"Wasteful French skirmishing?" Topic

There seemed to have a been a good amount of discussion among Austrian and Russian military leaders about what was enough skirmishing and what was too much, and specifically "too much" in that it yeilded excess casualties.

Also, we are often given the impression from modern writers that the French were quite good at skirmishing (better than all other nations save possibly the British), often with all sorts of bombastic cheerleading and myth-spinning.

But maybe these good results stemmed from a difference in tactics and doctrine that rested not so much on "national characteristics" or "élan" or "skill" or some such. Maybe the difference was that the French just accepted much higher skirmishing casualties than their continental opponents – the very thing that bothered some of the commanders of their opponents' armies.

It is hard to know, since the French did not even identify soldier battle casualties per se. But they did record officer battle casualties, and therefore comparisons are perhaps possible …..

Light infantry casualties from the actions of 5-9 September 1812 (N.S.)

Comments
- The three battles at Shevardino, Borodino and Mozhaysk are grouped because the Russians treat them together and report their casualties accordingly. Borodino accounts for the overwhelming share of the casualties.
- The total number of light infantry companies were 204 for the French Empire and 195 for the Russians. But since the French guard did not fight, it is likely best to separate their casualties.
- We do not have battle casualty figures for the French soldiers, as these do not seem to have been a matter of interest to the French staff. An approximation of French soldier casualties could be made by comparing "états" of different dates, but this process is fraught with error and does not explicitly identify battle casualties. Since it is likely that the ratio of officer to soldier casualties was similar for both sides, using the officer casualties should be sufficient for a comparison.
- The French and Russian infantry companies were of similar size and had a similar number of officers.
- The French offcier casualties are from the Martinien, and so may exclude wounds that were not treated by the French medical staff. Similarly, the Russian casualties do not include concussed or lightly wounded officers. Thus the casualty reporting rates should be roughly similar, although it is quite possible that the French lists are more complete. The Russian casualties can be found (by name) here : xxc.ru/walls/w11.htm
- It can be noted that (i) the French Imperial troops were operationally on the advance and hence their light infantry was perhaps more often exposed, and (ii) the overall casualties for the Russians were somewhat higher than for the French. Since these last two considerations would act in opposite directions on comparative casualty rates, perhaps the net effect is not significant.
- Looking at overall average casualty rates, across the whole battlespace, blurs the distinction between "committed" and "reserve" units. Although the decision to commit light infantry or hold it in reserve can be doctrinally driven (or even politically driven in the case of the French guard!), the officer casualty data is given below by regiment so that other members can re-cast the comparison for some selection of regiments or physical sectors of the battlespace.

Conclusions (excluding the non-fighting French guard)
- The casualty rates for killed light infantry officers are 0.12 per company for the Russians and 0.24 per company for the French Empire. The casualty rates for wounded light infantry officers are 0.24 per company for the Russians and 0.96 per company for the French Empire.
- The ratio of wounded to killed officers was 2:1 for the Russians and nearly 4:1 for the French Empire, perhaps reflecting (i) under-reporting of lightly wounded Russian officers, and/or (ii) better medical care for the French Empire officers.
- Even if we double the number of wounded Russian officers to allow for under-reporting, it appears that the French Empire light infantry officers suffered roughly twice the casualty rate of the Russians.

Discussion
- Is it possible that the battlefield doctrine and tactics of the French light infantry, derived as it was from Revolutionary experiences, was wasteful of the lives of the men in comparison Russian practices which were more influenced by the jäger tactics of the German-speaking nations?
- Is this more ruthless use of the men's lives a possible explanation for the much-vaunted results of the French light infantry?
- Was this a useful, if pitiless, doctrine – or was it un-usefully wasteful?

===========================================

Russian Officer Casualties (dead/wounded)
Leyb-Gv. Egerskiy / 5-y korpus : 12 roty : 8/15
Leyb-Gv. Finlyandskiy / 5-y korpus : 12 roty : nil
1-y egerskiy / 4-y korpus : 9 roty : 2/0
4-y egerskiy / 2-y korpus : 9 roty : 0/10
5-y egerskiy / 7-y korpus : 9 roty : 0/8
6-y egerskiy / 7-y korpus : 9 roty : 2/0
11-y egerskiy / 6-y korpus : 9 roty : 3/5
18-y egerskiy / 4-y korpus : 9 roty : nil
19-y egerskiy / 6-y korpus : 9 roty : 2/0
20-y egerskiy / 3-y korpus : 9 roty : nil
21-y egerskiy / 3-y korpus : 9 roty : nil
30-y egerskiy / 2-y korpus : 9 roty : nil
33-y egerskiy / 4-y korpus : 9 roty : 0/3
34-y egerskiy / 2-y korpus : 9 roty : nil
36-y egerskiy / 6-y korpus : 9 roty : 1/0
40-y egerskiy / 6-y korpus : 9 roty : nil
41-y egerskiy / 7-y korpus : 9 roty : nil
42-y egerskiy / 7-y korpus : 9 roty : 4/5
48-y egerskiy / 2-y korpus : 9 roty : nil
49-y egerskiy / 8-y korpus : 9 roty : 1/0
50-y egerskiy / 8-y korpus : 9 roty : nil
195 roty : 23/46 -- average per rota : .12/.24

===========================================

French/Allied Officer Casualties (dead/wounded)
-- 7e légère / 1er corps : 30 compagnies : 8/17
-- 8e légère / 4e corps : 12 compagnies : nil
-- 13e légère / 1er corps : 30 compagnies : 7/20
-- 15e légère / 1er corps : 30 compagnies : 15/49
-- 18e légère / 4e corps : 12 compagnies : 0/3
-- 24e légère / 3e corps : 12 compagnies : 8/8
-- westfälische Jäger-korps / 8e corps : 30 Kompanien : 0/32
156 compangnies : 38/149 -- average per compagnie : 0.24/0.96

French Guard Officer Casualties (non-fighting) (dead/wounded)
1er chasseurs à pied / vielle garde : 8 compagnies : nil
2e chasseurs à pied / vielle garde : 8 compagnies : nil
fusiliers-chasseurs / jeune garde : 8 compagnies : nil
1er voltiguers / jeune garde : 8 compagnies : nil
4e voltiguers / jeune garde : 8 compagnies : nil
5e voltiguers / jeune garde : 8 compagnies : 0/1
48 compagnies : 0/1 -- average per compagnie : nil/0.02

===========================================

Wow! Full power to the forward shields NOW Mr Spock! This'll be good.

As I said, you can re-cast the data many ways.

These guys fought each other, right ? …..

Raevskiy's jägers
-- 5-y egerskiy : 9 roty : 0/8

-- 41-y egerskiy : 9 roty : nil
-- 6-y egerskiy : 9 roty : 2/0


-- 42-y egerskiy : 9 roty : 4/5
Total 36 companies : 6 dead and 13 wounded officers

Davout's légère
-- 7e légère : 30 compagnies : 8/17
-- 13e légère : 30 compagnies : 7/20
-- 15e légère : 30 compagnies : 15/49
Total 90 companies : 30 dead and 86 wounded officers

I hope the members find the topic interesting.

Were there any differences between the French and Russians in terms of numbers of officer per company? Having more officers present would be expected to make for relatively more wounded or killed officers.

Also, did they define 'officers' in the same way, or was one definition wider than the other? A broader definition would tend to make for a higher number of officers.

Does really matter if the French skirmishers suffered more casualties than their counterparts?

Skeptic ….

Same officers per company :
maior, kapitan or shtabs-kapitan + poruchik + podporuchik for Russians
capitaine + lieutenant + sous-lieutenant for French ligne.
French garde had 4 : capitaine + lieutenant en 1er + 2 x lieutenant en 2e – but they are non-fighting.

Neither officially had battalion-level officers.

At the regimental level, for Russians add shef (a general officer, sometimes called away to a higher command), polkovnik (colonel – usually commanded a battalion), podpolkovnik (lieutenant colonel – usually called away with the 2nd or depot battalion) and another maior (usually commanded a battalion), 2 adjudants (one with the shef, one with the colonel) and two staff lieutenants. Their cadets (1 per company) counted socially and functionally more or less like officers, but not officially and so are not included in the casualty numbers presented here.

For the French regiment we have the colonel (usually commanding 3 battalions out of 5 in the larger 5 battalion regiments), a major (usually at the depot), a major en 2e in the larger 5 bataillon regiments (where he would command 2 battalions), a chef de bataillon per bataillon (2 or 5 for the regiments listed – each commanding a battalion), an equal number of adjudants (each assisting a chef de bataillon) and usually two staff lieutenants. Their regimental doctors counted socially more or less as officers, but are not included in the casualty numbers presented here. Their adjudant sous-officers (one per bataillon) counted socially and functionally more or less like officers, but not officially and so are not included in the casualty numbers here.

So really much the same thing.

=========================

whill4 ….

Does really matter if the French skirmishers suffered more casualties than their counterparts?

I don't know. I posed the question for discussion.

Does your favorite rules give some plus up for French in skirmishing due to "national characteristics" or "skill"? What if it is just that the French were, well …. just more wasteful ….. took great casualties and just threw more men at the problem? That would matter in a campaign game for sure.

But even in a single-battle game, it might change victory points or conditions. Also, maybe you take away the French plus up for skill and give them more "endurance" or "morale" or reduce the communicability of bad morale, panic or routs to simulate a "first bunch are chopped up, let's throw in another battalion" method.

Anyway, I thought the officer casualty rates were interesting and so shared them on the "History" channel here.

Skeptic ….

I should try to be more comprehensible. Perhaps this attempt will easier to understand (and all in English even).

I am about 95% sure that this would be the correct full-strength officer allocation in a Russian regiment of 1812. There had been a recent reorganization and local variations, absences, postings to higher staffs and commands, etc. would cause the actual organization to differ. But I think this correct.
The company command was the first-listed officer, the cadet-ensign (NCO) and a sergeant-major (NCO, of course).
The companies were composed of 2 platoons – the first commanded by the lieutenant, the second commanded by the sub-lieutenant.
The staff captain rank was junior to the captain. The reason for them, originally, was that the 4 highest staff officers each "had" a company (this in the past was a somewhat proprietary "having", as in they got revenues from "their" companies), which they could not actually command since they were actually commanding the regiment and its three battalions. Hence there was a need for four "staff" captains to actually lead the four companies of the 4 highest "staff" officers. In makes just slightly more sense in Russian, but not much more.

regiment : "shef" (general officer commanding the 1st and 3rd battalions serving together on campaign) + adjudant
- supplies lieutenent
- lieutenant treasurer
- infirmary supervisor (NCO, non-combatant)

1st batallion : senior major + doctor (non-combatant)
- 1. grenadier company : staff captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant, cadet-ensign (NCO)
- 1. jäger company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant, cadet-ensign (NCO)
- 2. jäger company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant, cadet-ensign (NCO)
- 3. jäger company : junior major, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant, cadet-ensign (NCO)

3rd batallion – colonel + adjudant + doctor (non-combatant)
- 3. grenadier company : staff captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant, cadet-ensign (NCO)
- 7. jäger company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant, cadet-ensign (NCO)
- 8. jäger company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant, cadet-ensign (NCO)
- 9. jäger company : major, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant, cadet-ensign (NCO)

2nd (replacement or depot) batallion center companies (used spearately in combined replacement formations) – lieutnant colonel + doctor (non-combatant)
- 4. jäger company : staff captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant, cadet-ensign (NCO)
- 5. jäger company : lieutenant, sub-lieutenant, cadet-ensign (NCO)
- 6. jäger company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant, cadet-ensign (NCO)

2nd battalion grenadier company (used separately in combined grenadier formations)
- 2. grenadier company : major, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant, cadet-ensign (NCO)

4th (recruit) battalion : staff captain (used to move recruits from regional recruit depots to regiments)
- 1. recruit company : corporal
- 2. recruit company : corporal
- 3. recruit company : corporal

==========================================

I am about 98% sure that this would be the correct full-strength officer allocation in a French line light infantry regiment of 1812. The assignment of company numbers in the higher numbered battalions was not consistent, but I think this was what was intended. Also, I am not sure if the depots were supposed to have the full complemnt of junior officers – in fact they had very, very few oficers or men in 1812 and some majors just went out on campaign with the last departures. Lastly, I cannot swear that I have seen the decree or order authorizing elite companies in the newly-raised 6th battalions, but it would be rather unweildy in the field if these were absent. Perhaps they were formed after departing France and before the first major combats.
The company command was the captain and a sergeant-major.
The companies were composed of 2 sections – the first commanded by the lieutenant, the second commanded by the sub-lieutenant.
The company was technically an administrative formation, and there were slight differences in the command structure that might be said to apply on the battlefield. These differences are largely semantic for the line, and more substantive for the French guard.

regiment : colonel
- major en 2e (only included when 5 battalions are serving together)
- supplies lieutenent
- lieutenant treasurer
- doctor

1st battalion : chef de batallion + adjudant captain + adjudant NCO
-- 1. carabinier company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 1. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 4. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 7. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 10. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 1. voltiguer company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant

2nd battalion : chef de batallion + adjudant captain + adjudant NCO
-- 2. carabinier company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 2. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 5. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 8. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 11. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 2. voltiguer company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant

3rd battalion : chef de batallion + adjudant captain + adjudant NCO
-- 3. carabinier company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 3. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 6. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 9. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 12. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 3. voltiguer company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant

4th battalion : chef de batallion + adjudant captain + adjudant NCO
-- 4. carabinier company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 13. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 14. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 15. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 16. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 4. voltiguer company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant

5th (depot) battalion : major
-- 1. depot company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 2. depot company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 3. depot company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 4. depot company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant

6th battalion : chef de batallion + adjudant captain + adjudant NCO
-- 6. carabinier company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 17. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 18. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 19. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 20. chasseur company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant
-- 6. voltiguer company : captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant

For completeness, although non-fighting, I should add the French guard. I can also fix a couple of typos in my first post.
The guard was composed of 4 rather over-sized administrative companies per battalion, but formed and fought in 8 "pelotons" or platoons. Actually, the line also fought in "pelotons", but there were 6 in a line battalion, exactly the same as the number of companies. I say "over-sized" not only becasue the guard had a 20% larger company establishment, but also because they were much more likley to be able to field companies nearer to established strengths.
A guard adjudant NCO, while technically non-commissioned, actually ranked with the army lieutenants, and would be commisioned upon his retirement if he had not been promoted during his active service.
There was a command echelon above the regiment that was unique to the French guard, in this case the "corps de chasseurs de la garde". This echelon would span all French guard light infantry. A portion of this echelon would take the field during campaigns, filling out the brigade and divisional staffs for the guard units.
The French guard as a whole also had its own general staff, of course.

corps de chasseurs – colonel-commandant (division general)
- colonel en 2e (division general)
- 3 adjudant generals (brigade generals)
- aides-de-camp, logistics and recruit depot officers

regiment – major-commandant or major-colonel
- captain treasurer
- clothing lieutenant
- food lieutenant
- 2 eagle bearer 2nd lieutenants (1 in Young Guard regiments)

1st battalion : chef de batallion + adjudant captain + adjudant NCO + doctor
-- 1. chasseur platoon : captain, 2nd lieutenant
-- 2. chasseur platoon : 1st lieutenant, 2nd lieutenant
-- 3. chasseur platoon : captain, 2nd lieutenant
-- 4. chasseur platoon : 1st lieutenant, 2nd lieutenant
-- 5. chasseur platoon : captain, 2nd lieutenant
-- 6. chasseur platoon : 1st lieutenant, 2nd lieutenant
-- 7. chasseur platoon : captain, 2nd lieutenant
-- 8. chasseur platoon : 1st lieutenant, 2nd lieutenant

2nd battalion : chef de batallion + adjudant captain + adjudant NCO + doctor
-- 1. chasseur platoon : captain, 2nd lieutenant
-- 2. chasseur platoon : 1st lieutenant, 2nd lieutenant
-- 3. chasseur platoon : captain, 2nd lieutenant
-- 4. chasseur platoon : 1st lieutenant, 2nd lieutenant
-- 5. chasseur platoon : captain, 2nd lieutenant
-- 6. chasseur platoon : 1st lieutenant, 2nd lieutenant
-- 7. chasseur platoon : captain, 2nd lieutenant
-- 8. chasseur platoon : 1st lieutenant, 2nd lieutenant

You have to be very careful with any statistical analysis. There is a very old, and very sage, statement on statistics: 'There are lies, damned lies, and then statistics.' I would caution you to heed that old saying in any statistical 'study.'

What you've done here, however, is merely to assemble some data, with little or no analysis relating to the fighting referred to, and come to a conclusion that is not only irrelevant, but is actually nonsense.

What are you trying to prove? That the Russian army was superior to the French? That the French lost too many officers? French officers were required to lead from the front. French general officer casualties compared to those of other nations were also much higher. Does that mean something else besides they led in person? I don't think so.

This thread could mean something if you actually were doing it properly, but as it is, it's meaningless.

K

@justonemore: Thanks! Note that French 'élan' would imply a greater willingness to come to grips (and accept casualties).

Likewise, leading from the front would entail proportionally more officer casualties, which is why accurate numbers on overall casualties (officers plus enlisted) would be expected to provide more comparable data.

Here are some more factors to control for. Were all of the light companies engaged during the battle, and were the French and Russian light companies both engaged to the same extent? Did the same proportions of both sides' light companies actually skirmish during the battles, or might one side's light companies have tended to have fought formed-up instead?

Also, the three battles are, IIRC, all cases where the French were the attackers, and were, IIRC, nominally the victors. As attackers, they might have been expected to have incurred relatively more casualties. As the victors, they would have captured the battlefield, and been in a better position to accurately record their own casualties.

@10th Marines: Actually, he's off to a good start in terms of exploratory data analysis. However, you do have a point in that his hypothesis is not all that clearly-stated, and that several other factors are not yet controlled-for.

Also, did French light infantry actually skirmish MORE than the line. As Ive understood it the French Lights were more of a supurior line troop. Both light and line would deploy lots of Voltiguers right?

So the high casualties might mean the French light troops could withstand higher punishment on average, due to the high morale ect but not equate with their skirmish ability.

Of course I might be wrong, Im far from an expert regarding the French.

Hi all,

A silly question first – does 'roty' mean company? If so, why does each line Eger regiment have 9? I thought there were 4 Coy per Bn in 2x Bn per Rgt?

Just out of interest I've added the total casualties for NCOs, rank and file and non-combatants from the lists in the back of Nafziger's book. (From previous discussion I'm aware there are some errors in this book, but anyway).

Format justonemore's data – non-officer casualties

Leyb-Gv. Egerskiy / 5-y korpus : 12 roty : 8/15 – 693
Leyb-Gv. Finlyandskiy / 5-y korpus : 12 roty : nil – 454
1-y egerskiy / 4-y korpus : 9 roty : 2/0 – 463
3-y egerski???????? – 270
4-y egerskiy / 2-y korpus : 9 roty : 0/10 – 290
5-y egerskiy / 7-y korpus : 9 roty : 0/8 – 659
6-y egerskiy / 7-y korpus : 9 roty : 2/0 – 810
11-y egerskiy / 6-y korpus : 9 roty : 3/5 – 148
18-y egerskiy / 4-y korpus : 9 roty : nil – 267
19-y egerskiy / 6-y korpus : 9 roty : 2/0 – 274
20-y egerskiy / 3-y korpus : 9 roty : nil – 206
21-y egerskiy / 3-y korpus : 9 roty : nil – 99
30-y egerskiy / 2-y korpus : 9 roty : nil
33-y egerskiy / 4-y korpus : 9 roty : 0/3 – 30
34-y egerskiy / 2-y korpus : 9 roty : nil – 283
36-y egerskiy / 6-y korpus : 9 roty : 1/0 – 174
40-y egerskiy / 6-y korpus : 9 roty : nil – 306
41-y egerskiy / 7-y korpus : 9 roty : nil – 481
42-y egerskiy / 7-y korpus : 9 roty : 4/5 – 511
48-y egerskiy / 2-y korpus : 9 roty : nil – 324
49-y egerskiy / 8-y korpus : 9 roty : 1/0 – 239
50-y egerskiy / 8-y korpus : 9 roty : nil – 486

OK, so I guess the 30th Eger might be a typo for the 3rd?

Just from a quick glance at this data there is a rough relationship between officer and non-officer casualties but there's a lot of variability in there! eg 50th Eger officers were lucky, 4th Eger officers not so lucky.

I'm surprised that the French would have a similar number of men per company as the Russians. I'd reckon on the same number of troops per battalion (or slightly fewer on average for French Bns) but the French had 6 companies per Bn whereas the Russians had 4. Knowing that officers tended to survive the rigours of the campaign better than rank and file, maybe there would be a higher proportion of officers in the French light inf?

Also the Russians fought from cover in some parts of the battlefield, the Guard Eger in Borodino, various regiments in the woods. I've heard of 'wolf-pits' in the area of Raevsky's redoubt – were these to break up attacks and/or to provide cover for eger (ie big fox-holes)?

Interesting stuff justonemore, I'm hoping that between everyone we can indeed learn something, but not sure exactly what yet ;-).

This is a very interesting subject.

One observation though is that selecting French Legere regiments is not necessarily a good proxy for the whole corpus of French skirmishers- the Legere regiments at Borodino and many other battles fought very much like the Ligne- ie the bulk of the companies in close order with usually only the Voltiguers out front. The 13th (supporting the first attack on the Raevsky redoubt), the 15th (overunning Semonovskaya) and the 8th (helping fend off Uvarov) definitely fought this way.

Of course many of the Russian Jager Regts fought for at least part of the day in close order (eg the 18th, 19th and 40th Jagers helping the Ufa expel the 30th Ligne from the redoubt and capturing Gen Bonnamy.

It might be better (but more difficult) to compare casualties in the Voltigeur companies of the whole army against equivalent Russian sub-units (?Strelkovy platoons of all units), but even its probably not quite like for like.

Another observation is that I recall ?Eugene of Wurttemberg commenting that at Leipzig, the Russian infantry (although unclear if Jagers) were not as effective in fighting the French and Poles in the villages and gardens. I need to check that ref- but feel sure I remember it correctly.

There are contrary examples though- eg at unit level, 1806 Prussian skirmishers actually did rather well against their French counterparts- and at Altenzaun, the Feldjagerregiment did give the French an absolute masterclass in light infantry fighting.

I think though that the basic contention is worth further exploration and the use of casualty figures can be a very useful technique though most valuable when connected to narrative accounts. Congrats on a thought provoking approach.

Some excellent ideas and comments! Thank you – especially to "Timbo W" for posting the Nafziger data!

Some questions were posed :

"What are you trying to prove?"
Nothing. I thought I saw something in the data and posted it for other members' discussion and comments. I asked a few questions for the other members' opinions. I don't know why this causes you to write "damned lies", "caution", "irrevelevant", "nonsense", "meaningless". That's not very friendly.

"French officers were required to lead from the front."
Exactly the same for Russians, and probaby everyone else. For example, I have provided the 1783 light infantry manual for the Russians and invited you to identify any substantive difference from Davout's 1811 Instructions. I have not seen any response.
link
Do you want more Russian manuals that show where officer's were located during battle? Do you suppose that all non-French officers were hiding or something?

"French general officer casualties compared to those of other nations were also much higher."
Prove it with regard to the Russians in 1812-1814. I don't believe this assertion is generally true of battlefield casualties (i.e., not counting French general officers chopped up by Cossacks or angry locals).

"French 'élan' would imply a greater willingness to come to grips (and accept casualties)"
Well, maybe. Or maybe both sides' men were equally willing to serve and die (think of the reputation for Russians in this regard) and the French tactics and doctrine just chewed up more men. Remember – we don't have French battle casualties for the men (as "Timbo W" posted for the Russians). We know from the états only the counts on given dates, not what happened to them. We have only the officers specified as battle casualties for the French. However, here is a great effort at interpolating some approximate data about the French soldier battle casualties:
link

The French were indeed attackers in all three battles and Russians had overall greater casualties. So maybe these two tendencies have a low net effect on the comparison.

As I stated, the Russian officer casualtis are likely understated : missing light wounds and concussions – these they just assumed would happen and no one really got any "credit" for it. In general Russian record keeping is quite good. Officers were nobles and all more or less "mattered". Soldiers, as ex-serfs, were something not too far from a kind of Imperial property, and needed to be carefully accounted for. Hence we have battle casualties by regiment for all ranks. And the records would have been checked and counter-checked by bureaurats for years – well after they had re-captured the battlefield.
I would not have posted anything on the topic if I could not double the reported Russian officer casualties and still see a significant difference in comparison to the French.

I have never seen company or battalion casualty information for French or Russians, only by regiment (a key administrative unit in both armies).

Russian "companies" is "роты" / "roty". One company is "рот" / "rot". There are also other word endings depending on the grammar of the sentence. Sorry, I have trouble thinking of Russian or French units, etc. in English. We speak Rusfranglais at home, and sometimes my posts get a little mixed language in them. I am sorry.

The listed Russian army jäger regiments formed two 4 company battalions, their 1st and 3rd battalions. But they also each had the grenadier company of their 2nd (depot) battalion on the field, in a combined grenadier formation. Total 9 companies each. The Russian guard fielded all 3 battalions : total 12 companies each.

30-y egerskiy is correct, "3" is the typo. In 1812, 3-y egerskiy served with the Finland corps and then joined the northern wing of the Russian counter-offensive.

Yes, skirmishing was done also by other units beyond French légère and Russian jägers. And yes, these "light infantry" units also fought formed up. Yet on both sides, these units tended to fulfill about the same role – skirmish or lead an attack that involved an advance to contact (either formed or in some kind of open order) or defend woods, buildings, and broken terrain. If we want to control for different missions given to different units, we can re-cast the data with some sub-set of all the regiments. Or maybe these variations average out if you look over all the light infantry units of both sides (except of course the non-fighting French guard).

Thanks again for your very interesting discussion!

Well I'm certainly learning things, but think I am starting off from a lower level than most others.

30th Eger – doh! of course! I'd have spotted that one if I'd checked Alexander's or Gingerich's OBs. Another edit to make in Nafziger…

rot/roty – great I've learned something new.

Oh, one thing I should have made clear – the Nafziger figures include killed, wounded and missing all together.

Ah, I see what you mean about the 9 roty per regiment. In the Nafziger data the casualties (non-officer) are given separately for the Eger regiments themselves and the Combined Grenadiers (which included some Eger). Therefore the two sets of figures might not be directly comparable, but likely differ by only a small amount as the 'Eger within CG formations' should only be 1/9th of the total.

This I guess meshes with seneffe's point that many 'light infantry' on both sides weren't deployed in skirmish order on the day and vice versa. Would be interesting to compare overall figures for the line infantry as well and see if there was a clear difference between light and line.

I was wondering what the concensus is about average strength of a light infantry company on each side? As far as I can make out it would have been lower for the French et al. So would they have had a higher proportion of officers on the day?

Justonemore:

I agree with Skeptic. It is a good place to start. Here are some more things to consider in making any conclusions about the statistics:

1. The combat missions: If the French were attacking/advancing against the Russians, it would be likely that they would take greater casualties. So what were both sides attempting to do?

You wrote:

The French were indeed attackers in all three battles and Russians had overall greater casualties. So maybe these two tendencies have a low net effect on the comparison.

I am not sure I understand why those would have a low net effect? The only way that could be is if the Russian and French skirmish casualties were identical to the overall casualties, and you have said previously that the French light companies took greater casualties. So that can't work that way. Also remember that French legere regiments more often than not led divisional attacks, both as skirmishers and formed.

2. Terrain: would make a difference, if one side were in built-up areas and the other side wasn't.

3. Relative experience: The French light infantry units and the Jagers weren't all monocromatic in experience and ability. For instance, when the Saxon Army invaded Russia in 1812 with Napoleon's forces, one Saxon officer recorded that "The Russian army was not yet that which it became in 1813…They did not understand how to skirmish in open order." This was the inexperienced troops of Genereal Oertel's Russian corps. Weeks later, the Saxons met up with the experienced Russian Army of the Danube, fresh from campaigning in the Balkans. The same Saxon officer noted these were "the excellent Russian Jagers of Sacken's corps. They were as skilled in their movements as they were accurate in their shooting, and they did us great harm with their much superior firearms which were effective at twice out range." [Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon pp. 114-5] Inexperienced troops will suffer more casulaties and inflict less.

4. Using the Officer Casualties and your conclusions:
These can not necessarily be considered equal between the Russians and French, so you can not extrapolate overall loss comparisons of officers unless you have more information. For instance, Oman used Martinien to extrapolate French casualties over all for whole units, officers and enlisted.

He found that the French officer casualties, where enlisted losses were known, averaged .06 of all casualties. For the British it was .04. Now the British and French also had equal numbers of officers, but the French had an average 50% higher casualty rate than the British--.06 over all engagements--even against the Spanish. Why? Oman felt it was the French officer's propensity for leading from the front. However, all manuals of the day as well as the army traditions of the Spanish and British have officers leading from the front… of course, we are talking about skirmishing, not line combat as someone else pointed out. It has also been noted that skirmish officers had a higher casualty rate than in among the formed unit. Different nations placed officers in different places which could also affect casualties.

So, where did Russian officers lead from? What was the average officer loss? When deployed as skirmishers, did the Russians place more officers with the Reserves and supports, or the front line skirmishers? The French had a different set of practices regarding officer placement than the British. That would also impact average officer losses.

5. Weapons: As noted by the Saxons, some Jagers had 'superior weapons' with superior range. That could also have something to do with casualty rates. Some Jager regiments had rifle-armed troops, some did not. That also would have an impact.

You have some raw data that needs to be refined with more information. You still don't have enough to compare apples to apples, let alone Russians to French. ;-j

Bill

I do want to remind all here that I have not formed any firm opinion or "position" on this topic. There is no "agenda", and I am literally just posting the data and some related questions to stimulate your thoughts and ideas, which often strike me as really interesting.

=======================

McLaddie ….

Excellent comments – thank you!

1. French attacking more, so we might suppose more exposed. Russians actually took more casualties, so we might suppose better French fire discipline, concentration of fire, etc. One factor tends to increase French losses. The other tends to increase Russian losses. My thought is that the ratio of French/Russian losses would not be much effected.

Again, this data is only interesting if we see a significant difference with apples to apples compared as near as possible. Anything else, and our inability to get perfect apple compared to perfect apple will mean we can draw no conclusion at all.

2. In the three actions, and especially Borodino, the "front-line" moved quite a bit. I think that each side's light infantry occupied all types of terrain. I don't see any particular difference of terrain effecting French casualties differently then Russians.

3. The French were all very experienced, with the exception perhaps of the Westphalian jägers (I don't know these units well). The 4e and especially the minty-fresh-from-conscription 6e bataillons might not have been too great.

The Russians were a complete mix from the Russian guard down to the 49-y egerskiy and 50-y egerskiy, which were raised only during the mobilization. There were some very well-regarded units (1-y egerskiy, 20-y egerskiy – both with a good number of "legacy" rifles, and purchased Brown Bess muskets in 20-y egerskiy – and the 4 regiments of Raevskiy's corps) and some rather less distinguished. But there is no great pattern – 49-y egerskiy turned out to be a really good regiment, for example.
If we have to say overall, I would give the advantage of experience to the French light infantry.

4. Placement of officers in the open order formations was really similar. I linked the Russian 1783 era jäger manual. It was never supplanted and reads much like Davout's 1811 instructions. There are a few additional, rather fussy looking, evolutions, but the core doctrine looks quite similar. There are lots of plates, so Russian language is not really needed to get a general idea.

5. Partly rifle armed units would be those with numbers up to 19-y egerskiy. These had been issued rifles to NCO's and 16-ish men per company before the official decision to go with all muskets. 20-y jägers was raised form former militia rifle men and local "police" in Olonets region, and so likely also had a good number of rifles (the Saint-Petersberg arsenals seemed to have had a good supply, opolchenie were even getting them). 21-y egerskiy may have gotten some the same way.
20-y egerskiy and 21-y egerskiy were completed with purchased Brown Bess muskets. There may have been a few Baker rifles floating around the guard regiments. 5-y egerskiy and 6-y egerskiy had their rifles also, and maybe managed to retain some more than the usual partial issue. Both had been all-rifle at some point near the end of Paul's reign. Regular Russian muskets were used otherwise. I don't know for sure if 49-y egerskiy and 50-y egerskiy had the most recent, and rather nice, Model 1808, but I think they were so armed. One was missing slings or cartridge boxes or something – I forget exactly. I am sure some old pattern muskets were still in use.

Sidenote : the Russians delivered lead and powder to the regimental "non-combatants". Bullets and rounds were made locally. So mixed armament was not such a big problem. In general, the Russian "non-combatants" performed logistical and supply functions that the French did outside of the regiments. Their casualties might be not counted if we are aiming at apples to apples.

Overall, I see no real weapons advantage.
But if someone wants to claim the mixture of weapons used by the Russians was somehow better than the muskets equipping the French …. well …. after "10th Marines" tells you in about 100 posts that you are crazy, I at least won't argue with you.

Bill, I am not sure that a useful comparison can be made with this data. But it is only with good comments such as yours that we can test it out and see if we get anywhere.
Thanks again!

you say here:

I do want to remind all here that I have not formed any firm opinion or "position" on this topic. There is no "agenda", and I am literally just posting the data and some related questions to stimulate your thoughts and ideas, which often strike me as really interesting.

but by the end of your post:

well …. after "10th Marines" tells you in about 100 posts that you are crazy, I at least won't argue with you.

yeah….riiight

I actually thought this might have been a good discussion until you said the above…

Your agenda here is either to alienate a few so that you can establish your own credibility and point of view or anger Kevin into forming a response in order to ambush him? Or is it both? Like I always say, go directly to the last paragrph or two of a persons post to see what they really mean to say…i.e. their agenda

And yes, you can see what my agenda is based on your comments.

Skeptic,

My point is that you can make statistics say anything you want and using them may or may not be a valid tool in any analysis you might want to provide. You have to be careful of any 'statistical analysis' and I would believe that battlefield performance and who did what to whom would be a more valid combat analysis.

K

Shane,

Let's parse what I wrote a little more carefully ….

McLaddie proposd a possible weapons difference that could account for the French losses. He mentioned rifles. Indeed, it is not impossible that rifle armed troops could do more sharpshooting and hence cause a disporportionate number casualties to the enemy, especially to enemy officers. The British actually tried to do this. So his concept was not clearly impossible.

However, the arming of Russians with rifles was spotty, as I outlined. Additionally, their muskets (at least the old pattern ones) were not so great. Also, they did not have a real special focus on sharpshooting compared to the French. So, my conclusion was : no weapons difference.

McLaddie might want to insist that there was a weapons difference, as indeed the Russians did have some rifles and some Brown Bess muskets. He might want to claim even a few Model 1805 Russian jäger rifles could indeed make a great difference. I then supposed that 10th Marines, who has posted many times about French weapon design and manufacture, could/would jump in and explain how the Russians if anything had a weapons disadvantage. I concluded by saying that after such a barrage of information (hyperbolically 100 posts) I would have nothing to add.

In summary, I was saying that I expected that 10th Marines could write about 100 posts explaining that the Russians did not enjoy a weapons advantage that could account for a great difference in casualties. I was saying that he could explain this better than I could. That's 100% non-hostile – to both 10th Marines and to McLaddie.

Also, Shane, mate (you called me "chuvak" – it is like "mate" if you didn't really know), if you go by the last two paragraphs, then go by both of them, OK ? The last paragraph includes "I am not sure that a useful comparison can be made with this data. But it is only with good comments such as yours that we can test it out and see if we get anywhere." That's hardly an ambush.

Tell you what …. if you don't go looking for ambushes that are not there, I promise to label any ambush that I set up : "Ambush Here". I really will. I promise. Deal?

As others have pointed out, there is a nice factoid above in that at Borodino Davout had 2.5 times as many skirmishers but the officers took twice as many casualties.

To know whether this means anything you'd have to calibrate it against other unit types, and the same unit types in other battles, and officers versus ORs (to see if this arises from br sniping).

You'd then have to take some of the qualitative attributes and scale them into the data – advancing yes or no, in cover yes or no, under artillery fire yes or no.

My guess, knowing nothing more than most here about Borodino, is that the French casualties were higher because of artillery. The French artillery was firing ball at long range at men in cover and on slopes. The Russian as firing canister at short range at men standing in the open.

Once that sort of factor is controlled for you might get a more interesting picture.

My point is that you can make statistics say anything you want…

Only if you are sloppy (or sneaky) with your methodology.

…and using them may or may not be a valid tool in any analysis you might want to provide.

Hence the reason for seeking to control for additional factors. If they cannot be adequately controlled-for, then, yes, statistical analysis may not be appropriate.

You have to be careful of any 'statistical analysis' and I would believe that battlefield performance and who did what to whom would be a more valid combat analysis.

See above, and also see the rest of my comments, which already got at other factors to control for.

At least, I tried to make constructive comments…

Would it be possible to identify only the French officer casualties from the Voltigeur companies.
It may have been the case that whole French battalions were deployed in open order to oppose the enemy skirmishers, particularly when in disruptive terrain, but then again it is equally as likely that when advancing across open terrain, only the Voltigeur companies were employed in the skirmish chain, whilst the parent battalions, both line and light, maintained close order – and consequently suffered higher casualties.

npm

OK all,

lets see if I can explain my point on the comparative strengths of the light infantry companies on both sides. This is very much a 'back of a beermat' calculation, but I think it could be informative, particularly if my assumptions are wrong! My head is full of cold, so please forgive my fuzzy reasoning today.

So, typical figures for Borodino (these from Digby Smith)

French etc – 214 Infantry Bn = 82,000 men
Russians – 180 Infantry Bn = 72,000 men

Therefore
French = 383 men per Bn = 64 men per company (for 6 coy Bns)
Russians = 400 men per Bn = 100 men per company

From justonemore's data
French = 156 companies Legere = 9,984 men
Russians = 195 companies Eger = 19,500 men

and as above, company officers were 3 each for both sides.

French = 468, so 21 men per officer
Russians = 585, so 33 men per officer

If you shoot a random Frenchman = 5% chance of being an officer, if a random Russian = 3% chance of being an officer

French officer casualties = 38 killed /149 wounded
Russian officer casualties = 23 killed /46 wounded

So for killed = 38/23 = 1.65 and for officer proportion 5/3 = 1.66 therefore if both sides suffered the same number of casualties then this is exactly the result you would expect.

I'm sure you can see the problem with this! If the French suffered the same lt inf casulaties as the Russians we come back again to double the casualty rate for the French, seeing as they had approx half the men to start with. The total lt inf casualties for the Russians was 7500 (around the 40% often quoted for Borodino). This would equate to 75% casualties for the French – which doesn't seem likely.

OK, where does this get us? I think the only likely conclusion is that the French suffered a higher proportion of officer casualties than the Russians.

Surely every comment on this thread regarding the pitfalls of statistical analysis applies in spades to battlefield analysis done from quotations from a few eye-witnesses and after-action reports?

Regards

Here's another quick piece of math [I apologize in advance for the assumptions – for example, I know not every French battalion would have had a voltigeur company. I'm also assuming that the skirmish chains were maintained, not by entire battalions, but by individual platoons of either French voltigeurs or Russian strelki.

From the figures in Timbo W's post above, French 214 battalions – approximately 214 voltigeur platoons each with 64 combatants – 13,696 voltigeurs total. Assuming 1/3 in the skirmish chain [Davout's practice], that's 4,565 men, which in pairs, each 10 paces apart, would occupy 22,825 paces of frontage.

Russians 180 battalions – approximately 180 strelki platoons each with 50 combatants [1/2 the grenadier or carabiner company from a typical infantry or jager battalion] – 9,000 strelki total. Assuming all these men are in the skirmish chain [no reserves], in pairs, each 5 paces apart, they would occupy 22,500 paces of frontage.

The actual engagement frontage of Borodino was between three and four miles wide, that's between [assuming 30" per pace] 6,336 and 8,448 paces.

So no more that one third of the available skirmish force would have needed to be committed at any one time to the skirmish chain for either side. This allows for attrition, rotation of forces etc. But in all cases, it does suggest that the French had more opportunity to refresh the chain, having a deeper pool of possible reserves. If the French did suffer more casualties in the skirmish chain [doubtful, but possible], the looseness of the formation might have resulted in the targeting of more individual officers, simply because they were more visible. But the whole point to the chain, at least for for those in it, was to avoid getting hit, by finding as much cover as possible – and that didn't have to be a tree, it could equally be the body of a fallen soldier or horse. The reason for the failure of a chain was probably less from loss of men, but more from lack of ammunition. In the French case, using Davout's model, rotating men in and out of the chain was practical, because they had ready reserves. The Russians, potentially had less opportunity to replace losses, because virtually everyone was committed to the chain from any particular battalion, so once they were out of ammo, another unit entirely would need to replace them – and that was asking for trouble. Napoleon was a great believer in the power of reserves, and it would seem that a looser chain with more recourse to a pool of immediate reserves, would be more successful than a denser chain with fewer potential reserves. Simply put the denser Russian chain couldn't last as long as the looser but more easily reinforced French chain.
Just my thoughts…….

npm

"Would it be possible to identify only the French officer casualties from the Voltigeur companie"
Well …. not really. Casualties were reported by regiment for both sides. However ….
- quite a few légère officers were members of the Légion d'hommeur, and more than half of these have their Légion records retained (and even published online for the names starting "A" to about "L" – it is a work in progress), and some of these include the état de service, and a few of these will mention posting to a compagnie d'élite.
- the archives of the regiment are retained in good shape for more than half of the regiments, and careful reading would likely get you the compagnie assignments …. in person only, at Vincennes outside Paris.
- the regimental history may mention the commander a compagnie d'élite for 1812, and almost half of these histories are available on line (you will need to know the successor regiment of the late 19th century to the traditions of the légère regiment)
- a family member or genealogy society may have published a bio for the officer, sometimes locally in France and sometimes online

French 64 men per company & Russians 100 men per company
I never calculated it that way, but I think those averages "feel" about right.

Timbo W …..
Very interesting analysis. I am studying it. I think the "random target" aspect is a good one, especially since the artilley casualties would be randomized. Thank you!

"pitfalls of statistical analysis applies in spades to battlefield analysis done from quotations"
Right. Of course. Secondary and tertiary sources spend millions of words telling us what the authors thought they knew. We buy the books and read them. But actual primary source material is a lot rarer. I don't see why we should ignore any source of primary information about these battles.

"approximately 180 strelki platoons each with 50 combatants"
Oooops (maybe) --- not exactly Russian usage/doctrine.
First, the bulk of the light infantry tasks would be assigned to jäger regiments. These would then be fighting in a skirmish or open order, by battalions. These deployed with two levels of reserves (and had done so since at least about 1778 – I posted above the manual written in 1783), really very much like the Davout 1811 instructions.
If a formed unit wanted to cover itself with a skirmish screen, it could not really detach the leftmost of the 8 platoons (the strelki) as a whole – it would mess up the evolutions of the formation (such as forming square) and remove the regulation effect of having picked men on both ends of the line (grendery were the 1st platoon on the right).
Instead, each of the center companies picked their best marksmen – typically about 12 – plus a good number of corporals and sergeants and a junior officer. These would post themselves as the outermost files of each of the company's two platoons. They would trot out to form the chain when called, fighting in pairs spaced 5 to 15 paces apart.
If these needed ammo, then a "non-combatant" could bring it up, likely with a stern message delivered by the company sergeant-major about not wasting the tsar's ammo. If they needed replacements or some extra shooters, then the strelki and genadery were sent out, peeling off one file at a time from each end of the batalion formation.
When we read of grenadiers being assigned to peform light infantry tasks (e.g. by Raevskiy at Leipzig), it is usually a grenadier battalion (a battalion in a grenadier regiment or a combined grenadier battalion) being sent out to act like a jäger battalion.
I do not know of the Russians detaching the grenadier companies (i.e., the grenadery and strelki platoons) from a formed unit, leaving it with only 6 formed platoons. Although this was tactically possible (the battalion commander could just order it), it would leave the formed unit at pains to perform any conversion, especially a conversion where it was required to ploy (line to column, line to square, column to square). The formed unit would more likely not do any conversion (and perhaps not even move) until the 2 elite platoons returned.

Great stuff! Thanks again to all!

The whole idea of using officer and soldier casualty statistics to prove one point or another is farcical.

For a start, Borodino was a battle where the French attacked and the Russians defended, so most of the time the French officers had to be out in front to encourage their men to go forward which was standard practice in the French army anyway.

Secondly, the Russians were on defence most of the time (counter-attacks withstanding) thus their officers would be usually found behind the firing line for obvious reasons.

When the Russians counter attacked this trend would be reversed but the point remains that the side on the attack is going to be more likely to suffer officer and NCO casualties while leading their men forward no matter which army they fight for.

That is all it means, and has nothing to do with wastefulness, less quality or anything else. An attacking force is going to lose more men and proportionally therefore more officers. This is clearly indicated in your statistics.

There is some old military maxim somewhere that suggests that to maximise your chances of victory in an attack you must attack with odds of 3:1 (local superiority) or risk failure at the point of contact i.e. your objective. I would expect to see higher French casualties during individual attacks simply because while advancing they cannot fire. The enemy can basically turkey shoot while the advance is on. However, when halted and engaged it comes down to superior skill, command control, skills, tactics and willpower (morale). I suggest that this is where the French in advance lost most of these men but when they engaged outfought their Russian counterparts in the actual duels over terrain in the end.

Shane, casualty statistics CAN be extremely valuable in getting closer to accurate understanding of what happened in battles, although they are most useful when used in conjunction with narrative accounts to help evaluate their accuracy.
I think it even goes back to Caesar quoting the disproportionate numbers of Centurions and Tribunes killed in one battle to support the contention that a Legion broke under pressure.
I'm not sure what to make of the particular line of stats in this thread- its provoking debate anyway. But the use of statistics in general is far from farcical as a technique and can be the closest thing to proof if used, as others have said, carefully.

Also I'm not sure that the attackers not being able to fire made much odds at Borodino, as both attackers and defenders took such a horrendous pasting from enemy artillery over such long a period, it would make the differential in the last bit of the advance to contact seem quite small.

Justonemore- I'm really interested in the contention that Strelkovy platoons would be unlikely to be sent out to skirmish because they made it harder to put the battalions through evolutions- but surely thats just the same as the British Light Company or French Voltigeur company, etc, and we know they were sent out often enough?

Seneffe,

I just don't see it sorry. I believe that stats on casualties per square foot can provide an analysis of the "intensity" of a conflict but not provide an analysis that assesses the level of ability…sorry, but to me that just does not work.

Also I'm not sure that the attackers not being able to fire made much odds at Borodino, as both attackers and defenders took such a horrendous pasting from enemy artillery over such long a period, it would make the differential in the last bit of the advance to contact seem quite small.

Yes but your talking about a much broader picture here. Justonemore is trying to discuss "wasteful French skirmishing" which you cannot do from such a borad context as you just explained. You have to go down to the micro-level of analysis here which justonemore is intending but I do not think casualty counting is the right methodology here. There are way too many external variables to count including what I already explained. Unless you can get the entire description of every casualty of his stats, what wounds they received, what caused them, where they were caused and so on which as you might imagine is impossible and a waste of effort.

Please believe me, I have nothing against what justonemore is trying to do here but I do not think this is the right way to analyse it. Attackers often lose much more men while advancing than the attackers in defence until contact is made (provided the attackers made it to contact at all). The only thing wasteful about the French approach to skirmishing here is that in order to engage with the Russians they had to order an attack (or 10) and advance under a hail of incoming gunfire and artillery etc. It was inevitable they would lose many man during the advance.

The use of statistics in this way is meaningless. The only way to get a more accurate account is to gain statistics after contact was made when both sides were engaged to gauge just how wasteful or good or bad one side was over the other. And we all know that is an impossible ask.

The only thing wasteful about the French casualties over the Russians is that the French first had to cover the distance in the initial advance before making contact and engaging the enemy. Any formation in an attack is going to suffer this, it is typical of any attack in history from ancient days to the present. A death count means nothing once the other side raises his flag on your hill…

But on reflection, a high death count often leads to analysis of the encounter and assessment on how to lessen the casualties by the introduction of better tactics for future engagements, I will give you that.

Shane

I wrote:

Attackers often lose much more men while advancing than the attackers in defence until contact is made

sorry, that should have read:

"Attackers often lose much more men in the act of advancing than the defenders suffer until contact is made…"

seneffe …..

I don't know anything about British drill. I am sorry.

For the French …..

The manual originally (1791) was based on 8 pelotons (this is what a French maneuver element is called, as I am sure seneffe knows) formed from 8 center companies, plus the grenadier/carabinier company moving separately, forming a separate peloton. This facilitated using the grenadiers and carabiniers in formations of combined units formed of these elite companies. The 8 peloton group of center companies had the usual evolutions.
PDF link

The creation of the voltiguer company was in 1804/1805. It's formation replaced the 2nd center company in each battalion. The "grenadiers" of Oudinot in 1805 were formed from the grenadiers/carabiniers and 1st fusiliers/chasseurs of selected battalions. These were left with thus 7 companies. But only one of these made the campaign, the remainder staying to protect the Channel coast. This unit, the 15e légère, fought in 6-company formations, and detached their voltiguers. Oudinot's command also fought in 6-company battalions. The other regiments took the field at 9 companies, so could detach their voltiguers and still form with pelotons made of 8 companies – hence the famous detached voltiguers. This situation held over through the end of 1806.

In Janaury 1807, Oudinot's division was reorganized. Now its 6-company battalions were each composed of grenadiers/carabiniers and voltiguers. But here only 2 companies (one of each type of elite) were taken from any one regiment, and these from the 4th or depot battalion. So, still it was 9 companies in the field for most of the army, which could be used as 8 formed pelotons plus voliguers detached.

Actually, the real question is exactly if/how they formed all 9 together (that is, without detaching the voltiguers). Personally, I think they sorted the 9 companies into the usual 8 pelotons, or formed 8 pelotons without the grenadiers included (just as per the 1791 reglément – which is why they didn't re-write it). But, generally, I think the voltiguers were indeed detached.

In 1808 we have the conversion of the army to 6-company battalions. From here, I don't think they actually detached only the voltiguers. This would be only 1/6 skirmishing – which was getting to be too low as their enemies started doing a lot more with skirmishing. I think they either formed all 6 companies or detached both the grenadiers and voltiguers (1/3 skirmishing, just like the Russians), leaving 4 center companies formed (or sent all six companies out to act like a jäger battalion). The remaining 4 center companies would then move as 8 pelotons (each now the size of a half-company, the same method as used in the guard, and again as per the 1791 reglément). There is no problem of frontages and spacings with this, since if there was a mix of 6 peloton (company size frontage) and 8 peloton (half-company size frontage) battalions moving together, the 8 peloton guys could move in division columns (2 pelotons wide) while the 6-peloton guys could move in peloton columns.

Anyway, here is an article in English about how the Russians did it, you can see the on-going (even after the war) debate about whether to cover with 1 chain (12 men per company) or 2 chains (12 men per platoon).
link
This is for line battalions, not jägers – and specifically if there were no jägers to perform the screening function. Really, the Russians thought this was something jägers should do, in whole battalions (supplanted by grenadiers in whole battalions from grenadier regiments or combined grenadier battalions if needed).Hence they had 1/3 of their regiments fielded as jägers.

Notice that this indicates something similar for both the French and Russians : sending out non-elite and non-specialist soldiers to skirmish was really pretty rare. I think you could expect this with conscript armies – and these often not even given their normal, prescribed training before being sent into action.

Anyway, you can't do the evolutions with odd-numbers of sub-units, right?

Hey justonemore (wish I had a real name to converse with?)

Anyway, you seem very knowledgeable with the ethnicity (origins) of each Russian regiment. I was wondering if you were ever interested to list each regiment to show where each individual regiment came from (recruitment grounds) so that those interested could get a picture overview of these regiments origins? Provided you have this information of course.

Justonemore wrote:

Bill, I am not sure that a useful comparison can be made with this data. But it is only with good comments such as yours that we can test it out and see if we get anywhere.
Thanks again!

J:
You bet. I think one thing you can do immediately is look at the losses as representative of the casualties light troops would suffer during a day's engagement. I don't think you can make judgments about why one side lost more or not, but if this was an extended contest, particularly over a large area, you can look at the averages and get a 'sense' of the kinds of casualties skirmishers would suffer, both officers and men.

I am surprised by all the cautionary tales concerning statistics. Statistics are like any mathematical equation applied to real events. It has to be done carefully for the results to have any significance. That goes without saying.

And considering that wargame designers do this kind of quantifying throughout a set of game rules, I would think wargamers would be comfortable with the process…and how to avoid the pitfalls. With statistics, you have to decide what kind of results/conclusions you want to draw from the data before you can determine and develop the information base needed to achieve it.

Bill

I'm afraid I have to be a wet blanket.

The casualty figures for Borodino are shrouded in mystery and speculation, so making finer distinctions seems out of the question.

The theory of the effectiveness of skirmishing is based on the presumption that it is area fire, and therefore the expected casualties should be:
K x density of friends x density of foes
which will be the same number for both sides. So whichever side can sustain the combat using fewer troops will have end up with larger reserves. A disparity in skimishing casualities would suggest other factors are in play.

In my mind the introduction of the Strelki platoon to each battalion of infantry and jager during 1811 was a direct consequence of attempting to emulate the organization of the French battalion organization. Obviously this was very new to the unit formations, and the performance of any detached Strelki company, if they were employed, would perhaps have been sub-par compared to that of the French. The adoption of the corps system, and the introduction of the light platoons to each battalion, were each devices to find the 'holy grail' to defeat the French – in this case by emulating their organization.

The reason I conclude that the Russian skirmish chain would not have had an immediate reserve [unless it was formed perhaps by the Grenadier platoon], was the actual distance the number of men could practically cover. Fifty men, in pairs, at 5 pace intervals, equals a frontage of 125 paces, and this doesn't account for placement of NCO's and Officers outside the chain. The remaining 350 men in the battalion in three-rank line would have occupied about 100 paces. The conclusion being that the whole platoon complement was required to cover the necessary frontage, at most the chain could have held back twenty percent, or ten men – this of course assumes the parent units were deployed, or in column at full intervals.

npm

Remember, every Russian "infantry" regiment could match up with a battalion of jaegers in the division, and that the battle line was regularly a double row of units. The sharpshooters might have been specialist, or it might just have been an honorific for men that weren't burly enough for grenadiers. There is some question whether the French relied on 3d rankers instead of the voltiguer company, and 1/6 of the battalion doesn't offer that much more reserve by that analysis.

I'm of the school of thought that light companies/platoons performed their duties on the skirmish chain, and that light battalions performed their duties where close order troops would not necessarily perform to their highest potential. So you find light battalions in woods, in buildings, in steep terrain, along the banks of watercourses etc. Their formation would be something between close order and the skirmish chain, probably only two deep, probably with a close order reserve to fall back and rally upon. Not all of Russia is endless Steppe, in parts it is heavily wooded – the Birch tree reigns supreme – the very geography of the terrain will lead towards a requirement for light troops, hence the high proportion of jager units in a typical 1812 Russian division. The difference between French Line and Light battalions was virtually non-existent by 1812, and both performed interchangeable duties. At Borodino, it does appear that the Russian Jager tended to be employed more in this role, fighting in the disruptive terrain. But did the French respond in kind – probably not, and I think that is evidenced by the casualty returns. At Borodino the French Light tended to fight in close order, and suffered as a result.

npm

A couple more thoughts,

as Ligniere says, the light infantry on both sides at Borodino could cover a far greater frontage than the battle was actually fought over. Borodino after all was one of the battles (if not THE battle) with the densest troop concentrations in the Napoleonic Wars. Therefore I'm not convinced that the relative loss rates will tell much specifically about the skirmishing. You'd imagine that a large proportion of lights on both sides would be 'formed up' even in regiments that were tasked with skirmishing. Indeed the % loss for the Russian Eger rank and file was practically identical (~40%) with that for the infantry regiments.

The higher casualties amongst the officers of the French Legere in comparison with Eger officers do seem notable. The numbers killed seem low enough to be affected by random chance, but the number of French officers wounded appears to be far higher than the Russians, this could be an artefact of the reporting system – whether seriously and lightly wounded were counted on both sides etc.

Alternatively I like Shane's explanation of officers having to lead from the front on the attack but standing behind (or within?) the firing line on the defence. I've always wondered which ranks of infantry officers generally rode horses in a field battle. This could increase their vulnerability, particularly if the opposition fired high (as I understand was often the case). Maybe the attackers were more likely to be mounted?

I doubt we will come to a clear conclusion on justonemore's original question from these data, but the journey is often more illuminating than the destination!

nvrsaynvr wrote:
I'm afraid I have to be a wet blanket.
The casualty figures for Borodino are shrouded in mystery and speculation, so making finer distinctions seems out of the question.

Nvrsaynvr:
Well, you are taking it much further than I was. I wasn't suggesting anything like I was simply taking about "a theory of the effectiveness of skirmishing."

I was just talking about an average casualty rate: How many casualties can one expect to see from a skirmish action over several hours? That's it.

As for the figures being "The casualty figures for Borodino are shrouded in mystery and speculation." It's only shrouded because no one has really looked for the evidence, which certainly isn't easy when it is all in Russian and French. It the absence of real information, of course it will be all mystery and speculation.

Bill

"ethnicity (origins) of each Russian regiment"
Usally new regiments were composed of 2-6 companies taken form existing army units, 2-6 companies of garrison or internal "police" units and then filled up to 12 companies with conscripts. In general the assignment of conscripts was made to get them out of their home region, but not any farther than necessary. Each region had a recruiting depot. Each regiment pulled from a specific depot. These are listed in the Viskovatov and available in translation thanks to Mark Conrad. This was all a little more organized in 1807 and later, but a similar system had been used before. As the regiments moved about some, and some recruit depots were changed to spread the conscription evenly, there was some degree of change over time.

"the Russian skirmish chain would not have had an immediate reserve"
When a battalion covered itself – no. It was either one or two chains (12 men per company or 12 men per platoon). The replacements were peeled off the elite platoons as needed. But as NSN notes, the whole idea was to let the jägers do this.
The strelki selection was largely honorific – chosen for behavior and marksmanship for smaller-sized guys size (just as NSN noted). I think the focus on markmanship in this selection would have been greater in the jäger and grenadier regiments, by the way.

"to emulate the organization of the French battalion organization"
Well, I don't know. Emulation or parallel convergent evolution?
In large conscript armies you get lots of smaller guys. You have an internal reward system that stresses size and melée ability. You need to find a way to recognize the smaller guys. What else would you do?
Anyway, I think the main idea was to standardize the battalion organizations and insure that all the fielded 1st and 3rd battalions would be of a predictable size and capability. The big change was not the strelki. The big deal was to make the regiments of identcal battalions instead of grenadier+musketeer battallions and to make all regiments (jäger, grenadier and musketeer/infantry, army and guard) have the same internal organization.
The raw number of light infantry might be more of a case of emulation : from 38 army and 1 guard jäger battalions to 171 army and 6 guard. But if this was emulating, it was not emulating Napoléon – the increase was started based on seeing the French Revolutionary armies.

The Russian division and corps system was not too much like the French. It grew out of the prior Inspection system and had a lot to do with recruitment and moving conscripts into the field. The esteemed Robert Goetz has written a series of fine articles on this topic in English and you should be able to find them at napoleon-series.org.
The corps were identical, smallish (two infantry divisions with lots of artillery, total 26 battalions and 72+ guns, all 6-lbers and heavier) and essentially fixed over time. They were not meant to operate independently (the engineering and higher logistics assets were at the army level of command). Their corps artillery, cavalry and cossack assets, if any, were not organic but attached and mission-dependent (and quite small at that : 4-8 squadrons of cavalry, 400-500 cossacks, 1-2 companies of guns). They were an operational maneuver element, not a strategic one.
It is hard to see emulation of the French in this system.

"holy grail"
I think the Russians found it : production of lots and lots and lots of good artillery, a good system of conscription and replacements (including horses), high battle casualities and high attrition, long campaigns …. a different strategic approach from the one used by Naploéon. A brilliant choice, in my opinion.

I don't think the Russians ever felt a hard sting of tactical or operational deficit to the French. They saw 1799 as a success. Other than Austerlitz, they did quite well in 1805 and comforted themselves that defeat came from Austrian errors. They might have thought the winter offensive of 1806/1807 was ill-advised, but saw Eylau as a useful and bloody draw. Friedland was bad, but it was a terrible position to have offered battle. Some advisors to the tsar wanted to keep fighting, some thought a French alliance was a good idea, some wanted a "truce" to build up the army. The had lost many battles before, and would lose more. A mutually bloody tactcial defeat was actually strategically useful to them, and they were beginning (from Eylau) to recognize this.
They were impressed by the French, but not over-awed. They saw the French as very formidable, but beatable. Especially if the French were so foolish as to advance east from Poland. I don't think "emulation" was very high in their minds.

"which ranks of infantry officers generally rode horses"
Battalion commanders and higher for both sides. Company commanders and lower walked. Also riding were the 2 adjundant lieutenants per regiment for the Russians and the capitaines adjudants-major (1 per battalion) for the French (if they had a horse that no one had eaten or taken to the artillery, etc.). Russians might (or might not) dismount to lead an attack and a company commander filling in for an absent battalion commander might (or might not) get to use someone's horse.

"the journey is often more illuminating than the destination!"
I agree!

Timbo wrote:
Borodino after all was one of the battles (if not THE battle) with the densest troop concentrations in the Napoleonic Wars. Therefore I'm not convinced that the relative loss rates will tell much specifically about the skirmishing. You'd imagine that a large proportion of lights on both sides would be 'formed up' even in regiments that were tasked with skirmishing. Indeed the % loss for the Russian Eger rank and file was practically identical (~40%) with that for the infantry regiments.

Timbo:

That's why it's important to know which Jagers were doing what. However, there were large numbers of deployed skirmishers at different locations in the battle. Also remember that both armies were deployed in depth, not all crowded together across the battlefront. Mikaberidze's The Battle of Borodino describes a number of skirmisher events.

The higher casualties amongst the officers of the French Legere in comparison with Jager officers do seem notable. The numbers killed seem low enough to be affected by random chance, but the number of French officers wounded appears to be far higher than the Russians, this could be an artefact of the reporting system – whether seriously and lightly wounded were counted on both sides etc.

Organizationally, the Russians Jagers had fewer officers and NCOs than the French Legere. And of course, this is in the middle of a campaign where the actual numbers and offical numbers could be way off. And yes, the Russians and French may not be counting the same way. Even the Union and Confederate armies had different criteria for determining unit numbers and casualties.

Alternatively I like Shane's explanation of officers having to lead from the front on the attack but standing behind (or within?) the firing line on the defence. I've always wondered which ranks of infantry officers generally rode horses in a field battle. This could increase their vulnerability, particularly if the opposition fired high (as I understand was often the case). Maybe the attackers were more likely to be mounted?

The rule of thumb on mounted officers was based on two things: 1. The battalion and regimental commanders, and 2. Company captains who could afford a horse… Assigned ADCs etc. would have them. Regardless of the combat mission, the officers would or wouldn't be mounted depending on those one and two issues. Most army general orders cover that question.

Skrimish officers would be moving up and down the line behind the line of their skirmishers [that is what you read from accounts and instructions in written manuals.] They would be more of a target because they were up and moving. Formed lines and columns would have the same placement of officers regardless of advancing or defending. Very few officers stood in front of a line. There was the color guard in the middle of the battalion led by the colonel/commander, then company officers would the flanks of the line, but most would be behind, to control any shirking etc. Only in a final assault would you possibly find officers being seen 'in front' of their particular company. Officers weren't part of the rank and file, because they didn't stand in the 'ranks and files'.

Bill

Leading from the front is pure nonesense, a chef de bataillon, who commanded a battalion was on horseback behind his unit.

There might be occasions where officers went to the front – but usually they were either on the flank of their peloton, or behind it (for subaltern offciers) or commanding from horseback behind the battalion.

In skirmishing, an officer must direct and controll the firing line, which is easier to do from the rear than standing in front of his men – between the enemy.

VW, no it is not pure nonsense.

In skirmishing, an officer must direct and controll the firing line, which is easier to do from the rear than standing in front of his men – between the enemy.

? when did I say this??? but sure, go ahead and take my words out of context to make your nonsense point.

For a start I was talking about the initial advance "before" contact, not the actual firing line once contact was made (if you bothered to read my post properly you would have understood this). And secondly French Officers in particular were noted for leading attacks from the front.

However, once engaged of course the officers would be behind the line directing the fire. But when ordered to advance or attack a particular piece of terrain, say, the Borodino village the officers of the French light troops would have been right out in front leading the attack, especially if the intent was to close to close with the enemy.

Light troops were committed to engage the enemy in built up areas, covered areas, terrain features that were covered in obstacles etc…If the enemy had to be dislodged, such as the village of Borodino the light troops were often sent in to do such work. This meant the officers had to put sword in hand, yell out the command and charge the enemy. Naturally this was done from the front. I am surprised certain people here simply dismiss this as, "pure nonsense" that in itself is pure nonsense to suggest it did not occur.

VW you might want to go back to your books…

and I said nothing about the, "chef de bataillon" did I? I was talking about junior officers such as company commanders and lower as well as NCO's.

Also, if a unit of light troops is given a terrain piece as an objective to advance to or take the officers would have to be out in front leading the way if the objective is at distance or unseen due to other terrain features along the way. You cannot lead an attack or advance from the rear if you cannot see what the situation is. This is why Captains and Lieutenants often suffered much more severe casualty rates then say majors, colonels and generals. They had to be "up front" with the men directing traffic.

I am simply amazed you deny this??? It is obvious you have had zero military training yourself.

An 'academic' with no idea about actual war? Surely you can't be serious, Shane! These fellows are all well known to be veritable Hectors!

god help us all…

Well the buffoonery at least has the benefit of spurring me to think about the issue. There are a limited number of ways officer casualty rates could differ from the troop. (Leaving aside reporting bias which is a big concern.) For instance:

• targeted by fire – mostly firearms
  
• more exposed to fire – 50 paces out front, or moving behind a sheltered skirmish line
  
• targeted in close combat – mostly horsemen
  
• friendly fire??
  

If the idea that French, and French skirmisher officers suffered higher rates is based on Oman, perhaps someone needs to reexamine his analysis for systematic bias and statistical significance.

Two issues are being pondered here: a comparison of Russian and French light infantry officer losses in three engagements in 1812 and only comparing light infantry units.

Neither issue, alone or together makes much sense.

Using statistics alone in an attempt to analyze the effectiveness of part of the infantry of a nation is ludicrous. Nothing useful can be achieved. Then, taking light infantry units alone in the battles as a comparison is another problem.

The Russians and the French employed their light infantry differently, and trying to analyze their combat effectiveness merely through losses in a vacuum accomplishes what? Light infantry alone did not fight these battles. They fought alongside or with other units, coordinated or not, and it wasn't a vacuum. Casualties were not caused merely by light infantry units either.

Studying merely numbers without the benefit of memoirs, after action reports or other documentation is merely 'bean counting' and not significant in historical inquiry. Analysis of this type goes far beyond a head count-esprit, training, bad luck, leadership and much more have to be taken into account and not by themselves.

K

Good officers do lead from the front. And there is a time when the commander actually does get in front of the unit and indicates the equivalent of 'Follow Me!'

There are myriad examples of this happening starting with Murat at Jena leading the combined light cavalry of several corps with nothing but a light whip in his hand through the Prussian infantry.

Believing that it didn't happen is incorrect and again, quite ludicrous.

K

One thing with all the 'analysis' that is taking place, valid or not, is the seeming idea that the term 'skirmishing' means the same thing for the different armies and light infantry arms of those armies. Further it appears that only light infantry companies, and no higher light infantry organization is being considered.

The French deployed more than company-level light infantry to skirmish, fight in open order, or to maneuver. The French employed Tirailleurs de marche et de combat for the parent batallion which could involve one or more companies from that battalion.

Tirailleurs de march et de combat for the parent regiment could deploy multiple companies as tirailleurs to support that regiment.

Further, you might have Tirailleurs de march et de combat for the parent brigade and the parent division, multiple companies being employed in that role.

Then you would have Tirailleurs en grande bande which would be entire units, battalions and higher, that would be deployed in open order and would be acting as a maneuver unit, or a corps principal, themselves and the unit(s) would fight and maneuver in open order.

It wasn't just a single voltigeur company from either a line or light unit covering their parent battalion and the voltigeur company was not the only company in the units capable of fighting in open order. Light infantry regiments certainly were as were many line units.

K