"Austrian Utilization of Light Troops " Topic

Hi all,

I would like to continue the discussion about light infantry to a focus towards the utilization of light troops in the Austrian army during the Revolutionary period both in Germany and Italy. The influence of the Grenzers in the Balkans in particular and then move on to discuss the history of their light troops in the period around 1799-1800 in detail. I am also not adverse to delving back into the 7YW period to identify the foundations of their evolution as well.

From this I would like to take a look at their use in 1805 during the Ulm campaign and later on at Austerlitz. From this point 1809 and the changes (if any) that occurred as a result of reforms etc resulting from lessons learned from previous wars. I would then like to move on to 1813-14 to see what changes occurred there or what influenced their deployment. Such as their propensity to over-deploy them to counter the French and how generals had noticed this and tried to limit their use.

I have only limited understanding of them to be honest and thus have a cursory impression of their tactical deployment and utilization. I would like to deepen my understanding and come into this with no solid preconceived notions of their use. I have developed a set of rules regarding Austrian skirmisher use but is it admittedly quite shallow, I desire to improve my system with your help.

p.s. The more historical quotes that can be supplanted here the better so start researching!!

Regards,
Shane

For example:

Only marginally revised in 1769, the 1749 regulations provided drills and routines for almost all occasions; but while including much that was unnecessary they ignored light infantry drill for regular regiments; and by ordering everything so exactly they perhaps tended to impair the flexibility often required on the battlefield

Osprey Men-at-arms series 276
page 13
Philip Haythornthwaite

Any comments on this?

Wow!! Big subject Shane once you spread it across so many periods. Dont know where to start? Maybe we split it up by period?

Interesting to say the least Shane but I doubt that anything I could come up with would be much more than odd bits from secondary and tertiary sources.

From limited reading about the early campaigns in Italy I'd say that the Austrians could put up a pretty sound defence in villages and buildings and make good use of ground, at least on the defensive. To my mind that implies the ability to deploy small, semi-independant groups – possibly an indication of being effectively trained for skirmishing.

Not much to start with and I have no idea whether or not this would or did translate to larger, more formal, encounters.

Generally I think that the opinion of Grenz is that they were a bit of a dissapointment in the LI role, at least to start with. I get the impression that this was more a matter of lack of will rather than lack of skill.

Hi guys, thought I would start with the 7YW to kick things off. It would be great to build on the foundation here (if this is the right place to start?) and go from there.

I want to build a story of Austrian skirmisher tactics and doctrine by studying any and all information possible and keep going through the years ending in 1815…

Shane,

Well if you want to start with the 7YW, you have to look at Chritopher Duffy's 'Instrament of War'

link

This is the best source in English on the Austrian Army,

You might also like THe Army of Maria- Theresa

link

This covers the Austrian Army from 1740-1790

My understanding though is that one of the reforms that Austrians tried but failed was to introduce greater discipline into the Grenze to turn them into more like European light infantry. In so doing they lost there natural elan. If you look at the Asutrians campaigns against Freddy the one that always gets overlooked in is the Boheminian Campaign of 1744. By using light troops exclusively and avoid a pitched battle FM Traun caused something like 30,000 casualties to the Prussians. Politics brought Charles of Lorraine back to the army in 1745 and a string of defeats. (And people wonder why I'm interested in asymetrical warfare.)

Hope this helps,

Elliott

Hey thanks Elliot, that is a huge help. I do have the book in your first link, I might look that over in-depth now.

Interesting about the Grenzers, they are a troop type I know little about pre-1800. Were they purposely kept off 7YW battlefields for the purpose of raiding etc?

Shane

Grenz were not primarliy battlefield troops, but the could be used to hold rough ground, like holding the Lobosch Heights at Lobsitz (1757), they were on the Austrian right at Leuthen (1757) – the Prussians attacked the left and they notably failed to spot the oblique attack – and where the first troops it by the Prussian attack at Hochkirch (1758) spring to mind without checking.

What they were best at, IMHO was the petite guerre. The were particularly effective against armies like the Prussians whose weltanschauung was opposed to the employment of light troops. Prussian Friekorp (the doubel-blues) were never never able to keep up.

Elliott

Thanks Elliot.

In the Osprey book I have quoted above on the next page he explains that although the line regiments had zero light infantry training the Grenadier btlns did have rudimentary training in the skill of skirmishing. How widespread or accurate is this?

It seems to be a common thread that Grenadiers were thrown out to skirmish (if the need arose) over musketeers for example. To me it appears that this trend was probably in most armies from the 7YW through to 1815?

What I am finding mystifying about Austrian light troops is how few of them there were. One is almost forced to conclude that their battlefield role must have been trivial because their numbers were.

According to link

In 1805 the Austrian army totaled 305 line, 3 jager and 51 Grenzer battalions. There was also an additional 10 garrison and 61 reserve battalions, 12 battalions of Tyrolean militia and 12 volunteer jager or free battalions.

So including the "12 volunteer jager or free battalions", only 15 of 371 front-line battalions (i.e. I exclude the garrison, reserve and militia) were proper light infantry. Grenzers seem not to have been. This means that light troops were 4% of the Austrian army's strength. In the French army, light troops were 26 of 115 regiments, i.e. 23%.

Given that there were only one-sixth as many light troops one wonders whether there were ever enough for proper doctrine to be propounded and developed.

I am suprised to learn that Grenzer could not act as light infantry, having a tradition of light infantry – I am looking forward what David Hollins has to say about that.

In case you add up the Grenzer – Jäger and others you come up to a different percentage.

It is my understanding that the quality of the Grenze declined btween 1763- and 1792, this decline was a result of an attempt to introduce the discipline applied to line units.

7YW* grenadiers were not intended to act a true light infantry but were used in situations as a crack reserve or for particularly difficult tasks. They were combined by certain commnders on an ad hoc basis, say as a crack reserve by von Browne did this at Prague (1757) where they almost turned the tide of the battle, or for storming, as at Gabel (1757). Form April 1758 they were sperated from their parent units for the duration of the campaigning season.

We must destinguish between skirmish troops and light infantry that were used for operating in rough country and the petite guerre. Both would require a looser formations and smaller units.

Skirmishing in front of the infantry line in terms that we think for the Reveloutionary and Napoleonic Wars was not done during the 7YW*. Light infantry ws intended to operate in rough ground that would breakup a regular line.

One thing that both the Austrians and the Prussians did was to recruit deserters into Freicorp units, who fought as light infantry.

I would not say that Grenze could not operate as light infantry, but I would say that the Grenze of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were less effective in that role forefathers of the wars of the mid-18thC.

Hope this helps,

Elliott

* The wars of the mid-18thC, either the War of the Austrain Succession and Seven Years War, or the 1st to 3rd Silesian if you prefer do show developement of troops, equipment** and tactics; they are characterised by certain features that mean it's easier just to call them the 7YW.

** In reseaching some of these dates I did note that we have illustrations from the 1750's of Austrian artillery using the bricole. LOL

Once again, thank you Elliot, this is something I did not know. already I have learned a great deal.

Shane,

No problem mate. That's what the lists are for.

Elliott

Don't forget that the Grenzer (light infantry) had also Grenzscharfschützen (rifles)

Why Grenzer should be less effecitve in the French Revolutionary Wars or Napoleonic Wars compared to the 7YW – I cannot see.

von Winterfelt, my understanding was that the Austrian attempted to reform the Grenze, turning them from the irregular roots to into more drilled troops. This would tend to emphasis fighting in denser formation.

I would be really useful if we could have some input from David H as this one of his areas of expertise.

VW,

Could you elaborate on these: "Grenzscharfschützen" (rifles), their organization and numbers etc ? Is this like the schuetzen detachments in the musketeer btlns?

Shane,

Here is some material from Rothenberg's book on the Austrian army of the period, Napoleon's Great Adversary: Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1814. Included are comments on the Grenz and why they became less effective after the Seven Years' War. The Austrians insisted that they become regulars instead of their usual military occupation as irregulars expert in the 'little war.' Rothenberg's The Military Border in Croatia on the Grenz will also be very helpful.

The question as to why the Grench lost their effectiveness, or more correctly why would they, has to be taken in context to how they were employed and trained and that warfare had changed dramatically since 1763. In that respect, Elliott is correct and is wrong.

Rothenberg clearly demonstrates the problems the Austrians had adapting to the new style of warfare, especially with coordinating regulat line and regular light infantry on the battlefield. Comparing Rothenberg's work with that of the Zhmodikovs' on Russian tactics, the problems are very similar between the two armies. Perhaps fighting the Turks had affected both armies?

As a footnote, I found this little ditty written by a Russian grenadier in 1803 referring to his own army:

For my country I stand on guard
Yet my back is beaten hard
The stick's the sole reward for me
Who defends us from the enemy
He who beats his men a lot
Rises straight to the top
And is thought extremely keen
Though a devil he has been
He who fails this brutal test
Has to serve with the rest

-Grenadier Ivan Markov, 1803

Markov's superiors were apparently unhappy over his attempt at poetry, and he was forced to run the gauntlet, a particularly nasty form of punishment.

'Conscript three, beat two to death, train one.'

Page 33:

‘In the Austrian army, light infantry missions, scouting and skirmishing, commonly were entrusted to the Grenzer, though there were complaints that training them as line infantry had spoiled their natural aptitude for these duties. As Fieldmarshal Lacy put it in a memoirandum dated 5 December 1782, ‘it must be decided once and for all whether the Grenzer are to be considered regular troops or a mere militia. If they are considered regulars they must be properly exercised and trained and this will give them very little time to devote to agriculture.' Lacy, of course, conceived military efficiency not in terms of light infantry, but in the framework of linear tactics. Nonetheless, training and organization of the Grenzer continued to conform with that of the line and their combat performance declined.'

Page 38:

‘Trained in the rigid techniques of eighteenth century warfare, the [Austrian] army would be repeatedly mauled by the more aggressive and elastic forces of the French Revolution and Napoleon. There was nothing wrong with the Austrian rank and file, but there commanders were thinking in terms fast becoming obsolete.'

Pages 49-50:

‘After the Seven Years' War the French developed sophisticated tactics, codified in the Manual of 1791, which prescribed both line and column…By 1792, however, the new volunteers no longer were able to operate according to the manual. They temporarily abandoned most formal tactics. March columns were used to bring the troops into battle. Then, to overcome the massed fire of infantry in line, the most daring elements went forward as skirmishers, tirailleurs, on occasion supported by boldly advanced artillery. After fire had shaken the line, the remainder of the force rushed the enemy in a loose attack column. An alternative method was to fight entirely in open order, relying on individual fire and movement, personal initiative and use of terrain. These were the tactics employed in 1793-1794. Of course, lacking cavalry support, a branch in which the republic was inferior, French brigades surging forward repeatedly were driven back by disciplined volleys, the bayonet, or cavalry charges. As the republican troops gained more experience and discipline, they adopted a more flexible combination of skirmishers, line, and column, supported by artillery, the ordre mixte later preferred by Napoleon.'

‘The new style of war, based on a transformation in the role of infantry, depended not only on military innovation but required political and social change which the armies of the Coalition, recruited from a narrow social base and relying on harsh discipline, were unable to achieve. The Austrian service remained tied to the regulations of 1769. Infantry remained rigidly divided into ‘light' and ‘line' units and the light were treated as accessories, useful for the ‘little war' of outposts but apart from the formal battle line. This did not solve the problem of countering the French skirmishers. Though line volleys and bayonet charges could drive the skirmishers back, this disarrayed the close order line which became vulnerable to the shock of the French columns…'

Page 70:

‘…despite occasional efforts to promote an effective combination of light and linear tactics, the predominance of close order fighting remained undiminished. While a noted Austrian military historian has claimed that ‘by 1798 the Austrian army had learned how to fight in open order supported by closed formations' this contention is not substantiated by the evidence. On one occasion, to be sure, during the battle of Novi in November 1799, the Austrians deployed in open order but were driven off the field in disorder. Thereafter the regulations once again stressed that skirmishing was to be employed only in a limited fashion. For instance, Zach, then chief of staff to General Baron Melas in Italy, issued instructions on 1 April 1800. ‘In action' he wrote ‘troops must remember not to lose time with firing. Only a few tirailleurs are necessary to screen the front. If these are followed up by troops advancing courageously in closed formation, with bands playing, and keeping their formation, such an advance cannot be repulsed by an enemy fighting in open order.' Two weeks later, on 13 April, another army order stated that ‘recent actions have shown that unnecessary skirmishing can only be detrimental…but a determined charge delivered in close order, screened by only a few skirmishers, will certainly result in victory with very few casualties. The Austrians had not abandoned linear tactics and the campaigns of 1799-1801 again revealed that they could not match the French in broken, wooded, or hilly terrain…'

Pages 145-146:

‘The regulations of 1807 also provided instructions for fighting in open order and skirmishing but the two sections dealing with these matters gave skirmishers little scope. Such tirailleurs were to be found from the third rank composed of the ‘brightest, most cunning, and reliable soldiers in the battalion. Skirmishing was conceived basically as defensive, screening the closed formations against hostile skirmishers. Though the individual skirmisher was given some latitude in the use of terrain and in loading and firing, the skirmish screen was tightly controlled with orders transmitted by the battalion drums…Rigidly controlled and regimented, the Austrian skirmishers rarely were equal to the French…A German officer…argued that it was …'too much drill' that made the Austrians less effective skirmishers than the French. And the Austrian official history concluded that ‘it was not realized that the soldier, unless he has natural aptitude for skirmishing, must be carefully trained for independence.' Instead, the Austrians tried to get quick results by following the totally wrong approach of relying on formalized drill…There was little effort to return the Grenzer, the original light infantry, to their skirmish role. A new manual for the Grenz infantry, published in 1808, merely was a modified version of the general infantry regulations. Even the feldjager operated without receiving any instructions specially designed for their service. A short manual, Instructions for Skirmishers, appeared in 1810 but consisted merely of instructions for the individual man with no tactical content.'

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin,

Thank you so much for the correction. You had access to resources that I did not (Rothenberg's The Military Border in Croatia). In addition I down't know my way around Rotherburg as well as Duffy. I will now endevour to trace down the book you refer to.

Best wishes, as always,

Elliott

Hi Kevin,

Thank you for that information. I also own this book and will endeavour to re-read it I think. These comments are very interesting.

Only a few tirailleurs are necessary to screen the front. If these are followed up by troops advancing courageously in closed formation, with bands playing, and keeping their formation, such an advance cannot be repulsed by an enemy fighting in open order.'

This leads me to believe that the Austrians did experiment with heavy skirmish tactics by the later period of the revolution but this failed. It also seems to point out that the Austrians, by dropping the experiment and continuing to use solid linear formations they felt that they could basically counter the enemy light troops and defend themselves much better. I agree with this to an extent but feel that in doing so they became more vulnerable to the French light infantry even more so from that point on?

Shane

Shane,

Agree completely. The Russians, Prussians, and Austrians all felt obliged to write a regulation in order to have their designated troops skirmish. It was a reaction to what the French were doing and their attempt to counter it. It wasn't always effective, and probably generally not, hence Radetzky's comments on the subject twice in 1813.

Excellent points, by the way.

Sincerely,
Kevin

'Don't forget that the Grenzer (light infantry) had also Grenzscharfschützen (rifles) Why Grenzer should be less effecitve in the French Revolutionary Wars or Napoleonic Wars compared to the 7YW – I cannot see.'

Before the 1780s the Grenz were irregular light infantry. They also had irregular light cavalry and sometimes artillery:

'There were frequent modifications in the organization and equipment of the [infnatry] regiments. Beck reduced the regimetns from four to three battalions, a total of 3,600 effectives. Siskovic in turn increased the infantry regiments to 4,080 men, augmented by special detachments of cannoneers and sharpshooters. The increase, however, remained largely on paper, and the Croatian regiments never reached their projected strength levels during this period [the early 1770s]. Considerable attention was given to the training of the gunners and the sharpshooters. In general the Grenzer gunners remained unsatisfactory. their training, conducted for the most part with wooden dummy pieces, was decidedly inadequate. But there was slow improvement and by 1780 each infantry regiment had one howitzer and three six-pounders, handled by a detachment of about 250. The specially selected sharpshooters were armed with a rather complicated and expensieve double-barreled carbine. The upper barrel was rifled, and the lower barrel was smooth to allow more rapid fire. These special detachments created special problems. in 1786 the Hofkriegsrat advised all commanders to be especially careful in the selection of sharpshooters and gunners 'so that the first will not desert with the expensive weapons, and the second after having received their expensive training.''

The border cavalry were reduced starting in 1763 and by 1786 only one cavalry regiment, the Szekler Hussars, were left.

The effectiveness of the Grenz was greatly reduced after 1763 because of heavy losses in 1756-1763 and by the fact that the Austrians converted them into regulars, with regular discipline and drill, and they largely lost their former effectiveness as light infnatry.

K

Kevin has backed up with cites what I vaguely remembered. The Grenzer were perceived as an irregular militia, who could be useful doing things you didn't need traditionally trained soldiers for. On balance, though, Austrian commanders wanted them to be regulars and thereby drilled their skirmish effectiveness out of them.

Using them as a skirmish screen appears to be ahistorical.

I would be inclined to treat them as a form of Cossack on foot. Good fire factors and movement rates but brittle in formation or in the open. Maybe give them extra bonuses for fighting in streets or soft cover.

With Grenzers, how would you rate them for say:

1800

1805

1809

1813-14

Regarding their ability to be utilized as Light troops? With ability I mean, able to perform light infantry duties, regulations regarding this and any historical evidence of them being used as such.

also, as formed close order troops I am not so sure how they should be truly rated in quality. i.e. – as Militia, as trained well or poorly or would you have to drill down into individual regimental quality and experience to get a better informed picture of them?

There the Austrians did use constantly skrimishing screens – those most have been drawn from somewhere – seemingly the 3rd rank (in case one denies the Grenzer any role in this) – and in case you would use Grenzer as French Light Infantry (fighting in close or open order) – they had as asset their Grenzsharpshooters.

Again, to see how formed troops fought along with Tirailleurs one would have to consult sources like :

Instruktionspunkte für die k.k. Armee zur Campagne des Jahres 1794, p. 127

Oberservationspunkte für die Generale bei der Armee in Deutschland im Jahre 1796, p 136

Bezügliche Befehle bei der Armee in Italien im Jahre 1800, p. 142

you all find this in

Beiträge zur Geschichte des österreichischen Heerwesens, erstes Heft : Der Zeitraum von 1757 bis 1814, Wien 1872

Nowhere I could read that Grenzer were drilled their skirmish effectivness out of them.

I would treat Grenzer as for example French Light infantry but with much more scope there they had additionlly their sharpshooters equipped with rifles with them.

VW, are there any English translations of these works?

You can get a rough English translation of any google book by getting the Google translation bar, calling up the book, going to plain text and hitting 'translate'. It will do it automatically if you want.

When I say rough, I do mean rough, but it gets you in the ball park and you can then start a finer-grained translation.

Bill

Secondary sources seem to differ as to whether Grenzers were line, light, or neither. I guess the only answer would be contemporary primary sources.

Eighteenth century German. Fun fun fun.

@ vW: I've looked at link and I can't see any reference in there to Grenzers ot their tactics at all. It all seems to be about logistics and camp construction procedures. Am I looking at the wrong link?

@ 4th Cuirassier

This is not the full book, try

link

There you will find some "standing" orders of several commanders how they whould have liked that the Austrian Army did combat against the French.
It is not a book about how the Grenzer fought and their tactics.

Another source might be volume V of Angeli :

Erzherzog Carl von Österreich als Feldherr und Heeresorganisator volume V, Wien und Leipzig 1897

Also available on google books.

I agree a difficult topic, from my understanding, I would class them as ligt infantry.

Otherwise – hopefully Dave Hollins will contribute to this discussion

Hi Bill,

I have the translation bar but when you try to read the book it is still in German. Sadly I never took up German in High school, a choice I regret now.

These books need to be translated into English and put out into the market. I would jump at the chance to own many of them.

while I agree that it would be terribly convenient for everyone in the world to speak and write MY language and that someone should translate anything I might want to read into MY language, it's not a very practical thing. the economics of it just don't work out. It's sort of like saying you don't know how to drive, why don't people just volunteer to drive you where you need to go? The effort involved in translation would mean the translator would be compensated at a rate of about 5 hours labor per dollar or something similarly abysmal. either that or they would be sold for several hundred dollars each in which case who could afford them? Given the time and effort, it would take fewer man-hours for the handful of people interested in these works to spend some time learning basic German.

Give a man a fish and he eats a meal. Teach him to fish and he can feed himself. or something like that.

Oh, and to get google to translate you can't be looking at the images, you need to click on the "plain text" link on the top right. the plain text is OCRed which means that sometimes the letters don't come through right, but you do get actual text that google can try to translate instead of a static image.

Examples of Austrian Utilization of Light and Line troops:
Background: 1769 reforms and regulations allowed the third rank of each company to be taken off and combined with the next company in a separate ‘Zug'…They could be used to extend the line, as flank guards or skirmishers, leaving the formed troops in two ranks. At the same time Empress Maria Theresa decreed that the Grenzer were to be trained and employed as troops of the line. [Rothenberg, The Military Border in Criatia: 1740-1881 pp. 18-29]

Coburg's 1793 Instructions specifically turned these third rank "Zug" units into attack squads, which were very effective when combined with light cavalry in clearing French skirmishers. [From Tom H.'s book on the Austrian Infantry.]

1793-1794

"The French had occupied Röthgener Castle ('Röthgener Burg), and the hamlet Oberröthgen south of Eschweiler, both south of the Inde brook. From these, the Austrian troops advancing along the road from Weisweiler to Aachen came under fire. Therefore the second column, commanded by General Davidovich, was deployed against these positions and ordered forward. Leading the attack was the light infantry, which passed the farmstead 'Patternhof', and drove the French without much trouble from their positions at both Oberröthgen and Röthgener Castle. West of the hamlet Oberröthgen the Austrians deployed both guns captured previously at Weisweiler, and fired several shots at the retreating French, which were pulling back to the Stich Hill. The raising terrain in front of the Stich Hill was completely without cover.
Several efforts of the Austrians to storm the French positions were in vain, and all were repulsed with heavy Austrian loss. French fire was so effective that the Austrians abandoned Röthgener Castle and Oberröthgen again, pulling back behind the Patternhof and taking cover in a huge orchard east of this farmstead. The stalemate lasted until about 13.30 pm. Around that time two locals reported to the Austrians that they knew a way to reach the French positions unseen and were willing to guide them.
Assigned the 1 1/2 company of Tyroler Jäger, about 120 men, these locals led them through a deeply cut hollow road into the Eschweiler Forest, from here following a path hidden by trees and thick bushes, right behind the French positions on the Stich Hill. Arriving there, the Tyrolean's at once opened fire at the surprised French gunners and the infantry covering them. The French limbered up their guns, and retreated hastily along the road to Stolberg, crossing the Inde Brook, and following the road through the village Eilendorf to Aachen. They were pursued for a while by part of the jäger. On the Stich Hill the French had abandoned much of their baggage and ammunition.

Source: "The Battle of Aldenhoven / Aix-La Chapelle, 1793" by Geert van Uythoven [First Empire No. 68, Jan/Feb 2003].
An article by H.P.R. von Porbeck, that has appeared in 'Neue Bellona' I (Leipzig 1802): "Die Schlacht bei Tourcoing". Porbeck was present during the battle. The article contains the complete, official 'Hauptdisposition'. It says about the Austrian "Hauptarmee"

"Hauptdisposition, fur die verschiedene Armee-theile."

Hauptquartier Valenciennes, den 1ten April 1794."
"Because the enemy is very easy being pushed back, when we can advance into his flanks or in the back, each column reserves 200 volunteers at the start [of the fighting/attack], each hundred with a captain and 2 officers, which have to be bold and determined men. These men are destined, together with the light infantry and to support these, left and right from the road [formed movement was mostly only possible along the roads, see former messages], to turn the wings and flanks, [of] the enemy troops, positions and post, to facilitate the advance of the columns, or to turn, or storm, the enemy entrenchments when present."
[signed] Prinz Coburg, F.M.

A French description of French and Austrian skirmisher action. In 1793, General Giradon informs us about the way in which one employed them:

"the Doriol General, after having made signaled with four shots, detached 100 riflemen per battalion and forced the enemy line back on Bouxwiller. The two battalions of the 2e regiment, that of Chaumont, and those of the 1st regiment, 7th of Meurthe, Dieuze and Chàteau-Saline were sent to go to edge of a wood close to Mietesheim, with order to excavate this wood and to flush out the enemy; 100 riflemen were detach by battalion. Unfortunately, the enemy riflemen made a very sharp fire: our battalions could not support the effort. The Enemy forced us to retire." Hake, p. LXVII, citing the Newspaper of the major Girardon (Files of the War.)

The Austrians had always more riflemen than us in this war. Brushmaker will still notice in 1800 "this crowd of riflemen who usually accompany the attacks by the Austrians." [Of Cugnac, Campagne of the reserve army, fall II, p. 432]

[1864 reprint of Duheme's Essai historique sur l'Infantrerie Legere page 72.] Duheme was present in Flanders during this time and has a great deal to say about the Austrians:

"These advanced guards, well handled, only disputed their ground long enough to make us waste time and men. They brought us from one position to another till they reached that which they really meant to defend. There they let us use up and scatter our last battalions whose ardour generally shattered itself against their entrenchments. Then fresh troops issued from them in the most perfect order, they in their turn, threw out skirmishers upon our flanks, and thus they charged at advantage troops dispersed and fatigued, corps in disorder and unable to rally most of their men.

Duhesme later in his work writes,

"We did not have other light infantry only the 12 battalions of foot chasseurs. The Austrians approached with more, more skilful and more tested light troops. The panic, fear and the routs of our troops left the columns of Valencians and Lille to address [the Austrians] as they slipped to the sides of these columns. Their riflemen, hidden behind shrubs, in ditches, afflicted our battalions, which, bravely in line, suffered ten-per-cent loses without seeing their enemy. "(p. 85)

Duhesme (p. 102) gives a graphic description of the Austrian light infantry tactics as it was experienced by him':

"In spring 1794, as already said, the Austrians opened the campaign in the north with the siege of Landrecies, they put up measures, which were suitable to weaken and to exhaust the French élan, which had been so disastrous for them in the past. They concentrated the observation army around that place, put into fortifications, placed big reserves and advanced the advance guards as far as possible. These well commanded advance guards did contest the terrain only as long as possible to inflict losses in time and tirailleurs. By that they drew us from one position to the other till to those they really intended to defend. Then they let us disperse our last battalions and let us exhaust ourselves, whose fire was broken by their fortified lines. Fresh troops emerged in most splendid order from them, placed themselves tirailleurs into our flanks, and attacked as such with big advantage our disordered and exhausted soldiers and disarrayed units of whose majority couldn't even rally around their colours. Fortunate for those divisions, where a cautious general had retained a reserve which was able to cover the retreat and to prevent a rout."

An Austrian commentary:

"Because the enemy is very easy being pushed back, we can advance into his flanks or in the back, each column reserves 200 volunteers at the start [of the fighting/attack], each hundred with a captain and 2 officers, which have to be bold and determined men. These men are destined, together with the light infantry and to support these, left and right from the road [formed movement was mostly only possible along the roads, see former messages], to turn the wings and flanks, [of] the enemy troops, positions and post, to facilitate the advance of the columns, or to turn, or storm, the enemy entrenchments when present."
Hauptdisposition, fur die verschiedene Armee-theile."
Hauptquartier Valenciennes, den 1ten April 1794."

Geert van Uythoven is responsible for translating many of these passages. His website where these and others can be found is:
members.home.nl/uythoven

1799
An example of Austrian grenadiers fighting as skirmishers is presented in the after action report of FML Vincenz Kollowrath to Archduke Charles (signed Emmingen ob Eck, 31st March 1799). FML Kollowrat commanded the Reserve during the battle of Stockach. The grenadiers were a part of the reserve at that day:

"…I ordered the grenadier battalions Tegethoff and Bojakowsky to advance against the enemy with their music playing. Because I met enemy skirmishers immediately on the first heigth, I ordered a half company to deploy in skirmisher order, followed by the remainder of the Tegethoff battalion in close order. They dislodged the enemy out of the woods; this battalion advanced bravely and energetic….
"Österreichisches Staatsarchiv – Kriegsarchiv, Vienna; Alte Feldakten – Deutschland 1799/3/179

The battle of Ostrach (21st March 1799) was fought in broken terrain. During the heavy fights in the forests around Ostrach the Austrians used their line infantry as skirmishers. This is noticed in the after action report of FML Baillet to Archeduke Charles
(signed Spöck, 21st March 1799).

"…I will not refrain from informing Your Royal Higness that 3 battalions Lacy & 2 battalions Von Schröder already have arrived in the encampment left of the road from Ostrach to Foulendorf; the 3rd battalion Von Schröder however, which was used for skirmishing inside the forest, is still dispersed and will arrive late – my quarters are inside the first house in Specht. "
Österreichisches Staatsarchiv – Kriegsarchiv, Vienna; Alte Feldakten, Deutschland 1799/3/225

Part of the reason that FML Baillet used Line troops as skirmishers is that he had no jagers, Freiwillingers, or Grenz in his command. On December 1, 1800. FZM Riesch and now FZM Baillet fought against Ney at Ampfing. Neither command contained any light troops, yet James Arnold in his Marengo and Hohenlinden writes on p. 218:

"To hold his position, Desperrières utilized constant maneuver to compensate for his lack of numbers. He stripped manpower from an unegaged sector to meet an Austrian assault, and then hustled the soldiers back to their original position in time to meet a new attack. Eventually, his tactical touch could not contend against overwhelming force. With both flanks turned and a cloud of Habsburg light infantry in his rear, Desperrières ordered a withdrawal.

From Bernhard Voykowitsch's Castiglione 1796 p. 36:

During the 1792-97 war the Grenzers did not fight in the 34 field battalions the regular establishment would have provided for. Instead in 1793 only so-called componierte (combined) battalions of 6 companies and two battalions Grenz-Scharfschützen of 4 companies each had been formed. Due to the emergencies of the 1796 campaign this number rose to 45…

The many free corps were of various origin: here only those freecorps will be dealt with which actually saw service in Italy. The first was the Giulay Kratisches Frei-Corps raised in the Grenz too but on a voluntary basis. The establishment of its battalions was identical with that of the regular Grenz units. The other free corps was the Deutsche Feld-jager under colonel Mahony raised from foresters: it consisted of 10 companies o f 4 officers, NCOs, 3 buglers and 200 privates each.

Usually all this light infantry [Grenz and freecorps] was not employed in full battalions but was distributed by companies to the different brigades. In Austrian rosters and orders of battle of the time they are usually counted by companies.

Bill

1809-1814:

Source: Anon.: "Geschichte des kaiserlich-östreichischen 7. Linien-Infanterie-Regiments Großherzog Toskana [former 'Von Schröder']", in 'OMZ' 3. Band, 8. Heft (Wien 1824) pp. 195-196:

"During the fierce fighting at Ebersberg (3 May), a division [i.e. 2 companies] of the regiment, commanded by Captain Siegler, had the opportunity to distinguish itself. The enemy tried to cross the ditch moving through the suburbs of Ebersburg, in order to cut off the battalion of Wiener volunteers fighting in the city, commanded by Major Graf Salis. When Captain Siegler noticed this, on his own account, left the second line and charged the enemy, throwing them back, taking 150 prisoners, and liberating the battalion 'Salis'. The captain received, for his brave voluntary deed, the Order of Theresia from the Capitel."

At Teugen-Hausen, described in the same volume:

"Also not meeting any resistance further up, FML Lusignan's force had marched between the woods and he had arrived on the hill just beyond with the lead battalions of his brigade, which was deployed in battle order, when the sounds of a lively firefight could be heard from the direction of Teugen. Austrian skirmishers and patrols from the brigade, who had descended the slope to Teugen, together with sharpshooters from the Peterwardein Grenzers, who had advanced through Roith and across the Buchberg, had run into French units there. FML Lusignan now hastily despatched the forward closed up units onto the north-eastern slope of the Buchberg and positioned his main battalions, which were only now slowly advancing through the woods and gradually reaching the line, together with their battery to the north of the woods".

Elsewhere, in Volume IV, of Krieg 1809 there is yet another description of IR7 deploying skirmishers at Urfahr from the third rank, also to reinforce the jäger and grenzer.

The Austrian history of the 1809 battle Krieg 1809 is filled with examples of line troops skirmishing in conjunction with Grenz and Jagers or by themselves. I was fortunate enough to get my hands on a copy of volumes II and IV--in German, of course, but the parts I did translate gave many examples. Here are some:

1. The third Zug of several line regiments are thrown foreward at the beginning of the battle (page 224, volume II )

2. The IR33 deploys skirmishers during the engagement at Landshut, later together with IR3 they repeatedly deploy skirmishers at the orders of GM Radetsky.(vol. II)

In volume II and IV, there are numerous instances of line regiments reinforcing Jager and Grenzer skirmish lines which are advancing or in firefights with the French.

3. At Znaym,

"The advanced pickets of the Mittrowsky IR10 engaged, and were supported by their battalion, and covered by a 12 pdr position battery, obstructed the enemy's advance, until one battalion of Kollowrath IR11, and two pieces of ordnance came up commanded by Lieutenant Loffler." Later, "a second battalion was detached to this height, and a chain of riflemen formed, to force those of the enemy back into the village."

Carl Varnhagen von Ense, an officer in IR47 Vogelsang, left an account of his regiment at Wagram in Die Schlacht von Wagram, last published in 1909.

In this he describes how his regiment was lying down to avoid enemy cannon fire when "almost all" the company commanded by Hauptmann von Marais was deployed as skirmishers. The company "dissolved into skirmishers, behind willow tree trunks and high corn", and then later "The skirmishers were called back from the Russbach and stepped back into line."

And from the same account:

"To the left, and not far from the fifth Corps the first was formed in two lines on the heights before Brenditz; it occupied with one battalion the entrance to the ravine on its right flank, and the neighboring vineyards with riflemen and Jagers."

In October 1813, at Hanau, 2nd battalion IR14 "moved forward to support the Bavarian skirmishers in front of the Lamberwald. When the skirmishers were driven back, skirmishers of this battalion moved forward, established a lively fire and halted the enemy advance."

And later account, by an officer in 3rd battalion IR63 Bianchi , published in Mitteilungen des kuk Heeresmuseum (1902-1907), describes masses deploying skirmishers at Valeggio in February 1814.

"GM Baron Stutterheim rode up and ordered us to form division masses, then to wheel to the left and march off towards the enemy; muskets were to be loaded on the march. The masses were drawn up in a chequer board arrangement with IR63 on the left. Our masses sent out skirmishers (from IR3 Erzherzog Karl, IR4 Deutchmeister and IR63); the four guns, which were attached to our brigade, unlimbered and took up their firing positions and now the firing was general. The enemy deployed gradually across a longer front and forced us to dissolve the masses into open order skirmish lines."

There are lots more examples.

Bill

Shane wrote;

I have the translation bar but when you try to read the book it is still in German. Sadly I never took up German in High school, a choice I regret now.

These books need to be translated into English and put out into the market. I would jump at the chance to own many of them.

Shane:
I agree they do, but I wouldn't hold your breath.

Have you changed the text into "plain text" before hitting the translate button? You have several choices above the book page including plain text and PDF.

Of course, the translator can't deal with the Gothic Script in PDF. My oldest son reads German fluently and still gets headaches with the old script.

If you still can't get a translation with plain text German, then I don't know what's wrong.

Bill

Vendome,

although I would love to study and learn German I just do not have the time. However, historians are translating non-English works all of the time over the past 50 years or so. You only have to look at recent work by Scott Bowden amongst others in this. These guys do it for a living and do it well. It is the work of them as professionals that I admire, I simply do not have the talent nor time to halt my own life choices to do what they do every day of their lives…do you understand my meaning?

Bill,

Thank you for your quotes, this and the other information provided by Kevin is the stuff I am looking for here. I have little personal knowledge on the Austrians from their early years and how their army evolved over time from those early beginnings right through the Napoleonic wars. The more information you guys provide the clearer picture we can get on this evolution and discuss the issues around the subject more accurately.

I thank you.

I do Shane, I'm just saying that it will be slow going waiting for it. Either that, or you will be paying a lot of money. or probably both. You will get more and better access faster by investing some time, and then will have mountains of free material available to you that would takes decades and many dollars to acquire otherwise if it gets translated at all. More bang for the buck.

I personally think it would be a worthwhile investment of your time, even if it meant taking some hours each week away from forum participation. Maybe less fun, but long-term more rewarding. Fluency would be very time consuming, learning some basics to be able to get the gist of it and see what you need to work through in detail (or ask for help with) doesn't require so much time, really.

Please excuse the repeat of the Dehusme quote. I had two translations of the same paragraph from two different editions of the book.

I am adding this because it is an excellent example of how the third rank was used in general during the Revolutionary wars, by all the Allies including the Prussians and British, and here specifically the Austrians. And how that could be used as skirmishers.

17 April 1794: The after action report of GM von Petrasch
(Bericht des Kayserlichen General-majors von Petrasch)

Translation by Geert van Uythoven

Note: On 17 April 1794 , the Allies started their spring campaign with an all out attack on the French armies near Lanrecy. The attack was executed by eight columns, made up from Austrian, Dutch, and Anglo-Allied forces. The Duke of York commanded the 4th Column, consisting of Austrian and Anglo-Allied units. His advance guard, led by GM Abercromby, consisted of the Husaren Regiment "Erzherzog Ferdinand" (Austrian, 5 squadrons, Colonel Devay), a squadron of light dragoons (British), Freikorps O'Donell (Austrian, 10 companies), and 4 'cavalry guns'. These troops were supported by a brigade of three Austrian grenadiers battalions, commanded by GM Petrasch.

Source: ‘Von D', "Feldzug der verbundenen Armeen in Flandern, im Jahre 1794", in ‘Neues militairisches Journal' 9. Band 18. Stück (Hannover 1798) pp. 297-302. The notes are by ‘Von D.'

"After the grenadier brigade had marched into the bowl behind the first windmill, I received the order to deploy a battery consisting of an 18-pdr, two 12-pdr's, and a 6-pdr, and to bombard the enemy redoubt with these, while at the same time to the left a similar battery was deployed, to enfilade the enemy redoubt. At the same time, the advanced grenadiers had to endure a heavy cannon and howitzer fire, which however was without much effect.

While the battery was firing, I received order from the Duke of York to storm the redoubt with the grenadiers. I formed another battery of four 6-pdr's which was followed by the ‘Manessy' [grenadier] battalion 1) at a distance of 80 paces, in such a way that the battery was on my left wing, and a such was covered by it. The third rank covered my right flank as reserve, until the arrival of the English artillery to this purpose, which arrived almost immediately and advanced resolute."

1) One of the three grenadier battalions that was under the orders of the general.

"The ‘Ulm', and the ‘Rouviere' [grenadier] battalion followed at a distance of 300 paces as supports. I moved into a dip of the terrain, with much covered the troops for the enemy fire, as long to the right, hoping to gain the flank [of the enemy].

Then I observed that the enemy had abandoned the grand redoubt, and mostly continued firing with his cavalry guns, of which three were aimed at my battery, at the first shots disabling a 6-pdr cannon. Soon his fire slackened, and it seemed that his intention was to occupy the redoubt at the entrance of La Haye Mandresse village, to prevent our advance any further."

At that moment, I took the 'd'Alton' grenadier division 2), and stormed to the redoubt and the entrenched entrance of the village, and arrived before the enemy. At the same time, with the utmost violence, Captain Reinwald and Lieutenant-Colonel Bousgutgnon with the ‘Wartensleben' division, forced the entrenched entrance of the forest, and captured it.

The captains that had stayed with the third rank in reserve: Von Debaut with ‘Wartensleben'; Graf Spork with ‘d'Alton'; and Graf St. Julien with ‘Joseph Colloredo' (the latter being wounded during this event), turned the flank of the enemy, and with the in the meanwhile advanced battery which had deployed in the enemy [grand] redoubt, the enemy was wedged in, and despite its heavy musketry was forced back, pushed back trough the forest with great force, and pursued.

2) The third part of one of the three grenadier battalions, apparently the ‘Manessy' [battalion].
3) From every Austrian infantry battalion, the third rank is formed in a division of 2 ranks, which follows the battalion and serves as a reserve, or acts on its flanks… in either formed or as skirmishers.

"On the other side of the forest, at Bequigny, the [grenadier] battalions, the artillery, two divisions of the ‘Erzherzog Ferdinand' Hussars under Major Löper, and Lieutenant-Colonel O'Donnell with part of his Freicorps, reformed again. After the arrival of the English Lieutenant-General [Major-General?] Abercromby the supports were ordered to remain in Bequigny, while the light troops were ordered to push through the woods to Bohain [village], to ascertain if the enemy had abandoned this place, which was also done by Colonel Devay [with the ‘Erzherzog Ferdinand' Hussars] from the other side. Because the enemy had fled to St. Quentin an Guise, the advance guard occupied Bohain at daybreak, and I advanced to the heights behind them as support." [Italics mine]

signed) von Petrasch
Generalmajor.

Bill

Vendome,

I do see your point. Funny thing is that one of my friends is about to learn German early next year so I might yet hang off his study on this to learn from him rudimentary skills in German. But it really depends on the intensity of my own current study which takes up huge amounts of time.

We will see.

And here is a short article by Dave Hollins from the distant past concerning the Grenz 1799-1800:

The main Austrian light force was the Grenzer regiments from the Military Frontier, which occupied what is now northern Croatia, northern Serbia and central Romania. After devastating losses in the 1788-91 Turkish war and a series of failed harvests, the Frontier regiments had only put a few composite battalions into the field during the First Coalition and were also in need of reform. The whole area was still suffering with dire poverty and neglect.

The basic subject was covered in AoNs 11-13 plus errata in 14, but in brief, from 1769, the Grenzer Regiments had been designated as Line troops holding the titles from IR60-76. In 1798, the Grenzers were removed from the Line and designated as 17 National Border (Nationalgrenz) Infantry regiments. As before, the Frontier and its units were organised into 6 Districts (Generalcies). Heavy losses during the campaigns would force the authorities to find reinforcements from Hungary, Civil Croatia and even Moravia.

For the Second Coalition, the western regiments of the Karlstadt, Warasdin and Banal Districts (Regiments 1-6 and 10/11) fielded their regulation two battalions each together. In addition, in 1797, the Ungarisches Banal Erstes Feld Bataillon – the First Field Battalion – was raised from the Banal District, comprising three companies each from the two Banal District regiments. The Slavonian District (Nos. 7-9) also fielded their two battalions per regiment, together with additional field battalions from each regiment. The 9th (Peterwardein) Regiment provided two extra battalions (3rd and 4th), while the Brod and Gradiska Regiments added a 3rd Battalion each, a total of 10 battalions in all, the additional troops being raised in 1799.

The eastern regiments of the Banat (12 & 13) and Siebenburgen (14-17) Districts continued to field composite battalions drawing on all their Regiments, as they tried to organise their units properly on the regulation footing.

The Banat had a mixed population of Germanic settlers and assorted Slavs (Serbs and Wallach, a mixture of Romanians and Bulgars), officially forming the 12th and 13th Regiments respectively. The former 1st and 3rd Banat battalions had been disbanded in 1797 to form the 1st Battalion of the Wallach- Illyrian (13th) Regiment. The 2nd and 4th Banat were formed in May 1796, both comprising three companies from each Regiment, the 4th becoming the 2. Feld Bataillon of the (12th) Deutsch-Banat Regiment in 1798. The 5th Banat Battalion, raised also from three companies from each Regiment in September 1796, became the 1. Feld Bataillon of the (12th) Deutsch-Banat Regiment in 1797. Raised in the same way, the 6th Banat Battalion, raised in 1797 became the 2. Feld Bataillon of the (13th) Wallach-Illyrian Regiment in the same year. Thus in all, the Banat raised five battalions. These ethnically mixed battalions were disbanded after the War and the separate nationalities reformed into the regulation battalions.

The Siebenburgen District managed to retain ethnically separate units, the Szeckels and Hungarians forming units from the 14th and 15th (Szeckler) Regiments, while the Wallach (or Vlach) provided units from the 16th and 17th (Wallach) Regiments. Survivors from the First Coalition, the 2nd Szeckler Battalion comprised three companies from each Regiment. In 1799, the 4th and 5th Szeckler battalions were raised wholly from the 1st Szeckler (14th) and 2nd Szeckler (15th) Regiments respectively, together with a small 6th Szeckler Battalion formed from two companies from each Regiment.

The Wallach fielded three composite battalions, raised originally during the First Coalition. The 1. Wallach Bataillon had been formed in 1793 from 4 companies each from the two Regiments. The 2. Wallach Bataillon had been raised in 1796 with an initial strength of three companies from each Regiment. Reduced to just two companies by June 1799, hasty recruitment raised its complement back to six companies again by October that year (two companies from 16th Regiment and four from the 17th). During the Autumn 1800 armistice, these battalions were broken down and reformed as the two battalions of the 16th Regiment. At the same time, the former 3rd Wallach Battalion, raised in September 1796 with three companies from the 16th Regiment and one from the 17th was likewise mixed and matched into the 1. Feld Bataillon of the 17th Regiment.

Austrian Light Infantry 1799-1801 by Dave Hollins

This is all excellent primary stuff, but I am still left with a question about Grenzers. Simply put, I don't see anything that suggests Grenzers were doing any of this skirmishing. I see allusions to line units, grenadiers, and jagers, but I haven't seen anything saying that Grenzers did this stuff or how.

Now admittedly if every other type of unit was skirmish-capable, it would be perverse to insist Grenzers were not. What I am left pondering is what made Grenzers special, because if we accept that they were light infantry, well, so was everyone else!

It is good news though because I had been wondering how the hell an Austrian 1805 army was going to survive against a French one with no skirmishers. Seems it doesn't have to.

I would also be interested in any info people have on how the volunteer and Freicorps companies were distributed. IIRC (and I'm away from my spreadsheet) the number of companies was about the same as the number of regiments in the army, so one per regiment would be about right. I have no idea of their strength or whether this was how they were used. Does anyone else? Bueller? Anyone?

Grenzer at least had their sharpshooters equipped with rifles along with them, that for sure would give additional skirmishing capabilities.

Also – what did the French do with those Grenzer units they took over after 1809 – they used them as light infantry.

very good point

Aha, did they? That would be an excellent point, though I dunno if it tells me much about 1800-1805…

Shane
I'm not much good on the primary sources, but Duffy's Eagles over the Alps on Suvurov's 1799 contains the following quote (p 53) from the Austrian officer/historia Stutterheim:

"…I must mention that in those earlier campaigns [1796/7] hard experience taught our infantry to fight in small groups and in open and mutually supporting ranks, and that many officers acquired…a complete understanding of the kleine krieg – both of them prerequisites for fighting in Italy. Conversely very many of the troops of the old French army had embarked with Bonaparte for Egypt, and the newcomers from Germany could not get their bearings in Italy. I mention this circumstance because it told very much to the advantage of the Austrian army and contributed greatly to the successful outcome of its operations in Italy."

Duffy gives chapter and verse on this quote, drawn from Stutterheim's history of 1799 published in 1812. The army at Marengo was substantially the same as the army used by Suvorov, so these comments would apply in that context (though not necessarily for the French).

Personally bitter experience has made me suspicious of this type of generalised comment, event from officers that were there. It's always good to back it up with an analysis what really happened in the battles, so far as we can get this. There isn't quite enough detail in Duffy's book for this.

In 1809 Gill's account of the battles in Bavaria is very interesting (if highly secondary). It is clear to me from this that by this stage at least Austrians deployed third line skirmishers freely. At Teugn (by his reading) they gave a good account of themselves against the French (though I expect this was mainly a numbers game). Later in his first volume Gill says that both the French and Austrian commentators thought the Austrians were usually outfought by the French in skirmish battles, though.

It is also clear from Gill that the Grenz could and did fight as light infantry in 1809, but that their performance was often poor. This seems to be more from a lack of will to fight than lack of skill – but I think there were exceptions. My impression with the Grenz in 1809 is that each unit needs to be rated, rather than using a generic rating.

No doubt our much more learned friends can throw more light on this.

Matthew

4th Cuirassier wrote: This is all excellent primary stuff, but I am still left with a question about Grenzers. Simply put, I don't see anything that suggests Grenzers were doing any of this skirmishing. I see allusions to line units, grenadiers, and jagers, but I haven't seen anything saying that Grenzers did this stuff or how.

4th Cuirassier:

Every time you see the term "Light Infantry" or "Riflemen" in the material I provided from 1794-1796, that is probably Grenzers because when the Jagers are mentioned, they are called Jagers. And during that time there weren't that many of Jagers.

I would also be interested in any info people have on how the volunteer and Freicorps companies were distributed. IIRC (and I'm away from my spreadsheet) the number of companies was about the same as the number of regiments in the army, so one per regiment would be about right. I have no idea of their strength or whether this was how they were used. Does anyone else? Bueller? Anyone?

Bernhard Voykowitsch says [again on p.36].

A six-company Grenzer battalion had a war estalbishment of 25 officers, 114 NCO's, 1 artillery NCO [for the battalion guns], 7 surgeons, 12 grummers, 6 fifers, 29 gunners, 1200 men, 26 officers' servants [batmen], and 12 craftsmen a total of 1432. Unlike the line infantry Grenzer units usually reached their strength.

During the 1792-97 war the Grenzers did not fight in the 34 field battalions the regular establishment would have provided for. Instead in 1793 only so-called componierte (combined) battalions of 6 companies and two battalions Grenz-Scharfschützen of 4 companies each had been formed. Due to the emergencies of the 1796 campaign this number rose to 45… [from 14. BH]

The many free corps were of various origin: here only those freecorps will be dealt with which actually saw service in Italy. The first was the Giulay Kratisches Frei-Corps raised in the Grenz too but on a voluntary basis. The establishment of its battalions was identical with that of the regular Grenz units. The other free corps was the Deutsche Feld-jager under colonel Mahony raised from foresters: it consisted of 10 companies of 4 officers, NCOs, 3 buglers and 200 privates each.

Bill

There are some things that play into all this that Matthew's quote and the French using the Croats as Light Infantry are good examples of:

1. From 1792-1815 there is a cycle of experienced light infantry, loses, new, inexperienced troops being cycled in, causing waves of competency and inadequacy back to competency among ALL the armie--both locally and across entire armies.

2. There was a strong belief among all nations' military men that certain nations were 'naturals', requiring little training to be good, whether they were German Foresters, Tryolian Jagers, or the Grenz… and of course, the French.

The idea that any infantry could be trained to be excellent light infantry was a relatively new idea, not one entertained during the SYW. Either the light infantry were from the cultures that produced 'natural skirmishers' or they were the scum and bandits of the Free corps.

That is why the Austrians, in their Krieg 1809 history of the war concluded that

"it was not realized that the soldier, unless possessing a natural aptitude for skirmishing, must be carefully trained for independent action.'

It is why the British, from 1792 to 1800 build light infantry from Germans, Corsicans and the French. The 5th Rifle battalion of the 60th is all German. The writer of the British Light Infantry manual was German. Larry, who Gates says also helped develop the British light infantry arm with his books was French who taught in the Berlin Milirary Academy.

3. Of course, the last issue is one of changing skirmish practices. What the French, British, Russians, Austrians, and Prussians were doing in 1805 in both methods and organization is not what they are doing in 1810 to 1812.
Those changes were bound to reduce unit effectiveness until the bugs where ironed out.

Bill

4th Cuirassier:

Sorry, but I missed answering your question about "how the volunteer and Freicorps companies were distributed."

They were distributed by company and each column formed and historically were given between 0 and 6 light companies depending on the column's battle mission.

In the Austrian Army in Italy 1796, most brigades were given one or two companies, though some had as many as 4 to 6 companies and a few didn't, but then had hussar squadrons as compensation.

With Suvorov in 1799 the Austrian Jagers were brigaded with the only Grenz in the army under Ott.

In 1800, Melas's Italian Army had eight companies in the Advanced Guard, but few if any with the line brigades. The Austrian army in Germany that fought at Holenlinden didn't have many light troops at all, but about half the brigades had 1 company of Jagers or Freecorps. All the Grenz were in battalions, but those brigades with Grenz didn't have light companies attached.

In 1805, the Grenz battalions were brigaded in the Advanced Guard before and at Austerlitz.

The Austrians until 1809 and after saw battalions and companies as little building blocks to be added and subtracted from ad hoc 'columns' [5,000 to 10,000 men] as the moment seemed to require, so you see different organizations of Grenz and Freecorps in every army between 1793 to 1805. The Austrian armies in German 1794-1797 distributed companies pretty much as the 1796 Italian army did, but not always. Some columns were considered 'Advanced Guards' while others got no light companies at all. I am sure that availability also played a part in the organization.

Bill

@ bill

This is all excellent stuff. It sounds then like Grenzers can indeed be used as light infantry in the earlier period, with a few Freikorps attached in proprotion to overall force size and role.