"Skirmishing Tactics" Topic

Some of the regiments that formed Davout's I corps in Russia also contained 6th battalions. These were only composed of fusilier companies, they did not have either grenadier or voltigeur companies. In this case, it would have been essential for the fusilier companies to provide men for the skirmish chain. Were these the battalions that Davout was referring to when debating whether to use the third rank or an entire company as skirmishers?

npm

Were these the battalions that Davout was referring to when debating whether to use the third rank or an entire company as skirmishers?

npm:
I don't think so. What Morand says of it sounds like it was a general discussion about which basic approach was better , rather than identifying specific troops or battalions in that question. The implication being that all of the troops would do it the same way.

Bill

McLaddie,

You wrote:
"Davout's entire Corps had no light infantry from 1806 through 1812 and they did just fine."

Although it's irrelevant to the point, this is untrue. His 1st Division (Morand) included the 13th Legere as early as October, 1806.

For the 1809 campaign, the 2nd Division (Friant) included the 15th Legere, and the 3rd Division (Gudin) included the 7th Legere. This OB preserved through the 1812 campaign.

But in the end, what matters, I would think, is how all this is represented on the tabletop. Shane clearly has a developed rule mechanism going.

My question at this point in the discussion would be: except in 1:1 or 1:10 skirmish rules, do these differences of tactical doctrine have any relevance?

Personally, my vote would be that a skirmish company is not significantly different from a similar number of 3rd rankers. The significant factors would be numbers, training, experience, and morale. For a flanker co. at 1:60 figure ratio, I'd use a single stand of figs on a wider "skirmish stand" of representative width.

Widowson:

I took a look at Davout's Corps in 1806 at Auerstadt, and found one OOB without any Legere, and others with the 13th Legere in Morand's division. I found the same thing in looking at several OOBs for 1809 Borodino. One has only the 15th Legere in Friant's Division, others don't have it at all. It does seem that Davout had fewer Legere regiments than the norm of one per division…

Obviously, in the midst of a campaign there could be a lot of reasons for this, but in general, I have to say

mea culpa. Thanks for pointing that out to me.

Bill

Widowson wrote:

My question at this point in the discussion would be: except in 1:1 or 1:10 skirmish rules, do these differences of tactical doctrine have any relevance?</q.

Widowson:
Well, obviously it seems to have relevance for Davout, a Corps commander, as to whether line troops deployed by company or third rank. The question would be why bother with the question and what battlefield issues influenced Davout's choice. Ney advocated third rank deployment. The Prussians chose it over company deployment in their reforms.
So what were the differences?

Personally, my vote would be that a skirmish company is not significantly different from a similar number of 3rd rankers. The significant factors would be numbers, training, experience, and morale. For a flanker co. at 1:60 figure ratio, I'd use a single stand of figs on a wider "skirmish stand" of representative width.

I'm guessing here, but I would think deploying a company would require a shorter frontage and some formation complications that 3rd rank deployments wouldn't, but then the battalions with only two rank formations because the third was committed to skirmishing would find that while they maintained their frontage, they were less able to sustain casualties. A couple of Prussian regiments experienced this at Jena.

Whether those are issues a game designer *wants* to include is another question altogether.

Bill

WE actually found in our games that a French btln circa 1809 (6 coys) would have 3 figures or 120 men (at high strength) with a frontage of 24yds per figure or 72yds for the voltiguer company.

However, an Austrian btln of 24 figures in our system would be able to deploy up to 6 figs (3rd rankers) out in front of the btln at any given time. With each figure occupying 18yds frontage this would give them a btln coverage of 108yds in comparison to the French single voltiguer company.

So in response to Bills point we do show this and it is an issue as a French player I face all of the time. I find that the Austrians can actually out flank my voltiguers in these situations and cause my voltiguers great trouble. However, if I throw a legere regiment into the mix things begin to change and I re-gain the advantage in skirmishing. However, Legere btlns are not so prevalent in the army ration between ligne and legere.

This then forces me to use Fusilier companies to make up the numbers. These troops are not so good at skirmishing and in our system actually suffer negative morale while acting in such an open order formation due to inexperience and training. When forced to do this it also weakens my ligne btlns to a point where the Austrian heavy infantry can spot the weakening and thrust forward. When this occurs I am in trouble.

It is very complex and these situations unfold in different ways in every battle we have but if the cards fall in the right way the Austrians can really gain an advantage. And the further extended my line is the more prevalent this situation becomes.

It is a real challenge sometimes to overcome or ensure it does not happen in the first place but this is what I like about this level of play. You have to think on your feet and things can get ugly very quickly. This is what I enjoy about our games.

Also, Davout's famous 3rd Corps had the following organization for its Infantry Divisions from 1805 up to the end of the 1807 campaign:

Davout's 3rd Corps
Austerlitz 1805

1st Division (attached to 5th Corps)
13th Legere Regiment
30th Ligne Regiment
17th Ligne Regiment
61st Ligne Regiment
51st Ligne Regiment

2nd Infantry Division
15th Legere Regiment
33rd Ligne Regiment
48th Ligne Regiment
111th Ligne Regiment
108th Ligne Regiment

Davout's 3rd Corps
Auerstadt 1806

1st Infantry Division
13th Legere Regiment
30th Ligne Regiment
17th Ligne Regiment
61st Ligne Regiment
51st Ligne Regiment

2nd Infantry Division
33rd Ligne Regiment
48th Ligne Regiment
111th Ligne Regiment
108th Ligne Regiment

3rd Infantry Division
12th Ligne Regiment
21st Ligne Regiment
25th Ligne Regiment
85th Ligne Regiment

Davout's 3rd Corps
Eylau 1807

1st Infantry Division
13th Legere Regiment
30th Ligne Regiment
17th Ligne Regiment
61st Ligne Regiment
51st Ligne Regiment

2nd Infantry Division
33rd Ligne Regiment
48th Ligne Regiment
111th Ligne Regiment
108th Ligne Regiment

3rd Infantry Division
12th Ligne Regiment
21st Ligne Regiment
25th Ligne Regiment
85th Ligne Regiment

What I take away from this is that in 1805 Voltiguer companies were non-existent or only just forming thus the full complement of Legere regiments in the corps. However, in 1806 onwards with the Voltiguer companies now fully incorporated into the Ligne regiments there was not as pressing a need for the scarce Legere Regiments thus the duties of screening were fully laid with the voltiguers of each Ligne btln.

Shane

Shane:

I think you are reading way too much into Davout's corps OOBs.

In comparison, his corps was out of the norm--which I think has more to do with the continued competency of his line troops than any voltigeur/legere numbers from 1805. After the Camp at Bourlogne I can't see any problems with untrained voltigeurs in 1805. I've never read anything like that. Most all had one Legere brigade/regiment in each division. All of them at Jena, Austerlitz, etc. It was the norm for the French beginning in the Revolutionary Wars.

If you look at the French Corps organization from 1805 to 1813 when provisional and composite battalions were littering the French army, the norm remained at least two or three legere battalions in the first brigade of a division. The exceptions tended to be some foreign corps and 4th and 5th divisions.

The introduction of voltigeur companies doesn't seem to have changed either the divisional organization or prevelance of legere regiments in the French army. The French worked hard to maintain a 3:1 ratio of ligne to legere regiments throughout the late Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods.

Bill

Shane wrote:

This then forces me to use Fusilier companies to make up the numbers. These troops are not so good at skirmishing and in our system actually suffer negative morale while acting in such an open order formation due to inexperience and training. When forced to do this it also weakens my ligne btlns to a point where the Austrian heavy infantry can spot the weakening and thrust forward. When this occurs I am in trouble.

It is very complex and these situations unfold in different ways in every battle we have but if the cards fall in the right way the Austrians can really gain an advantage. And the further extended my line is the more prevalent this situation becomes.

Shane:
I think you have captured the actual dynamics of skirmishing in your description of your game. The core tactical problem was who would skirmish, and how many? That is why Charles and the Austrians, The Russians and even the British recommended not deploying too many skirmishers, while the tendency was to do just that when the French were so free with theirs. Even so, the French felt the same way. If the enemy resisted friendly skirmishers, each side would deploy more and more in an effort to overwhelm the other…

…skirmishing and losing men uselessly. I cannot express how much aversion I have always had for skirmishing. It is difficult to imagine how much it costs in casulaties…two new [close-order] attacks against the position, just like the first, would not have been more deadly… The skirmishing ended on our side and the enemy started it again. As a matter of fact, it was extremely difficult to stop bickering except by withdrawing our troops, and this was not without inconveience for either advantageous terrain or the morale of the army.

This sounds like the complaints of Allied troops fighting against French skirmishers. It is actually the French officer Pelet describing what he sees as the problems with skirmishing after witnessing Ney's attack at Bussaco, where the division's two brigades deployed almost entirely as tirailleurs. Pelet pp. 182-3.

That sounds like the situation you are describing and Charles complained about in 1796. Deploy too many line troops as skirmishers and your real power, the close-order troops are seriously weakened. On the other hand, deploy too few and you lose advantageous terrain and the 'army's morale' suffers under unchallenged enemy skirmish fire.

It is a thorny problem, and there is no 'good' answer to it, which is why most officers like Pelet hated skirmishing.

Here is a skirmish encounter with Allied troops and the French: [I'm keeping the actors unknown for the moment.]

Scarcely had the division got into position when the enemy advanced to the attack. The light companies of the first brigade, with the 8th company and marksmen of [a regiment], were ordered out to skrimsh and keep down the fire of the enemy's sharp-shooters., which was causing a heavy loss particularly amongst the officers. It was now a quarter to three o'clock. The light comanies in front maintained their gournd for an hour against the ever-increasing number of the enemy; but his sharp-shooters had by this time picked off nearly all the artillerymen who were serving the only two …guns which had as yet come into action. and as he was becoming very threatening in front, [the commanding army general] who was present with his staff, directed [the division commander] to detach a regiment to the front, in order to cover the guns, and drive the ehemy form his advanced position. [The brigade commander} thereupon rode up to Colonel D. and said that the honour of executing …orders would devolve on [his regiment.]

The regiment accordingly cleared the bank of the front, fired a volley as it advanced, and charging with the bayonet, drove the French advnaced troops with great precipitation and in disorder to a hedge about one hundred yards in the rear, where they again gave way, pursued to another hedge and about the same distance, from which they were agains driven in great confusion upon their main columns, which was formed on the rising ground opposite.

The regiment, now joined by number 8 company, halted and formed up behind the last hedge and fired volleys at the enemy unitl all the ammunition was expended. WHilst in this critical position it was ordered to retire, which it accomplihsed without confusion, although it had to re-pass the first hedge and cross a deep ditch, and formed line about fifty yards in front of its orgiginal position. Here it was ordered to lie as it was much exposed to the enemy's fire, and it remained lying down for about an hour, when it was again ordered to its original positon…

Now, is this the Austrians facing the French in 1794, or the Prussians in 1806, or perhaps the Russians in 1807 or 1813? There is the inability to keep the French tirailleurs from causing serious damage. Their Opponents, unable to control them with skirmishers, calls out a regiment in close formation to charge them…something that was exactly the wrong thing to do according to Etling and Chandler. In the end, the French skirmishers came back and started at it again, which is why the regiment laid down…

Nope. Actually the engagement is at Quatre Bras in 1815, carried out by experienced and successful officers. The army commander who gives the order is the Duke of Wellington to Picton, who has Sir James Kempt tell Colonel Douglas to send out his 79th Highlanders. That regiment suffered two officers and 26 men killed, sixteen officers and 259 men wounded, while all the officers lost their horses.

I think there are a number of reasons for the British behaving they way they did against the French, throwing out lots of skirmishers didn't seem to be the right answer. [They had all the lights of the first brigade [@350 men] and the company 8 of the 79th…plus 'sharpshooters'. That is another 100 men. What is interesting that having 'sharpshooters' thrown out in 1815. Supposedly having designated sharpshooters outside of the light companies in line regiments went out of fashion along with volunteers, schutzen and 'picked' men among line troops.

The dynamics of battlefield skirmishing seem to remain the same across the tweny years of war, only the different approaches to the balancing act evolve.

Bill

A classic example of the British use of sharpshooters as extra light troops is vividly shown in the battle of Maida. These men were hand picked crack shots and called, "Flankers".

Our picture of them is that they may not have been necessarily trained and experienced skirmishers but that they were highly accurate "sharpshooters". So in our system we rate them fairly averagely as skirmishers but their fire discipline is two disciplines higher than the rest of the btln. This maskers them noticeably better shots in the mechanics and thus fairly deadly when used to purpose.

The only problem we have had is how many of them can the average British Line btln produce and detach when called? We worked on a number of 10% of the main strength and I think this is fairly OK but could be higher?

Those "flankers" were a specific number of men from the center companies. They weren't called 'sharpshooters.' From what I gather the practice was started in Flanders in 1899--Bundbury describes it as a response to the numerous Dutch and French skirmishers, but I have never seen them mentioned after Maida. Bunbury doesn't say they are chosen for any particular sharpshooting skills.

IIRC, I think 12 from each company. They weren't called sharpshooters, while the soldiers in the account at Quatre Bras are specifically called "sharpshooters' and are separate from the light companies.

I would imagine that no more than 10 or 12 would be sharpshooters too, but I am not sure about anything else other than identifying "sharpshooters" was not an Army SOP or convention written down, but apparently something that regimental colonels did, choosing a number of men outside of the regular lights to act as sharpshooters.
Whether they are called sharpshooters because of their role, like the the author calls the French tirailleurs "sharpshooters" or because of their ability, I have no idea, but can see both or either being true.

Bill

I think you are reading way too much into Davout's corps OOBs.

But this is my point, you said that Davout's corps was not the norm and that is what I meant. Because his corps was not normal the need for integral legere regiments was not so prevalent. Because his units were so well trained they could indeed carry out the duties normally associated with the Legere btlns.

What is interesting though is that if you look at the tactical set up of his forces in the battles his corps fought in in those first three years you tend to see the Legere btlns out in front (1st line) with the Ligne btlns making up the 2nd and 3rd lines. These legere btlns are not actually in skirmish formation but in "Line" with skirmishers out in front. This is fairly normal practice. The legere btlns basically feed lights to the screen but are fighting in close order.

I know there are many cases of entire Legere btlns being thrown out into skirmish formation but this does not seem to be how they were used in Davout's corps. I may have missed the occasions in which they might have been but deployment maps I have seen do not indicate this. So instead to me it seems to be that the Legere Regiments take on the honour of facing the enemy first in line rather than actually skirmishing in their entirety, a role we so readily associate with Legere regiments.

I can only put this down to the fact that the enemy they encountered usually had far less skirmishers thus the need to put out swarms of them were not so important and actually counter-productive if done. So as a compromise these regiments were placed in the front line in "line" formation so as to be readily able to skirmish in the need arose but predominately fought in line formation because that need did not arise.

However, that is for Davout's corps facing continental armies in Europe. I believe that Davout's corps, if thrust into Spain would have fight entirely different if facing the British army that had a predomance on light troops that steadily increased over time. I do feel that the study of the peninsula was fairly unique compared to the rest of the European battles in that skirmisher deployment seemed far more important due to the the propensity of both sides to ensure they were not out fought in this kind of combat.

But by the 1812 campaign and later in central Europe with all of the reforms of all of the army's the parity in light troops seemed to level out and there number and utilization increased, especially in the allied army's. Thus the French were forced to throw their own out in ever increasing numbers to follow suit.

I dunno, this is just the impression I got. The evolution of tactical warfare in Spain seemed to evolve at a different rate to that of central Europe? Maybe I am reading a little too much into it but that is the point, to try to gain an insight into not just what were the decisions but why were the dicisions made? What was the reasoning behind them. Basically an insight into the minds of the commanders.

Shane

IIRC, I think 12 from each company. They weren't called sharpshooters, while the soldiers in the account at Quatre Bras are specifically called "sharpshooters' and are separate from the light companies.

Great, this equates more or less than to my guess at setting the limit to no more than 10% of the btln strength max. I would dearly love to find out more about the practice and the why. Your point about flanders has pretty much answered that for me. I will now go hunt down books on flanders. There are some good FE articles on this campaign I have and will no re-read.

What I always found interesting about the British army was the tactical use of the btln in that it was also organized into two equal "wings". I know this has little to do with skirmish tactics but it is useful to understand the reasoning behind it. My guess is that because there so many companies in a British btln having two wings allowed for better organizational coordination? and the ability of the btln to face two foes if needed or work independently but in short proximity if the need arose?

I think you may find the two wings was when the Battalion was at such strength that it had the extra officers and formed two platoons per company. In two ranks that stretches beyond reasonable for combat and the split into two wings of 10 platoons each restores the ease of formation changes and alignment.

Shane:

Yes, all of the French Corps led with the Legere. I believe that the French deployed a set amount of skirmishers from the Legere going forward, and then responded to circumstances, which means you would see more or less skirmishers being deployed, 'depending' on what the enemy did.

You commented on the Light Division. The British were old-fashioned in many ways, including sticking to line deployment and a fairly rudimentary general staff, for instance. The Light Division was the "Advanced Guard" of other nations, a practice started before the SYW.

Obviously, the British felt the practice had some utility. However, I don't see the Light Division necessarily being deployed or positioned all that differently than regular divisions. [When it actually became a division in size…]

I don't know the actual rationale.

Bill

British Flankers:

Henry Bunbury described the use of flankers in the British Mediterranean army:

These soldiers were taken from the battalion companies in each regiment, and placed under the command of picked officers. They were trained to act as sharpshooters; were not told off in line with their battalions (except at reviews, parades etc) and in the field were kept in rear and on the flanks of their respective battalions and brigades, ready to act in front or flank as occasion might require. This was the plan of Sir James Craig, and introduced at Malta in 1805. It was discontinued when Sir John Moore took the command of the army

As can be seen, this was not normal British practice, although it had been done before, and was ordered in this instance by the Army commander.

It is often assumed that the Light brigade at Maida was composed of these "flankers", but apart from a detachment from the 35th regiment (the main body of which was not with the army), this unit was actually made up of light companies.
Perhaps this explains the need for the flankers, as the composite light brigade, which incorporated the majority of the regimental light companies, seems to have been used as a separate elite force rather than a skirmish screen for the army.

An indication of the amount of flankers drawn from a battalion is the strength of the flanker detachment from the 35th regiment serving with the light brigade. This numbered around 120 men, which is 15 per company (they were drawn from the centre companies only). This could be misleading however. Because the main body of the 35th did not accompany the expedition it is possible that the flanker detachment had been augmented prior to embarking.

There are very few references to flankers or sharpshooters in the Peninsula and at Waterloo. There is Major Forbes' account of Quatre Bras, which Bill has already alluded to, where Forbes claims that "marksmen" were sent out from the 79th Regiment to aid the light companies. There is also a reference to Flankers being sent out by the 42nd Regiment at Corunna. These seem to be rare exceptions and whether this was peculiar to these particular regiments is difficult to say.

Apart from light companies and flankers, there are also many references in defensive engagements to the "pickets" being the first to engage the advancing French voltigeurs. These pickets were very often not from the light companies.

Snort:
Thanks for the quote. I had forgotten they were called 'sharpshooters', though again whether ability or role is being identified here I don't know.

And yes, most of the British skirmishers were light infantry companies, but that Stewart brought 'Flankers', not light companies, from regiments not present at the battle is interesting.

I think that who skirmished and why was far more free-wheeling and influenced by regimental needs than usually supposed.

Bill

Thanks MS, I new they were trained sharpshooters. I had read the same passage somewhere before. That is why I rated them as average skirmishers in ability but 2 ranks higher in fire discipline in our system.

At Maida the light (and grenadier) companies were consolidated into elite forces. The elite light battalion/brigade was the unit that delivered the deadly volley that did for the 1st Legere and is the battle's most famous episode (but was not the complete battle as some accounts imply).

As Major Snorth says, this explains the need for separate sharpshooters. The practice of concentrating elite companies into separate brigades was not taken up by Wellington (or Moore), so there was no need for extra sharpshooters in the Peninsula. As I understand it, light companies were detached, but they were combined at brigade level, usually with specialist rifle companies.

Regarding Davout's corps a couple of things might be useful.

First, Napoleon organized the corps d'armee in 1805 to be of non-uniform makeup for two reasons-to confuse enemy intelligence and because of the varying capabilities of the marshals who commanded them.

Second, corps in the Grande Armee were basically a headquarters with corps troops assigned to them (gendarmes, artillery, train, engineers, etc). A corps headquarters could handle between two and five infantry divisions and had either a brigade or division of light cavalry to scout for it.

The system was flexible in that divisions could be cross-attached to another corps as needed for a particular mission or detached to form new corps, as happened with Mortier forming an VIII Corps in 1805.

So, I would suggest that except for a basic organization, no corps d'armee was typical, merely similar.

K