"Inchon - Wise Move or Major Gamble?" Topic

Was MacArthur's landing at Inchon the wise move of an experienced general, or a risky gamble by an egotistical commander?

It worked – it was brilliant.
Had it failed it would have been so foolish, so rash.

Had it failed he'd have been petitioning Truman to allow the use of nukes a little earlier…

It was risky and was questioned during the planning stage. IIRC McCarthur got approval by being politically saavy and arguing well for his plan of attack.

Was MacArthur's landing at Inchon the wise move of an experienced general, or a risky gamble by an egotistical commander?

Yes.

Doug

Both, as elsyrsyn said.

Indeed!

Both.

Agree, both. 'Wise move' and 'risky gamble' are not
necessarily mutually exclusive…

Have to say both.

But of course he was using US Marines so his risk was mitigated in that respect.

The landing itself may have been too far north.
Result was the NKPA ran to the hillsdies and the allies had to chase them out of the hills for another two years.

If they landed a bit further south, they may have had a better resiult in destroying the NKPA more effectivley.

Don't forget, it was done in conjunction with a breakout from the Pusan Perimeter by the 1st Cav Division that raced up thru Osan to link up with the Marines. Units literally drove thru NK units that were milling around in what they thought were safe rear areas.

… let's not forget it was backs to the walls in the Pusan Perimeter. Aggressive strategies were needed to send the political message that we were back in the picture.

troopwo, most of the NKPA faded into the hills as guerillas south of Seoul or in the center and east coast. The terrain in the center of the peninsula made it almost impossible to trap light infantry in the same way whole armies were surrounded in WW2.

The operation was a calculated risk, but the odds were all in the US favor. The Navy and USMC leadership and planning staffs were the same people who had executed dozens of amphibious operations in WW2. They knew exactly what they were getting into. The plan was to time the invasion so the NK troops would find out they were cut off just before the breakout for maximum psychological effect. The planners did not count on how effectively the NK higher command prevented a moral problem after the landing: they simply didn't tell their troops about it.

I agree to a little of both.

It was a bold move of an an experience commander and had great operational effect.

It was both. MacArthur had a lot going for himself. He was his own worst enemy, however.

Isn't any attack / offensive a gamble to a greater or lesser extent?
You can do all you can to stack the odds in your favour, but nothing in war is ever certain.

Considering MacArthur left my grandfather and many other marines to die at Bataan because his furniture was more important, I'm going to take an unusually strong bias and go with risky gamble. Even if the operation was a success….

As others have said, it can be both. Same as Arnhem really, except obviously Inchon went better…

Sorry, Bangorstu, Arnhem was based on a lot of assumptions and wishful thinking, not the available intelligence. A number of senior officers should have been court marshaled for it.

I think it was the only real option. Feeding troops into Pusan wasnt going to do anything useful, an amphibious outflank was the only way of opening up the UN frontage.

Cold, you dont court marshall people for three major water barrier crossings at low cost in one week.

Five or six years ago, I read Tolands' 'In Mortal Combat".
It gave me a bit of time to think of General Walton Walker. He was the army commander that lead the Eighth Army in Korea until his death in early '51(?). He is the guy no one ever hears about. Instead it is all about the Macarthur gong show. Anyway, I posted this in 2006. No one ever really responded to it. I suppose because no one ever seriously looked at anyone but Macarthur.

From 2006,"Reading the sudden interest in MacArthur has got me thinking about Gen. Walker in Korea. I finished reading Tolands, "In Mortal Combat" and it has got me thinking that maybe Walker deserves more praise.

1. Retreat and defense of Inchon. Not everyone can handle a retreat or a defensive battle so well. MacArthur couldn't. Walker didn't do so bad on rather a shoestring as it were.

2. Walker opposed Inchon. He didn't argue against a landing, he just thought that by landing so far north as Inchon and then driving on Seoul would leave the bulk of the NK army too far from the landing to effectively destroy. He wanted to land further south on the west coast and drive to Kaesong.(sp?) If that happened the bulk of the NK army would have been anhiliated in a tighter pocket and they would not have needed to chase guerllia groups around the southern hills for a few years.

3. Walker listened to his own intelligence reports after some initial captures of chinese in October of 1950. Tokyo, meaning MacArthurs' staff, was in denial and screaming for him to force an advance to the Yalu. Walker played rather hesitant in ordering an advance. He made preparations for a withdrawal at the same time as sending out reconnaisance probes north, giving him the ability to claim he was advancing while being prepared to withdraw if his own intelligence summaries proved correct. He ultimately saved the bulk of his troops.

4. He didn't allow himself to be drawn into a wasting battle to save Seoul.

5. Planning the fight to advance for the winter and spring of '51.

Is it because of MacArthur claiming all glory, that Walker is not thought about? I know he was Pattons' chief of staff in Europe. It couldn't have been an easy job, but he must of been the support behind the drive. These above reasons are good enough to place him among the top generals.

Pity the US never sent an actual armoured division to Korea.

Why is Walker so overlooked?"

Funny no one responded to this at the time.
Like I said, maybe this guy deserves a lot more praise.

First, the idea of an armored division in Korea is pointless. There are very few places with enough open terrain to deploy a tank battalion task force. And I have tried. There are only 3 valleys I know of wide enough for an armored brigade to maneuver and 2 of them are south of Seoul. The road network in 1950 would not support the logistics required. Part of the reason the UN forces were so spread out when the Chinese intervened was the roads could not support large concentrations of forces we already had.

Trapping the NKPA in a WW2 style pocket would not work and was an example of trying to fight the last war. Most of the In Min Gun was light infantry and the senior leadership was very experienced at guerilla operations from the Japanese occupation and China. They would have faded back into the hills no matter where the landing occurred. Operationally, they really had no alternative.

The problem with Walker was he was not colorful like his protege, Patton. He was more like Bradley in personality. Not only was Walker completely overshadowed by MacArthur's bombastic egomania, but MacA's loyal staff worked hard with the press to shove blame for anything that went wrong onto him. Walker did a great job in some pretty tough circumstances. The toughest maneuver in war is a fighting retreat; Walker did it with an untrained, understrength, poorly equipped force against a larger, well trained, combat-experienced enemy, then turned around and defeated that enemy. His decisions and tactics are still studied at Leavenworth, while MacArthur is noted for his 3 biggest accomplishments: abandoning the Philippines, Inchon and getting fired. I recommend you read "This Kind of War"

link

Odd how the North Koreans seemed to have no problems in using lots of T34s in Korea…

Did they?

I always though that they had relatively few T34s

The NKs had about 150 T-34s when they began the war. The tanks were organized into a single tank brigade for administrative and logistics purposes. In combat, the brigade was parceled out to infantry divisions. The brigade never operated as a single formation. The myth of masses of T-34s arose from the shock of poorly trained troops with ineffective, obsolete weapons facing them for the first time. By the end of 1950, the US Army had deployed over 1300 tanks to Korea and never tried to use them in battalion size.

I spent 4 years in Korea, 3 in a tank battalion and 1 on division staff. I have first hand knowledge of how hard it is to find room to maneuver mechanized forces in mountainous terrain. I only trained in 1 area open enough to deploy a full tank company in a single formation.

I was in a Mech Bn in the ROK about the same time Cold Steel was … and not surprisingly, I agree with him …