"Gettysburg "what if" ?" Topic
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Old Pete | 20 Dec 2011 6:53 a.m. PST |
Recently Ayr and Sheffield wargames societies fought a "what if" of the second day of Gettysburg. Rules used were adapted from "Give them the cold steel" The scenario assumed that the Confederates did not bring on a major engagement as Gen. Lee had ordered until all his forces were on or near the field of battle. We decided that heavy skirmishing and a desire to hold the high ground, that Union forces gradually fell back to defend Gettysburg, Cemetery Ridge and Cemetery Hill. Pickett's division was at full strength (5 brigades) and arrived early in the afternoon. The Union 6th Corps commanded by Sedgwick also we assumed would force march and arrive slightly later in the afternoon. All the stuff we used is available at either edwardw@emckie44.freeserve.co.uk Or link All the documents are in WORD or power point; you can adapt them to suit yourself. Regards Old Pete |
Pan Marek | 20 Dec 2011 7:36 a.m. PST |
Why in heaven's name would anyone give up the round tops? |
Campaigner1 | 20 Dec 2011 8:37 a.m. PST |
@Pan Marek, See the other thread "Lee's failure at Gettysburg". The reason they gave up the Round Tops in the scenario, is because Little Round and Big Round Top were not the key battlefield terrain features that Gettysurg myth and legend have made them to be. So much emphasis has been placed on them, and it has been assumed for years that the Round Tops held the key to the Union right flank. They did not. In fact, being on the fringe of the battlefield, and given their rocky and wooded features, they really had very little tactical value to either side. Cemetery Hill was the central high ground that had to be held during the battle. It was open terrain, suited to massed artillery and occupation by infantry in line of battle, and was smack dab in the center of the Union position. It commanded the entire Union center and enabled the Union to hold interior lines. To lose Cemetery Hill, would be to lose interior lines and lose the whole position around Gettysburg. Because Little Round Top has been made into a shrine by popular movies, documentaries, and by the Park Service, many have not read key author's works on the subject, and have not looked at the realites of the Round Tops in terms of what kind of terrain they really were. It's always assumed, that had the confederates swept Union resistance off Little Round Top, that the confederates would have instantly swung artillery onto Round Top and enfiladed the Union left flank with artillery fire. It is also assumed that the loss of the hill would have automatically meant that the confederates would have gotten into the Union rear and caused the collapse of the Union line. This is all false. First of all, Big Round Top was almost completely wooded, isolated away from the Union left flank, and of NO VALUE to either side of the battle. Little Round Top, while being closer to the Union left flank, was STILL not suited to the placement of artillery nor suited for any kind of massed enfilade fire. It was a tactical dead end. Yes, it WAS high ground, but NOT the kind of high ground that benefitted armies. Cemetery Hill was the high ground that mattered at Gettysburg. The Round Tops did not. The northern slopes of Little Round Top were heavily rock-strewn, and could at best only hold perhaps ONE battery of artillery facing northward, if that. And the rocks hindered the placement of limbers and horses, and hindered the spacing necessary for placement of the guns themselves. The rocky ground also would have made ammunition supply a nightmare. Lee was working agains time. He HAD to take Cemetery Hill before the entire federal army concentrated. To be blunt, any attack against the Round Tops was a waste of his time and a waste of resources. And he knew that attacking around the flanks of the Round Tops would stretch already badly stretched exterior lines. His attacks had to be attacks of concentration and conversion, not further stretching or thinning. Therefore the Round Tops were more of a hinderance than a benefit for Lee's particular situation at Gettysburg. In short, Lee recognized all of that, and therefore pushed the Round Tops out of his plans, because he knew capturing them would not help him win the battle whatsoever. This is why on July 2nd, Lee's orders were to BYPASS the Round Tops, attack northward, capture the PEACH ORCHARD area to enable him to mass his artillery for a barrage against Cemetery Hill, before his converging forces captured Cemetery Hill. Lee knew the important ground on July 2nd was NOT the Wheat Field, Devil's Den, or Round Tops. Those areas would bog down and hinder any attack on the Union left flank. Only two terrain features mattered to Lee on July 2nd. The open ground around the Peach Orchard, for artillery, and Cemetery Hill/Culp's Hill itself. Capturing any of the areas east of the Peach Orchard were meaningless. The Round Tops were meaningless tactically. They only became "important" because Hood's division drifted east and attacked those areas mistakenly, and Union forces reacted to it and defended those areas. But those fights did not determine the battle, and the Little Round Top battle was in reality an isolated fight that had nothing to do with Lee's goal. Lee was visibly upset in his after-battle report in regard to the attack on Little Round Top. He stated that the unordered attack on the rocky hills delayed and hindered the general attack against Cemetery Hill. It can't be any clearer. Little Round Top had no value to him because he recognized that it had no tactical value. When one looks at the reality of the terrain of Little Round Top, one can quickly conclude that the hill actually had very little impact on the battle, and actually had no tactical value to either side. It was a high point, yes, but a high point with no tactical attributes. Just because a battlefield has a high point, it doesn't mean that high point is automatically important. It depends on what kind of terrain is on that high point, and if it is suited for occupation and suited to the logistical requirements of artillery. Little Round Top was certainly none of these things. And Big Round Top was even more useless. Remember that Lee had NO orders or plans during any phase in the battle that included capturing Little Round Top. He recognized that Litte Round Top was too far remote, too heavily wooded, and too rocky to be of any benefit it was captured. He knew that those hills would actually be a hinderance to hold rather than a benefit. Also remember that the attack on Little Round Top itself was AGAINST Lee's orders for July 2nd. The rebel regiments that ascended that hill did so on their own accord, not because it was part of the planned attack for the 2nd. Recent books on the subject, and recent research has shown that Round Tops were not considered important as being the key to the Union position, but rather the opposite. Only after the battle, with the 20th Maine and those others who fought on the hill, wanting to be given due credit and due recognition for defending the hill, was the myth born that Little Round Top's defense saved the Union army at Gettysburg. |
Old Pete | 20 Dec 2011 8:40 a.m. PST |
Pan At start of scenario no one was on the round tops. In our game the Union forces advanced onto both round tops, however Longstreet attacked south of Big Round Top swinging around the Union left flank. |
Campaigner1 | 20 Dec 2011 8:47 a.m. PST |
@Pan Marek, The Round Tops might matter in the context of the way wargames scenarios have been written for miniature battles of Gettysburg. The Round Tops do matter in many wargames scenarios. But wargames and scenarios are often written and played based on long-held assumptions of that battle that are proving to be false. Indeed, many wargaming scenarios are highly unrealistic because they are based on perceptions of the battle that are not based in historical reality. It's been drummed into our skulls for so long that Little Round Top was the key position, enforced by popular culture. Because of that, any time we see a wargamer or a scenario in which a player abandons the Round Tops, we immediately cry "insanity!" That's how strong myth and popular belief can influence us. The historical research and assertions of the true importance of the Round Tops at Gettysburg is really not new. Books have been around for a good 15, 20 years that elaborate on the true reality of the Round Tops and put them in their proper historical place. |
Campaigner1 | 20 Dec 2011 8:56 a.m. PST |
It's important to remember that even in a "what-if" scenario like this
it still doesn't change the nature of the terrain of the Round Tops. They are still heavily wooded and rocky, and still unsuited for any kind of enfilade or occupation. A truly accurate and effective wargames scenario of Gettysburg needs to reflect how difficult the terrain on that hill really is, and should practically make it impossible for the occupation of artillery. If a rulebook or scenario allows for easy movement and easy placement of artillery and infantry on Little Round Top, then that rulebook is worthless and based on fantasy, because it is distorting reality. In other words, no matter what troops are around it, flanked by it, near it, parallel to it, or otherwise overshadowed by those heights
the fact remains that those hills were NOT suitable high ground for changing the outcome of a battle. They are NOT open type terrain hills such as Cemetery Hill. The Round Tops are an entirely different creature, and no matter what troops dispositions or battle lines are formed around them, the hills themselves are not the great keys to the battlefield that everyone assumes them to be. All high ground is NOT created equal. Some high ground benefits or endangers a position, some does not. Little Round Top did NOT. Little Round Top did not hold the key to the Union left flank, or any flank, whatsoever. |
firstvarty1979 | 20 Dec 2011 9:15 a.m. PST |
The one thing they did provide was concealment and cover for the advancing Union Corps. The VI Corps camped right behind them the evening of the 2nd day, and could do so with little worry of taking significant casualties, despite being so close to the battle. |
jrbatso | 20 Dec 2011 9:46 a.m. PST |
Cemetery Hill is the key terrain feature. The Veterans knew this. The first wooden observation tower was constructed on East Cemetery hill. However, the Round Tops do hold tactical and operational value. If you take them you can overrun the Union supply train at the base of Powers Hill. And capturing the Taneytown Road and the Baltimore Pike cuts the Union supply line to the depot and railhead at Westminister, Maryland. |
Pan Marek | 20 Dec 2011 11:06 a.m. PST |
A very compelling argument in answer to my question. I will, however, take a strictly practical approach. If I was a general in that time and place, I would not leave them to be occupied by my adversary. It was a mitake that cost the Americans Ticonderoga in the AWI. Artillery on the high ground is never a good idea if its not your artillery. But, given the scenarion in the game, I can imagine neither side paying them much attention, so long as neither side held them. |
bgbboogie | 20 Dec 2011 11:10 a.m. PST |
Error
.. a) Confederate long range artillery would have enfiladed the whole union line if it had gotten in place on the Little Round Top. b) Rebel infantry would have also caused havoc in the rear areas, so no the Round Tops are not a myth. A good what if is; reverse the whole battlefield and make the union come down the Chambersburg Pike and have Stuart in place, we are trying that in the near future. The trouble with Gettysburg is we all game it with hindsight; so as the Rebs you win 9 times out of 10 on day 1. |
donlowry | 20 Dec 2011 12:07 p.m. PST |
The scenario assumed that the Confederates did not bring on a major engagement as Gen. Lee had ordered until all his forces were on or near the field of battle. In which case Gen. Reynolds would have lived to receive the Pipe Creek Circular and would have fallen back to that line; and there would have been no great Battle of Gettysburg. |
Omemin | 20 Dec 2011 12:49 p.m. PST |
If you've ever stood on Little Round Top, there's no way on God's green earth you'd let the other side have the place. The view commands the whole field, all well within rifled artillery range. |
Campaigner1 | 20 Dec 2011 1:56 p.m. PST |
@Omemin, jrbatso, and bgbboogie, Your assertions all leave out one key thing you're forgetting. Lee's problem with EXTERIOR LINES! And you're all too preoccupied with the view that you have all seen when standing on the hill. The view is spectacular, but you're missing the forest through the trees here. There is a specific reason that Lee ignored the Round Tops. Because he didn't have the MANPOWER or weight of infantry to extend his lines further than they were already stretched. A successful infantry attack had to have weight of numbers. The only way an attack on July 2nd could succeed would be to keep Hood and McClaws together so that combined they could punch through the Cemetery Ridge line. Any thinning of that line out towards the flanks or rear of the Union army wouldn't have worked because the confederate line would have been too thin to maintain their attack. And indeed, you're forgetting the fact that on July 2nd, the thinning of the confederate lines near the Round Tops is why the attack up the Emmitsburg Road failed! Instead of two concentrated, cohesive confederate divisions attacking as one, they became disjointed and lost their weight and mass of attack. Hood's division petered out precisely BECAUSE part of it has lost contact with McClaws and precisely BECAUSE it had tried to stretch itself further and attack the Round Tops. A large scale Civil War infantry attack required support, ammo, and sustainability. The Little Round Top attack, even if it had temporarily succeeded, could not have been SUSTAINED. There was nothing to sustain it with. WHO would have supported the occupation of Little Round Top? Parts of Ewell's corps? They were miles away on the wrong side of the field. Hill's corps? Same thing. The rest of Longstreet's corps? Pickett wasn't even on the field yet. There wasn't anyone to support an attack into the Union rear, because it wasn't ORDERED. Do you understand what I'm getting at here? There's no hindsight or time machine that I went in, and now I'm declaring I know what happened during the battle better than all of you. Rather I am saying that you are not understanding the logistics and realities of what the attack on Little Round Top entailed. And too much drama is being made of this sudden "opportunity" that would have "laid the whole rear of the Union army open". I don't mean to burst anyone's bubble here, but you have to understand something. In the context of the battle, if the confederates HAD taken Little Round Top, inevitabley they would have been ordered by Lee to come down OFF it in the evening. They would have HAD to! To be resupplied! To get water! To get ammo! To return to their division! They couldn't stay there! It wasn't sustainable. They didn't have wings. They weren't supernatural. So not only would taking Little Round Top not resulted in the magical disaster for the Union everyone thinks it would have, but in fact nothing really all that dramatic would have happened except that they would have temporarily occupied it then would have been forced to abandon it. You can't just generically declare that "Little Round Top was important because confederates could have gotten in the Union rear." What confederates? With what support? With what orders? With what cohesion? The Alabama regiments? Are you kidding me? They were spent beyond spent. There was nothing left in the confederate ranks with the energy, cohesion, and supports that could have done anything in the Union rear! You're looking at Little Round Top purely based on the generic fact that it's high ground. YES, when one stands up there and looks at the commanding view, one sees how commanding of a view it is. You can see for miles around. That view is what compelled Goveneur K. Warren to take action to get Union troops up on it. But you're all being dazzled and influenced by the commanding view Little Round Top provides and not thinking about it in the context of the battle itself. Here's the problem. A commanding view from a hill doesn't mean it's suitable for a sustained attack and exploitation. A commanding view doesn't make it a key to a position. YES, Little Round Top overlooks a huge part of the battlefield. YES, you can see for miles around. But you're missing the larger point. Ok, so Little Round commands a view of the Union left flank. So what? What then? It commands a view of the battlefield but doesn't do much more. Lot's of hills around Gettysburg afford commanding views of the area. Doesn't mean they were all key to the Union position. Imagine for a moment that confederate troops swept away the 20th Maine and are looking down on the Union left flank. Now what? You have a few exhausted confederate regiments that just charged Little Round Top multiple times, with no supports, no reinforcements, worn out by attack. And now those few regiments, who had no orders from Lee to do what they did, and are now spent and unsupported, are going to "wreak havoc" in the Union rear and Union supply train? They're going to "take" the Union army from the rear? How? Under who's orders? Under who's coordination? Not Longstreet's. He's busy trying to keep together a general assault up the Emittsburg Road. He's busy trying to keep cohesion between Hood and McClaws. Not Hood, he's wounded. Not McClaws. He's busy in the Peach Orchard. Those few Alabama and whatever other regiments that attacked Little Round Top had no supports behind them to sustain any move into the Union rear, because it wasn't part of Lee's orders! These regiments, even if they had won the hill, had nowhere to go afterwards! They had just fought themselves out, and worse, weren't even supposed to be there. Don't forget, all of Lee's orders were bent on the coordination of getting artillery massed into the Peach Orchard area. Who would have had the authority and coordination, not to mention the magic wand to suspend time, and suddenly decide to move masses of artillery up onto Little Round Top instead? And the fact that Little Round Top could only hold a few artillery pieces? And the fact that no orders existed for massing artillery on Little Round Top, even if the terrain HAD made it possible to do so. And we haven't even discussed that those regiments that did attack Little Round Top were low on ammo, water, without supports, without orders, and without any cohesion with the rest of the confederate army! How can your assertions overcome all that? They can't. You are all giving too much generic credence to this automatic assumption that a confederate occupation of Little Round Top suddenly "leaves the whole Union rear and supply trains wide open". Really? A few disjointed and exhausted confederate regiments would have swept down off of Little Round Top and taken the Union army in the rear? By themselves? Is that realistic? No. You're talking about Little Round Top as if suddenly by magic the whole focus of attack on July 2nd could have been suddenly shifted from going up the Emmitsburg Road toward Cemetery Hill, switching over suddenly to a drive on Little Round Top? And you're assuming that somehow by magic, the confederate 1st Corps artillery could have been instantly shifted and moved onto Little Round Top? And then magically wave a wand and make Little Round Top's rocks and trees disappear, and make it wider to provide a platform for massed artillery. HOW??? There's an awful lot of fantasy in there. Again, you are all simply looking at Little Round Top and focusing too much on the fact that it has a nice view of the surrounding area. Yes, the view is wonderful. But in every other military aspect, the hill was not useful in flanking the Union position. The hill was not the key position it's been supposed. I am tired of this argument that after all is said and done that "well, any of us can look at a battle in hindsight and think we know exactly what should have been done. We'll never REALLY know no matter how much we debate it." That's a cop out. This isn't about sitting around a table, playing armchair generals and thinking ourselves smarter than those who fought the battle. This is about looking at what we DO know about the battle, and what information we DO have about what happened. And it's about what we DO know of the logistical and tactical realities and limitations that a Civil War attack was subject to. These things are not misty, blurry debatable things, they are realities. So I'm sorry, but the assertion that you are clinging to IS a myth. In the context of the battle, knowing what Lee's priorities and situation were, Little Round's importance IS a myth. |
Pan Marek | 20 Dec 2011 2:24 p.m. PST |
Lee ignored the roundtops? Only until the Union had them, then he wanted them too. |
Jerry Lucas | 20 Dec 2011 2:25 p.m. PST |
Thank you campaigner1 for your opinion. |
thosmoss | 20 Dec 2011 2:28 p.m. PST |
Wonder why Longstreet kept suggesting outflanking the Union army? Seems he only had a couple exhausted regiments to choose from. |
Campaigner1 | 20 Dec 2011 2:30 p.m. PST |
[Omemin wrote: "If you've ever stood on Little Round Top, there's no way on God's green earth you'd let the other side have the place. The view commands the whole field, all well within rifled artillery range".] NOBODY disputes this point! However, that is not the issue! Again, you're making a statement without looking at the reality. "The view commands the whole field, all well within rifled artillery range". Umm, yes but the hill couldn't HOLD more than a battery's worth of guns. What does it matter if the hill looked down on the Union fight flank if you can barely put anything on it? And how would you resupply those guns up those rocky slopes quickly? Who would have cleared away the rocks? How long would it have taken to get artillery placed up there, in time to make a difference? Do you honestly assert and believe that a single confederate battery of FOUR or SIX guns would have delivered enough fire to drive the entire Cemetery Ridge Union line from the field? And how would all of that been done in a timely fashion enough to affect the battle, before dark set in? That's another factor not even being considererd. If Little Round Top had been taken, it would have been almost DARK or close to it by the time the confederates had gotten their few guns up on it. And that same darkness would have confronted the few rebel regiments that were stumbling around "in the Union rear". And do you honestly assert that a brigade's worth of unsupported confederate infantry would have come down off of Little Round Top by themselves, after being worn out in battle, and by themselves would have driven off three Union infantry corps and taken the Union supply train? By themselves? With little ammunition? With no hope of reincforement? With no water? With battle fatigue? Against several Union infantry corps? By themselves? So yes, the VIEW commands the whole field. But what use is the VIEW when you can't put anything on the hill in the first place???? It was a hill that had a view but no attributes for successful occupation. YES, you're right, when one is up there and looks at the view, your reaction would be that you would never allow the other side to have it. And that is what happened with Governeur K. Warren. He saw the view and perceived the hill to be important – as he saw it on the spot in the heat of the moment. But Warren had no way of knowing that Lee had no plans to attack Little Round Top purposely. Warren was reacting on the spot to the confederate infantry he saw advancing in the valley below. And Warren was making a gut reaction because it was high ground. However, he obviously DIDN'T look around in the moment, and realize how unsuited it actually was for the placement of artillery and how difficult it would have been to attack and hold it. The best way to sum up what Warren did was he was covering all possibilities. His reaction was to get some Union infantry up there for the sake of securing the hill for the AoP and preventing any chance of the confederates taking it. But this fact, in a vaccum, doesn't automatically mean that the hill WAS that important tactically, or that the confederates taking it WAS a real danger. You see what I mean? You can't view Little Round Top in a vaccum! So I conclude again that yes, the perceived and long-held notions of Little Round Top ARE a myth perpetuated by popular history and by popular notions of the battle. This is not new. I'm not the only one saying this. A dozen authors or more have thoroughly proven that Little Round Top's importance was overblown in the years after the battle. This myth was partially entrenched by the veterans themselves who fought on the hill. And later it was further entrenched by the Park Service and its non-challenge of anything but the popular view of the battle. Unfortunately, the information and evidence we have, which is STRONG, directly contradicts this. The importance of Little Round at Gettysburg is a myth, plain and simple. |
67thtigers | 20 Dec 2011 2:55 p.m. PST |
Campaigner1 is totally and utterly correct. The "low rocky hills" (the names "Round Top" and "Little Round Top" don't exist at the time) east of the Plum Run were not a tactical feature. If they were of any importance then they'd have been targetted by a formation of some type rather than a few regiments that came off the axis to protect the flank. What was important was Peach Orchard Ridge. It is the Dominating Ground in that area, and it was where Longstreet struck. Notably, Union possession of the "Round Tops" did nothing to stop the use of the POR as a point d'appui. The area is a dead end. Edit: LRT is not a "magic hill": YouTube link :D |
Campaigner1 | 20 Dec 2011 3:02 p.m. PST |
[Pan Marek wrote: "Lee ignored the roundtops? Only until the Union had them, then he wanted them too."] Oh YES, Lee ignored the Round Tops! And he did so for the ENTIRE battle!
"After the Union had them he wanted them too."??? I'm afraid not. Lee wanted CEMETERY HILL from start to finish because that was the key to the Union position, and was the key to consolidating his own army in the same blow. That is not my opinion, it's a fact. I have no idea where your notion comes from that Lee wanted them after the Union occupied them on July 2nd. That is completely false, I'm sorry. Lee's own orders and after-battle reports show this. It's not my opinion or far-flung belief that Lee never ordered an attack on Little Round Top. It's a fact. HE NEVER DID! No orders from July 2nd ever refer in any way, shape or form to attacking Little Round Top. FACT. I've read as much. His own orders and words about the battle tell us that. So unless Lee lied in his after-battle reports, I'm afraid this notion of him wanting the Round Tops is simply not true. In case you think I am giving a mere opinion here, I will give you a direct quote from Lee himself regarding the attack of July 2nd: Lee said that the forces who attacked the Round Tops "embarassed and delayed" the general advance up the Emmitsburg Road. Embarassed and delayed? Does this sound like a general who was intending to attack and occupy Little Round Top? He's asserting in his after-battle reports that he did NOT include an atttack on the Round Tops in his orders, and that those forces who did attack Little Round Top did so AGAINST orders and actually HINDERED his planned attack against Cemetery Hill! I don't know how it could be any clearer than that. It's not opinion or conspiracy theory that Lee had no interest in taking the Round Tops. It's a fact. A dozen books on this topic also say the same exact thing. It seems that not everyone here is aware of Lee's own words and his own afterbattle reports. There is a huge difference between giving one's "opinions or beliefs" about a battle, and looking at available information and evidence and making assertions based on that. I don't know how Lee's own words and his own orders could make it any clearer. And it's not just Lee's words. A dozen or more officers on both sides corroborate it. I am saying here as fact that Lee NEVER wanted and NEVER attacked Little Round Top purposely. It was attacked against orders on July 2nd. There's no debate or armchair discussion about that. It's a fact. Pfanz's book elaborates on this, Sears book does, Harman's book does, and other do as well. Let's leave the debate and what-if hindsight discussions in their proper place and not let them enter into a topic for which we have excellent information and evidence. I don't mean to sound flippant here, but it really doesn't matter to me whether or not you can emotionally detach yourselves from the long-held romantic notion of the battle and long-held notions that Lee was attacking the Union flanks on July 2nd. And it really doesn't matter to me either that some insist on clinging to their emotional view of the battle rather than what the actual information and evidence tells us. That's up to you to do as true historians. This is a case of people not being able to let go of the emotionally-influenced view they have had of Gettysburg, perhaps most of their lives. But how we "feel" about a battle or "want to feel" about a battle directly conflicts with the actual event itself. It's hard to look at Gettysburg, without believing that the heroic defense of Little Round Top could NOT POSSIBLY have been the key battle of July 2nd and that the Union line was saved from disaster only just in time thanks to the heroic foresight and heroic actions of Vincent's brigade. It makes for a good tale. Unfortunately, a tale is all it is. Yes, a battle DID take place on Little Round Top, but it did not have the impact on the battle we would like to think or feel it did. The one impact it DID have was that it hampered Lee's greater orders and attack on Cemetery Hill. That was the biggest impact it had. This doesn't take anything away from the men who fought and died on that hill. But the importance of the fight for that hill, in the context of the overrall battle, is not the dramatic tale that has been perpetrated. |
Campaigner1 | 20 Dec 2011 3:42 p.m. PST |
[Marara wrote: "Thank you campaigner1 for your opinion."] Thank you, but I'm not expressing my opinion. I'm asserting and sharing facts about the battle that are not up for debate. A dozen or more other members on here will absolutely back me up because they know the same information about the battle. This isn't a what-if discussion or a vague, hindsight guessing, "gee I wonder" conversation. It's a discussion about a Gettysburg wargaming what-if scenario, that has elaborated into the importance of some of the battle's terrain features and factors in relation to realistic wargaming. One of those terrain factors happens to be that on July 2nd, Little Round was attacked in error and against orders. Little Round Top contributed to the overrall failure of the attack on Cemetery Hill. For anyone thinking I am guessing or giving opinions, here are some links. I apologize if I am coming across as being upset or having a strong attitude about this. But it is only because I have studied this battle intensely, and there are ALOT of deeply entrenched myths about this battle, perhaps more so than any other event in history. I will NOT allow guessing, emotional attachments to certain moments of the battle, or opinion to stand against knowledge and real information: gettysburgdaily.com/?p=7132 link link link link This link makes reference to John Bachelder, his role in helping to emplant the battle in the American conscience, and his role in the 1870's and 1880's in helping to perpetuate many of the entrenched myths of Gettysburg, and his motivations for doing so. His story is elaborated on more in Troy Harman's book. His story is HUGELY important in understanding how certain terrain features at Gettysburg rose in prominence while others were reduced to obscurity, regardless of their true and actual significance in the battle. link
The last link also discusses the SHAPE of Little Round Top and how it favored a Union occupation somewhat more because it was oblong from north to south, and it allowed for Union artillery to have greater space to face WESTWARD against the confederates. By contrast, that same oblong shape allowed for practically NO room for any confederate artillery trying to face NORTHWARDS in an enfilading position against Cemetery Ridge. Rather like trying to fit artillery into the space of the uppper point of an oblong football. No space to place massed artillery facing northwards!
That about sums it up for me. Happy gaming everybody. |
Campaigner1 | 20 Dec 2011 3:51 p.m. PST |
Here is a short excerpt taken from the last link. This pretty much says it all, if all the other information is not convincing enough: "• Little Round Top would Have Been Pivotal for Confederate Artillery:
False: LRT was a key platform for Union artillery because the western side, facing the Confederates, had been cleared of trees. But the rest of the hill, namely its northern side facing the Union position, was tree-covered forest, with almost no view of Cemetery Ridge and no room among the boulders to maneuver cannon to fire north toward the Union line. About all the Confederate artillery would have gained in taking LRT was a nice view of the sunset." And this doesn't really stress that even the Union artillery that occupied the hill facing westward had difficulties in placing its guns along the "relatively more open" western slopes.
But the northern slopes were impossible for placing artillery facing northwards. None of the hill lent itself to particularly effective placement of artillery. But the slope the confederates would have needed to use was both narrow, and tree and rock covered. Not quite the artillery platform that would have turned the tide of the battle is it? |
Bottom Dollar | 20 Dec 2011 6:03 p.m. PST |
To reiterate what jrbatso said: What about that road running due south just next to them ? Wouldn't need to fire artillery north or ransack wagon trains at all. If the Rebs had just sat on them at the end of July 2nd, the Federal command would've been collectively crapping their pants. PS Let me let you in on something, there's a reason the Feds fought for them
and committed about a 1/3rd (rough guess) of the AoP to defending. |
svsavory | 20 Dec 2011 7:11 p.m. PST |
Campaigner1 is correct that Lee ordered Longstreet to attack up the Emmitsburg road toward Cemetery Hill, and never intended to attack the Round Tops. Of course Sickles' unauthorized advance complicated those orders to say the least. It's interesting to note that Sickles' original position didn't encompass the Round Tops at all. His line just sort of petered out in the low ground north of Little Round Top. He felt threatened by the high ground at the Peach Orchard in his front which led to his famous advance without orders. Neither Sickles, nor Meade, nor even Hunt ordered any guns placed on Little Round Top before the attack, so they must not have felt the hill was all that important as an artillery position. Interestingly, on July 3 when the Confederate guns occupied the Peach Orchard area, it didn't really help them all that much in their final assault. Conversely, enfilade fire from Union guns on Little Round Top wreaked havoc on Pickett's troops. So while occupation of LRT was never Lee's objective, holding it certainly enhanced the Union defensive position. |
Bill N | 20 Dec 2011 9:56 p.m. PST |
One problem that some of us have with your view is this: Lee takes Cemetary Hill-Then what? The hill itself is just a geographic feature, one of many potentially srong military positions in that area. Take the hill and you probably inflict a few thousand more casualties on already mauled formations, plus you capture some artillery pieces. Meanwhile the bulk of the U.S. army shifts to other defensible positions nearby. So you have July 1 all over again. The Napoleonic instinct in some of us says that Lee needed to do more than just capture a hill. He needed to pound or disorganize the Army of the Potomac sufficiently that it would not be in shape to fight for a while. This is part of the attraction of the Round Tops. LRT may not be a great platform for Confederate artillery to rake the Federal lines or otherwise be the key to victory. However in most scenarios where you can imagine the Confederates taking it, you can also imagine the Confederates then pushing on into either an exposed Federal flank on Cemetary Ridge or into the rear areas of the Army of the Potomac. This Second Manassas scenario is the recipe for a Napoleonic victory of the type we imagine Lee was trying to achieve. The other issue is if the Confederates held LRT at the end of July 2, does this alter events on July 3? I do believe LRT is defensible by the Confederates IF they also hold the area around the Peach Orchard. Would Meade have been content to simply hold his position, or would he have commmitted forces to evict the Confederates from LRT like he did from Culp's Hill? If he did the latter would this have created any opportunities for Lee? |
bgbboogie | 21 Dec 2011 4:22 a.m. PST |
Campaigner1 I agree with Bill N Svsavay comments Please note I do not use capitals to empahsis a point as it would be considered rude. Having not only walked the Round Tops several times, but have GPS the angles and measured distances, I find a flaw to your argument, ok, it was not in General Lee's plan to take the hills, but both Hood and Longstreet were in command there and considered them key. Did Hood drirft right or did he just do what he thought was right and proper to do, he knew there was a track around the round tops as his troops had scouted it and may have wanted to use it. The unions got guns there, and, were resupplied. So it stands that the rebs could do the same and at the time the trees were cut further back yes it would not be easy but doable. IF the rebs had gotten guns there, there is no way the union line would have held as is, it would have had to have fallen back to break the enfilade, if not ordered to do so, the gunners would have done so, as no one likes beig shot at from the side it cracks morale like a nut. The support units would have also come under effective fire imagine the caissons and wagons being targetted!!! ??? The day though was saved by Dan Sickles, had Generals Hood & McLaws troops hit III Corps in its origional and ordered location, held the Round Tops with Rifled Artillery, had gotten Eshelmanns and Alexanders Artillery battalions along the Emmittsburg road & ridge providing effective fire the union would have been in some very serious trouble indeed. The point on "Embarrassed and delays" most likely points to the signal corps troops who could see all and report all. Finally; remember it was General Warren who sent V Corps and Vincents brigade up to hold the area because he saw the feature from an artilleryman view, he could see a target rich environment, therefore the feature was key, but a different key to a different discipline, as an artillerymans viewpoint as opposed to an infantrymans viewpoint. And on, maybe as an alternative campaign secnario, now that would be interesting. |
Jerry Lucas | 21 Dec 2011 5:59 a.m. PST |
Any "What-if" is based on opinion, since we do not know what could have happened or how changing 1 events effects other events. Nor can we we read the minds of commanders based on after-action reports, most were cover your butt report. Campaigner1 you are so focussed on the round tops being meaningless and based on myth that any action that uses say Little Round Top will be doomed for failure by the Confederates
. |
Omemin | 21 Dec 2011 10:37 a.m. PST |
The question becomes what you see from Lee's viewpoint. Assume that he is on exterior lines and stretched thin. Okay, so WHY is he attacking, particularly in the center, where Cannae comes to mind? If he's short of troops, especially after the second day attacks failed, he shouldn't be attacking at all. Longstreet's attack on the second day was aimed at the Peach Orchard/Wheatfield area and the Round Tops. Otherwise, the movement of troops from the far right of the assault to mask the Federals firing into the flank of the attack on the Round Tops would not have occurred because there would be no such attack. At that point, neither side held the Round Tops. If they weren't important, why the attack on the second day to take those hills? If Lee wanted to win by using up Federal troops and forcing them from the Cemetery Ridge position, Little Round Top was a good place to do it. Set a defense that will cost Meade too much to attack on Seminary Ridge, occupy Little Round Top, and await the inevitable costly assault or retreat on the part of the Army of the Potomac. |
donlowry | 21 Dec 2011 12:13 p.m. PST |
Campaigner1 knows what he's talking about. I suggest the Round Top supporters read Lee's official reports of the battle. His focus was entirely on taking Cemetery Hill. Why? because it was the key position in the Union line -- a salient, the point of the V. Take that position and the AotP's line is broken and Lee holds the central position. Little Round Top was useful primarily as an observation post. There was room at the top for only one battery. The 5th Corps infantry were on a shelf near the base of the hill. Big Round Top was even higher, but more wooded. Much of the enfilading fire on 3 July that the Confederates thought was coming from LRT was actually coming from a line of guns Lt. Col. McGilvery of the Art. Reserve had established on Cemetery Ridge, south of Gibbon's division. Lee could only have spared enough troops to take Little Round Top by moving his 2nd Corps farther to his right, which Longstreet suggested. But Ewell talked Lee out of that. Besides, taking Culp's Hill, which was Ewell's objective, would have been more useful than taking Little Round Top, as doing so would have threatened the Union line of communications down the Baltimore Pike and outflanked the Cemetery Hill position. Longstreet did not particularly advocate taking either Round Top -- he wanted to go even farther south and, making a strategic turning movement, get between Meade and Washington, which would force Meade to do the attacking. |
Bill N | 21 Dec 2011 6:31 p.m. PST |
Don: I don't think there are many who disagree with your position that Lee's focus was on taking the Cemetary Hill position. The point where we differ is on how that is being done. I admit that I may be misreading Lee's report, but when I see Lee talking about Longstreet moving against the Union's left, trying to gain a position where artillery could be brought to bear, I see an effort being not merely to advance up the Emmitsburg Pike, but to get onto the flank of the U.S. forces holding the Cemetary Ridge line and then rolling it up northward. This is more of a Napoleonic plan than what Campaigner1 seems to describe. Taking LRT isn't necessary to the plan, and I've seen nothing that indicates taking the hill was a goal of the attack. However that doesn't mean that taking it can't be useful in accomplishing the goal. As I said earlier though you aren't talking about just taking the hill but then moving on afterwards. Also I do read some of Lee's comments as indicating that the presence of Federal forces on LRT did affect his plans. |
cwbuff | 21 Dec 2011 7:02 p.m. PST |
Those darn ACW soldiers. They just kept going to where the enemy was at the moment they received fire. Good discussion. I have enough trouble keeping up with "what did". |
Bottom Dollar | 21 Dec 2011 7:18 p.m. PST |
and they just walked in standing up shoulder-to-shoulder to take pointblank rifle fire at 50 yards. Dummies. |
Bottom Dollar | 21 Dec 2011 7:19 p.m. PST |
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Campaigner1 | 22 Dec 2011 7:55 a.m. PST |
I apologize for the use of capitalization for emphasis in my postings, I did not mean to come across as rude, that is not my intention. I just have alot of passion for this particular topic, because there is so much disinformation and misconception out there about Gettysburg, even among Civil War students and gamers, and indeed even among Civil War scholars and writers. Doesn't mean I think I'm 100% right either, but I do know many things about the battle, and I am aware as are others, of many things that are taken as fact which are well known to be utterly false. It's just that the information has either been ignored or buried under popular history. I'm simply trying to help others in the right direction in that regard. |
Campaigner1 | 22 Dec 2011 8:13 a.m. PST |
[Bill N. wrote: "I admit that I may be misreading Lee's report, but when I see Lee talking about Longstreet moving against the Union's left, trying to gain a position where artillery could be brought to bear, I see an effort being not merely to advance up the Emmitsburg Pike, but to get onto the flank of the U.S. forces holding the Cemetary Ridge line and then rolling it up northward. This is more of a Napoleonic plan than what Campaigner1 seems to describe. Taking LRT isn't necessary to the plan, and I've seen nothing that indicates taking the hill was a goal of the attack. However that doesn't mean that taking it can't be useful in accomplishing the goal. As I said earlier though you aren't talking about just taking the hill but then moving on afterwards."] Bill,
We are both agreeing on the nature of Lee's July 2nd attack. You are absolutely right, Lee's attack on the 2nd called for converging forces to take Cemetery Hill. This indeed included Hood and McClaws striking the 2nd Corps and rolling it up towards Cemetery Hill as they struck home. And you are right, it was a Napoleonic tactic that Lee was using on July 2nd. Lee had used the 45 degree angle flank attack before at 2nd Manassas, and Chancellorsville. Lee called for Hood and McClaws to strike the 2nd Corps at an angle, marching on the line of the Emmitsburg Road as a guide. This attack was simply mimicked by Lee on July the 3rd when he used Pickett. Pickett was placed out in front of Seminary Ridge prior to the attack. He was not on Seminary Ridge concealed in woods as so many have been told. His whole division was thrown out into a ground swale, several hundred yards in advance of the tree line of Seminary Ridge, at a 45 degree angle to the 2nd corps line. Essentially, Pickett was supposed to attempt the exact same thing as Hood and McClaws had tried on the 2nd. Both attacks were made at the same angle to the Union line, and in fact were both attacks "up the Emmitsburg Road" so to speak. The only difference between July 2nd and 3rd was that Pickett was "further up" the Emmitsburg Road than Hood and McClaws were. That's it. That's why when you recognize that, you see that Pickett was not ordered to strike the 2nd Corps head on towards the east, but rather at that 45 degree angle, so it could roll up the 2nd corps as the attack towards Cemetery Hill progressed northward. Essentially Lee was ordering Pickett to ignore the rest of the Union line south of the 2nd Corps, and focus on upper Cemetery Ridge and rolling it up towards the hill. Lee was counting on horse artillery to protect Pickett's right flank so he could focus on the 2nd Corps and the hill. |
Bill N | 22 Dec 2011 8:51 a.m. PST |
Thank you for the clarification. Also I do agree on the value of reading Lee's report on the battle. |
Campaigner1 | 22 Dec 2011 9:16 a.m. PST |
Bill, I understand what you are saying about Little Round Top. The problem for Lee, and I can't stress this enough, was that Lee didn't have the consolidiation of his lines or the weight of manpower to have the luxury to include Little Round Top in his plans for July 2nd. Even if LRT was a hill suitable for artillery placemenet(which it was not), Lee still had no desire to throw any resources at it because it was too remote to have any effect on his plans. And add to this that LRT was too remote and too far removed from the key points Lee was attacking to be of any use. Add to this the fact that Lee was working against time, Cemetery Hill had to be taken before the whole federal army was up and concentrated. The last thing Lee could afford to do was stretch his lines further and weaken them by going after hills that had no value and no use. There was no time, and the lines were too thin. Lee's attacks all had to have the element of consolidation and convergence in mind, not thinning and seperating. Hood, McClaws, Early, and the others all had to have their compasses pointing toward eachother, toward Cemetery Hill, so they all could meet there, drive off the enemy, and hold and keep the objective. Picture it like red arrows all moving toward Cemetery Hill as a bullseye. All attacking forces had to be moving towards and inwards against the bullseye, like a giant ring closing. LRT took troops away from that bullseye, and so took away necessary weight of power against the bullseye. This was the essence of Lee's whole plan at Gettysburg. There was no time to play around with the potential usefulnees that LRT "might have" in getting in the Union rear. Simply wasn't time or enough troops to do that. If Lee had wanted to attack the Round Tops and get into the Union rear, he would have done so and given clear orders to that effect. It would have had Hood and McClaws attacking directly eastward, not northward, and would have been supported by elements of either the 2nd or 3rd Corps brought down Seminary Ridge from their positions around town. But that's not what Lee ordered. Any attack in the direction of LRT undermined that concentration towards the bulleye, it took troops away from the direction of convergence. Tactically, LRT was useless to Lee's orders, and in fact would be a hinderance if any of Longstreet's corps attacked it against orders, which is precisely what happened. Longstreet made a comment to Lee on the early morning of July 2nd, after he had been given his orders from Lee for attacking up the Emmitsburg Road. Longstreet remarked to Lee that if he sent Hood and McClaws up that road to roll up the 2nd Corps, and then strike the Union 1st Corps and 11th Corps on the hill itself, that it would be two confederate divisions alone attacking perhaps elements of three Union corps, totalling 40,000 men or more. This was the essence of Longstreet's doubts and concerns on July 2nd. Longstreet doubted whether his two divisions alone could punch through from the south, and he also doubted if the other units around Cemetery Hill would support him and attack in a timely and coordinated fashion. Essentially, Longstreet worried that Hood and McClaws would be chewed up moving northward if they were not supported by Hill and Ewell north of Cemetery Hill. The last thing Lee or Longstreet could afford was to have Hood and McClaws veer off that line of attack and waste themselves on LRT or the ground near it. And of course, as we know, that is exactly what happened. Hood lost 50% casualties getting bogged down in the LRT area and wheatfield area, to no avail. Longstreet had doubts that Hood and McClaws alone could punch through from the south, through all that resistance and reach the hill. This is why it was so critical that those confederate units north and west and east of Cemetery Hill moved in coordination with Hood and McClaws, so they all struck the hill at nearly the same time as they came together. To put it bluntly, Lee had neither the time nor the manpower on the southern part of his line to stretch Hood and McClaws further by having them strike LRT or move around LRT. And as far it "being a useful goal" that could have added to the overrall attack, it wasn't feasible. Hood and McClaw's line simply wasn't long enough. The two divisions had to maintain a united front and a solid front as it struck the Union 2nd Corps flank. Any dillution or weakening of that united front would make success less and less likely. Because of this, the problem of the exterior line, which stretched all the way from Culp's Hill, around the town, and down Seminary Ridge, there simply wasn't enough concentration of confederate troops to have the luxury of stretching out to attack the Round Tops. In fact, Lee was so stretched, he made it clear to Longstreet that both divisions were to remain "stuck" and aligned to the Emmitsburg Road no matter what, to keep them together. To put it another way, Lee was commiting to a massed attack on Cemetery Hill that couldn't afford to have any of its manpower drifting east into the Round Tops area. The Round Tops and the rough ground in front of it were a dead area that would only bog down the necessary punch to get through to Cemetery Hill. And indeed, on July 2nd, this is exactly what happened. Two circumstances bogged down the push up the Emmitsburg Road. One, Sickles corps being in the way. That was not expected. Two, Hood being wounded, and the subsequent drifting of Hood's division eastward, getting caught up in the local fights around Devil's Den and the rocky hills. Lee envisioned a quick, decisive push northward against an unsuspecting open flank of the 2nd Corps. Instead, Hood and McClaws ran into Sickles, and local resistance in the area that engaged Longstreet all the way from the Peach Orchard over to Plum Run. When Hood protested to Longstreet about LRT, he wasn't protesting that he should be allowed to attack LRT instead of going up the Emmitsburg Road. The protest from Hood was that when Hood's line brushed by LRT off to its right, he was concerned that it might be subjected to enfilade fire if any federal troops were up there. Hood was concerned about casualties he might take as he was marching to the west of the hill as he went up the Emmitsburg Road. The protest had nothing to do with attacking LRT itself. Hood was not begging Longstreet to go "up the rocky hill". Hood was expressing concern about what might happen as Hood marched by the rocky hill on the way to Cemetery Hill! And this is a very important point. Lee knew this as well. And it shows how Lee's larger plan and orders were the first priority above all else. Indeed, Hood might be subjected to some enfilade fire from LRT as it marched northward up the Emmitsburg Road. But Lee was willing to have Hood take these casualties, as long as they held cohesion and remained aligned with McClaws. In short, LRT was nothing more than a "by-passing" point for Hood to brush by as it marched northwards up the E. Road, not a place to assault so that it could be examined, researched, and mulled over as a "possible" place to put a few artillery pieces among the rocks, if they had the urge to. ***The most important thing to remember about Lee's July 2nd orders, was that he was actually ordering a massed, Napoleonic style attack by Longstreet against the Union flank on Cemetery Ridge. It was supposed to be two confederate divisions in one grand, solid line hitting the Union flank at an angle as they marched northwards. It was not intended to strike down around the Round Tops, but rather up on Cemetery Ridge. He wasn't trying to strike the "extreme left flank" of the Union line to "flank the whole Union army and get in its rear", but rather the "middle left flank" up on Cemetery Ridge!*** ***I can't stress enough how different those two things are! Again, July 2nd was about striking the upper left flank of the Union line of the 2nd Corps, not about striking the left flank of the whole Union army to attack its rear behind LRT. Those are two completely different things!*** Can you see the difference in priority? Lee's priority was Cemetery Hill. LRT was nothing but a pimple on the map to be bypassed by Hood as quickly as possible. It was to be ignored. Certainly it was not to be attacked. Lee couldn't afford to have the better part of a whole division off attacking something that didn't contribute to his goal. The time constraints didn't allow for taking LRT "in the event that it might be useful for something". Formulating an attack against the extreme Union flank and rear would have involved a whole shifting of his army so that an attack against the flank would be supported and reinforced. The tiny force that assaulted LRT did it alone and against orders no less. It couldn't hold the hill because it wasn't a supported attack. Think of it this way. Lee was calling for a decisive and rapid strike of concentration against Cemetery Hill. He couldn't afford to have any of that concentration siphoned off into "side goals". The luxury didn't exist to drift off and take hills that were of no immediate value. There was no time to play with taking terrain features that didn't contribute to that decisive strike. In that regard, not only was LRT not useful to Lee, it was in fact a hinderance that prevented victory on July 2nd. In essence, Hood getting bogged down in the LRT and Devil's Den area was the equivalent of an attack running into "quicksand", losing its momentum so to speak. That's why Lee spoke of the attack on LRT so scathingly and was so bitterly disappointed that the rocky hills were attacked at all. LRT was Lee's bane at Gettysburg. It helped contribute to his failure of taking Cemetery Hill on July 2nd, nothing more. It took troops away from his intended attack and used them up on a terrain feature that contributed nothing to his orders for the day. And Lee's words bear this out clearly. |
Ivan DBA | 22 Dec 2011 9:29 a.m. PST |
The value of the round tops was not as artillery platforms, but as the anchor of the Union left flank. If they hadn't held, the Rebs could have outflanked and rolled up the Union left---via infantry assault, not an artillery enfillade. Think about what had happened at Chancellorsville just one month earlier, and you'll get the picture. |
Campaigner1 | 22 Dec 2011 9:57 a.m. PST |
[bgbboogie wrote, "The point on "Embarrassed and delays" most likely points to the signal corps troops who could see all and report all."] What???? The Union Signal Corps troops who could see all and report all??? Pardon me, but what on earth are you talking about?
Omg no, no, no, noooooooo! I gotta take a deep breath here cause I'm going nuts. Boogie, that quote comes from Lee's after battle report! That quote is describing Lee's reaction to what happened on July 2nd! What it's referring to is Lee's reaction to what happened on Little Round Top! The quote is from the part of his report in which he states that he never wanted Little Round Top attacked because it "embarassed and delayed" his general advance on Cemetery Hill! I.E., THOSE CONFEDERATE TROOPS WHO ATTACKED THE HILL caused embarassment and delay to his overrall July 2nd orders! I have to use caps here, I'm sorry: LEE'S ATTACK AGAINST CEMETERY HILL WAS EMBARASSED AND DELAYED BECAUSE OF THE UNINTENDED ATTACK ON LITTLE ROUND TOP. THE ATTACK ON LITTLE ROUND TOP CONTRIBUTED TO THE FAILURE OF THE GREATER ATTACK ON CEMETERY HILL! In other words, the part of Hood's division that attacked LRT "embarassed and delayed" the greater goal of July 2nd, which was Cemetery Hill! This is simply more proof provided by Lee's own words that he never ordered an attack on LRT. And he was very angry and upset that troops were wasted in attacking that area, because they should have been maintaining cohesion and staying together for their push against Cemetery Ridge and Hill! Forgive me, but how in the world do you get something about the Union Signal Corps from a statement like that??? The confederate attack of July 2nd wasn't a stealth mission. Yes, Lee was hoping to strike quickly, but he couldn't hide his army from view. He wasn't trying to "sneak" his men quietly past the hills before someone saw them! Signal Corps Troops on the rocky hill weren't even on the fringe of his concerns. It was about striking early, striking hard, striking quickly against Cemetery Hill. Signal Corps troops being on Little Round Top had nothing whatsoever to do with Lee's plans! This is like The Twilight Zone, I swear I truly do not know where this information is coming from. Are you actually suggesting that Lee purposely ordered an unsupported allout attack on LRT, in order to drive off a few SIGNAL CORPS troops? And in the process diverting away needed troops from his intended attack, and ruining his entire battle plan for taking Cemetery Hill, and ruining his plans for winning the battle??? Are you serious? With all due respect, what you said is quite simply one of the most ridiculous things I have ever read. Not only is it completely wrong, but you took Lee's quote and turned it into a fantasy. Can we please get back to the real information that is out there and have discussions based on it instead of spreading ridiculous guesses and opinions about things without knowing the context they come from, and pulling them out of thin air? Jeez, at least take the time to study and learn the context of a quote and where it comes from before offering a far flung opinion about it that with all due respect makes absolutely no sense. There's no wondering or debate about what Lee meant by that quote, it's in his report and crystal clear. It's expressing dismay and disappointment about LRT and how it contributed to the failure of July 2nd. |
Campaigner1 | 22 Dec 2011 10:22 a.m. PST |
[Ivan DBA wrote: "The value of the round tops was not as artillery platforms, but as the anchor of the Union left flank. If they hadn't held, the Rebs could have outflanked and rolled up the Union left---via infantry assault, not an artillery enfillade. Think about what had happened at Chancellorsville just one month earlier, and you'll get the picture."] No. Wrong. Taking Little Round Top would not have automatically allowed the Rebs to roll up the Union left with an infantry assault. You are not considering Lee's exterior lines and the issues he faced. And you are not taking into consideration the fact that Lee never ordered an attack on Little Round Top! It was assaulted by an isolated force of brigade size that went up the hill unsupported and against Lee's general orders. It couldn't hold the hill or sustain it because it wasn't part of Lee's orders. Just because the 15th Alabama and some others might have taken LRT, Lee wouldn't have automatically said "My GOD, we've taken the Rocky Hill, shift the whole army from the attack on Cemetery Hill immediately, and move them all from the town and and southwards, we'll take the Union army from the rear!" That's a fantasy. Lee's reaction, if LRT had been taken, would have been to pull them back so that they could rejoin their command down below in the Peach Orchard area. It wasn't his plan at Gettysburg to get into the Union rear by going over Little Round Top, and so he wouldn't have supported any further action in that direction, with troops nor with any supplies. It would have stalled out!!! I'll keep saying that until someone gets it. There wouldn't have been a grand rolling up of the Union left and rear from the Round Top area because there was NO attack supported to do so! The Alabama regiments and others who assaulted the hill would have occupied it for a short time, then later would have had to come down off it to get water, ammunition, and supplies. It was a dead end attack and the hill itself was a tactical dead end! There was nothing behind the assaulting brigade to sustain the hill, let alone sustain a push into the Union rear. No orders supported that attack, and as such no suppport was allocated to sustain it. LRT was not the anchor of the Union left. The assertion you are making is based on the old, popular, myth-based view of the battle. There is new information that puts LRT in its proper perspective. You are still clinging to the drama of "if the hill hadn't held" without looking at the logistical and tactical realities facing the confederate army at Gettysburg. Lee's line was too long and stretched too far to make a supported and sustained attack on LRT and the Union rear. Again, please note that the attack on LRT was never ordered by Lee. As such, those few regiments who attacked it had nothing behind them supporting them for a sustained push into the Union rear. And since none of Lee's plans called for a push into the Union rear, there would have been noone to coordinate or resupply those who were up on the hill. If the federals had been driven off LRT, it would have been a dead end for the confederates up there, they would have done nothing but eventually come down off it in the evening. I am really at a loss as to why this concept is so difficult to grasp. The taking of Little Round Top would not have spelled doom for the Union left flank because it wasn't even the actual flank of the Union army, and Lee was not attempting to flank the whole federal army, nor get in its rear. The flank Lee was after was up on Cemetery Ridge, which is where Lee was trying to strike on July 2nd. It only became the flank and "anchor" of the Union line only after the night of July 2nd when it was occupied by other Union forces. But in the early morning of July 2nd, it was not a flank or anchor of the Union army. It was a hill on the fringe of the field with no value to either side. And it was attacked against orders. I'm going to say this for the last time, and I hope it sticks with someone: ***Lee never at any time ordered an attack that was for the purpose of moving around the extreme left flank of the Union army and getting in its rear! Never!*** LRT was an assault for high ground that Lee was not interested in. It's successful capture meant nothing to Lee. He didn't want it attacked in the first place. And because it went against his plan of attack for July 2nd, he would have done nothing more than pull those men back down off the hill, even if they had taken it. Period. The only reason the LRT assault happened at all was because Hood's division lost cohesion with McClaws, and those regiments that attacked the hill itself did so unsupported and against orders! Against the orders of Lee, and against the orders of the confederate brigade commanders who were desperately trying to keep Hood's division in contact with McClaws for the assault on Cemetery Hill!*** |
Campaigner1 | 22 Dec 2011 10:29 a.m. PST |
Ivan DBA, What you're saying is ironic, because a combination of an artillery enfilade combined with an flanking infantry assault was exactly what Lee was trying to do by attacking up the Emmitsburg Road! Remember, an infantry attack needed relatively open ground for a decisive, cohesive strike. And artillery needed a large, open space for effective mass deployment. The Peach Orchard/Emmitsburg Road area was just such the terrain that Lee recognized and needed to carry out his assault on Cemetery Hill. By contrast, the area of the Round Tops and Devil's Den was the worst possible terrain from which to launch a large infantry assault and artillery barrage. It is because of this that Lee wanted the Little Round Top area by-passed so that Longstreet could sweep up the open ground to the west of it and take the Union army in flank up on Cemetery Ridge. Trying to attempt that kind of attack through and over the Round Tops would have been a logistical nightmare
no open ground for artillery placement, no open ground for the effective alignment of large bodies of troops in battle lines, etc. It would have had to involve the shifting of a huge chunk of his army from the Gettysurg area and moving it to the southern part of Meade's lines. At that point, he would have practically been doing what Longstreet was favoring before and during the battle, which was moving off entirely and finding a spot between Meade and Washington and force a different engagement altogether. In other words, the Little Round Top area, strewn with rocks, wooded, and horribly hilly and uneven ground, was the last place Lee would have tried to flank the Union army and get into its rear, even if that had been his plans, which it wasn't! |
bgbboogie | 22 Dec 2011 10:55 a.m. PST |
I took in context the origional time delay in getting General Longstreets troops into their attack positon, losing time counter marching, which was indeed due to the signal postion. I also said might not was. I agree with you Campaigner1 that the LRT were not an objective for this attack, General Lee's writing confirm this, I think his plan, if the timings were kept to , would have cracked the cemetry hill position, but time is against all in battle. I also do not try force my opinion, people have their own opinions, but this forum 'is' a discussion forum and also a learning curve for all, including me. The who what when why rule applies; Why did Hood lose cohesion? Federal forces appeared on LRT. Why did he aim for the LRT? He would have been outflanked. Does Hood say why he let this happen???? M |
donlowry | 22 Dec 2011 11:20 a.m. PST |
By the time Union forces appeared on LRT Hood had been wounded and was out of the chain of command. Upon seeing Sickles' deployment, which extended back towards (but not onto) LRT, he had asked Longstreet for permission to move farther east, but Longstreet told him no, he had already presented that idea to Lee, who had reiterated the order to attack up the Emmitsburg Road. Now, MAYBE Hood ordered his brigades to move east anyway, but I've never found any evidence (other than the actual move) that he did so. MAYBE he had already so ordered, on the assumption that Longstreet would go along with the idea, when asked, but that's just a supposition. But whoever ordered the move eastward, be it Hood or the brigade commanders, the move was made in search of the Union flank and was not specifically aimed at LRT -- it's just that LRT was where the flank was found to be. The one point that I think Campaigner1 is missing is that Lee evidently thought that the Union line ran down the Emmitsburg Road, ending somewhere north of the Peach Orchard, and would have seen Sickles' advance as an extension of that line. Keep in mind that Lee did not know how much of the AotP had arrived on the field as of 2 July, and probably thought he was dealing with only a part of it, as he had been the day before. The AotP did some very hard marching to reach G'burg when it did -- something it had not done before, and which Lee would not have expected. BTW, Campaigner1, the name was McLaws, not McClaws. |
Bill N | 22 Dec 2011 1:10 p.m. PST |
Campaigner1-I'm not sure why you came back after me. With your clarification on Longstreet's line of advance we are pretty much in agreement on what LEE intended to do on July 2. While I didn't say it, I also agree that if Lee intended to hit the U.S. flank and roll it up as we are discussing, then detaching troops to try to capture LRT works against that plan. I do think it is somewhat unrealistic of Lee to expect that a Confederate brigade or divisional commander would be willing to expose his flank not just to fire from LRT, but also to a POSSIBLE counterattack from behind that position and not leave troops to mask the position. That doesn't mean that I am disagreeing with you that Lee wanted his lieutenants to do just that. Here is where we DO disagree though. I do not see taking LRT as unimportant. I just see taking it as unimportant TO LEE'S PLANS. Yes taking LRT would mean a major change in what Lee was trying to do on July 2. However when we move into "what if" land, then major departures from existing plans and reallocation of resources become possible. |
Bottom Dollar | 22 Dec 2011 2:29 p.m. PST |
Bill N wrote: "I do think it is somewhat unrealistic of Lee to expect that a Confederate brigade or divisional commander would be willing to expose his flank not just to fire from LRT, but also to a POSSIBLE counterattack from behind that position and not leave troops to mask the position." Houck's Ridge north to the Trostle Woods, and especially Houck's Ridge, would've made excellent defensive positions to deflect a massed Federal counter-attack from due east. Perhaps the Rebs only expected to need a brigade to screen that flank and probably would've welcomed an attempted counter-attack in that area. If Longstreet or Hood had decided to follow Lee's original plan I think they could've secured that flank well. After all, they were prepared to use Houck's Ridge defensively on July 3rd and 4th. LRT doesn't make for very good artillery positions, hard to get pieces up there, not a whole lot of space once there and a lot of rocks. Also, said artillery positions are well within sharpshooter range firing from Houck's Ridge or Devil's Den.
I also think Lee knew beforehand the general line of Sickles' troops as they stood just prior to the actual attack AND he still expected or wanted an attack UP the Emmittsburg Rd., meaning yes, leaving the flank open, but not necessarily vulnerable which is why I mentioned Houck's Ride. If you've ever been there and stood in Plum Run Valley, you can tell immediately that Houck's Ridge and the terrain in the Wheatfield, Devil's Den area is very defensible against attacks from the east.
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Omemin | 22 Dec 2011 2:40 p.m. PST |
Lee wasn't going to roll up the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge with enemy troops on the Round Tops. That would entail turning your back on an enemy force, which is dumb. Therefore, taking the Round Tops (as Lee evidently was sure they were occupied) was a necessity. The same exterior lines argument can be made against attacking Wolf Hill and Culp's Hill, which Lee tried to do simultaneously with the attack at the Round Tops. It seems pretty obvious that Lee was not very concerned about a thin line in the center if he was doing that. The point on both ends of the Federal line is that the Confederates had to attack to get on the Federal flank, which was the Round Tops, Wolf Hill, and Culp's Hill. Otherwise, rolling up the line would be impossible. |
67thtigers | 22 Dec 2011 4:13 p.m. PST |
Hood was wounded by a shell and had to leave the field. That is why his division lost C&C. He doesn't have a lot to say about it as he was dosed up on Laudenum in the hospital. |
Bottom Dollar | 22 Dec 2011 4:42 p.m. PST |
Campaigner1 wrote "Lee said that the forces who attacked the Round Tops "embarassed and delayed" the general advance up the Emmitsburg Road." Campaigner1, I would be curious to know where you found this information b/c I just read Lee's report and couldn't find it. Further, I never recall having read anything by Lee criticizing how the the attack by his right was made on July 2nd.
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Bottom Dollar | 22 Dec 2011 4:47 p.m. PST |
"Those darn ACW soldiers. They just kept going to where the enemy was at the moment they received fire
" Yes, I agree with the rejection of that perception. It would appear as such and is a very similar sentiment I think to the popular myth that ACW soldiers remained ramrod straight while attacking as they blasted each other into oblivion at ridiculously close ranges. |
Bottom Dollar | 22 Dec 2011 4:52 p.m. PST |
Omemin wrote: "Lee wasn't going to roll up the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge with enemy troops on the Round Tops." I've never read a shred of historical evidence which indicates that Lee designated the Round Tops as part of his July 2nd attack plan. Everything I've read points to his desire to have the attack made UP the Emmittsburg Road. Clearly, with Federal troops on or near or behind LRT, Lee would not have ordered an attack UP that road if he had thought that the right flank of the attacking force would itself somehow become vulnerable. |
Old Pete | 22 Dec 2011 4:58 p.m. PST |
Thanks for all the interest, in hindsight feel "Old Pete" Longstreet was proven correct. Lee appeared to think his army was invincible and though he came close to victory, would a victory with such losses not have been a hollow one? In our game the Confederates assaulted Gettysburg, Cemetery Ridge and south of the Round Tops simultaneously. The attack on Gettysburg resulted in Ewell's corps being mauled, Anderson's and Pender's divisions with the support of Pickett's division drove the Union 3rd Corps off southern Cemetery Ridge but was blocked by the Union 2nd and 6th corps and with the rest of Longstreet's corps sweeping round the Union left flank the Army of the Potomac withdrew east and south east in good order. The final result was Gen. Lee gaining only a minor indecisive victory, which would cause the war to go "on and on". All the stuff we used is available at either edwardw@emckie44.freeserve.co.uk Or link All the documents are in WORD or power point; you can adapt the rules, event cards etc to suit yourself. I could do with some comments as we plan to play a "what if" on the Seven Days Campaign next. Regards Old Pete |
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