"How the British Nearly Supported the Confederacy picture " Topic

i suspect we have different definitions of active support.

i could be convinced that french and british declaring the blockade illegal and merchant ships sailing into te South, not Active support. Assume The Royal Navy isn't shooting at the union (much)

a blockade of the North by a foreign power that chokes the north is "active support"

We know British warplans.

1. Destroy the USN. Milne planned for multiple squadrons to hit every blockading squadron immediately upon declaration of war.

2. Implement of blockade of the Union. This required about 67 warships (planning figures were 7x line of battle, 12x frigates, 25 sloops, 23x gunboats)

3. Despatch an expeditionary force to Canada. 75,000 regulars were to reinforce Canada, which was planned to provide at least 100,000 volunteers. They were to dig in defences.

4. Send a naval force down the St. Lawrence. Planning figures were 72 RN ships on the Lakes at St Lawrence (2 line-of-battle, 9 ironclad batteries, 2 corvettes, 6 dispatch vessels, 53 gunboats)

5. Destroy all US war industries and ports. To accomplish this the first point of attack would be the reduction of Ft Monroe to give the RN control of Chesapeake Bay. Simultaneously a gunboat force would penetrate the Delaware River, destroy DuPont and push as far as they could, burning Philadelphia and Trenton. Portsmouth (NH) was to be reduced with Mortars (the fortifications were too close in and Mortars could hit the naval yards for no return). Raids to destroy the Springfield Armoury and other war industries were also planned.

6. Mount an amphibious desant on Portland, Maine to control the terminus of the Grand Truck Railroad, then push inland to secure it.

7. Once the main attack force had cleared Chesapeake Bay they would mop up New York and Boston Harbors, and various other sundry ports.

Well is that ever a flight of fancy. Pure British dream, wish or whatever, that would never leave their wargame table.

Where is the part were the British take California and Nevada? I guess the American's just sit while the British Army do as they please. Hey lets burn Washington again! It's only, at the time, the most heavly fortified city in the world. The defending American's will just standby and let us through.

How about leaving Britain open to invason by let's say for instance France, Prussia or anyone else. Would Parliment allow this. Would the bulk of the British people allow this. There is solid evidence from Parlamentary records newspapers cabinet minutes that it was very unlikley and politically impossible after Sept. 1862. It was not in Britian's national intrest to go to war against the U.S.

We know British warplans.

Really? Source please? Besides it dosen't matter, every country has warplans against many countries. Purssia had plans done up for invading the U.S. in the 1890s. The U.S. had plans for invading Canada in the 1930's. All countries militaries does that, SOP.

There is a reason why Lincoln said:

Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant, to step over the ocean, and crush us at a blow? Never! -- All the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest; with a Bonaparte for a commander,could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years.

At what point, then, is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer, if it ever reach us, it must spring up amongst us. It cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen, we must live through all time, or die by suicide.

Rallynow

I remember to have read that Lincoln's discourse. When Lincoln pronounced it?

Best regards

Well is that ever a flight of fancy.

As opposed to the idea of implementing a blockade of the southern seacoast, gaining control of the Mississippi valley and moving on Richmond was with the resources available to the U.S. in 1861?

The British were probably underestimating the difficulties in fully implementing their plans. For example I would imagine that the Grand Trunk's line from Portland across northern New England would have been reduced to a wreck before the British could secure it, and moving up the Delaware most likely would have required large land forces. Still, in conjunction with Confederate forces and resources (such as Confederate harbors to use as bases for the blockade and staging points for army expeditions) a great deal of this would be possible, given the resources available to the United Kingdom. As for California, Nevada and Oregon, conquest wouldn't be required. These were the days before the transcontinental railroads, so a blockade of eastern U.S. ports alone could have severely reduced trade between those states and the eastern part of the U.S. to the detriment of both. Of course without a corresponding blockade in the west it would have left British commerce open to assaults from U.S. privateers operating out of western ports.

I think anyone who assumes anything about the outcome of British involvement in the ACW is on shakey ground. There are simply too many variables involved.

seems like much like most things civil war related, the timing is very important

in this case the earlier the better, and some of it seems silly/not practical.
for instance going up the delaware to hit trenton? seems like the type of thing that always ends badly. yet for no real gain.
your main inland thrust is to secure a railroad in maine?

i have to admit from a whatifs gamers standpoint, these real plans are disappointing.

maybe you can do some early fights as the Brits hit the blockade forces, but the rest…not so exciting

Can you imagine the field day Union privateers would have had on British shipping. They were a major headache in the American Revolution before the colonies were really organized to fight. Can you imagine the impact on them with a stronger centralized government?

Plus trying to keep their forces supplied once the North really took off. Canada might have ended up part of the US after all.

And while there might have been some politicians pushing for supporting the south, as has been pointed out before, the British had been the number one opponent of the slave trade for some 20 years by the time the war broke out. They would have a tough time explaining backing the south with slavery still intact.

Which begs the question, if the Confederacy had announced that they were going to begin phasing out slavery gradually, would that have been enough cover for the British to hold their noses and back them in the fight?

If the RN carried out an effective blockade on the US, which would have been relatively easy to establish and maintain, with the vessels available to the RN, then the likelihood of privateers acting effectively would have been very small. Even if they were able to act, the RN had sufficient vessels to effectively protect and convoy the trade that US privateers might attack.
Privateers in the 1780's and 1812-4, when the RN was facing the French Navy is one thing, privateers, whether steam or sail, in the Civil War would be a different matter. If steam, they'd find coal very difficult to procure, if sail, they'd find RN steam vessels hard to escape.

The British warplans are partially in box WO33/11 of the British National Archives, and partially in the Milne Papers (still awaiting the publication of Vol. 2 covering the period).

They're remarkably modern in that they are designed to break the Unions will and ability to fight. It was recognised by all (especially the Americans) that the balance of power had shifted decisively to naval power and the RN could frankly do what they liked. See the Congressional report on the matter: link

Naval wise you can get a wargame out of it. For example, if the local blockade commander decides to run into NY Harbor you can get a reasonable balance. Similarly you can run skirmish games with a battalion of Royal Marines raiding a coastal depot defended by a few US volunteer regiments.

What the British did not plan on doing was despatching a major force to reinforce Lee, although you can make some pretty good what if scenarios based around Lee, rearmed with British artillery etc. and reinforced by several additional Confederate Corps freed up when the blockade collapsed embarking on a campaign to capture Washington, which the Confederacy considered ther natural Capital.

Which begs the question, if the Confederacy had announced that they were going to begin phasing out slavery gradually, would that have been enough cover for the British to hold their noses and back them in the fight?

In November, 1864 Jefferson Davis dispatched Duncan F. Kenner of Louisiana to Europe on a secret mission with instructions to offer European governments a promise of emancipation of the slaves in exchange for recognition.

Napoleon, then deeply involved in his Mexican policy, declined the offer and replied that France could not act without British concurrence. When Kenner made the same proposal to the British government, Prime Minister Palmerston rejected it out of hand, informing Kenner that Britain would never recognize the Confederate States of America. Confederate diplomacy in Europe had come to a dead end.

I can't find the exact quote but I think it was VP Alexander Stephens who said (paraphrasing) if you free the slaves, then this government has no reason to exist.

Hi

I am unclear why the RN has an easier time in the ACW as asserted above. If coal is the issue, the US has all the coal, but the RN is sending colliers to support their boats at sea.

Again, why is 1882 EASIER? If it is so easy, how did the French NOT take Mexico which was not industrialized, had no navy?

R

how did the French NOT take Mexico which was not industrialized, had no navy?

The answer is easy: they did take Mexico, they did installed a puppet emperor… and when Napoleon III realized that the Mexican adventure wasn't that popular in France -specially between his natural political supporters-, that the Prussians and Austrians were rattling their sabers, and that he couldn't count with British and Spanish -their early allies in the Mexican affair- support (they decided that the Mexican intervention wasn't in their best interests and retired their forces from Mexico), Napoleon decided to pull out.

Of the three reasons, probably Prussian and Austrian threat to the peace in Europe was the most influential in Napoleon's mind.

Best regards

I bet General Grant ordering 50,000 troops under General Sheridan to the Texas border and the Secretary of the Navy drawing up plans to blockade Mexican ports.

Along with Grant taking steps to send General Schofield to Mexico, there to organize an army of Ex-Confederate soldiers and Union veterans.

Strong, loud and not so subtle suggestions from Lincoln, Seward and Congress for the French to leave Mexico, sooner if not faster, had something to do with it.

Rallynow

Actually, Seward guaranteed Napoleon III in late 1865 that the United States wouldn't intervene in Mexico. The same Seward stopped the hiring of Custer by the Mexican Republicans by a monthly stipend of 16,000 dollars to command the Republican army. By January 1866 the situation had been defused. Napoleon didn't start the retreat of the expeditionary corps until 1867, i.e. after the shock of Sadowa.

I don't deny that the US opposition to the French presence in Mexico did help to convince Napoleon III of the advisability of retreating his support to Maximilian. But the decission to do it didn't happen until the Prussians wiped the floor with Austria. Nobody in France expected such a radical turnover of the balance of power in Europe. Napoleon, as proved by the evidences available, panicked. Since August 1866, the French were convinced that they would fight against Prussia in a few years. For a moment, Napoleon feared that the Prussians would attack France while the French troops were still committed to Mexico. Well, if he would have had a better intelligence about his adversaries he would have known that Prussia would only attack when Bismarck and Moltke would think that everything was in its right place!

In a sense, the US pressure served Napoleon as an excuse to pull over the French expeditionary force from Mexico without letting know the Prussians how afraid he was from them. And he was afraid of them, indeed. Even though most of his contemporaries thought that France would do short work of the Prussian army, Napoleon III wasn't so sure. When he finally went to war against Prussia three years after the retreat from Mexico, he did with a sense of foreboding that even infected the commanders of his armies.

Best regards

PS: if interested in the topic, there is a book from Alain Gouttman which is useful to give you the overall picture of the French intervention in Mexico: La guerre du Mexique, 1862-1867. Le mirage américain de Napoléon III.Paris: Ed. Perrin, 2008.

Hi

Declaring yourself "emperor" isn't the same as owing the country of Mexico. The Mexicans didn't quit, and the "adventure" was an adventure because the French could not effect a winning condition.

Might as well say that the US won in Vietnam and Russia won in Afganistan because in both cases the powers involved were in place, decided who was in theory the president for a couple years.

Ultitmately neither could hold/control OWN the country.

You still have not addressed the thinking behind how the British could not control the american coasts in the American Revolution despite having the ONLY navy, actually owning ports to base them out of, but in the 1860s, needing to supply by sea, owning no ports and facing an actual navy, the brits suddenly become winners.

The french facing no navy, could not afford Mexico which was 1/16th the economic size of the US.

Rocky

Have you addressed the effect of RN action vs US commerce in the 1812 war vs in the War of Independence?
Have you factored in the influence of the French navy in the latter?

Rocky

I'll try to answer your questions one at a time.

First:

Declaring yourself "emperor" isn't the same as owing the country of Mexico. The Mexicans didn't quit, and the "adventure" was an adventure because the French could not effect a winning condition.

If you read my post you will see that I didn't say anything about 'owning' Mexico. What I said is that Mexico was taken by the French, which it was after an early setback at Puebla. If you continue reading you will see that I said that thereafter a combination of international commitments, tiredness for a war without an end in sight, and political pressures, both internal and external, forced Napoleon to quit the Mexican adventure.

In other words, and related to this topic, Mexican adventure is not a good example to compare with a possible intervention of Britain in American Civil War, as Britain's goals wouldn't have been to implement a forced change of government in the US, nor conquer the country, but to support the Confederacy in her bid for independence and, at the same time, to weaken US power in North America.

Strategically speaking the actual French intervention in Mexico can't be compared with the potential British intervention in ACW.

Second:

Might as well say that the US won in Vietnam and Russia won in Afganistan because in both cases the powers involved were in place, decided who was in theory the president for a couple years

If I would dare to say that France 'won' at Mexico, you would be right in your analogy. However, as I didn't I can't see how it's related.

Actually, both in Vietnam and in Afghanistan, from a strict military point of view, Soviets and Americans were defeating their enemies. It was political pressure (Vietnam) and economical chaos (Afghanistan) what forced both USA and USSR to retreat from those countries.

However this is irrelevant for the topic at hand, as Britain wouldn't have been fighting an insurgency: because she wouldn't have intent to conquer America, just to defeat her government and guarantee Southern independence.

As you probably know it's easier to defeat a state than an insurgency.

Third:

You still have not addressed the thinking behind how the British could not control the american coasts in the American Revolution despite having the ONLY navy, actually owning ports to base them out of, but in the 1860s, needing to supply by sea, owning no ports and facing an actual navy, the brits suddenly become winners.

In the American Revolution the British needed to take into the strategic picture the French and Spanish navies -and since 1781, the Dutch navy too-. That left available to send to America just 20 odd ships of the line, in order to blockade the whole Eastern Coast of America. Moreover, they must do it with sailing ships, not with coal ships.

In other words, between 1775-1783 the Royal Navy, far from being dominant, had barely parity with her main enemies: France and Spain; and needed to protect Britain and Gibraltar from invasion.

That situation wouldn't have existed in the 1860s. First of all, the RN had a superiority in numbers that would have allowed her to fight three major power navies at the same time in advantage. But more important, in that time the only potential power with a fleet big enough to be a threat to Britain herself was France, which wasn't interested in warring against her and actually more than willing to join Britain in an intervention against the Federal. And don't forget that in 1860s, the British navy would have counted with more bases than in the 1770s, as Southern ports would have been opened for her. Finally, in the 1860s the RN wasn't as dependant of winds as in 1770s, which gave her a strategic flexibility she hadn't in the American Revolution.

But in the final analysis, the most important of all was what Britain would have intended as her war goals: not conquer America, but defend Canada, open Southern ports, and blockading Northern ports. Those goals were doable, and would have -probably, as in counterfactuals nothing is certain- cost the war to the North.

If without British assistance, Northern victory was a close run thing, imagine how much more difficult it would have been if the South would have been supported by the superpower of the era -even if the support would have been indirect and limited. To start with, the North wouldn't have been able to blockade the South, and some conquests -New Orleans, for example- would have been vulnerable to British-Confederate combined operations.

Victory is not about conquest, but about being able to impose over your oponent as many terms of your agenda as you can. If you can impose more than your enemy can reject, then you have won the war, even if no city of your enemy has been conquered by your troops.

Best regards

Hi

Lucky US that the brits held off then, since you just proved your point!

Lets see, Britain had naval enemies in the AWI and 1812 versus ZERO navy, but in 1860s with compliant eneemies, now semi allies but facing an actual american navy, she sweeps the seas? Hmmm. Let me cast a "disbelief" here.

Then the advantage of coal fired versus sail. The south was a little short of coal. Thus, you are still supplying this superiority by what manner. Correct me if I am wrong, but I believe this issue alone meant that most british station fleets around the world were still using sail/74s.

Then toss in that the confederals could barely feed the army they had, but someone is going to feed, cloth, arm and rearm a british army on the land.

The issue with mexico isn't quite what you saw. This is simpler, despite facing a country 1/16th the size of the union economy, the french could not do the job. Thus, the case of "hostile navy, much larger numbers" and so on doesn't make it a UK walk over as presented above.

I have not bought into the romance of the "lost cause" of the ACW. And I still do not. Your assertion of a "close run thing" is questionable. Until Gettysburg, in short, the north pretty much lost and lost and lost, but the logistics meant they won. It was not a matter of the south losing, but when.

R

Rocky-Perhaps the problem you are having is with your starting point, namely that the defeat of the South was inevitable. If you start instead with the question how could the South have won the war, some of these points look different.

I'm not familiar with any sources discussing coal shortages in the South during the ACW. Perhaps you could provide some cites. Certainly there were coal mines in the South that operated during the war, and if coal was lacking Southern forests could produce the substitute charcoal. As was the case with food and other items the difficulty that the South faced was in getting them where they were needed. The Southern rail network was actually far better in 1861 than it is usually portrayed, but in the years leading up to the ACW the South relied heavily on river and coastal transport. This waterborn traffic was severely affected by the war, and as the South sustained war damage and wore out equipment the Southern rail network lost its ability to make up. With early British intervention the loss of this waterborn traffic might have been far less, and worn out or war destroyed equipment could be replaced from European sources.

Once transport networks are re-opened feeding British forces wouldn't be much of a problem. Overseas sources could be used to supply depots on the Confederate coast until Southern agriculture switched over to foodstuff production (which did happen). As for clothing, arming and re-arming a British expeditionary force I think that would come from the UK, not domestic Confederate sources.

No American navy in 1812. Guess someone should have told the crews of the Constitution and the United States. The Constellation in Norfolk managed to tie up a fair number of British ships without sailing. In 1861 the U.S. was on paper a stronger navy, but in reality…? Steam did alter naval warfare, but to me it is questionable whether that would work in the favor of a blockading navy that could use steam to help it maintain its station or whether it would work in favor of loosely blockaded ships seeking to burst through the blockade and get out in the sea lanes. Certainly Southern blockade runners were able to break through the U.S. blockade, but then again their usual goal was to make it to friendly British or Spanish ports nearby.

To me the greatest question though would be the attitude of the typical northerner. Would they be more willing to fight and devote their financial resources to the war if Birtain was involved or would they be less willing. If the former would they have been willing to continue their sacrifices in the face of setbacks or would they be more willing to let the South go and get it all over with.

Hi Rocky

Lets see, Britain had naval enemies in the AWI and 1812 versus ZERO navy, but in 1860s with compliant eneemies, now semi allies but facing an actual american navy, she sweeps the seas? Hmmm. Let me cast a "disbelief" here.

Why the 'disbelief'? Britain's navy in the 1860s was the biggest and more modern navy in the world. Strategically speaking it was head and shoulders above anybody else. That's not mean to disparage US Navy, but an assessment of the relative strength of both navies.

They had not that advantage in AWI, when the combined force of Spanish and French navies put a great pressure on the British.

And that without mention that the British economy would have been much more hard pressed to meet the demands of the military in 1770s than it would have been in 1860s.

Then the advantage of coal fired versus sail. The south was a little short of coal. Thus, you are still supplying this superiority by what manner. Correct me if I am wrong, but I believe this issue alone meant that most british station fleets around the world were still using sail/74s.

Then toss in that the confederals could barely feed the army they had, but someone is going to feed, cloth, arm and rearm a british army on the land.

The Britih wouldn't have need charcoal stations in the South; they already had them in her Caribbean and Canadian possessions, though more friendly ports wouldn't have hurt them of course.

And as for feeding her troops, I doubt that the British would have send soldiers to the South. What I guess they would have done is to help indirectly, through opening the Southern ports to commerce.

The issue with mexico isn't quite what you saw. This is simpler, despite facing a country 1/16th the size of the union economy, the french could not do the job. Thus, the case of "hostile navy, much larger numbers" and so on doesn't make it a UK walk over as presented above.

Rocky, please tell me, where did I write it would have been a 'walk over'?

This is what I wrote:

But in the final analysis, the most important of all was what Britain would have intended as her war goals: not conquer America, but defend Canada, open Southern ports, and blockading Northern ports. Those goals were doable, and would have -probably, as in counterfactuals nothing is certain- cost the war to the North.

If without British assistance, Northern victory was a close run thing, imagine how much more difficult it would have been if the South would have been supported by the superpower of the era -even if the support would have been indirect and limited. To start with, the North wouldn't have been able to blockade the South, and some conquests -New Orleans, for example- would have been vulnerable to British-Confederate combined operations.

I do believe this is a far cry from calling British intervention a 'walk over', don't you think?

I have not bought into the romance of the "lost cause" of the ACW. And I still do not. Your assertion of a "close run thing" is questionable. Until Gettysburg, in short, the north pretty much lost and lost and lost, but the logistics meant they won. It was not a matter of the south losing, but when.

Neither do I. But when I said it was a close run thing, I did base upon the strength of pro-peace faction in the North, not in the relative military capacities of North and South. Lincoln knew that if the war was transformed from a Civil War into a war for independence -as the South wanted- his administration problems would have multiplied, and the pro-compromise faction would have been strengthened. That' why the Proclamation of Emancipation was such a key document: besides ending the slavery as a legal institution in America, it shut the door at the internationalization of the war. Lincoln did what George III didn't: he contained the conflict and avoided South's recognition as an independent country by the rest of the international community.

Even with then, the pro-peace faction almost won the 1864 presidential elections. The capture of Atlanta by Sherman was instrumental in 1864 Lincoln's victory. That's why I said it was a close run thing.

More importantly, if the British would have supported the South, would have been able the Federals to defeat the Confederates in the years 1862-1863? Would have they counted with the same advantages that they did count in those years? Lee, for instance, wouldn't have needed to worry by Federal sea invasions of Southern ports. At Chancellorsville, for example, Longstreet corps wouldn't have been detached on the coast, watching in case the Federals made a new try against Richmond. Thousands of Southern soldiers would have been available for him, that in the actual timeline were protecting South's Atlantic coast.

Again, this is a counterfactual, so I can't 'prove' anything. It's just an educated guess based on what we know it actually happened, and the relative strengths of the parties involved. Nothing else.

Best regards

Hi

Bill, the point being made is in the other posts. You are correct, in 1812, the US had a half dozen big frigates a and a couple dozen smaller, still could not as a NAVE hold the coat of a Royal Navy force.

Notice how as ship gamers we sometimes fantasize about the almost fight where the Jamaican station fleet manages to intercept, in essence, the entire US navy for a "proper" fleet style fight. ONE station fleet in the Caribbean equals the biggest possible american fleet.

And the British could not take the US out, let alone do all the "closing of ports" and the like that is the base supposition being made about this thread.

The British Navy well exceeds the size and capability of the US navy in 1862. No question, but the disparity is no where as big as 1776 or 1812 when the british did not do the assumed effects of 1862.

As for "close run thing" if we are fantasizing about this, consider that the "peace party" might not have been such if offered "but the Brits are going to recolonize us by joining the south.

I don't fall into the wargamer point of view of "if I was there…" sort of thinking. This is a war that turned on logistics(as did the mexican adventure) and hold that the rest of these "what if's" are fun to think about, but not really serious. The "great man" theory of history is sometimes the issue, but not to my mind in the ACW.

Rocky

"What ifs" are largely for fun, but they are also the keys to understanding the importance certain factors played in the outcome. Logistics certainly played a role in the ultimate success of the U.S. in the ACW. However it is possible that with better leadership the U.S. could have won the war quicker and with less disruption in both the north and south. Likewise it is possible that the U.S. could have lost the war with a little more ineptness or better Confederate leadership at certain key moments. Under either circumstance we wouldn't be talking about the logistic superiority of the U.S. leading to victory, but instead might be talking about masterful strategy akin to Napoleon's first Italian campaign or Caesar's conquest of Gaul.

I do think we both agree on one point though. If the UK had decided to join the war we cannot assume that northern sentiments would have evolved in the same manner as they did. To me this is just one of the unknowables about the entry of the UK into the war.

I don't fall into the wargamer point of view of "if I was there…" sort of thinking. This is a war that turned on logistics(as did the mexican adventure) and hold that the rest of these "what if's" are fun to think about, but not really serious. The "great man" theory of history is sometimes the issue, but not to my mind in the ACW.

Hi Rocky

I am not so certain anymore. Once I stronged believed that some results were almost pre-ordained, no matter what the participants decided. Actually, in some debates when I was in college I used ACW as an example of implausability of any result other than a Northern victory.

Now I am more wary about it. Not as much because I have bought the whole 'great man' theory as I have became to appreciate the importance of contingency in history. That's why I have become to be less critical of counterfactuals as intellectual exercices (there is a book by Jeremy Black What If? which deals with the usefulness of counterfactuals in academic studies). Curiously, there were plenty of contingencies in ACW, that shaped how the war was fought, with an European powers intervention being one of the most evident.

Why is so interesting? In my opinion, because it let us understand certain decissions taken (or not taken) by those in charges of responsability, that DID shape the events.

Of course, it's not a perfect tool. There are too many variables -again, contingency-. But it allow us to understand how those might-be shaped actual Northern decission making processes. The possibility of a British and French intervention in the war -even the possibility of British and French recognition of South's independence- did influence Lincoln's administration decissions up to 1863. It was a contingency -a possibility- that acted upon real world decissions.

The same contingency also played a key part in the decission of Southern firebrands to push for unilateral independence declarations: they convinced themselves that King Cotton would force Britain and France to enter the war in the side of the Confederacy. More importantly, that conviction actually acted upon strategic decissions taken by the major players. Lee's invasions of Maryland in 1862 and Pennsylvania in 1863 were based on the assumption that a major Southern victory in the North would convince international community to recognize Southern independence (somehow I am under the impression that Lee wanted to re-enact the American War of Independence). A might-be created the frame of mind necessary for a real decission. And who knows? It could have worked that way… or not. But what is relevant is that it modelled the actual timeline of the war.

That's not just 'wargaming if I was there'. It is a real tool that historians can use, and will use, to understand the past. Because after all for the actual participants all was contingent before it happened. To know how their minds processed information and made decissions we need to put ourselves in their shoes and 'see' through eyes that acted based upon possible outcomes. Otherwise we would be committing an even greater sin (as historians) than 'if I was there': hindsight.

Best regards.

Hi

Well, to me this is yet a different discussion, the thinking and fears of the participants. I agree that AT THE TIME, some did consider this and it did affect various ideas.

One of the stories we tell ourselves in the US was the need in the American revolution for ONE formal win to convince the French to help us as having a chance. And I concede that this lead to thinking in the US in the south, beyond "king cotton", that if Lee could just pull off one biggie, everyone would realize the validity of the southern cause.

But to me, this is a different discussion that "the UK enters and wins" which started this thread.

Do you remember the poster last year who had the British pulling 100,000 men from India, transporting them to Mexico to march north? The logistics gave me a headache!

As I said, I have done campaigns on "counter earth" where "aliens" grab folks to go conquer a planet for fun, where the players just not worry about history, take their favorite ships and figs and try to conquer the new world. Sort of inspired by the real ideas in the South to move their assets to South America.

But I would never argue that the idea was anything more than just for gaming.

Rocky

Do you remember the poster last year who had the British pulling 100,000 men from India, transporting them to Mexico to march north? The logistics gave me a headache!

No, I do not, but I see your point.

But to me, this is a different discussion that "the UK enters and wins" which started this thread.

Well, I actually understood the discussion more in the way of "UK enters the war and the South probably wins her independence". Maybe that's why we have been disagreeing: we had different frames of reference, relative to the original question.

Best regards

I doubt you'd remember as it was probably me, and that is not what I said. I said planning was for a Corps of 15-30,000 to operate against California, landing at SF after that was secured earlier by a naval attack followed by a Marine landing. Rocky is strawmanning.

Hi

No, actually, the discussion involved using hindi troops as they would be used to the heat and such of Mexico for the long march. I don't remember the "seizing california" idea.

In that discussion, It became clear to me that the poster didn't realize what the distances involved were like, let alone the problems with things like water. I lived down on the border in an old mission town as a lad, and found the suggestion silly.

I am not, 67th, trying to "win" anything in this discussion thus, there is no reason for me to do a straw man argument.

Rocky

Hindi? You sure you don't mean Sikh? All real discussions in the 1860's involved Sikh troops.

Granted, the British simply can't land 100,000 Indians of any type anywhere in the 1860's. There just aren't that many spare. Let alone Mexico and marching which is an odd notion.

Can you find the post?

What would be the point of having a Navy and using it to land guys 1000 miles from where they're any use?

Hi

I don't have these fantasies, so I don't always get the point about these things!

What I mentioned earlier in the thread is that there seems to be an odd bias about the US that every war involving the US was either a huge crime and involved the US losing if only some commander in the day had been a modern wargamer who KNOWS these things.

There is a movement in wargameing that I first remember seeing with an Avalon Hill Game which had on the box "can you re-write history?".

I think some things are just inevitable movements of history rather than pivoting on the significant event or person. Not always, but commonly.

Rocky

I think some things are just inevitable movements of history rather than pivoting on the significant event or person. Not always, but commonly.

Rocky

Could you provide some examples? It's not a question with second intents; just curious.

Best regards

Hi

It is one I mentioned a few weeks ago about the American Revolution. The short version is that the "French and Indian War"(there were actually several, but we are talking about the 1757 events) "invented" america.

While we obsess with King George or something, or as americans, the rise of George Washington, the facts are sort of this. In Europe "nations" were semi aribtrary constructs, and the "nation state" did not follow, as we now think of it, language, culture and politics. In the Americas, there were a bunch of people with actual governments and cultures that might be french, Spanish(and Italian), Dutch, tribals and so on. Initially, in the period prior to the French and Indian war, there were various colonies and tribes and so on. When the king of England found himself "owning" much of north america, he had an extended group of people who did not see themselves as subjects of the british crown.

Even better, the king himself did not say "my loyal dutch subjects" et al, he said "those Americans". The mindset was in place in the Americas that was distinct and growing. Thus, when the king made an arbitrary line on a map saying "no British past this line" it was irrelevant to everyone involved. The folks of African and European extraction were already beyond the line, didn't consider, actually, that the king was in charge, the native americans did not have a concept of "this be indian land" and so on. In Europe, perhaps, such a line could have an effect and the decision of a king meant something.

In the "Americas" people were moving. AND starting to self describe as "Americans".

This is sort of related to posts where someone "corrects" us for calling "Americans" when someone from Bolivia is also an "American". In fact, the political line drawn doesn't affect the mindset of the participants.

Thus, the American Revolution through the war of 1812 isn't a matter of politics and people. but just a movement of people.

R

Thus, the American Revolution through the war of 1812 isn't a matter of politics and people. but just a movement of people.

I partially agree with you. But what you consider as opposites, i.e. movements of population vs politics and people, are actually complementaries. The expansion beyond Alleghenys, for instance, was due as much to individual initiatives of new colonists as to the particular interests of power groups of land speculators in Virginia and Pennsylvania. In other words, a movement of peoples was induced by individual decissions of individual persons that wanted to make a profit of the victory over the French in the FIW, which opened the Ohio to British colonists.

The victory over France and her Iroquois allies wasn't pre-ordained. It could have turned over the other way. Actually, in the peace negotations that ended the Seven Years War some individuals in the British government (Bute, for one, until he was replaced by Grenville as PM) were inclined to return Canada to France, in exchange for French possessions in the Caribbean. It could have gone that way, and then we would be discussing another timeline, perhaps in French?

So, yes, you are right, but also mistaken. Individual decissions are as relevant in human events as the structural forces that shaped the history of mankind. In other words, how individuals react to uncontrollable forces is what shapes history.

Best regards

There was a sizeable British base at Bermuda, coal was available there in vast quantities and was used by Confederate blockade runners. The caribean bases and those in Canada would have supported the RN in the atlantic. The opening of the confederate ports would have meant that those places could hae been used for resupply by the RN. In any case, in the age of auxiliary sail, blockading could be done with minimal coal useage.

"You still have not addressed the thinking behind how the British could not control the american coasts in the American Revolution despite having the ONLY navy, actually owning ports to base them out of, but in the 1860s, needing to supply by sea, owning no ports and facing an actual navy, the brits suddenly become winners."
I've answered this argument several times, and again above. But, in the 1780's the French Navy completely dominated the Atlantic, which meant that the RN couldn't re-supply British troops or blockade the US. The RN in the 1860's was so far superior to that of the USN that the USN would have been forced to stay in port to survive. The blockade of the Confederacy would have been ended, and the RN could have used Confederate ports. British colliers could have freely supplied the RN ships and bases, like they did in the rest of the world, and the US economy would have collapsed. The Confederacy would have been able to win through it's own efforts, with British Naval support and French neutrality.
I can't see any kind of scenario where the UK are likely to be trying to defeat the US themselves. Britain's North American concern was that of 1812, keeping Canada free of US landgrabbing.

Hi

Basil, the issue isn't individuals/movement, but the historical argument about the "significant individual" versus "movement". In the F&I, for instance, no individual is important enough that his death/replacement/absence would change things.

I can argue, in contrast, that much of the Napoleonic period is Napoleon and his absence would change history. I can also argue that the "7 Years War" part, the significant individual is not the Prussian, but the King of England and his obsession with protecting his Home town.

But in the americas, whatever the individuals in charge decide are, at best, playing "catch up" to the movements of the people who lived there.

When I was in Catholic School, the nuns made a similar argument about french/catholic america, but I don't think it really matters. Part of the issue was that a swap of Canada for the islands wouldn't actually change either the english speakers, the indians or anyone else. And this discussion always ignores the aspect that WE see English versus French, but the people on the ground didn't actually either see themselves as one or the other, which is the point. You have folks supposedly subjects of Spain speaking a number of languages, the establishment in California of the missions is contemporary with the American Revolution, and english speaking "americans" were soon moving there ignoring the rules.

Rocky

Hi

Chouan, I understand the British assets. YOU miss the point. The point is this:in 1776 to 1814, the British had an overwhelming naval superiority. And could not shut down the coasts of america. And the argument is that with actual opposition in the form of a second rate navy, suddenly, the British win in a walk.

THAT doesn't work. You have not made the case.

Rocky

Hi, Rocky

I do understand your argument, don't believe I do not. And it's a strong one. However I don't abide by the idea 'significant individual' vs 'structural'. I believe that's an artificial opossition. My perspective about history is more in the line of sinergies between necessity (i.e. structural trends) and contingency (i.e., individuals or significant events). Both are in constant dialogue-confrontation, if you know what I mean.

For instance, your statement:

"But in the americas, whatever the individuals in charge decide are, at best, playing "catch up" to the movements of the people who lived there"

it's only partially true. The Scotch-Irish inmigrants that settled the backcountry in the Carolinas didn't go to the wildest parts of the country by some structural necessity, but because the decissions taken by the propietary class in the Low Country to deny them the chance of acquiring lands there. In this case, therefore, the structural movement of settlers was directly provoked by individual choices of retaining big tracts of land to be exploited by slaved workforce.

In the French & Indian war, the conquest of Canada wasn't a necessary outcome. The British had the upper hand, no question, but it took a good amount of chance, opportunity, pluck and not a small quantity of luck to conquer it.

Or take the American Revolution itself. I don't doubt that the present US would have severed their links with Britain sooner or later, but the form that the independence took (i.e. a revolutionary war) was a by-product of individual decissions taken by the British government and the colonists themselves. Again contingency had a key role on how the structural tensions in the relationship between the colonies and the Crown were resolved. The war itself could have gone in several other ways than it did: from an early destruction surrender of the Colonists, to a division of the country according the rule of uti possidetis, up to the actual outcome of total independence from Britain, or an independence of the Thirteen Colonies plus Canada.

Best regards

"Chouan, I understand the British assets. YOU miss the point. The point is this:in 1776 to 1814, the British had an overwhelming naval superiority. And could not shut down the coasts of america. And the argument is that with actual opposition in the form of a second rate navy, suddenly, the British win in a walk.

THAT doesn't work. You have not made the case."

You keep missing the point. Between 1776 and 1814 the RN did NOT have an overwhelming naval superiority. I've made this point repeatedly. During the American War of Independence, for the only time since the Dutch Wars, the RN was overshadowed by the French Navy. The Marine Royale at this point was bigger than the RN and completely dominated the Atlantic, and even the Channel. They won several battles, most notably at the Chesapeake, which meant that British troops in America were unable to be reinforced or re-supplied, which led directly to America's victory. In 1812-4, Britain's Navy may well have been the largest, but it was at full stretch to contain the French Navy, which meant that it simply didn't have the ships to carry out an effective blockade of continental Europe AND the US. Hence US privateers could effectively sail at will. Also the RN's ships were fast wearing out with constant blockade and convoy duty.
In our scenario, however, Britain could use the bulk of its Naval assets against the US, and with only a limited number of ports in the US to blockade, ie only from the Chesapeake to the Canadian border, then a blockade would be relatively easy, especially with places like Savannah and Wilmington as bases from which the RN could re-supply. In our scenario, France is at worst a neutral, and potentially an ally, so where is the threat from elsewhere to degrade the RN's efforts against the USN?

Hi

Basil, I don't see the american revolution as a close run thing. Again, the mindset of the king, the mindset of the colonists was such that there was no winning condition. In fact, as we have chatted, the Brits win and win and win every time formal battle happens. But there was no winning condition.

I think in some cases you are quibbling with definitions. That is, that the class of wealthy owners precluded new land ownership on the coasts driving interior movement is sort of my point. It was not the significant choice of the king drawing a line on a map, or anyone else. Similarly, the elites as a group is not an individual on the order of, say, Napoleon changing history.

Which is my point.

As my interests are wider than just the british colonies: I would note that in the modern Southwest, the Spanish Crown had drawn lines on a map and assigned land ownership under patent to the Hidaldgo class, but it did not matter to the indians, the converted indians, the white guys moving into the area. It was not an individual that changed history. In this case, the closest we have to a "significant individual" is Father Junopera Sera establishing some missions on the coast and "el camino real". But this is, by historical standards, late in the game being coincident with the American Revolution. This means that California as a place, besides being disputed by the Russians, French and English, is soon seeing "americans" walking in for their own purposes in a generation or two.

The Spanish on the ground make a lot of decisions to exclude unlicensed people and control things like the indian towns and the Santa Fe Trail, but it is the facts on the ground that define the history, not the individuals and their thinking.

Rocky

Hi

Chouan…I see what you are saying, but in essence, you have "cheated". The thread "what if" is the british support the confederacy.

Not, "the british support the confederacy If, and if and if and if…." I also dispute your assertion that the French outstripped the RN or equaled it anytime in the period of the 7 years war through the Revolution. Rather, it was assumed by everyone at the time that the british ships were capable of fighting opponents 50% stronger in rating. Doesn't sound like your point being made.

Then, again, there was NO USN, just private boats, in the ACW whatever the way my ship buddies argue the merits of the various boats, and the american penchant for harbor defense, the point made is simple. The Brits have no fewer problems in the world and the US does have a capable navy.

And, like the revolution, the issue is not that the British Navy or Army can win any "fair" fight, but on a strategic level, just what does a winning condition" look like?

Rocky

I can't understand why you don't get it, unless you're just being argumentative for the sake of it.
The War of Independence wasn't just Britain v America. The French, Dutch and Spanish all had Navies. Britain was open to attack and invasion. Whether there was a USN is immaterial.
Given we're playing 'what if' we need to consider why and how Britain would intervene in an internal squabble in America. I'd suggest that that 'if' wouldn't occur if Britain was in a situation at all similar to 1776-83. They wouldn't send troops and ships to America in the face of European hostility.
So, you have to assume acquiescence, or even support, on the part of the European powers, or it's just not happening.
Assuming that acquiescence, or support, opens up possibilities. One possibility is throwing overwhelming naval force into the conflict.

The only country which was seen as a threat by the UK in the 1860's was France, and to a lesser extent the Russian Empire. However, the scenario postulated has France and Britain as allies of the CSA. Which means that France isn't a threat. Thr Russian Navy in the 1860's, whilst not negligible, wasn't a major force, and certainly wasn't seen as a threat by the UK. Russia's expansionism in Asia was, but that was on land, not on sea. So there is no Naval power that the UK would be concerned with in the 1860's.

chouan
IMHO…if the British got into the war, most of the scenarios then have France and other major actively helping the Brits. Which means the South wins. Therefore it is pretty much a waste of time talking about them.

so i would think it would be more interesting to talk about at least the Brits having to worry about france/europe. or russians in india.

Hi

Simbiotic, I get your point, you miss mine!

The thread did not say "what if everyone cooperated with the British joining the south", but the simple "if the UK moves, the US is DOOMED.

I agree, if and if and if a lot of cats get herded without any other consideration into going with the Brits in Joining the south, the point would be made.

I was pointing out that this was presented as "UK versus…"

Which is MY point. The british have too much on their plate, as much as they did during the revolution AND the added problem of actually facing a real american navy which did not exist.

I don't see a blockade and conquest of the US being impossible against NO NAVY, getting easier in 1860 let alone possible.

Remember, in the 1776 period, the British had a SOL/station fleet in Canada AND one in Jamaca either capable of overwhelming any naval US assets. By 1860, the RN is big, but has logistics AND an american Navy as well. The Station Fleets are no longer capable of alone overwhelming any American naval asset, thus, it is not easier even with stacit cooperation.

Rocky

But also remember, for the final time, that in the 1776-1782 period the French, Dutch and Spanish Navies all had bases in the Caribbean as well, and the French Navy, alone, was bigger than the RN at this time.

Hi

I got that, though I still don't see the point. Those powers still had navies, and even earlier the french usually had more ships, bigger ships than the british. Who, regularly spanked them all together or separately.

Isn't that the story line with, say Nelson?

The disconnect is that you see these factors in the 19th century, but cannot fathom that it doesn't get better when the US has an actual navy with some ironclads.

Rocky

No one is doubting that the Federal navy is better in the 1860s than in the 1770s or 1810s, but as has been pointed out numerous times the factors that prevented the RN from deploying its full strength against the US in the two early wars are not there in the 1860s. So yes the RN would have had a stronger US navy to crack but she would have been cracking it one much much bigger hammer.
With CSA ports open to the Royal Navy the naval war is no contest, regardless of whether Britain and/or France commit troops in Virginia or anywhere else.

If your suggestion is that in a 'what if' situation Great Britain in the 1860s had a naval contender that she had to safeguard against then yes she couldn't have the same impact on the ACW, but the only real contender was France and Britain and France were buddies throughout the 1860s.

No, you're still not getting it.
Before 1781, Britain doesn't have naval superiority. After 1815, Britain has naval supremacy.

This cow is Very Small.

That cow is Very Far Away.

Even with naval supremacy, Britain, HAVING LEARNT THE LESSONS OF THE PAST, isn't going to take on America just for the hell of it.

BECAUSE THEY'RE NOT STUPID.

So British intervention requires a better motivation than 'because we can. We did it before and, well, it didn't work out too good, but what the hell?'