"Skirmish Doctrine gathering " Topic

'Kevin is actually saying he used Zh. & Zh.'s bibliography to find interesting Russian sources.'

Amazing that people can actually not only put words in someone's mouth, but can read their thoughts as well-absolutely incredible.

Since I only listed one source, you are absolutely incorrect. The material I posted, and there were no quotes, merely paraphrasing, came from the Zhmodikovs' books. If you have a problem with it then I suggest you take issue with the material.

K

Shane,

Don't you just love it when people get caught red-handed doing something they oughtn't and then vehemently deny it?

Butter wouldn't melt in their mouths, as my mother used to say.

Then they turn around and blame somebody else for what they themselves have done. I believe in the world of psychobabble that is referred to as 'projecting.'

Prisons are full of innocent people, did you know that? All you have to do is ask the prisoners themselves-they'll tell you.

And you're right-this thread is shot. At least Bill tried to salvage it. There are too many marplots I think.

Give us all a bloody break.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Sorry Kevin, just trying to give you the benefit of the doubt. I couldn't figure out why you were rambling on about encoding difficulties when Zh. & Zh. is entirely, even the references, in Latin characters. I see Bill was right in the first place, you were just making a wisecrack about a hypothetical.

But that is part of the problem. Justonemore's point about full, original citations really refers to the tangential issue involving Radetzky. Gracefully acknowledging Frayer brought up an interesting caveat and we should try to find the original would make this conversation less rancorous.

Justonemore's objection to: The issue is integrating the tactical operations of the light troops, or line troops if that is the case, in open or skirmish order with those of the troops in line. As late as 1808 the Prussians, Russians, and Austrians couldn't or wouldn't do this. is a challenge. I don't think anyone would object to you supporting your assertion from Zh. & Zh., which is an excellent monograph. I don't see much there, but then I may not have an eye for the cherrys;-)

I have no idea what Shane is going on about. Rejecting an argument is not a personal insult.

NSN
Pomme de terre, Vendémiaire, An CCXVIII

I have no idea what Shane is going on about. Rejecting an argument is not a personal insult. Then again, Shane seems to have an emotional breakdown in every thread that gets going, so maybe it's just habitual.

and there ya have it, another personal attack. Your a tough man behind you computer screen aren't you?

amazing, I try to put up a thread for positive reasons for us all but once again the attacks by the SAME faces just keeps on coming. It is no wonder I get frustrated about it when guys like you enjoy ruining what was a good discussion. You have added NOTHING to this thread until now and here you are, launching into a very clear personal attack once again.

Just how mant times have you been DH'd lately for personal attacks?

and there ya have it, another personal attack. Your a tough man behind you computer screen aren't you?

Aren't they though? I have frequently seen Hollins at various Napoleonic-related events over here and have never felt the need to talk to him, but I'm keen to get a face-to-face explanantion of the term 'Idiot Tendency' and why he thinks it applies to me.

I hear you Ian, these guys just take things to a whole new dirty low level. They cannot be civil, polite and moderate in their tone. They have to resort to attack and snide personal remarks for some reason only god knows why?

They disgust me with their ever quest to in insult and bully, a past-time they just seem to delight in. Get em into the real world face to face with you and I would bet they would not dare act like this and say half the snide comments they come out with here.

I know only about the Russians. Let's review the bidding ….

1. 10th Marines posted two out of context comments about the Russsian light infantry : Duhesme and Surtees.
When we look at the contexts, we find (i) Duhesme never saw or fought the Russians, (ii) Surtees once saw them disembarking from landing ships and never again, (iii) both were writing about 1799 in Holland, which is (iv) before the Napoelonic era proper and (v) involved exactly two half-strength battalions of Russian jägers, and that (vI) the Russians themselves were not too pleased with these jägers : they were disbanded and the commander sent to oversee the ash and trash detail for the navy on some Finnish rock – so hardly a "typical" unit even for 1799.

2. 10th Marines proffered the alleged Radetzky out of context quote about "the Austrians and the Russians".
But actually this traces to an English language work by Rothenburg published in 1982. In the original Rothenburg text, which was footnoted to an Army of Bohemia internal document of September 1813, there is only the indentification "we", with not a clue as to who this "we" is. 10th Marines doesn't have the original document, so he can provide no explanation, identification or context.

3. Next we have the rather strange statement that "The problem the British, Russians, Austrians, and Prussians had with the new French tactical system is that as of 1792 no one, except for the French, had attempted to integrate regular light infantry with regular line infantry in formation on the battlefield."
This ignores decades of Russian light infantry experience fighting the Prussians, Persians, Turks, Swedes, Poles and various Native peoples. The formal Russian doctrine dates from 1761, and perhaps earier. To illustrate the point, I proffered the regulations put into effect 1783-1786, complete in the original language with the illustrations – clearly showing typical line and light infantry integration and with evolutions bearing a strong resemblmance to Davout's instructions of almost 30 years (!) later.

4. Then we have "The issue is integrating the tactical operations of the light troops, or line troops if that is the case, in open or skirmish order with those of the troops in line. As late as 1808 the Prussians, Russians, and Austrians couldn't or wouldn't do this."
When pressed for some source support for this rather absurd assertion, we are told by 10th Marines "I found the material on the Russians from the two volume work Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars by Alexander Zhmodikov and Yurii Zhmodikov." This is a modern secondary source in the English language with the usual Latin alphabet. There is no Cyrillic alphabet problem with posting information from it, despite 10th Marines rather confused/confusing assertion that he "can't post anything in Russian because my keyboard does not have a Cyrillic option".
NSN and I both looked through the book. We can't find this "material".

In summary, 10th Marines has repeatedly shown no interest in sharing information that is useful and relevant with typical and normal source quotation and context. We cannot determine where his sources' words and ideas stop and where his own personal ideas and conclusions start. When measured by the usual standards of usual historical investigation and discussion, his contributions here with regard to the Russians are useless.

I will leave it to others to determine if his "material" regarding the Prussians and Austrians is equally devoid of accurate and relevant source support. Reading over the coments of other members, it would appear that indeed this is the case.

Please note, there is not a single personal remark in this post. I am commenting only on the nature and value of the material posted by 10th Marines. I am writing about his posts and his methods of source utilization. I am not writing about him, his character, his personality, his motives, his honesty or his intelligence.

I would eagerly make the identical comments in person if I were to meet 10th Marines.

McLaddie,

I am so sorry – I missed a question from you.

The Russian Army jägers reached a total of 57 regiments by late 1813 – 171 battalions and an establishment of about 110,000 men. In addition, there were light infantry formations in the Guard, in the Opochenie (militia) and among the Native units.
Additionally, there was 1 grenadier company out of four per line battalion that could be called upon for detached light infantry service. Half of this company was composed of specially selected marksmen.

The French fielded some 37 French légère regiments in the Army, if my memory serves me well. That would make something like 140 battalions in 1812/1813 – and a total establishment above 100,000 men.
Additionally, there was 1 specially selected volitguer company out of six per line battalion. There were more light infantry formations in the Guard, the various non-French "auxilliary"/"mercenary"/"tributary"/"concession" formations in the French Army, and among the departmental (militia) forces.

I would estimate that the Russians and French each mght have fielded upwards of 150,000 light infantry – or at least tried to do so.

I do not think that the British had anywhere near this number. But please correct me if I am wrong.

Thank you justonemore, regardless of your argument with Kevin at east you have contributed information here that does help ascertain the level of commitment to skirmisher numbers by relevant nations.

If only your mate could keep his comments out of the mire…

I thought I'd address Whirlwind's questions from a couple of days ago. they are pertinent to the issue and hopefully help clarify some things.

Even if you take Radetzky's quote as him specifically referring just to the Austrian troops within the Army of Bohemia in 1813, is it not a valid analytical jump to say that although Radetzky was only referring to Austrian infantry in this particular army at this time we have no evidence that:

a. This Austrian Army was substantailly different from others of its time (1813) – i.e. we shouldn't expect anything different from, say, the Austrian Army of Italy.

Whirlwind:
The operative word here is 'no evidence.' In looking at a quote, you have to ask these questions:

1. Who is speaking?
2. Who is the intended audience?
3. What is the purpose of the communication--i.e. the hoped
for response?
4. What evidence is there that the speaker A. had direct
knowledge of the information communicated, and B.
appeared to act on the recommendations himself.

So,
1. Radeszky is the Chief of Staff for the newly formed Army of Bohemia. The comments are attached at a later date to a general order [Which we haven't seen] with the recommendation that only a few skirmishers be deployed by units because 'we don't understand the methods of skirmishing i.e. mainere de tirailleur. The 'we' that turned into "the Russians and we" is understandable as the army was a mixture of the two armies, but we don't know that he was talking about both.

2. He is making this recommendation to the officers of whoever is receiving the order it is attached to, and them only. Whether that is every officer or simply a general order to all new regiments etc. isn't known.

3. The message is simply a caution to not use too many skirmishers because 'we' weren't very good at it.

4. There is every reason to believe that Radeszky, reformer zealot or not, had direct knowledge of the abilities of the troops in his army. However, it is also clear that he didn't think his recommendation applied to all troops, even in his army because there are numerous cases of Radeszky himself leading or ordering large numbers of Austrian and Russian infantry to skirmish before and during Leipzig a month later.

Can we infer that whatever Radeszky said applied to other Austrian and/or Russian armies? No. There is no indication that Radeszky was commenting on ALL Austrian or Russian Troops. It was attached to a general order, not anything referencing other armies.

His troops were different, with different combat histories from the other armies, for one. Two, there is no indication that the armies at Bautzen or Lutzen or in Italy followed his recommendations, or demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to skirmish. If there is some evidence, either similar comments by those armies' officers or battlefield reports, then yes there were be some reason to infer that.

b. The composition and tactics of the Austrian Army in 1812, or even 1809, were so different from that of 1813 [i.e. no 1812 French-type disaster that would change the quality and composition of its Army] i.e. we can't see why the Austrian infantry would be noticeably better at skirmishing in these years either.

Why can't you? Any evidence of that? Certainly other armies like the British, French and Prussians demonstrated different composition and tactical abilities at skirmishing over those years, so why not the Russians and Austrians?
Again, any evidence to lead you to that idea?

Although as you say this quote shold properly only apply to one Austrian Army in one certain area, without further first-hand evidence (and taking into account the value of that first-hand evidence obviously), surely we are only left with these comparative tools?

No, I don't think so. We might not have all the information we would like, and comparative tools are just fine…but again you want to make sure you are comparing apples to apples, not doing what Gates did with the quotes he gives and has quotes referencing one issue being applying to a very different one, not once, but in several places in just a two paragraph secion of his book.

I'm certainly not even mildly knowledgeable about the details of the Hapsburg Army so maybe there are substantial reasons to think that the performance of its skirmishers in this particular year and theatre were abnormally low – but may we not hear those reasons?

Well, Frayer in the comments he posted gave at least three:

1. The Army of the Bohemia was newly-formed of a large number of conscript newbies, made up of two different nations.
2. The Army was very low in Light Troops, both Jagers and the Austrian mix of light infantry…about 1/3 of normal…based on earlier Russian and Austrian armies, including those in Italy and Germany.

3. Radeszky uses Grenadier units as skirmishers on a regular basis, presumably because they do know how to skirmish and add to the available light troops.

All quotes have specific things they refer to for specific reasons and audiences. The writers were not talking to us. To get the most information and application out of a quote it has to be applied accurately. We have only a limited ability to reasonably infer anything without enough evidence.

Webster's Quote:

Inference:The act of passing from one proposition, statement, or judgment considered as true to another proposition whose truth is believed to follow from the former.

If you are not clear on the 'truth' of the first proposition, you will go astray whith any inference based on it. As Websters goes on to say INFER imples arriving at a conclusion by reasoning from evidence.

It isn't easy to do all this. Historians struggle with these issues all the time, so why should we have it any easier? The problem is that many military writers apparently aren't aware of the methods historians use to avoid the pitfalls of badly applied quotes and narratives.

Here are just a few of the books devoted to just this question:

Brundage, Anthony
Going to the Sources: A Guide to Historical Research and Writing. 3rd ed. 2002

Howell, Martha & Revenier, Walter
From Reliable Sources: An introduction to Historical Methods 2002

Dobson, Miriam & Ziemann, Benjamin ed.
Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century History 2009

Barzun, Jacques
The Modern Researcher: The classic manual on all aspects of research and writing first published in 1957, is now in it 18th edition IIRC.

The opening quote of Barzun's book:

Every one of you gentlemen, every thinking man generally, is always searching for sources and is, in practice, an historian. There is on other way to undersand the events that take place before your eyes. Every business man who handles a complicated transaction, every lawyer who studies a case, is a searcher for sources and a practicing historian.

Theordor Mommsen, Rectorial Address at the University of Berlin, 1874

There are effective useful ways to use sources, and there are misleading and ineffective practices too. We just need to know the difference and apply the proper methods to really get what we need from the sources.

Wargamers and wargame designers are often practicing historians searching for sources to understand events. We can't become impatient because it isn't quick or easy, or that all the writers don't use quotes properly at times--including me…and sometime writers use them very inapproprietely…like Gates.

That isn't a morale judgement or character assasination. It is a technical judgment on a particular aspect of a writer/historian's craft. The application or inference either works or it doesn't.

Bill

Bill,

When is your next book due out?

K

The 'we' that turned into "the Russians and we" is understandable
Yes, but it should never be passed off as a verbatim translation of what v. Radetz wrote. Instead, a simple use of [ ] should show that the text was edited : "…. [the Russians and Austrians] do not unnderstand …."

What Rothenburg (1982) claimed that v. Radetz wrote was : "operations en tirailleure can only be conducted in a very limited manner because we do not understand this kind of fighting."
All the other versions, which all trace their footnotes back to Rothenburg, are just other authors paraphasing (with greater or lesser fidelity) or misquoting Rothenburg. Whether v. Radetz wrote in German or French (for the benefit of the Russians), he did not write what Rothenburg quotes – this is a translation. Further, it is also a rather strange and really quite poor translation, more a kind of bastardized Franglais than actual English :
-- it includes a key phrase that purports to be in French, rather odd for an English translation : "operations en tirailleure"
-- "operations" and "tirailleure" are not correct French : these should be "opérations" and "tirailleur"
-- "operations en tirailleur" (even correctly spelled) is not the name of any set of military evolutions in French
-- the various authors who purport to offer Radetzky via Rothenburg (Kiley, Muir, Holmes, Gates, etc., etc.) sometimes take it upon themselves to re-write the quote. Here we find more mangled French : "mainere de tirailleur" (which should be "manière" and again does not correspond to any actual French usage even when corrected!)

I am sure all this paraphrasing, strange translating, inventing French military phrases and concepts, misquoting and so on is a great convenience for these anglophone authors in making their "points". Here is an example from Kiley (2007):

Radetzky according to Rothenburg :"operations en tirailleure can only be conducted in a very limited manner because we do not understand this kind of fighting."
Radetzsky according to Kiley : "
Radetzky observed that neither the Austrians nor the Russians understood fighting in open order and believed that skirmishers could be used in a very small, limited way. The conclusion that was reached was that the Austrians were not the equal of the French when fighting in open order."

Do you think that Radetzky could even recognize this version as even related to the original ?

We still have absolutely no idea what v. Radetz actually wrote. These various anglophone authors themselves also have no idea (save Rothenburg). I would not want to write a book, and offer some quote as evidence without ever having seen the quoted document myself. I think that would be really poor historical method that would render the result quite useless.

10th Marines :

Good to see you here again.

From you we have:

"The issue is integrating the tactical operations of the light troops, or line troops if that is the case, in open or skirmish order with those of the troops in line. As late as 1808 the Prussians, Russians, and Austrians couldn't or wouldn't do this."

"I found the material on the Russians from the two volume work Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars by Alexander Zhmodikov and Yurii Zhmodikov."

I have the book and can't find anything like what you claim is there. Neither did NSN.

Can you please provide a full quotation (the whole text of the relevant section, including any footnotes) from the book of the "material" you claim is there.

Otherwise, we will have to conclude that your ideas are yours alone – ideas that you just made up and not based even on a secondary source. No harm in that, of course. It is just a difference.

Thanks.

Bill,

When is your next book due out?

K

K:
Some of this is from my next book…

Bill

Otherwise, we will have to conclude that your ideas are yours alone

And who would 'we' be?

Bill,

What is the title and when will it be out?

K

Shane:

Where did you get this quote:

Schlieffen quoting on Hohenlohe's men facing French skirmishers are Jena:

"The French infantry hidden in the fields and behind hedges and walls, directed…accurate fire at the Prussian and Saxon battalions, lined up like practice targets that couldn't be missed, that by the numbers, from left to right, fired one ineffective volley after another"

And this one:

Peter Paret goes on to say:

"Clearly Hohenlohe should not have attacked. But once his lines faced infantry in open order, the prevailing doctrine, as Schieffen notes, left the Prussian lines helpless."

I'd like to find them. Thanks

Bill

link

Bill – The Amazon preview includes the footnotes but not the text. But there is this link PDF link that shows the text (but not the footnote). Between the two, we have the full context and reference.

This isn't Schlieffen quoting Hohenlohe (which was my original impression from Shane's post, but I seem to have misread it), or a Schlieffen who was witness tot he events – it is Paret quoting Graf Alfred von Schlieffen of the German general staff, the guy who's plan was almost but not quite followed in WWI, in his analysis of Jena.

Thanks, guys. I had the book, but didn't think to look in that book of Paret's.

Paret's description of why the Prussians lost the battle and then further discussion analyzing Schlieffen's comments is fascinating, particularly the cultural connections and assumptions.

However, von Schlieffen's description of the Prussian and Saxon actions at Jena aren't accurate generally, and give a totally innactuate picture of what the Prussians were trying to do, both when described by the French and in the Prussians' own words. In other words, the notion that standing in close formation volleying against the French skirmishers, hoping that somehow that would defeat them never is expressed or reported--nor is the idea that the Prussians stood around volleying because they couldn't think of anything ease to do, or thought the actions were the best thing to do. That simply isn't what happened.

All the efforts the Prussians report attempting to defeat the French do not include standing around volleying as the primary approach, or even response. Much, much more was going on during the battle. The disconnect between the actual battle reports and descriptions like von Schlieffen and many, many others continues to amaze me. All you have to do is read what the participates say and one can see that Schlieffen hasn't--which seems ineplicable to me.

Bill

the notion that standing in close formation volleying against the French skirmishers, hoping that somehow that would defeat them never is expressed or reported--nor is the idea that the Prussians stood around volleying because they couldn't think of anything ease to do, or thought the actions were the best thing to do. That simply isn't what happened.

How do you know that for sure? Most of the information on the Prussians of the Napoleonic era was destroyed by Allied air raids of WWII. How do you know that the descriptions Schlieffen comments about were not true? He would have a much better opportunity to analyse the evidence than you have from your position.

Bill, all respect to you but I am totally frustrated as to how you so easily dismiss anyone else's input into a discussion you do not agree with. You cannot seem to even agree to disagree most of the time. You have to be correct all of the time no matter what and have the last word on any topic. Capt Snort has to go through this with you all the time over the past few years and others as well. you dismissive attitude to any evidence you do not like is so tiring to deal with. I actually prefer not to respond but I felt I had to at least let you know how frustrating you are to debate with.

Of course you will get the last word and dismiss totally anything I or anyone will present. So I bow to your superior knowledge and intellect. I also understand that the usual faces will now launch into a tirade of personal attacks about personality and habitual emotional breakdown but you know what? in reality it is is simply total frustration at being constantly shouted down in the name of supposed clear and irrefutable evidence.

I am not a historian, author or any other such person. I am just a wargamer with a deep passion for the period, just as I did for WWII many years ago. I am not a professional nor do I claim to be but I do have a perspective and right to express my opinions which are formed from the evidence provided by historians in the books I have bought on the subject over the past 30 odd years. My only habitual problem is that I express them here when I probably should not. I have had enough and bow to yours and other's superior knowledge and intellect, I will leave you to stand on top of the pile and wave your victory flag. I am too exhausted to bother anymore, life is way too short.

Oh, and Paret observes about what Schlieffen's critique:

Clearly, Hohenlohe should not have attacked. But once his lines faced infantry in open order, the prevailing doctrine, as Schlieffen notes, left the Prussian lines helpless.

Love to know what prevailing doctrine that was. All the "prevailing doctrine" I have found does not include formed troops standing in the open volleying at skirmishers.

That was not the prevailing doctrine during the Seven Years War, during the French Revolution, and it certainly wasn't the tactic used at Auerstadt in dealing with skirmishers.

That wasn't the SOP/prevailing doctrine for the Prussian army, and the Prussians did know it was a Bad Idea The aide to Prussian General Knobelsdorf described the skirmisher dynamics during the French Revolutinary war. He wrote in May of 1793 that the French were:

". . .still badly trained; but they were not only our equals, but our superiors in the woods where the soldier doesn't keep in his ranks, executes none of the evolutions of the drill manual and, covered by the trees, needs do nothing apart from fire his musket. Our men, accustomed to fight in closed ranks on open ground, found it difficult to put themselves into this apparent disorder which was nevertheless necessary if they didn't want to be just targets to the enemy."

So, what doctrine is being spoken of by Paret and Schlieffen? It doesn't exist and doesn't explain the Prussian actions at Jena.

Bill

Shane:
I can understand how my comments could frustrate you. I am not "so easily dismissing anyone else's input." It wasn't easy to get the information that led me to question those quotes. If 'dismissed' the quotes, I was more than willing to offer the evidence that led me to my conclusions.

You cannot seem to even agree to disagree most of the time. You have to be correct all of the time no matter what and have the last word on any topic.

Shane:
I have been corrected for inaccurate information/conclusions twice just on this thread. I haven't argued with it. I have been and can be wrong. It is a matter of the evidence.

am just a wargamer with a deep passion for the period, just as I did for WWII many years ago. I am not a professional nor do I claim to be but I do have a perspective and right to express my opinions which are formed from the evidence provided by historians in the books I have bought on the subject over the past 30 odd years.

I can appreciate that, and you certainly have every right to express your opinions. I have a deep passion for the period too. And because of that, I have a deep passion for 'what happened' and the only real source of that information: the evidence. I have found that when an author makes a conclusion, it is really good to find out what evidence has been used to come to that conclusion and how.

I agree with Voltaire: I don't care what a man believes, I want to know why he believes it."

I am simply pointing out where historians/authors have been incorrect… when you look at the 'why.' I don't say that to frustrate, or to have the last word. I say it based on the evidence, and much of it is readily available. And I have made an effort to make that evidence available here.

For instance, when authors have said that the Prussians didn't deploy skirmishers or underutilized them, a simple conservative count of what is reported deployed, that and the actual tactical accomplishements demonstrate that they deployed at least 1 of every 4 infantrymen at the battle.

Am I supposed deny this or simply say it's just a matter of opinion because some author says they didn't? All the evidence available from the battle indicates this, regardless of what particular historians say happened. I won't kibbiz about that.

I have had enough and bow to yours and other's superior knowledge and intellect, I will leave you to stand on top of the pile and wave your victory flag. I am too exhausted to bother anymore, life is way too short.

For me, this wasn't a matter of who stood at the top of the heap. It was a matter of answering the question you asked, and then particularly what the Prussians did at Jena. I want to know what happened…regardless of who is on top. Kevin has seen that several times in the past.

If you find that hunt tiring, it's understandable, but you didn't ask an easy question.

My personal frustration is reading well-known and quoted historians' conclusions about such things as the Prussians' actions at Jena--only to find that when I really look at the available evidence, their conclusions are not supported at all.

Like Schlieffen's comment about the prevailing doctrine. The Prussians did had some doctrine for close formation infantry dealing with skirmishers…but unless I have missed something, standing in the open and simply volleying wasn't it. I am glad to provide a number of sources for that conclusion--I certainly don't expect you or anyone to accept it without that evidence.

However, offering that evidence seems to tire you, or it represents an effort of mine to have the last word.

Personally, I feel you and I are historians. We are making conclusions about the past based on evidence. The question you ask about skirmish doctrine couldn't be answered without such an inquiry. And it is work. Opinions are for those areas that don't have enough evidence.

I am sorry that you found this all frustrating. Certainly not something I wanted to have happen. I wanted to answer your questions and the questions that came up with evidence. I find it frustrating to not do that, to simply accept some writer's conclusion because they said it.

Bill

I cannot find the original order of Radetzky – but this is what Schwarzenberg did issue about the tactical conduct against the enemy in 1813.

"the Brigade commanders would like to exercise often with the desiganted units for attacking in column or masses, to send out in front of them a double line of tirailleurs"

p. 267

Beiträge zur Geschichte des österreichischen Heerwesen
Erstes Heft: Der Zeitraum von 1757 – 1814
Wien 1872
Available on google books, there a loads of other highly interestig informations about the Austrian Army to be found in this volume.

David Hollins in his "Austrian Grenadiers and Infantry" p. 46 quotes Schwarzenberg stating in 1812:

'To dissolve battalions into skirmish order would…be a mistake. In open ground 20-30 skirmishers will be enough to hold enemy skirmishers from the front of the battalion or Mass. In restricted ground, they can be increased to 1/3 of the battalion, but the other 2/3s must remain closed up in one or more reserves depending on the terrain…If the
enemy is repelled, they are to be pursued with a third or at most [half], and the other half must form up quickly and only follow up slowly and in good order.'

Bill

Hello Bill,

Thank you for taking the time to respond in detail. I've messed around with this response a couple of times and not been happy with it, so I've gone for points – I hope this doesn't come across as terse.

1. Re:Radetzky himself. I hear all the contextualizing about him and the quote and I'm happy to go along with it. In lieu of further evidence, I'm happy to assume that it isn't safe to regard him as talking about any Russians at all (whether in his Army or not) or directly about any Austrian troops outside the Army of Bohemia.

2. The fact that the Austrians did end up doing lots of skirmishing doesn't by itself invalidate his (earlier)opinion and I had thought that the 'Francophiles' (for want of a better term) maintain in their secondary works that the French did generally beat the Austrians in the skirmishing of 1813/1814? I'm certainly in no position to evaluate this however – and maybe this is a 'wargamey' thing rather than an historian's?

3. Was the composition of the Austrian Army so different in other theatres/armies from that of the Army of Bohemia? I hadn't understood that Frayer's point was that the Army of Bohemia was unusually composed of poor troops as compared to others of that period i.e. 1813-14 , are you sure that is the case? If the troops are much the same then I'd maintain that if you have any confidence in Radetzky's quotation at all then one can infer that other Austrian troops were much the same in this regard. Was the training and experience of Austrian Line Infantry units assigned to other armies and theatres appreciably different to those of the Army of Bohemia or not? On the face of it, as close as any comparison of 'apples and apples' can be when applied to military units I'd think? The same questions can be applied to the Austrian Army of 1812, 1809 and 1805, (but with clearly decreasing confidence and expectation that someone will answer with a convincing reason why one of the apples is now a pear. So I'll ask the question directly, since we are here:

– To what extent was the Austrian Line Infantryman in 1805, 1809, 1812 and 1815 better or worse at skirmishing (of all kinds) than his counterpart of 1813-14?

4. The use of Austrian Grenadiers to skirmish may only indicate they were the least bad – not that they positively knew how to skirmish. It may only indicate what we would expect already – that Radetzky had more confidence in Austrian Grenadiers than in Austrian Fusiliers.

5. The changes in the skirmishing/light infantry capability of the British, French, Prussian and Russian armies during the course of the wars have been pursued at some length here at TMP and in books on the subject. I haven't read any such detailed discussion of the Austrians (or, say, the Spanish, for that matter). I would say that the burden of evidence is at least as much on those who wish to demonstrate that there was significant change as on those who assume that there wasn't any.

6. One of the things about writing a set of wargames rules – or even designing a single scenario – is that you have to decide how good troops are at doing every single thing within those rules – even if that decision is to rate all troops exactly the same. So for the Austrians in 1813/14, gamers have to make that call, we can't sit on the fence, which is probably why wargames' writers may be 'bolder' in their use of secondary sources than respectable historians. So, if in the rules I'm using differentiate troops in whatever way for their ability to skirmish:

Do I rate 1813 French Line Infantry as better at skirmishing than 1813 Austrian Line Infantry?
Do I rate them as equals?
Do I rate the 1813 Austrian Line Infantry as inferior to their French opponents if they are assigned to the Army of Bohemia, but equal (or superior?!) if they are fighting somewhere else?

Thanks again for your patience

Regards

David Hollins in his "Austrian Grenadiers and Infantry" p. 46 quotes Schwarzenberg stating in 1812:

'To dissolve battalions into skirmish order would…be a mistake. In open ground 20-30 skirmishers will be enough to hold enemy skirmishers from the front of the battalion or Mass. In restricted ground, they can be increased to 1/3 of the battalion, but the other 2/3s must remain closed up in one or more reserves depending on the terrain…If the
enemy is repelled, they are to be pursued with a third or at most [half], and the other half must form up quickly and only follow up slowly and in good order.'

Was he correct?

Regards

Whirlwind wrote:

Thank you for taking the time to respond in detail. I've messed around with this response a couple of times and not been happy with it, so I've gone for points – I hope this doesn't come across as terse.

Whirlwind:
You bet. They were important questions.

1. Re:Radetzky himself. I hear all the contextualizing about him and the quote and I'm happy to go along with it. In lieu of further evidence, I'm happy to assume that it isn't safe to regard him as talking about any Russians at all (whether in his Army or not) or directly about any Austrian troops outside the Army of Bohemia.

Until we can see the order his comments are attached to, I don't think we can reasonably assume he is talkin gabout the Russians or all Austrians.

2. The fact that the Austrians did end up doing lots of skirmishing doesn't by itself invalidate his (earlier)opinion and I had thought that the 'Francophiles' (for want of a better term) maintain in their secondary works that the French did generally beat the Austrians in the skirmishing of 1813/1814? I'm certainly in no position to evaluate this however – and maybe this is a 'wargamey' thing rather than an historian's?

Honestly, neither am I. I haven't looked at the Skirmishing during 1813/1814 in any detail to have an opinion on that. I have seen several accounts where the Russians feel they have reached parity with the French in 1813, but that's about it. But it all goes back to what the combatants actually performed that matters. Wargamey? Nah, it's just the kind of questions wargamers ask of history are often far different than many military historians, Francophiles or not.

3. Was the composition of the Austrian Army so different in other theatres/armies from that of the Army of Bohemia? I hadn't understood that Frayer's point was that the Army of Bohemia was unusually composed of poor troops as compared to others of that period i.e. 1813-14 , are you sure that is the case?

Well, the 'poor' troops is a qualitative judgment, so no, I am not sure of that. However, I am sure that there were a large number of new troops in the army, both Russian and Austrian. From what I know, his list of light troops is accurate, and the percentage of light troops in the 1812 Russian and Austrian armies and 1809 Austrian armies were closer to representing 30 percent of the respective armies than the 1813 Army of Bohemia. So yes, in general that is true and *could* well be a reason that Radeszky said what he did. Again, that order would be good to see.

If the troops are much the same then I'd maintain that if you have any confidence in Radetzky's quotation at all then one can infer that other Austrian troops were much the same in this regard.

That is true IF they were much the same. However, if all the Austrian troops were much the same, particularly from 1809 on, then who was he talking to? I would assume the Austrian officers would already be aware of that fact. Why suggest that the officers only deploy a few skirmishers because of the Austrians' lack of ability, if that was the norm and had been? I would think the caution would be rather unnecessary.

Was the training and experience of Austrian Line Infantry units assigned to other armies and theatres appreciably different to those of the Army of Bohemia or not? On the face of it, as close as any comparison of 'apples and apples' can be when applied to military units I'd think? The same questions can be applied to the Austrian Army of 1812, 1809 and 1805, (but with clearly decreasing confidence and expectation that someone will answer with a convincing reason why one of the apples is now a pear. So I'll ask the question directly, since we are here:

– To what extent was the Austrian Line Infantryman in 1805, 1809, 1812 and 1815 better or worse at skirmishing (of all kinds) than his counterpart of 1813-14?

That is a big question. I don't know. I do know there is a general feeling among writers that they did improve, but how and how much, I have no idea. Again, it would require a serious comparison of the Austrians' performance in each campaign to make such a comparison.

4. The use of Austrian Grenadiers to skirmish may only indicate they were the least bad – not that they positively knew how to skirmish. It may only indicate what we would expect already – that Radetzky had more confidence in Austrian Grenadiers than in Austrian Fusiliers.

True. But if he was saying that 'we' all don't know how to skirmish and the solution is to deploy very few skirmishers, then I would think the idea is to deploy very few skirmishers, regardless of who he had relative more confidence in… certainly not enough to say "except Grenadiers", if he really was make a blanket judgment about the Austrians…

5. The changes in the skirmishing/light infantry capability of the British, French, Prussian and Russian armies during the course of the wars have been pursued at some length here at TMP and in books on the subject. I haven't read any such detailed discussion of the Austrians (or, say, the Spanish, for that matter). I would say that the burden of evidence is at least as much on those who wish to demonstrate that there was significant change as on those who assume that there wasn't any.

I would agree. The burden of proof is on both sides if they want to make a conclusion of any validity.

6. One of the things about writing a set of wargames rules – or even designing a single scenario – is that you have to decide how good troops are at doing every single thing within those rules – even if that decision is to rate all troops exactly the same. So for the Austrians in 1813/14, gamers have to make that call, we can't sit on the fence, which is probably why wargames' writers may be 'bolder' in their use of secondary sources than respectable historians. So, if in the rules I'm using differentiate troops in whatever way for their ability to skirmish:

Do I rate 1813 French Line Infantry as better at skirmishing than 1813 Austrian Line Infantry?
Do I rate them as equals?
Do I rate the 1813 Austrian Line Infantry as inferior to their French opponents if they are assigned to the Army of Bohemia, but equal (or superior?!) if they are fighting somewhere else?

I agree. Wargame designers have to come up with quantifable relationships. They can't sit on the fence or be vague or avoid the issue as do writers at times. [For a variety of legitimate reasons, I might add.]

You have now strayed into simulation design. Your question really is whether the better, same or worse levels of unit ability you chose can mimic the historical outcomes--if all the same decisions and random events are recreated too. Do your mechanics mimic the historical behaviors and abilities of the combatants. You might not have to determine levels of ability, depending on how you design your game.

The problem of not having enough information and evidence or being unable to come to some reasonable, quantifiable value for a part of a simulation is a common problem for simulation designers. They have come up with methods for designing a functional simulation without having all the information.

I have seen rules sets avoid the whole issue and have them all troops equal--or some or all combat abilities, other than grenadiers and guard. And some of these designs "work" all the same. To 'work' means that groups of wargamers feel the battles results were "historically reasonable."

That is a game design dynamic, rather than a proof of some historical truth. The question is what constitutes "historically reasonable" results and what determines whether a simulation/wargame 'works?' That is a whole different discussion… which tires people out too.

Bill

David Hollins in his "Austrian Grenadiers and Infantry" p. 46 quotes Schwarzenberg stating in 1812:

'To dissolve battalions into skirmish order would…be a mistake. In open ground 20-30 skirmishers will be enough to hold enemy skirmishers from the front of the battalion or Mass. In restricted ground, they can be increased to 1/3 of the battalion, but the other 2/3s must remain closed up in one or more reserves depending on the terrain…If the
enemy is repelled, they are to be pursued with a third or at most [half], and the other half must form up quickly and only follow up slowly and in good order.'

Was he correct?

Whirlwind:
Was who correct? Dave or Schwarzenberg? ;-j

I don't know. I haven't seen the source of Dave's quote. As for Scharzenberg, what I think are reasonable inferences assuming an accurate translation are:

1. Schwarzenberg felt it necessary to lay out the process for larger deployments of skirmisher to avoid "the mistake of dissolving entire battalions."

2. Obviously, he felt his Austrians capable and willing to dissolve entire battalions, mistake or not. He wrote those instructions to hopefully see what he felt was a more controlled battlefield response from his officers.

Whether his officers actually followed his orders/recommendations or not, I don't know. I also don't know whether his instructions were the 'correct' ones or not. That again, would require some serious study of the Austrians' battlefield performance.

Bill

George Cathcart, who was present during the campaign in Germany in 1813 as a staff officer, wrote an interesting description of the various armies engaged. I know little about the Austrian army, so it would be interesting see what Dave Hollins makes of this. Although he makes no reference to Austrian skirmishers in this passage, he attempts to explain the levels of experience and skill. Cathcart described the Austrian infantry in 1813 as follows:

When the forces of the Austrian Empire joined the Alliance the comparatively small armament they had at their immediate command was in a high state of discipline, and their tactical doctrines were those which the author has described as line movements having reference thereto; in fact, a system similar to that which forms the basis of Her Majesty's Regulations at this day for the British Army. Some new Bohemian levies were hastily brought into the field at the commencement of the campaign, and not being incorporated into the other experienced corps, a measure for which there would not have been time even if the long-established system of national organisation of that corps precluded the possibility, they cannot be placed on a par with the regular army at that early period. This is mentioned here, because they had not time to be rendered capable of the system previously described, in a degree that could safely be attempted in presence of an experienced and enterprising enemy; and that of Napoleon [the columnar system of the French] more applicable to new levies, not having been substituted for it to meet the emergency, they were soon brought into trouble. In consequence of this a disaster occurred at Dresden, which, when thus explained, affords a useful example, and reflects no discredit upon the state of discipline in the regular Austrian army……If the infantry of the Emperor Francis generally appeared less vigorous than other troops in their mode of attack, it may be attributed in great measure to their somewhat antiquated system of tactics, which, though excellent in principle, requires in these days increased celerity, and adaption to the modern practice of other nations; but in cases of failure their admirable discipline generally enabled them to retire in good order. Their formation in line in defence of positions proved on many occasions the superiority of that order of battle, in the repulse and defeat of the enemy's columns of attack.

Cathcart also described the French army and practice, which seems to me to be an accurate portrayal. Most interesting for the purpose of this thread is this section on the French skirmishers and the comparison with those of the other participating nations. As normal, the French are seen as being more skilful, but there is no reference to the French deploying huge numbers of skirmishers in a mob as some sort of super-tactic, and neither in a more integrated manner, nor in a different manner than those of the other armies. He also clarifies the term "cloud", that was often applied to skirmish formations in contemporary battle descriptions, to a certain degree. Note that Cathcart is referring to the French at the start of the passage.

Every line of tirailleurs was invariably sustained by adequate small supports formed in rear, and, as far as might be, sheltered; but ready at hand to reinforce or relieve their comrades who were actually engaged. But, besides this, a sufficient and concentrated reserve was invariably stationed not far off, to sustain the whole of these advanced combatants. Thus, when people talk of a cloud of light troops, although the appearance may have warranted that figure of speech, the duty was nevertheless conducted with method, and in accordance with these principals. The author has dwelt on this particular feature more in detail than he otherwise would have done HAD NOT THE SAME SYSTEM APPLIED TO ALL OTHER NATIONS ENGAGED, with this difference only, that in its application, the duty of light infantry is perhaps more influenced by national character than any other tactical subject of consideration. In that duty individual intelligence is the main requisite; and the French are, without question, by nature the most intelligent light troops in the world.

@McLaddie

Go and download the book I refered to in my posting above, there you will see that from 1794 onwards the Austrian supreme commanders constantly tried to restrict the amount of skirmisher – which seem to be quite en vogue in the Austrian Army, especially in 1796 – and combine a small skirmishing chain with formed troops who should press on for attack.

There are some very good standing orders on that.

The same issues were debated in the Russian army. Barclay was for lower numbers and more careful regulation, Kutuzov and Bagration were for larger numbers and a slightly more loose deployment. Vitgenshteyn seems to have liked to use opolchenie marksmen in a slightly loose formation, but used his jägers more per Barclay.

The comments of Russians on this question – the optimal number and methods for skirmishers – can be quoted out of context to indicate that they somehow could not or did not skirmish, or did not know how to do it well.

I am sure it is the same for Austrians.

von Winterfeldt:

I did! Thanks. I couldn't find both volumes, but the first one does have some fascinating stuff in it. Thanks you.

The Schwartzenberg quote you gave is what prompted me to add mine. The instructions for two lines of Tirailleurs is intriquing. I am assuming two lines of two files, but maybe not. Were the orders a general order or for a specific engagement? It reminds me of Massena's instructions before Bussaco. He specifically orders skirmishers to be deployed, but as sending out skirmishers would have been SOP, the instructions *seems* to suggest more should be deployed.

I wonder if that is the same with Schwartzenberg.

The instructions about not deploying skirmishers is fascinating. It does seem to be a theme with the Austrians. You would think that if the Austrians couldn't and didn't skirmish, their generals wouldn't keep instructing them not to overdo it… ;-j

Bill

Major S:

Those are terrific quotes. What pages are they on? I am particularly taken with his explanation of 'clouds' of skirmishers, that he thought to explain that similie.

The description of the Austrian army could be what Radeszky was speaking to… again, unless we know what the general order says that his comments were attached to, it is speculation.

Thanks,

Bill

Bill,

The passages in question can be found here:

link

The most likely reason for deploying skirmishers in small numbers can be found in the Guide to Tactics in volume 3 of Clausewitz' "On War".

Clausewitz argues that if more men are committed to the skirmish line, the result will be an increase in casualties on both sides:

A) on the side who deploy more skirmishers, because as the intervals between skirmishers decrease, the enemy balls are more likely to find a target.

and

B) on the side who deploy less skirmishers, because the enemy has thickened his line and increased his weight of fire, although the effect of this fire is diminished due to the more dispersed nature of the target.

This leads to the force who commit more men to the skirmish line exhausting a greater percentage of their force, by ammunition depletion and fatigue, although the exchange of casualties is equal. It was deemed prudent to commit as few men to the skirmish line as necessary in order to keep this degradation to a minimum.

There were obviously limits to this, and if one force deployed so many skirmishers that they threatened to easily drive their opponents away with the bayonet, reinforcements would be necessary to sustain the fight. This type of escalation seems to have been typical of the skirmishing process.

Major Snort:

Yes, I remember that from Clauswitz. It makes sense. Whether his ideas were used or realized on the battlefield is another thing. It does remind me of some comments quoted by the Zhmodikov's in Vol II of their Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars p.37

In 1812, and at the beginning of 1813, some Russian commanders, including Barclay de Tolly, still considered French skirmishers superior to the Russian skirmishers in agility and marksmanship and thus more effective, expecially in woods. This was an additional reason to avoid a prolonged firefight, in some situations. In 1813 the abilities of the French and their allies to fight in skirmish order significantly delcined: Radozhitskii wrote that, starting from the battle of Bautzen the superiority of the French skirmishers in rough terrain had vanished. A.A. Pisarev writes that at Leipzig, young French infantrymen were formed in open terrain in a skirmish line that was too thick.

This last observation is given as evidence by Pisarev that the French couldn't skirmish as well as formerly.

However, what does this mean when the British were known to skirmish in extended line and possibly the French more than once mistook them as formed troops?

Bill

A) on the side who deploy more skirmishers, because as the intervals between skirmishers decrease, the enemy balls are more likely to find a target.

and

B) on the side who deploy less skirmishers, because the enemy has thickened his line and increased his weight of fire, although the effect of this fire is diminished due to the more dispersed nature of the target.

Thank you SOOO much M Snort !! This is the passage I have been trying to remember for god knows how long. This is the whole premise behind why I quantified and qualified skirmishers in my own system. The problem was I could not find this passage but knew it existed. I have this book and now I can quote it.

This is why I gave SS ratings (closer formation) to troops that skirmish in large numbers. They are higher in number but tend to bunch up thus become casualties at a faster rate. SK ratings to troops that skirmish in less numbers thus are usually more spread out and harder to hit!!

There were obviously limits to this, and if one force deployed so many skirmishers that they threatened to easily drive their opponents away with the bayonet, reinforcements would be necessary to sustain the fight. This type of escalation seems to have been typical of the skirmishing process.

And this is exactly what ends up happening in our system. Not by design but by realization by players at the table.

Thanks again, you made my day.

Shane

A.A. Pisarev writes that at Leipzig, young French infantrymen were formed in open terrain in a skirmish line that was too thick.

yet again more evidence that less well trained infantry acting as skirmishers often fail to maintain proper spacing and literally, "bunch up". This is exactly what I try to portray in my system.

and yes, I said I was tired but when I see evidence that helps to vindicate or verify what I have done in my system I will relish it.

@McLaddie

When you read the staning orders in the volume you will notice that there was a trend in the Austrian Armies to overdo skirmishing, to attack in hords of skirmishers for example – and the standing orders tried to reduced this to a reasonable standard.

Schwarzenberg wrote this instruction, I quoted from at the beginning of the campaign of 1813 – when the Austrian units stepped into the war – I assume as general guidelines.

Schwarzenberg's 1812 comment comes from an essay on the 1812 campaign, which is in one of the Mitteilungen series probably the Mitt des KAs, but there are others and I need to find my notes). AS vW has realised, the point I was trying to make was that policy was consistent across the period – ie: keeping the numbers down to 1/3 of the unit. I can only suppose there was a tendency to send out more when facing lots of French.

The Austrians had beeen using the reserve battalion system by this time, so they had called men in and trained them for a few weeks each year. So, the brightest third were trained as third rank skirmishers and I suppose S was trying to stop more being deployed. No western line regts went to Russia, so they were kept in Moravia and presumably given further training there.

A.A. Pisarev writes that at Leipzig, young French infantrymen were formed in open terrain in a skirmish line that was too thick.

yet again more evidence that less well trained infantry acting as skirmishers often fail to maintain proper spacing and literally, "bunch up". This is exactly what I try to portray in my system.

Shane:
That might well be what that quote it describing. But as Major S. says:

There were obviously limits to this, and if one force deployed so many skirmishers that they threatened to easily drive their opponents away with the bayonet, reinforcements would be necessary to sustain the fight. This type of escalation seems to have been typical of the skirmishing process.

That is my impression from all I have read. On the other hand, Pisarev simply says the line was too thick, not that they were bunching up or unable to maintain proper spacing or not covering the front they should have. It could be that officers are purposely deploying more skirmishers in close spacing because they were individually not as good as the skirmishers they were facing.

If your system allows for this as you say: "And this is exactly what ends up happening in our system. Not by design but by realization by players at the table", then you have it covered.

Massing skirmishers was a common tactic in an attempt to overwhelm the enemy. The French did it during the Revolutionary Wars and later. Pelet describes this deploying whole brigades as the French 'system' and compares it to the British. [It is an interesting description for a variety of reasons.] At Saalfeld and Jena, the 17th Legere exhuasts its ammo quickly [in two hours and has to be withdrawn.]

My only caveat would be that the downside to massing skirmishers instead of having supports and reserves and replacing skirmishers as Pelet describes the British doing at Buessaco would be that the mass is quickly exhausted, both ammo and fighting capacity--or at least more quickly exhausted.

One reason the French are at times confused by the British skirmish lines is because the British skirmishers are facing columns, not enemy skirmishers so they could want to increase their fire on the columns by closing up. [A possibility…]

As the British would skirmish in fairly tight files in extended line, that could well be considered 'thick' or mistaken for a formed line.

Also, If the general tendency for poor skirmishers was to bunch up, Radeszky's recommendation of deploying few skirmishers doesn't make a whole lot of sense, as a few skirmishers would bunch in a small group and certainly not cover any front, making their use sort of pointless.

I'm not saying that poor skirmishers wouldn't or didn't have problems keeping their spacing or bunching up, only that there are other reasons for that behavior, even among poor troops.

And yes, I said I was tired but when I see evidence that helps to vindicate or verify what I have done in my system I will relish it.

Shane, if that was the reason you asked the original question of this thread, it might have been better to state what conclusions your system is already based on and ask for more evidence that supports those conclusions, rather than just what folks know of skirmish doctrine. There is no reason to believe everyone will have come to your conclusions or seen the same evidence.

One problem, or more accurately, a condition of designing a Napoleonic wargame is one shared with writing history: once the thing is in print, no matter how much time you've taken in researching and developing your creation, afterward there will invariably be evidence somewhere that you wish you'd seen or is found to negate some conclusion you included in your game. It's the nature of the process.

For instance, you could do much worse than to base your combat system on Clauswitz's conclusions concerning the dynamics of skirmish combat. You would be modeling Clauswitz's views, and it would be history, the history Clauswitz, as a participant, was describing.

The description that Major S. gave is a good example. Very logical and I can think of a number of examples from my own reading that could be illustrating what he's talking about.

Yet, sooner or later someone is going to point out what I did. If what Clauswitz says is true, then why did the French, British and others group skirmishers so much closer on purpose. To what end? And how does that fit with Clauswitz? You may have an answer to that and include it in your design, but unavoidably, there will be another such question you never did see.

That's Okay. It's what's in your design that counts, not what was left out.

Bill

When you read the standing orders in the volume you will notice that there was a trend in the Austrian Armies to overdo skirmishing, to attack in hords of skirmishers for example – and the standing orders tried to reduced this to a reasonable standard.

von Winterfeldt:
Yes, thanks for the quote. Starting with Archduke Charles and his 1796 Instructions, that seems to be a theme of the Austrian Army. I have orders and instructions from the 1800, 1805 and 1809 campaigns cautioning officers about the same thing: Don't deploy too many skirmishers. Of course, the Russians in their 1812 Day of Battle Instructions say the very same thing to line officers in their skirmish instructions.

I can imagine that if the French are deploying hundreds of skirmishers, it would be very hard for the Allied officers not to try and match them. Even in 1815, with the Quatre Bras account of Picton's Division, the problem still exists. How many skirmisher to deploy against the large numbers of the French…particularly if the French, man-for-man, are better?

Schwarzenberg wrote this instruction, I quoted from at the beginning of the campaign of 1813 – when the Austrian units stepped into the war – I assume as general guidelines.

As the Austrians' 1807 Skirmish instructions call for pairs in their chains, there would be no reason to tell the Austrians to do something already SOP. I would think that Schwartzenberg wants two lines of skirmishers, one behind the other, which would be different than the 1807 instructions.

Do you know what he meant by 'two lines of tiraileurs' for certain? The Russian Line Regiments under Barclay were told to deploy in files of three skirmishers, while for some time the Jagers were instructed to deploy in two chains, one behind the other. Soo, there were lots of variations.

Bill

Schwarzenberg's 1812 comment comes from an essay on the 1812 campaign, which is in one of the Mitteilungen series probably the Mitt des KAs, but there are others and I need to find my notes). AS vW has realised, the point I was trying to make was that policy was consistent across the period – ie: keeping the numbers down to 1/3 of the unit. I can only suppose there was a tendency to send out more when facing lots of French.

Dave:
Thanks. When was the essay written, do you know? It is significant because he gives some details of how it is done. Where did you find "Mitteilungen series"?

Yes, that's what it seems to be, a tendency to send out lots of skirmishers when facing lots of French tirailleurs…

Bill

I thought I should provide this after mentioning it because it is such a great description of skirmishing from the French side and I already had it typed out:

The French Campaign in Portugal, 1810-1811
An Account by Jean Jacques Pelet. Translated by Donald D. Horward 1973

Page 181

As Loison's division was thrown back, a brigade of Marchand's division was pushed forward, but too late. It occupied the abutment beyond the passage of the upper Moura after a dispute with the enemy; each occupied it successively. The English maneuvered and fell back as soon as they received some cannon fire. Our brigade, attacked on its flank by artillery, was thrown to the left of the road. After fighting for some time, it found itself almost entirely dispersed into groups of skirmishers, and in the end it was necessary to support this unit with the second brigade. Thus we covered the entire slope below the convent of Bussaco while the enemy successively reinforced their line of skirmishers, hidden behind the rocks and the trees, but these Allied troops were not allowed to stay there very long, they were recalled by horns and replaced by fresh troops—an excellent method neglected by us for too long. Our system permitted the French regiments to be dispersed during a battle and in the end only the officers and bravest soldiers were left, and they were completely disgusted, even with having to fight for an entire day. The Portuguese were interspersed among the British; they acted perfectly, serving in the covered positions. Nevertheless, our skirmishers gained ground on the enemy and from time to t time pushed them beyond the reserves, which they were obliged to reinforce.

[The Italics above are mine. Two paragraphs on how Mermet's division reinforces Marchand's two brigades, and the how the rest of the day passed after the French attacks were repulsed, both sides firing cannon and skirmishing. ]

p. 182-183

….Thus the day passed, skirmishing and losing men uselessly. I cannot express how much aversion I have always had for skirmishing. It is difficult to imagine how much it costs in casualties or, as one my day—drop by drop. Two new attacks against the position, just like the first, would not have been more deadly. I could not resist saying a few words. The skirmishing ended on our side and the enemy started it again. As a matter of fact, it was extremely difficult to stop bickering except by withdrawing our troops, and this was not without inconvenience for either advantageous terrain or the morale of the army. However, I do not think skirmishing can be allowed for its own sake in any case, unless it is to prepare attacks, cover movements, or momentarily detain the enemy at one point while they are being attacked or outmaneuvered at another. General Reynier had wisely withdrawn his troops and taken up positions. There was hardly any more fighting in this direction.

Two more paragraphs explaining the final positions of the French Army and a bit of dissing Wellington…

…Towards evening the enemy, holding half the slope with a strong line of skirmishers who were seated and even lying down, was reinforced by large reserves, but several times we pushed them back as far as the summit. The enemy extended their line on both flanks as if to take a night position and form a chain of advance posted. Later they pushed their line forward and again started the fight. I did not know their goal, unless it was to recover the ground we had seized and not to abandon any part of the battlefield to us. This useless attack was repulsed by out infantry with the artillery hardly engaged. The enemy line was forced to retire even higher. Ours was formed and we remained there without any indication that the fighting might start again. Mermet's Division replaced the exhausted division of Marchand which had lost many men during the firing. It occupied both the upper and lower Moura with its posts extended to the height of upper Moura.

Bill

The Austrians seemed to look for a way to overcome the attrition caused by French skirmishers, to counter with an equal amount of skirmishers (that is how they felt) would mean to draw out an inconclusive fire fight and to loose men.

Seemingly they believed to put up a not too dense skirmishing screen supported by formed troops – which should attack the enemy skirmishers.

all of this to me sounds exactly like escalation warfare.

If a general deploys one soldier on the battlefield, the other guy has to deploy two or even three to increase the chance of victory. This then causes the first general to throw in another four or five to bring back the balance in his favour. The second general then must throw in ten more soldiers to swing that balance back and so on.

Before you know it you have deployed and engaged all of your available resources and are spent. You are forced to increase the intensity of the fighting to ensure you are not overwhelmed. If the other guy still has reserves you have lost but invariably what happens is the what started out as a single shot is now a general action where the forces committed totally over value the purpose of the action in the first place. All you end up doing is expending huge amounts of ammunition and valuable manpower usually to no gain.

It is only when one side identifies that they are overwhelming the other that suddenly the entire dynamic of the action changes from a skirmish to an all out attack. In these cases an outcome can be reached but only rarely.

Over-commitment of forces, especially skirmishers from what I read was a huge problem and I can see how the Austrians understood this propensity to commit more and more could escalate a small action into a general one. I can understand why they would limit their commitment to avoid an escalation which simply drains ammunition and men for no solid or sound objective other than killing each other. Grand tactics on the battlefield centered around Corps and divisions, not skirmishes.

In our own battles we see this all the time. Because we try to emulate skirmisher tactics in all of it depth and complexity I have many times witnessed a small skirmish firefight escalate into something that draws in troops from all over. Before you know it you have committed so many troops into the fight almost like a battle of ego's you lose sight of the grand plan. you end up with shattered units that no longer can be committed to the larger plan.

Sometimes it is very hard to resist the temptation to throw in more and more men, especially when you are fighting over a terrain piece that at the time seems all important. You later find out that in the bigger picture that terrain piece meant nothing because the battle was actually eventually won or lost on another part of the battlefield.

Shane

all of this to me sounds exactly like escalation warfare.

Shane:
Yeah, that's what it looks like to me. Pelet is describing that dynamic. The major questions for Brigade and higher commanders were:

1. How many skirmishers to deploy without weakening formed units too much. [Charles' complaint]
2. And who to deploy or not to deploy.

Obviously, the less ability at skirmishing, the more infantry had to be committed to do the job. And the mission, prepping an attack would requie more than defending against it.

In a wargame it is the battlefield dynamic you want to capture far more than specific details.

Bill

At the risk of prolonging an overlong thread, I'm intrigued about the fate Grawert's division outside Vierzehnheiligen later in the day. According to Chandler, quoting Maude, this was supposed to have stood out in the open and been shot to pieces by French skirmishers over two hours in "one of the most extraordinary and pitiful incidents in military history" (Chandler quoting Maude). Chandler's account chimes with Schlieffen's quoted above, no doubt all drawn from the same original source.

Bill says he can find no contemporary evidence for this episode. What does the evidence suggest in fact happened? And if it was untrue, how did this story get going? To me it sounds like a small incident that somebody witnessed that has been extrapolated across the whole division/two hours, in the way that often seems to happen.

Any ideas?

Mattew:
No, I didn't say I could find no evidence, I said that it didn't happen that way if you look at the evidence. Certainly the Prussians suffered under French skirmish fire, but they didn't stand around in the open for two hours doing nothing but returning volleys. [In most accounts, the French artillery fire is mentioned first or along with the skirmish fire as being equally galling.]

Your right about it being extrapolated across the entire battle from a smaller incident. Grawert's division was only one of five at the battle, one of three in the final Prussian battle line. Hohenlohe was with Grawert, as well as the officers who drafted the army reports of the battle, Marwitz and Massenbach, so they are overly focused on Grawert's actions before Vierzehnheiligen in the report. [actually, only part of Grawert's division faced the village.]

First of all, that "two hours" [which is a questionable time span in itself] started off with Grawert deploying skirmishers… [!] as he advanced on Vierzehnheiligen to take it. The frist pause in that attack was caused by the Sanitz regiment when it recoiled…which is not surprising because it was directly across from the French 36 gun battery as it advanced. Hoehenlohe stopped the advance to rally and reformed Sanitz.

The advance was attempted again, both the small woods in the center of the line and Issenstadt woods being cleared by this time of French infantry by Prussian and Saxon skirmishers. At the same time Ney's advance guard attacked on the right in the gap between the small woods and Isserstadt forest. That was eventually beaten back. Prussian artillery was brought up and the face of Vierzehnheiligen was cleared of skirmishers. The exact sequence of events is not real clear, but all of them did happen.

Hohenlohe again advances to take the town, which Marwitz states 'could only be taken with the bayonet'. Lannes, calling this 'the crisis of the day' in his report, launches a spoiling attack on the left with two regiments. That too is beaten back. More than an hour has elapsed since Grawert arrived on the field. At this point Hohenlohe is again ready to renew his attack on Vierzehnheiligen when Grawert rides up and congradulates Hohenlohe on winning the battle. [stupid I know, but hey, they'd cleared their entire front of the French attacks and claimed the woods.] Garwert then recommends waiting for Rachel before attacking Vierzehnheiligen because of Prussian losses, which Hohenlohe agrees to do. Any initiative Hohenlohe might have had is lost. And again, where is the Prussian battle line going to 'wait'?

Sometime after this, the French, retake Isserstadt forest and Isserstadt, along with the small wood. This done, Napoleon issues the call for a general advance, and it's all over.

During all this time the Prussians indeed were harassed by skirmish and artillery fire, certainly taking serious casualties. Hohenlohe's hesitancy along with the French spoiling attacks left the Prussians frustrated over the lack of any real advance, but dancing between both, advancing and then stopping to deal with French attacks.

Anyway you slice it, the Prussians did a whole lot more than just stand out in the open and stupidly endure two hours of skirmish fire while they attempted to defeat the French with volleys… That wasn't the plan at all.

Certinly, The whole thing was badly handled by Hohenlohe, and the Prussians certainly weren't the equal of the French, but they did hold their own for quite a while being outnumbered 2-1 the entire time. [When Garwert's division advanced, the French had more than twice the number of troops on the field than the Prussians. With Holtzendorf and Tauentzien both defeated, Hohenlohe had about 30,000 troops compared to Napoleon's more than 65,000 troops: Lannes', Soult's, Augereau's and part of Ney's corps engaged with the Guard in reserve.

Bill