"bait" Topic

Did the allies actually use US bombers as bait to tempt the luftwaffe to combat prior to D-Day?
I was watching a doco that made this claim & found it a bit shockng as many bombers were destroyed.

Up to a point I'm sure this is true.

Before late 1944 at least – the main value of strategic bombing seems to have been in forcing German fighters to engage the bombers – thereby not being available for close support of ground troops. They tried various strategies, including attacking aircraft factories, terror bombing cities…

I think the allies were bumbling around trying to figure out how best to use these powerful assets – and a lot of in fighting resulted.

It's sometimes in vogue to criticise the stategic bombing campaign as wasteful, a warcrime, bungled, etc.

While I contend that with hindsight, something else could have and should have been done with the resources poured into reducing German cities to rubble, and killing a largely innocent civilian population – I do understand and accept that the people forced to make the decisions and carry out the attacks did not know what we know now and had very little choice given the circumstances.

I think 'bait' is over egging the pudding a bit.

One beneficial side effect of the daylight bombing campaign was the annihilation of the Luftwaffe fighter arm.

It is true in so much as the intention was at least in part to get the Luftwaffe to come up and fight but the bombers weren't simply sacrifical lambs. The USAAF 8thAF staff were disciples of Douchet and the theory of strategic bombing & expected their heavily armed bombers to fight their way through to the target.

Until the advent of adequate long range escorts in 1944 this was an expensive war of attrition, a point tacitly acknowledged by the USAAFs change in tactics in mid-late 1943, when they effectively stopped unescorted daylight missions. The advent of the Mustang in the LR escort role was a game changer in that respect and made air defence much harder for the Luftwaffe.

Skarper, don't forget though that the USAAF was using 'precision bombing' in their daylight role, rather than Bomber Commands area bombing policy.

The British did the same sort of thing with their various 'Ramrod', 'Rhubarb' and 'Circus' etc missions in France from 1941 onwards, basically challenging the Germans to come up and fight, using a small bomber formation, heaviy escorted by fighters.

Well, not only as bait… They did have missions, too.
-Kle.

Precision bombing was fine in theory, but the ability of the USAAF to actually hit a specific target, like a factory or a railway marshalling yard, let alone a bridge was very limited. They still used large numbers of aircraft and hoped that someone at least would hit the target…

Much more precise than the RAF of course. In the early years, the Germans had to wait for the BBC to announce 'last night the RAF attacked ________' in order to know what the target of the seemingly random scatter of bombs actually was!

The equation is much more complicated then merely forcing the luftwaffe to contest the skies or even direct damage to German industry, which was considerable. A few passages from Richard Overy's "Why the Allies Won" better illustrate the point:

"…the facts show that German air power declined steadily on the eastern front during 1943 and 1944, when over two-thirds of German fighters were sucked into the contest with the bombers. By the end of 1943 there were 55,000 anti-aircraft guns to combat the air offensive--including 75 percent of the famous 88-millimetre gun…"

"By 1944 one-third of all German artillery production consisted of anti-aircraft guns; the anti-aircraft effort absorbed 20 per cent of all ammunition produced, one-third of the output of the optical industry, and between half and two-thirds of the production of radar and signals equipment. As a result of this diversion, the German army and navy were desperately short of essential radar and communications equipment for other tasks. The bombing also ate into Germany's scarce manpower: by 1944 an estimated two million Germans were engaged in anti-aircraft defence, in repairing shattered factories and in generally cleaning up destruction."

So in addition to the direct effect on German industry and direct confrontation with the Luftwaffe the allies could clearly see the indirect benefits with the diversion of resources. Hardly mere bait.

Skarper wrote:

Much more precise than the RAF of course. In the early years, the Germans had to wait for the BBC to announce 'last night the RAF attacked ________' in order to know what the target of the seemingly random scatter of bombs actually was!

Much better was the approach used by a WW1 Zeppelin commander, who gained a reputation for astonishing precision in navigation and bombing. He reputedly waited for the British newspaper reports detailing the places where Zeppelin bombs had fallen the previous night before completing the blanks in his logbok.

All the best,

John.

I'm currently reading Fortress without a Roof and there seems to be some truth to that, to a point. Bait is a bit of a strong word, but they certainly did hope that they would be able to shoot down more German fighters than they did and it seems like they were always disappointed when the Germans waited until the P-51s turned for home before attacking the bombers.

Good quotes, Marc. I was just reading some of the reactions of Wehrmacht personnel who were on leave from the front and visiting the city of Hamburg in July '43 (the first major obliteration of a German city), and it's clear it had quite an effect on front line morale, too.

The US bombing was no better than the RAF and the US term 'Marshalling Yards' was a euphemism for area bombing of city centres.

No bait, military operation to be changed shortly after.

Billy Mitchell most certainly used his bombers as 'bait' in the Great War.

I have little doubt Hap Arnold would not have employed similar tactics.

mjc

While I agree that one of the aims was destruction of the Luftwaffe whether through bombing the production facilties or engaging them in the air I have yet to see anyone provide any citation or credible source that the primary purpose of the bombing campaign was as bait.

The fact is that to be effective in luring the luftwaffe into engagements, if that were the primary aim, then the bombing would have to be acheiving results otherwise why rise to the bait? Why devote so much production to the effort when it was clearly needed elsewhere as well?

You can see by the quotes provided, and can provide more from other sources, that the Germans took the bombing campaign quite seriously.

When addressing the Canadian Parliment Churchill made the following famous comment:
"When I warned [the French] that Britain would fight on alone, whatever they did, their Generals told their Prime Minister and his divided cabinet: 'In three weeks, England will have her neck wrung like a chicken.

"Some chicken….Some neck!

I would say some bait!

Marc33594

What you are describing is no different than the Great War. The only difference is that the effects of the bombers in the Great War was not great while the effects of the American day bombing in WWII were quite palpable.

Thus there was considerably more impetus to get after the bombers in WWII and this in turn undoubtedly created opportunities for Allied fighters.

I would be amazed if Allied operations did not consider this angle and use it from time to time.

mjc

"Some chicken….Some neck!

Did someone call??

I don't disagree quidveritas my objection is to the contention that bait was the primary purpose of the bombing offensive as the documentary the original poster cited stated.

The allies recognized the bombers drew fighters and as someone had already stated would mount small bomber formations with large fighter escort to capitalize on that from time to time.

But so far no one has offered a citation or credible source to back the assertion that "bait" was the primary purpose of the US portion of the bomber offensive.

The USAAF 8thAF staff were disciples of Douchet and the theory of strategic bombing

Leaving aside their concerns with intimate personal hygiene I believe they were also adherents to the theories of Giulio Douhet.

The doco that used the term "bait" several times was ' WWII Lost Films: The Air War.'

Credible? From the postings above, probably not.

The USAAF 8thAF staff were disciples of Douchet and the theory of strategic bombing

Leaving aside their concerns with intimate personal hygiene I believe they were also adherents to the theories of Giulio Douhet.

Well it was late at night….

The Operation leading up to D-Day was "Pointblank", the destruction of the French Transportation system as well as other supports for German anti-invasion efforts. However the real killer for the Luftwaffe in France was that the American Daylight raids on Germany forced a redeployment away from the areas to be invaded to Germany.

it seems like they were always disappointed when the Germans waited until the P-51s turned for home before attacking the bombers.

BTW, any Germans waiting to attack after the P-51s turned back were no doubt in for a shock when the P-51s escorted the B-17s all the way to the targets and back.

there were a lot of feinted attacks with aircraft not carrying bombs so the german defences could not commit their forces concentrated

depends what you mean by bait:

the RAF used Blenheim raids to intice the Luftwaffe up to be bounced by the Spitfires above them … read Laddie Lucas' book and he states the result was the Blenheims were too frequently shot down before the fighters got involved.

also RAF bomber raids in late 43/early 44 used feints by training squadrons into such as France or the Danish coast to try to tempt the nachtjager away from the main attack (normally Berlin)