement and combat. However you describe it, it doesn't describe what was happening on the battlefield in regards to command or control in relationship to the distance to some 'signifier' or center of the formation. The distance between the unit and their commander did not determine, undermine or influence the unit's formation or 'efficiency.' I think the evidence supports that written orders during a battle were rare. You think otherwise. We disagree. Even were they not rare, written orders are process and should be built into the command rules. For amusement, I am interested in seeing one of the one plus page orders to which you refer. And this does not include Friedland, where orders were written during the 3 hour lull between the morning and afternoon battle. Ah, shoot, and I was going to use that. Actually I was referring to the Jena orders. But Napoleon wrote out very detailed orders the night before Austerlitz, right down to outlining how Soult should form up his Corps. I do question the conclusion of ‘rare.' I see no way of actually determining that, even vaguely. All I can say is that there were both verbal and written orders, sometimes both with directing battlefield operations. The question remains, ‘how did they do it?" How were thousands of men maneuvered as brigades, divisions and corps? How was command and control managed before radios etc.? The military of the time weren't shy about describing that. So, do you want to share references? I'd love to see where Napoleonic commanders spoke of command radiuses, even figuratively as having anything to do with their concerns on the battlefield. Best Regards, Bill H. |
ratisbon | 19 Oct 2012 4:59 p.m. PST |
McLaddie, It has been 3 days and no one else has posted and I don't blsme them. If you want to continue this contact my email. Bob Coggins |
Analsim | 24 Oct 2012 7:35 a.m. PST |
Bob & Bill, Thanks for carrying on without me again. I was away all last week on a last minute business trip again. Before re-intering the general fray, I want to get your opinion on a tangent topic that I think has some potential value in the Wargame design realm. It pertains to the subject of human behavioral decision-making. A topic that I think would and could provide game designers with the ability to leverage the way human thinks in order to streamline mechanics and take advantage of these subtlties in other design elements. Here's an example of what I am talking about. From Prof. Kahneman's own discussions and research, there are bascially two simple systems/models of how people think. "System 1" – Thinking corresponds to fast, intuitive, emotional and almost automatic decisions, though it sometimes leaves us at the mercy of our human biases. "System 2" – Thinking is more slow-going and requires more intellectual effort. To nobody's surprise, we humans are more likely to rely on System 1 thinking, because it saves us effort, even if it can lead to flawed thinking. Here is a quick example of how Prof. Kahneman illustrates System 1 and System 2 thinking: Suppose that a bat and ball together cost $1.10 USD and that the bat costs $1.00 USD more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? Many people, relying mainly on System 1 thinking, will quickly say $0.10 USD,33;But the correct answer is five cents. You may have to think about it for a moment, but it'll come to you. ;^) The main point I want you to consider for incorporation in the wargame design process is 'How little control we actually have over our own System 1 responses and the degree to which our subconscious intuition and biases affect our System 1 choices'. So, taking advantage of such human behavorial frailities as in the case of System 1 thinking would be a simple way of re-creating things like 'Fog Of War' by subliminaly harnessing the human minds natural propensity towards making knee jerk decisions/reactions. Can you wrap your mind around that concept and do you think we could make it payoff in a game design? Regards, James |
McLaddie | 24 Oct 2012 10:21 p.m. PST |
Hey James: Well, first off, considering Bob's overarching concern that nobody is bored by the thread topic, you sure chose a beaut. As an educator and simulation designer, I have several responses to your question: 1. Why would you want to encourage one particular type of thinking, System #1 in this case, in playing a game? Imagine folks playing chess that way. Oh, wait, some folks do--badly. Three of the main reasons anyone "chooses" to go with System #1 are: Pressure to act quickly, a lack of [emotional] meaning or importance to the answer, and a lack of perceived skill in the task. Include those three conditions to game play and you will get your System #1 thinking every time. But will anyone want to play it? Sure, if it's Bunko or Yatzee. Perfect System #1 type games. Only when the pressure is off, and/or the answer has high importance and/or the person believes they have some skill to apply to the task will you typically see System #2 thinking attempted. 2. It is very hard to separate those two thinking 'systems' in any practical sense when someone has a task to perform, like playing a game. Both are engaged and often used in tandam or sequentially in various combinations. Often the most talented players will go with System #1 because that is when intuition and talent often show up successfully. 3. Creating rules to make players 'think' a certain way that has nothing to do with the actual environment or conditions found in the reality being simulated warps the simulation. It warps the play experience in an effort to make the players 'part' of the game, the environment rather than independent actors in it. The real problem is that the emotions are the real driver in all thinking and learning, including System #2 thinking. For instance, no information will ever get into long term memory unless it passes through the hypocampus, the gatekeeping, and what opens the gate is the emotional context to the information. In other words, you don't remember anything unless there is emotional meaning to the information. You also won't get System #2 thinking unless the person feels the task is important enough to make the effort
which it is. Of course, soldiers are trained to do many automatic things through System #1 thinking, but leaders in combat are often most effective when they can force themselves to engage in system #2 thinking
and of course, games are almost all serious, complex combinations of both types of thinking, but System #2 thinking predominates. "Fun" is found in both ways of thinkiing. Best Regards, Bill H. |
Analsim | 25 Oct 2012 9:54 a.m. PST |
Bill & Bob, Coming back on topic. Your discussion above actually supports one of my own wargame design premises. That is: Why deviate from Historical practices at all? Tell me, what efficiencies have you gained or what significant C2 aspect has been captured from your design effort that deviates from those historical practices? I'm totally convinced from your discussion above, that you both understand the Napoleonic C2 function, I'm just at a loss to understand why interjecting an abstract concept (i.e such as Command Radius) improves upon the historical C2 process or provides additional game efficiency? Yes, I understand that one of the major wargame design challenges is to figure out and capture in its essence, "How 2-8 wargamers can assume all the roles, responsibilities and functions of several thousand battlefield participants?" Which is why I try to simplify design issues such as the C2 system down to its basic function of making decisions under conditions of uncertainty and risk. That way you can let the individual parts (i.e. decision making, uncertainty/SA & risk) influence the manner in which they are replicated and performed. As a rule of thumb, if the generic historical process works and can be used in the game, than don't replace it. Now I can fully appreciate the counter-arguement that, 'You can only do so much within the context of a finite set of rules.' But, that merely supports my contentions that focusing on the functioning of the basics is the way to go. With that said, it simply comes down to satisfying the three (3) needs common to any wargame design; MOVE, SHOOT & COMMUNICATE. Regards, James |
Analsim | 25 Oct 2012 10:27 a.m. PST |
Bill, Just to highlight a couple of points I wanted to make about System 1 & System 2 thinking and wargaming. First off, preliminary Battlefield Order writing is a product of System 2 thinking. However, once the shooting starts, its all mainly System 1 thinking that rules supreme. I'm glad you mentioned the fact that Soldiers are trained to respond to many circumstances in a pre-determined fashion. As a former Soldier myself, I can tell you that this kind of conditioning pays-off with dividends in combat. Because 'No One has to think' (i.e. a'la System 0). Finally, I see the act of trying to harness the power of such behaviorial characteristics as another means to pack more capabilities within same length and constraints of a given set of rules. Just keeping an open mind to take advantage of anything that allow you to do more with less. Regards, James |
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