"Giffen at Rennel Island: Monumental Screw-up or Scapegoat?" Topic

In Naval History magazine (June 2011), Richard B. Frank writes that Robert C. Giffen – who was predicted at the start of WWII to be one of the Navy's best commanders – "screwed up monumentally" at the Battle of Rennel Island (off Guadalcanal). His commanders blamed Giffen for the defeat… yet Giffen would go on to other assignments and a promotion.

Did Giffen screw up at Rennel Island, or was he simply a scapegoat?

Don't know enough right now to make an opinion. I haven't read the article on it. Robert

I've never even heard of the battle…

Off to research…

Giffen can certainly be criticised, his sailing plan made an air attack against his forces too easy. By that stage of the war, (early 1943) he should have known not to be sailing in a streight line. That said, military failure is a complex business and their was a lot of blame to go around. So I'd say he was both, a screwup and a scapegoat.

Seems like there was a lot of monday morning quarterbacking regarding Giffen's performance. I can't claim to be an expert on the battle, but what little I know tells me that Giffen acted reasonably knowing what he knew.

Since Giffen ended the War as a Vice-Admiral his "screw up" doesn't seem to have been a career ender.

The battle is also discussed in Frank's book on Guadalcanal; he tends to lay into Giffen pretty hard.

Given what the USN had been experiencing in the Solomons campaign up to that point (even what they didn't know about IJN surface-launched torpedo capability), it seems that Giffen could have disposed his ships at least a little more carefully for AA defense. That said, the US SW Pacific command had been pretty ruthless in sacking even somewhat successful commanders for what seemed trivial oversights; I think it was Capt. Hoover of the Helena who was axed for leaving the scene of the Juneau's sinking after having just been through two straight night battles, and acquitting himself very well.

I think Halsey should share part of the responsibility.

Giffen was a 'gun' sailor, not one familiar with
aircraft and their potentials (despite his 1940 NWC
training). His previous task group/force command
experience was in the Med ('Torch') and with but
limited experience with air attacks, and those from
the French (hardly known for their aerial torpedo
attack expertise.)

So he was 'brand new' to the Pacific and also fairly
new to the JNAF's tactics with air-delivered torpedoes.

And Halsey was the one who put him in command.

Part of a superior's responsibility lies in understanding
and making allowances for the weaknesses or lack of
experience of subordinates, and not exposing those
subordinates unduly.

Perhaps that factor is why a promo board acted favorably
on Giffen's promotion to vice-admiral – the board felt
that he did the best he could in the situation in which
he found himself.

Giffen's TF was following orders to get to a blocking position ASAP (US transports were heading to Guadalcanal with army divisions and the area command thought the IJN was sending more ships to interdict that and to reinforce their troops). His TF was in a reasonable formation for the time (2 columns of cruisers, with DD's in an arc ahead and to the sides (IJN subs were still in the area)). The initial air attack occurred at night after the CAP returned to its carriers. His TF evaded pretty well against the initial strike force of 31 bettys. If there were any faults on Griffen's part, it was his strict use of radio silence failing to inform his TF what to do during the air attack and his failure to ascertain a 2ed air attack was forming up shortly after the first; when he was getting his ships back into formations.

As far as the next day's IJN air attacks, they finished off Chicago (no power and being towed at the time) and also got a DD. The CAP (Enterprise fighters-the CVE's could not launch till after the attack was over) over crippled chicago was not able to stop the daylight air attack.
(IMO) I might be inclined to say that Halsey did not provide adequate CAP over the crippled Chicago; then blamed Giffen for his TF tactics to throw off blame from himself for not providing sufficient CAP when he knew Giffen's TF would be within range of IJN land based air.
Good summary of the battle here:
link

(I agree with Ed's summary above) Even tho Nimitz and Halsey blamed Giffen for the loss of a CA and DD in their official report (Giffen was TF CO), I think the official report was not so damning of Giffen cause they realized that he was not negligent in his control of the TF. Especially when the higher ups misread the intent of the IJN thinking they were going to reinforce Guadalcanal and purposely put Giffen's TF in harms way as a blocking force within air strike range.