"Skirmishing Tactics" Topic
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boomstick86 | 20 Sep 2010 5:38 p.m. PST |
I've read that French voltigeur companies thrown out as skirmishers often held back a significant part of their strength in a formed or semi-formed body between the skirmish line and the formed troops, for purposes of reinforcing the skirmish line at critical points, or as a body to fall back on in case of cavalry. Any idea how this reserve may have been formed? Some sources say it was usually composed of the 3rd rank of the voltigeur company, but I don't want to assume it formed in one rank at company width. I'd like to model this on the table top for a skirmish line vignette and I need ideas, thanks. Rich |
Extra Crispy | 20 Sep 2010 6:38 p.m. PST |
My understanding is that it was often the men of the third rank who formed this "reserve" but that they were in a loose skirmish order themselves. They were not formed up
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boomstick86 | 20 Sep 2010 7:17 p.m. PST |
But to fill the role of reserve, they must have been more tightly under the control of their officers than the men in the forward skirmish line, if less so than the 'elbow-touchers' in their rear, right? Wouldn't this imply at least a reasonable compact formation? |
McLaddie | 20 Sep 2010 10:06 p.m. PST |
It depended on how many men were thrown out. A company generally would cover the entire front of the battalion with about half the company. The rest would be in reserve. Almost always, regardless of the country, when a reserve or supports were present, they were in close formation. That way they could move quickly as a unit and more importantly could act as a solid defense other skirmishers could rally around if attacked by cavaly. Another reason for reserves was that skirmishing burned through a lot of ammunition, and troops would have to be cycled through the skirmish line. Surprisingly, the French did not practice this type of reserve conservation to the extent that the British or other nations learned to. Pelet has a great deal to say about this in critiquing Ney's attack at Bussaco. Bill |
Matheo | 20 Sep 2010 10:17 p.m. PST |
We're talking here about a single voltigeur platoon, acting along it's parent battalion. When forming a skirmish line in front of the battalion, they would retain first (right-hand) and last (left hand) half-section as a formed body, with centre half-sections going skirmish. Those formed half-sections would then align to the centre, and remain as a single section. They would provide reserves for the skirmish line, in case of casualties or weapon malfunction. Also, in case of danger (enemy light horse or such), those half sections would move back to their original positions to left and right, and the skirmish line would retire to the centre of platoon. When fully deployed, it would look like this: skirmish line of single files first; then the voltigeur officer with his bugler, then the formed section, then the rest of battalion. I'm not really sure about the distances between those elements, my guess (and guess only) is it would be about 10-15 paces between voltigeur elements (skirmish line, officer and the rest of platoon) with the battalion maybe a bit further back, some 30-50 paces. The commands (and so the actions) for such arrangement, apart from usual "fire by files" and "cease fire", would be "retire" (for the skirmish line to fall back between the formed half-sections") and "replacement" (for one of formed guys to replace wounded/kia/weapon malfunction). Sorry, cannot remember the exact french commands. HTH |
Oliver Schmidt | 21 Sep 2010 4:01 a.m. PST |
Morand ("Davout") 1811: link Reille 1815: link |
Ligniere | 21 Sep 2010 6:26 a.m. PST |
Davout's instructions describe the following – the company would advance on the center of the parent battalion and split into three sections, the center section would remain in position as a reserve. The two flank sections would advance ahead of the reserve section. The flank sections would advance their front and center ranks, who would pair off and spread out to cover the parent unit. The rear/third rank would remain as an immediate reserve for the skirmish chain. The chain would be about 10 yards from their immediate rear rank reserves, and they would be 75 yards ahead of the full reserve section. The reserve section might be 150 yards ahead of the parent battalion – but always in visual communication. I presume the distances were to ensure that the enemy couldn't hit the parent unit. Voltigeurs were meant to screen the parent, not to catch musket balls intended to hit the parent – the only way to effectively do that was with distance. From a company of 120 men, forty would be in the reserve section, and a little of fifty would be in the skirmish chain, twenty-five pairs of men. npm |
Defiant | 21 Sep 2010 8:20 a.m. PST |
Thank you Ligniere, You have helped me vindicate what I felt was the intentions of voltiguer companies and justify how I portray them in games. Shane |
boomstick86 | 21 Sep 2010 9:19 a.m. PST |
Wow, great links, especially the one with a diagram. And thanks for the descriptions Mateo and Ligniere. If I understand this correctly, the standard (at least both sources us this) distance between files in the forward skirmish line was 15 paces? That's much greater than I suspected, but very informative. |
Ligniere | 21 Sep 2010 10:10 a.m. PST |
boomstick86, It's hard to refute something when it's written down, but fifteen paces between pairs does seems like a lot. If you do the math, it's more more like 5-7.5 paces spacing to cover a typical battalion in line. At fifteen paces, a single company could cover two battalions – but maybe that was the point. Why expend all your resources at one time, if you only deploy 50% of your available voltigeur companies you can rotate them when fatigued or out of ammo. Shane, I'm only referring to the French practice, but I can't imagine it wouldn't hold true for the other nations, and allies of France. I think as gamers we tend to think of the skirmish line as being much closer to the parent than it actually was – I would imagine that the closest they would come to the close order formed parent unit would be a little beyond effective musketry range. When operating defensively the skirmishers would most definitely want to get out of the way once the advancing enemy came within effective musket range of the parent unit. I recently read an account from Vimeiro in Portugal, where the British skirmish line failed to get out of the way in time, and severely restricted the opening volley of the defending units. This was something I'm sure they quickly improved upon. npm |
McLaddie | 21 Sep 2010 3:04 p.m. PST |
I think one point that has to be made is that 'the standard method' was very loose and done differently depending on the units 'doing it.' For instances, the instructions for the 10th Legere have three lines reserve, supports and skirmish line made of the three sections, while Davout had two lines and the center section the reserve. That is why Matheo can give a third alternative. It is why Davout feels it is necessary to clearly state HIS and his staff's preferences in his 1811 instructions
Why have instructions when the Grande Armee had been fighting and skirmishing successfully for six year or more. Because the French didn't all have the exact same practices, as experienced as they were. That is why Ney, in his 1803 instructions states HIS corps will use the third rank to skirmish, a year before the army establishes their voltigeur companies. We are talking about a twenty year period where armies learned and relearned various skirmish practices in an era where SOPs were far more varied that you find in modern armies. That is why Marmont and Soult can change to armies of divisions in Spain when the rest of the French army has established corps. Need and local practices had their place. A good book written just after the Napoleonic wars is: The Essentials of Good Skirmishing by Colonel G. Gawler of the 52nd Light Infantry. The second edition 1837 is available free from Google. On the first page he gives the "Eight Essentials" to Good Skirmishing: 1. Active Intelligence 2. Correct Firing 3. Daring Courage 4. Making the best of cover 5. Presenting the smallest possible marks to the enemy's fire 6. Maintaining Extension form, and dependence on, a given File of Direction 7. Preserving a sufficient readiness to resist cavalry 8. A judicious Employment of Supports and Reserves. It is interesting that only two of the rules deal with skirmish organization, and #6 uses a "File of Direction" in the same mode as a brigade uses a Battalion of Direction. Now at the other end of the era is Larry's 1801 Instructions concerning the Duties of Light Infantry in the Field Probably the most advanced treatise at the time, Larry published the work in French, though he was the director of the Berlin Miliatary Academy. The British printed his work in English in 1803 and according to Gates became a mainstay in training and organizing British light infantry. Again, supports are mentioned, but like Gawler's work, where they were to be positioned was not made a hard and fast rule. Larry sees the need for supports, Gawler, supports AND reserves. Larry places supports on the flanks as does Gawler. Both books are available on Google in English. Also, Most of both Gawler and Larry's books are given to skirmish practices in the l'petite guerre and not the battlefield. Of course, so are Reilles and Morand/Davout's works too. Bill |
Defiant | 21 Sep 2010 3:38 p.m. PST |
Thank you Ligniere, In my system I explain to players that to effectively screen the parent unit the skirmishers must operate at least 50 yards or more in front and up to 300yds to remain in command contact. This denies the enemy (on level ground) the ability to hit the parent unit at all. Only the skirmishers can be fired at. If the skirmish screen is less than 50yds forward they do not screen the parent unit effectively. They will still be able to screen the parent unit however, the enemy can still fire on the parent unit with a deduction due to the screen. Shane |
Matheo | 21 Sep 2010 8:53 p.m. PST |
I think Bill nailed it wrt different methods. Mine description comes from the CENS maneouvres we did some time ago, that's their interpretation of french drill manuals from pre-1811 era, so it's perfectly acceptable that it differs from Davout's instructions. The distance between the files in skirmish line was supposed to be at 10 paces. For our downsized reenacting units we set it at 5 paces. The main problem was communications though; without proper bugler and understanding of sound signals, even downsized skirmish line at 10 paces would be almost impossible to command on practice, nevermind during the battle :) I think the whole point was to screen the battalion while still being able to act semi-independant in the face of enemy cavalry (hence the third line/centre section/wing half-sections reserve). |
Defiant | 21 Sep 2010 10:16 p.m. PST |
If I recall correctly there is also a current and well known Napoleonic website which tells us that there was a different pace distance between each pair of skirmishers depending on the nation. French – 15 paces Austrian – 6 paces Russian – 5 paces Although this is offered as official I do find it somewhat dubious. If in fact it is official and correct then I would embrace it in my system. I already have a SK and SS distance frontage for skirmishers but would like to know if what I have quoted above actually holds any water? Shane |
JeffsaysHi | 22 Sep 2010 3:08 a.m. PST |
A skirmish screen for covering movement of a column (as in not getting ambushed, and maybe what Davouts writing is for as I cant see why youd be doing a half circle of skirmishers around a line in battle) would I think have been different from a skirmish screen in a major battlefield close assault. At 150 yards for a battalion in line at the above distances that would be 30 skirmishers in pairs for the French, 90 for the Russian. As the French are often rated slightly superior in this respect of warfare we'd either have to conclude the individual French skirmisher was 4 times as effective as an individual Russian; or that the actual battlefield numbers were rather more equal. I'd plump for the latter, around the 80 mark for a battalion of 500. |
Defiant | 22 Sep 2010 3:51 a.m. PST |
p.s. Most rules systems give a generic negative for distance as a deduction for hitting skirmishers and causing losses to them. I am working on a very simple modification to this where the actual training/experience and ability factor together to provide a tiered negative. The reasoning behind this is because I have read that eyewitness accounts that explain that very adept skirmishers were very apt to utilizing cover any way they could to avoid being hit. While the less able or poorly trained were not so skilled. As my categories are: Adept Trained Untrained The negative adjustments would be relatively simple to implement with accompanying range modifiers. Shane |
von Winterfeldt | 22 Sep 2010 6:19 a.m. PST |
@Matheo What is your source that the usual file distance was 10 paces? According to my reading it could vary. About deployment, it would depnd what say a company of Voltigeurs had to do, in case cover the whole bataillon, there would be no need to creat a reserce to fall back onto it. On the other side it was quite usual that companies in skirmish orders did form own reserves, such as for example the Austrian line infantry. By that the skirmish line could be re – enforced and also the skirmishers could be replaced when they exhausted their ammunition. |
Oliver Schmidt | 22 Sep 2010 9:38 a.m. PST |
The instruction for the 10e léger dates from 1829: link Can anybody tell me where to find the complete text of the 1803 instructions for skirmishers by Ney ? |
Ligniere | 22 Sep 2010 10:48 a.m. PST |
Oliver Schmidt, The use of the third rank, as proposed by Ney, is included in 'The Memoir's of Marshal Ney, Volume 2'. The relevant section is from page 364 [of the book] forward – the previous sections make interesting reading too. Hopefully the following link will work for you link npm |
Matheo | 22 Sep 2010 11:18 a.m. PST |
"What is your source that the usual file distance was 10 paces?" Erm
it's Jakub Samek, CENS specialist for french drill. I hope Oliver doesn't laugh his arse off for this one ;) At least that's what we were told on maneouvres, however I'm inclined to side with "this could vary" camp. We've found in practice that 10 paces between files is very, very hard to maintain. 5 paces is more manageable, and about 3 paces is more than enough for reenactors, but that doesn't count (and we try to stay at 5 paces anyway; that's one idea of better troops being able to advance and fire in skirmish line with longer distances between the files). Light infantry manual for Polish troops is one thing I do not have access to atm, and that's a big loss. |
Oliver Schmidt | 22 Sep 2010 12:23 p.m. PST |
Thanks, npm, I found it ! Intersting indeed ! The 10 paces (6,5 m) are recommended for the 10e léger in 1829 (§. 21), which until this afternoon we believed to originate from 1816. The Polish 1812 instructions for skirmishers seem to be identical to the instructions of Morand/Davout. But I can't read them in Polish myself. |
Matheo | 22 Sep 2010 12:44 p.m. PST |
I can translate them for you, no problem ;) The thing is – I don't have them. Also, I think there was a version of those from 1811, which would be more appropriate for the drill manual we are using. But – anything would do ;) |
Oliver Schmidt | 22 Sep 2010 12:51 p.m. PST |
I believe, the following translation is – at least in parts – taken from the Polish 1812 instruction: link Powyższa polska wersja tekstu została opracowana na podstawie tłumaczenia pochodzącego z „Dodatku do Przepisu Musztry dla Piechoty Xięstwa Warszawskiego" wydanego w Warszawie w 1812 r. Fragmenty oznaczone kwadratowymi nawiasami nie zostały w oryginale polskiego tłumaczenia ujęte (co nie dotyczy zapisanych tu kursywą polskich komend, których francuskie brzmienie zostało powyżej dodane pogrubionym drukiem). For the texts of the Polish regulations, you could ask Paweł Grabowski
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Matheo | 22 Sep 2010 1:13 p.m. PST |
True that, I've obtained other basic drill from Paweł, haven't heard from him for a while though. Is he still active btw? The above link is actually a translation of Davout's instructions based on Polish text (in case anyone wondered). And it clearly states 15 paces between files, 300 paces in front of the rest of battalion (the third rank, forming reserve, would be 200 paces in front of battalion). Quite impossible to command without a capable bugler or strong drummer, if you ask me ;) |
Oliver Schmidt | 22 Sep 2010 1:23 p.m. PST |
Paweł – caporal Paul – is one of our most active grenadiers in the 22e demi-brigade de ligne
For all: here you can see a visualisation of the distance of 15 paces (9,75 m) between the files. picture (Execution of Reille's command: A 15 pas par file, prenez vos distances! – Marche!) Reille gives 10 or 15 paces as the regular distance between the files, Morand/Davout have 15 paces. |
Matheo | 22 Sep 2010 1:28 p.m. PST |
"Paweł – caporal Paul – is one of our most active grenadiers in the 22e demi-brigade de ligne
" Good – he was one of the best soldiers in 2nd Regiment :) I'll give him a call then. As for that picture – as I understand it, those files are marching one by one (first file marches to its position, then second as so forth). In CENS we do it a bit differently: all files start marching together, then the last file stops in its position, then second last and so forth: the first file is the last one to arrive on its position. I think it's a bit faster then marching files one by one (and I hope I make myself clear here). Now, as I seem to find no regulation for this in the link above, my question is: is it described somewhere else in the manual? |
Ligniere | 22 Sep 2010 1:37 p.m. PST |
What's fascinating about the picture is that this clearly identifies how open the skirmish chain was – most gamers prefer to throw whole battalions out to screen their main line, the intent being that these troops soak up the lead before it reaches the main body, so that the main body becomes a secondary bouncethrough target from the skirmish line – that's clearly not the purpose to the skirmish chain. Their role was to harass the enemy, and perhaps, as importantly, to stop the enemies skirmishers from harassing your own main body by keeping them at a good distance. npm |
Matheo | 22 Sep 2010 1:39 p.m. PST |
Ligniere – on the same token, though a bit off-topic, you should see how closely-packed the ranks would be in the formed platoon. 20 mm frontage per 28 mm miniature is waaaay too liberal ;) |
Oliver Schmidt | 22 Sep 2010 1:56 p.m. PST |
I agree that the task of the skirmisher line was not to "soak up the lead", but just to keep the enemy infantry at a distance. The skirmish line itself would not suffer much, as because of the distance between its files, most of the enemy bullets would pass through. But due to the long distance, fewer of these bullets would arrive at the main body, and those arriving there would have a very low energy left, causing only little damage. For some impressions of a unit formed in three ranks (many files missing though
) see here: link |
Matheo | 22 Sep 2010 2:07 p.m. PST |
And for just a little taste of how firing in line might have looked like
link (from this one on forward; lots of pictures there, only some of them interesting though ;) fire is by ranks and by file, only two ranks in platoon, width is less than one regulation section). @Ollie – some familiar faces there! Nice :) |
Defiant | 22 Sep 2010 5:29 p.m. PST |
The skirmish line itself would not suffer much, as because of the distance between its files, most of the enemy bullets would pass through. But due to the long distance, fewer of these bullets would arrive at the main body, and those arriving there would have a very low energy left, causing only little damage. I would like to add what I think is very important and relevant here. I think the main point of the skirmish screen to be placed well forward of the main body is an important one as others have said. I would just add that the enemy would not be in a position (unless elevated) to fire on the enemy main body well back. They would be forced to fire on the skirmishers who are well forward. Because of this, any rounds which pass through the skirmish screen (and there would be many) would be fired at a trajectory equal to the distance of the skirmishers, not the main body well back. Therefore, these rounds would mostly fall harmlessly into the ground between the skirmish screen and the main body
And that is why I think like Ligniere that the key importance of the skirmish screen was to force this to happen. I feel that the commanders of the time understood this and built their skirmish tactics around it. It was not until the distances between the main bodies of both sides were close that the skirmish screens job became ineffective. Once this distance was reached the skirmishers were commanded to either fall back or to the flanks etc. But by then their job was effectively over. I feel that this was a tactic of an advancing side to nullify to some degree the effect of incoming fire on an advancing body of formed troops so that once they hit that magical 100yd or less effective range their own troops were still in tact and capable of delivering equal volley fire on the defenders thus providing a higher degree of successful outcome in the ensuing firefight. Shane |
Defiant | 22 Sep 2010 5:50 p.m. PST |
I would also add and anyone who has ever been a soldier would agree. The number one thing that frustrated corporals and sergeants was (at least in my experience as a grunt) how soldiers would bunch up in the bush. Soldiers are constantly reminded to spread out but time and time again bunching up would occur. This is due to several reasons, visibility restrictions, fear and safety, inability to hear commands, terrain obstacles and so on, the list is endless and often different for every occasion. So the regulation distances between soldiers is often ignored. This creates a situation where the amount of flesh and blood (soldiers) in any given area increases. When this happens there is less open air and thus incoming rounds tend to find more marks. I would suggest that for example, troops that become cautious, fearful (shaken or demoralized) etc will bunch up. When this occurs they are hit more and this leads to a further deterioration of morale and collapse of the will to face forward. Inevitably morale breaks and the rout begins. This is not just for skirmishers but any body of troops who's morale is deteriorating. I would also say that if the regulation distances between light troops of a particular nation was 5 paces and not 10-15 paces like others this might be attributable to a lack of confidence (fear) of this kind of warfare. This lack of trust would cause the regulators to keep these troops on a tighter rein thus the 5 pace rule. Thus thicker screens by less effective (confident) light troops will see them hit more often and killed more quickly. I would say that the evidence of French light tactics becoming less effective late in the wars could be attributable to this because the confidence level of both commanders and the men were less because the overall experience was much lower. Shane |
boomstick86 | 22 Sep 2010 6:05 p.m. PST |
I know this is a bit off topic, but I began the topic, so perhaps I may be indulged
Why do most gamers (I speak anecdotally, of course) seem to select certain light battalions for dedicated skirmish duty (i.e. all companies in open order) rather than have each battalion in the line throw out a single company, voltigeurs in the case of the French, who are already there for that purpose? And furthermore, was one of these two methods more historically common – and therefore more "accurate"? |
von Winterfeldt | 22 Sep 2010 10:24 p.m. PST |
The French also used whole bataillons or regiments for a skirmishing line – I think it would depend what they wanted to achieve tactically, just a screen or conduct a fire fight on the long run. How they controlled it – I don't know. It seemed from battle reports that this wasn't so frequent as the down to one company restricted one. |
Keraunos | 22 Sep 2010 11:44 p.m. PST |
broomstick, there is a paralell thread right now on the 'history' board, it covers your quesiton in detail, I think |
blucher | 23 Sep 2010 4:39 a.m. PST |
"I know this is a bit off topic, but I began the topic, so perhaps I may be indulged
Why do most gamers (I speak anecdotally, of course) seem to select certain light battalions for dedicated skirmish duty (i.e. all companies in open order) rather than have each battalion in the line throw out a single company, voltigeurs in the case of the French, who are already there for that purpose? And furthermore, was one of these two methods more historically common – and therefore more "accurate"?" Couple of reasons. - you need your figures to be based as companys which isnt that common these days. Even if you do though it fudges things a bit because you reduce your frontage too much. - Not all nations used this method. The prussians/austrians used the third rank for example. |
McLaddie | 23 Sep 2010 9:48 p.m. PST |
I think there is a tendency here to put the whole skirmish process in a little box so it can be gamed. One ends up saying the purpose of skirmishing is " ", like saying that Columns were always columns of divisions and only used to maneuver. The instructions are all about deploying skirmishers, sort of the starting positions, not 'how it was done in all cases.' For instance, if a French battalion of seven hundred men deploys a company of skirmishers of @ 90-100 to cover the deployment area of the battalion column, that would be about a 200 yard front. At 15 yard intervals between files would be only say 14 files or 28 men. IF there were supports and reserves of the rest, that is about 1/3 skirmishers, 1/3 supports and 1/3 reserves. But what about the 10th Legere instructions of 10 paces between files? That would be 20 files and 40 men, which would work if ONLY supports were held back, a two line skirmish deployment rather than three lines. But The Russians have 5 paces. That is 80 men out in front of a 600 man battalion with little or no supports. however, The Russians had different procedures for line and jager troops, and even different processes between army corps. Barclay wanted three man chains/files. Kutusov insisted on 2 lines of skirmisher files. So what does that company of French skirmishers 28 strong do when facing 40 to 80 Russian skirmishers, particularly if the Russians skirmishers have a habit of charging skirmishers with the bayonet? Are the French so good, that they could hold back twice the number of skirmishers on the same front? If you want to support that skirmish line with line troops, where would you stick them if maintaining the 15 yard distance
And this doesn't even touch on the different missions skirmishers had during a battle, only ONE of them being " to keep the enemy infantry at a distance." And of course, this is all assuming a particular point in the Napoleonic period, because the French only started using voltigeur companies in 1804, so for more of a decade, the French were using other kinds of deployments including third ranks, schutzen-type groupings etc. Aferward you have instructions like Davout's in 1811 which are addressed to more than just the voltigeurs. In the end, the distance between files depended on the mission of the skirmishers, regardless of the nation, as well as training, how many enemy skirmishers they were facing etc. etc. etc. For instance, at Bussaco, Craufurd's division deployed 1500 men to cover the front of the 1500 men left in close formation
The attacking French division did the same, deploying all of their voltigeurs and three battalions of infantry
so what file distance did they maintain? At the same battle, Ney threw most of his division [two brigades]as skirmishers at the four to five battalion front of the British opposite them. What file spacing did the French use there? To understand skirmish combat and its purposes, we have to look at how they were used with the understanding that file spaces were guidlines and tools for deployment, not hard and fast rules at any distance. There is a reason there are so many variations between instructions even within the same army
Bill |
10th Marines | 24 Sep 2010 5:01 p.m. PST |
I have a couple of questions: First, is all that is being discussed is skirmishing by company and/or merely covering the front of the parent unit? and
Second, why is so much attention being paid to instructions/regulations when the French army didn't have one on the army level. Lastly, does anyone know why Davout issued skirmishing instructions in 1811? K |
McLaddie | 24 Sep 2010 6:36 p.m. PST |
K: Well, that's three questions, but: 1. I don't know. There does seem to be a focus on voltigeur companies, as they were normally sent out to screen units. Several examples have been given in the other thread on Skirmishing. 2. Because there is a desire to know 'how they did it', and various French generals and units did issue instructions on 'how to do it'. And obviously because the French army didn't have any army level instructions, that void was filed
which was quite a normal pasttime among most all armies
Generals issuing their own instructions for a corps, army in a theatre etc. Lots fo examples of that during the Napoleonic wars with all of the armies. 3. Yes, Davout/Morand state why they are issuing them at the beginning of the instructions, but it is clear through out the instructions. One main purpose was to establish a norm for 'how to do it.' Davout's letter to Morand: To the general Morand. Hambourg, 16th October 1811.I have received, my dear general, your letter of 16th and the five copies of your project to teach the service of the skirmishers [tirailleurs] to all troops. It seems excellent to accomplish this task, and I will send it to all generals commanding a division of infantry, ordering them to use the rest of the season to exercise all companies in this. And, thanking you, my dear general, I ask you to send a copy of this project, of which you surely will have kept an original for yourself, to each of your generals and colonels, directing them to stick to it and exercise the troops in the future. The companies of the voltigeurs are already familiar with these manoeuvers, it will be proper to exercise the centre companies with the companies of voltigeurs for the first time, it means a mixing of the fusiliers with the voltigeurs. I will be obliged if you let me know of measures you have taken, and the progress of the troops in this training, made on different ground, which can only develop the understanding of the soldiers and the same of the officers.
Bill |
Defiant | 24 Sep 2010 7:55 p.m. PST |
To get back to the original question I would like to add that we show the supports in our own way. People new to the system were often intrigued why
I was asked several times over the years why the skirmish figures in my system are much thicker in depth than normal line close order figures. In my system a skirmish figure of 40 men has a frontage of either Full Skirmish or Semi-Skirmish depending on their abilities and skill as skirmishers which represents their ability to spread out and cover the required frontage. However, the base depth of the figure is not thinner than a normal base depth but twice the depth. This was done to show that not every man in that 40 man figure is actually skirmishing. Half of them are actually to the rear of the figure is a small single or double line acting as supports. So a single figure (40 men) of semi-skirmishers with a frontage of 18mm (18yds) will have 10 pairs (20 men) along the front. Roughly 2 men per 2yds with the other 20 men behind them in a small line at the rear of the base to keep feeding the skirmish line. As for Full skirmishers the figure base frontage is 24mm (24yds). so this gives you 10 pairs operating along the front of the base at roughly 2 men per two and a half yards with the rest in a small line at the rear of the base. This is not perfect but it is great for us. The small support lines behind do not do much and count for zero in the scheme of things other than to feed men into the skirmish line ahead. Every time 40 men become casualties a single figure is taken off and so on. All of this portrays how singular light companies are used in my system. However, when showing entire btlns which feed in skirmishers to the skirmish line from the parent unit behind it is a different story. Where I have evidence that a unit did NOT throw out its entire strength into skirmish as the one time we portray this accordingly. But at this level your not dealing with singular skirmish figures like in companies, you are dealing with entire btlns and can more easily show the same concept of the parent unit, supports and the main line as I explained in singular figures. If you have a btln of light troops of say 20 figures and wish to throw out 50% as skirmishers you can do this: 25% (5 figures) in the front line spread out in skirmish formation. A five figure skirmish frontage. 25% (5 figures) in a second line as the immediate supports say 100yds behind that feed the main line of skirmishers. As skirmisher figures are killed instead of taking the figure from the skirmish line you simply take the figure away from the supports. The 5 figures would reduce to 4, then 3, then 2 and so on
but all the time the frontage of the screen remains at 5 figures strong until the supports are exhausted. Meanwhile the other half of the btln is to the rear acting as the base of the skirmish line for nothing more than morale purposes a couple of hundred yards to the rear.
The actual legal number of figures allowed to be in skirmish formation is set by tactical doctrine evidence that you may have and this is harder to find than you may think. However, it is a question I will be working on in the future because each nation had its own preference as to how many men it would allow into the skirmish line at any given moment simply because of command and control issues.
In fact, I am going to start a thread on this so begin gathering that evidence right now. Shane |
McLaddie | 24 Sep 2010 8:38 p.m. PST |
Shane: What kind of evidence do you have that less experienced skirmishers would cover less front? Oh, and I want to commend you on working to have skirmishing as a significant part of battlefield tactics. So many games reduce the entire exercise to comparing SK strengths which produces an exercise far from what the actual dynamics were. Too often skirmishing is seen as something that the two sides do which simply 'neutralizes' the other side and so 'doesn't count.' Bill
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Defiant | 24 Sep 2010 11:27 p.m. PST |
My only evidence regarding this is the natural propensity of less experienced soldiers to clump together and not maintain a regulation standard distance between each pair. I am relating this to my own experience as a soldier in light infantry tactics where this issue was taught to us. The regulation (order to spread out) was in many situations ignored by men, who less experienced and more fearful would tend to close in on each other for safety. This leads to higher hit rates when the bullets start flying because there is more flesh and blood in a given frontage. Of course I am taking a "very" broad brush on this but in relating this to the Napoleonic period you get a spectrum of units who skirmished from the most adept and skilled to the worst units who did not even know how to load and fire but were told to skirmish. I am thinking of for example the 95th Rifles and similar units such as German Jagers, French voltiguer companies and the Legere regiments of the early to mid empire and one end of the spectrum. Then on the other end you have certain militia units, Landwehr, Conscript btlns and so on who are also made to skirmish and usually do so with no formal training. The difference between the two groups being that the well skilled and highly experienced units would know how to spread out and maintain distance between pairs to reduce the chances of incoming lead finding a mark while the lesser experienced units, not knowing this, would tend to bunch up and close in on each other for security due to fear setting in and form ragged clumps in a skirmish line and therefore get hit much faster. Empire rules did a very similar thing with their SK and SS ratings and if you look closely at them you see that the worse, or less trained units tend towards the SS rating (semi-skirmish) while the much more experienced jagers, voltiguers and riflemen tend towards the SK (full skirmish) rating but also with the ability to close in and form SS if they wish. My difference to this is that I did away with the ability of SK skirmishers to also form SS frontages. My reasoning behind this was that these highly trained and skilled skirmishers would tend to maintain their distances and refuse to close in to a tighter formation such as SS for the very reason of safety. Ironically highly skilled light troops understand the importance of distance between pairs for safety reasons (less chance of being hit) and are also much better at maintaining order and control while light troops with far less skill and ability (SS) tend to close in on each other for the same reason, security and safety. The less experienced and skilled light troops are unable to see that what they think is security by keeping closer paces between pairs actually decreases safety due to the increased risk of being hit in any given area of frontage due to an increased number of bodies in that frontage. Whether my opinion is correct I am not so sure but I have read several passages about this over the years. I remember one where George Nafziger is discussing light infantry in the British army and said that the British regimental light companies tended to form thicker skirmish screens than the French voltiguers because that was their tactical doctrine. He argues that due to less confidence and concerns about command and control of light infantry this was the reason. However, with the Riflemen of the 95th and 60th and the French voltiguers this was not the case. These men being more experienced and adept at skirmishing inherently had better command and control due to their experience therefore wider distances between pairs was accomplished and set as part of formal training. Basically, you have two types of skirmishers, purpose built light troops (SK) and part timers (SS). Thank you Bill for your kind comments. I am far from perfecting skirmisher rules but I am really trying to form a design where skirmisher rules are an important part of our games. In the battle we are fighting right now the light troops on both sides are swarming ahead of both sides. We are having a French/Wurttemberg/Polish/Bavarian/Saxon vs Austrian/Russian/Prussian battle where every conceivable light troop of both sides is represented. These thousands of light troops are forward of the main heavy infantry fighting it out for occupation of terrain so that they can gain and advantage for the close order infantry when they arrive. This is how our battles play out every time and I try to instill this into the minds of the players of the importance of light infantry and not just how they are used but, why they are used. right now we have a situation where a Wurttemberg Fuzzjager btln is forcing Prussian dragoons to withdraw. They are shooting this regiment up as it tries to withdraw and reform. The close order infantry columns of Wurttemburgers behind are the real danger for the Prussian dragoons but the point is that the Fuzzjager btln is right out in front hammering the dragoons as they scramble to get away picking off men and horses by the dozen. On another part of the field an Austrian column is now in difficulty due being caught on their exposed flank by two companies of French voltiguers who have now caused the Austrian btln to falter (become shaken) with their incessant snipping. Their own third ranker's are out on front trying to fend off other voltiguer companies in that direction and therefor sadly outnumbered by the onrushing French voltiguers. My point is that in our games the light infantry actually fight their own battles much like a battle within a battle and influence the outcomes much more than given credit for in many other systems which deal with skirmishers so inadequately. In our games you can launch mass divisional infantry or cavalry attacks, open up with a grand battery of 100 guns but you can also fight a desperate firefight between two opposing skirmish companies over a small piece of terrain. We account for everything and miss nothing in our games. And I am not too modest to boast about it because I am proud of what our games achieve and portray because we put the time and effort into the system so that we cover every aspect of a Napoleonic battle we can. Shane |
Widowson | 24 Sep 2010 11:29 p.m. PST |
McLaddie, Your calcs are convincing, but you start out estimating the battalion frontage in yards, then make the distance between files of skirmishers as 15 yards, when I think it may be "paces." A pace is much shorter than a yard. Also, "So what does that company of French skirmishers 28 strong do when facing 40 to 80 Russian skirmishers, particularly if the Russians skirmishers have a habit of charging skirmishers with the bayonet?" My guess would be that the outnumbered French fall back on their supports, and then successively back on their reserves. The letter from Davout indicates that, in peacetime, Davout wanted the fusilier companies to be skirmish-trained by the voltiguer companies. What a great army was trashed in Russia! But what it tells us is that line companies of French fusiliers were not normally skirmish trained. Davout had to order a special program for it. By 1815, we see more than half of a Prussian infantry regiment skirmish trained – the entire fusilier battalion, plus the third ranks of the other two musketeer battalions. Accounts of Ligny indicate that, in house-to-house village fighting, the Prussians attacked almost entirely with bodies of skirmishers, with the formed units in reserve, to occupy villiages captured by the skirmishers. Unfortunately, the French seem to have had no such training for their fusilier companies. Some divisions had no light regiments. Besides the usual task of screening the battalion, skirmishers are used in other roles, as we all acknowledge. But the deployment set-up, at least conceptually, remains the same. There is the front line of pairs of skirmishers on a variable front, there is a line of reserves who also replace the front line, and there is a formed reserve. |
Defiant | 24 Sep 2010 11:44 p.m. PST |
Widowson, You make a very good point and one we covered in our games. We allow ALL reformed nations to allow their Line infantry to skirmish. However, if they are NOT formally trained they have large restrictions. Their morale is reduced dramatically, they can only form SS (semi-skirmish) and become very vulnerable to enemy close order infantry or cavalry attacks. Basically in our system they are classified as, "Untrained" light troops while acting in open order (SS). It is only units that are given formal training that becomes "Trained" light troops and only those who are highly skilled and experienced who become known as "Adept" light troops such as jagers, riflemen and voltiguers etc. But the advantage of this is that if you have a situation where your own integral light company is otherwise occupied, missing or destroyed you can throw out new (untrained) light troops to replace them who can at least maintain some kind of skirmish screen to protect the parent unit. Shane |
10th Marines | 25 Sep 2010 4:20 a.m. PST |
Bill, I have the instruction, so you didn't have to reproduce it, but thanks anyways. It seems to me that if skirmishing during the period is going to be discussed, then all types, not just companies covering their own battalion frontage, should be covered. There is much more to it, not to say that this hasn't been helpful, though. K |
McLaddie | 25 Sep 2010 9:12 a.m. PST |
K wrote:
It seems to me that if skirmishing during the period is going to be discussed, then all types, not just companies covering their own battalion frontage, should be covered. There is much more to it, not to say that this hasn't been helpful, though. Kevin: Yes, I figured you had the instructions, which made me wonder why you asked the question, but as you did, I answered it. I agree. To only discuss company skirmish deployments is like only discussing columns when trying to figure out how infantry in close formation fought in battle. Bill |
McLaddie | 25 Sep 2010 9:37 a.m. PST |
Widowson wrote: Your calcs are convincing, but you start out estimating the battalion frontage in yards, then make the distance between files of skirmishers as 15 yards, when I think it may be "paces." A pace is much shorter than a yard. Widowson: Yep, you are right. Some descriptions of deployments say paces, or about 2.6 feet. Others use yards. What makes it all the more annoying is that different countries used different lengths for both paces and yards, so uniformity of comparative distances takes some work. I used yards to simply give some general relationships rather than claim what I offered was specific distances, hence the "@"
;-7 Also, "So what does that company of French skirmishers 28 strong do when facing 40 to 80 Russian skirmishers, particularly if the Russians skirmishers have a habit of charging skirmishers with the bayonet?"My guess would be that the outnumbered French fall back on their supports, and then successively back on their reserves. Probably, and then what file spacing would the French skirmishers be maintaining? Skirmishing was a dynamic process and doesn't submit easily to One True File Distance. The letter from Davout indicates that, in peacetime, Davout wanted the fusilier companies to be skirmish-trained by the voltiguer companies. What a great army was trashed in Russia! But what it tells us is that line companies of French fusiliers were not normally skirmish trained. Davout had to order a special program for it. That would be true IF we never saw center companies skirmishing before in Davout's corps or the French army. However, we do see them skirmishing all the time before 1809, sooo we have to ask why this special 'instruction?' Davout/Morand make that clear in the instructions. 1. after 1809, [remember Echmhl? where Davout's divisions completely deploy as skirmishers?] the large number of new recruits in the center companies untrained in skirmish procedures made such instructions/training necessary. As they would normally be expected to support the voltigeurs in any combat, training them with the voltigeurs was just good sense. and 2. As Davout makes clear, there were more than one method for deploying center companies as skirmishers. He states that he and his officers debate using the 3rd rank [which Ney advocates in his 1803 instructions] vs company deployment and come to the decision that THEIR corps would deploy by entire companies. As some new troops in the corps would have used different methods of deployment, spacing of files etc., uniform practices demanded overarching instructions and training. By 1815, we see more than half of a Prussian infantry regiment skirmish trained – the entire fusilier battalion, plus the third ranks of the other two musketeer battalions.Accounts of Ligny indicate that, in house-to-house village fighting, the Prussians attacked almost entirely with bodies of skirmishers, with the formed units in reserve, to occupy villiages captured by the skirmishers. Unfortunately, the French seem to have had no such training for their fusilier companies. Some divisions had no light regiments. When you say 'seem to have had no such training', what gives you that idea? Davout's entire Corps had no light infantry from 1806 through 1812 and they did just fine. Besides the usual task of screening the battalion, skirmishers are used in other roles, as we all acknowledge.But the deployment set-up, at least conceptually, remains the same. There is the front line of pairs of skirmishers on a variable front, there is a line of reserves who also replace the front line, and there is a formed reserve. Yes, I agree. Yet even the French didn't always follow that form--even when they should have. I'll provide an example. Bill |
matthewgreen | 25 Sep 2010 3:56 p.m. PST |
The context of Davout in 1811 is that he was given huge quantities of fresh troops to train up for the invasion of Russia. Each regiment added extra battalions, and so on. With all this literally raw material, Davout was given the opportunity to mould them to the system he preferred, though probably not enough time to complete the task. Napoleon clearly trusted him though, since he assigned him many more regiments/divisions than anybody else – whom he then re-assigned after the campaign started. These records give us a very illuminating insight into the way that Davout thought troops should be trained. It is probably quite similar to the training he also gave his troops before the 1809 campaign, where he had the relative luxury of time to train his troops properly (excepting the 4th battalions in Demont's division). We should hesitate to draw wider conclusions. |
10th Marines | 25 Sep 2010 4:01 p.m. PST |
Davout was also stationed in central Europe after both the 1807 and 1809 campaigns to keep an eye on things and had time to do many thing, which included training and discipline. His corps grew in size both in 1809 and in 1812 and new regiments were added to his end strength. He probably wanted standardization within the corps. K |
McLaddie | 25 Sep 2010 10:04 p.m. PST |
What I think is interesting, apart from the detailed training specifics, was the debate Davout alludes to concerning whether to deploy skirmishers from the third rank or entire companies from the center companies. While I think it is obvious that even before the debate Davout's comments make it clear he prefered company deployment, the fact that he bothered to raise the question and discuss it among his officers suggests that even as late as 1810-11, both practices were still being used or seen as accepted methods for skirmishing with line troops. K wrote:
He probably wanted standardization within the corps. So there must have been 'other' ways of doing it within the French army for Davout to feel such standardization was needed
Bill |
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