"BMP-2 - Russian Squad Configuration?" Topic

A quick question specifically regarding the BMP-2.

I cannot for the life of me pin down what the Russian squad configuration is for this vehicle. So far I've come to this conclusion, based on a few things I've read online and the odd book that mentions it…

1 – Squad Leader/BMP Commander
2 – MG Gunner (RPK or PKM)
3 – Grenadier (AK-74 with GP-25)
4 – Senior Rifleman (AK-74)
5 – Rifleman (AK-74 & RPG)
6 – Rifleman (AK-74)

(All the above dismount for combat)

7 – BMP Driver (stay with vehicle – AKS-74U?)
8 – BMP Gunner (stay with vehicle – AKS-74U?)

Plus…

9/10 – Platoon elements such as sniper, medic, platoon commander etc.

Does that sound about right for the mid-90s or have I made a complete mess of this? My Concord book on the BMP was a bit rubbish on this topic, although the photographs were pretty!

Thanks

See page 55 in the PDF:

PDF link

That's what we thought we were seeing right about at the end of the Soviet Union, and when I left the office that produced that manual in '89.

Now see pages 173 and 174 in the PDF (pages 3-7 and 3-8 in the FM):

PDF link

That's from when TRADOC DCSINT tried to jigger around with what they thought they were seeing in the Russian republic for the US Army's "World Class" (still a knee-slapper!) Opposing Force. The manual is dated 1997, but the data is probably from '93-'94.

Allen

Allen – thanks for the second link – very useful.

Out of interest does anyone know where the PKM fits into the whole system? It appears to have been largely replaced (theoretically) by the RPK-74, but you see plenty of Russians (in Chechnya for example) with the PKM.

Or is a case of that's what they had to hand at the time?

Now I had the idea that it was the other way around, with the PKM replacing the RPK?

Allen

The PKMs were in the Soviet moto-rifle company's fourth, machine gun, platoon. To the best of my knowledge there were four PKMs in the platoon, two of them and their crews in each of the two of the platoon's BMPs.

This gave the company 12 BMPs. The organisational pattern came into use most prevalently as a result of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, which highlighted the inadequacy of the moto-rifle squads' organic firepower, but was not usually replicated in the remaining Warsaw Pact militaries, which still had the three bare moto-rifle platoons as well as the command squad, for a total of 10 BMPs.

It's rather surprising that a professional reference like the FM 100-60 doesn't list this widely encountered organisation variant, which contributed significantly to the firepower of a Soviet line moto-rifle company across all effective combat ranges. If I have a bit of spare time over the weekend, I'll browse some of the Russian language sites for the precise individual structure of the machine gun platoon.

No need! The company machinegun platoon can be seen on page 56 of the PDF for FM 100-2-3; its counterpart, the machinegun/antitank platoon of a BTR company, can be seen on page 33.

Yes, the company-level platoon was equipped with the PKM. I was referring to changing the squad-level LMG from the RPK to the PKM.

I am painfully familiar with the company level machinegun platoon. For quite a long time, we (and the British, and the Canadians) had seen company sets of twelve vehicles in motor pools. Nobody in the US had an explanation for this. At the annual London conferences, the Canadians, especially, had put forth what turned out to be the right explanation, but nobody here listened to them. Well, I did, but I didn't count!

At one point (after I had left Leavenworth), we had an unprecedented opportunity to talk to an emigre who had been a motorized rifle regimental commander and divisional chief of staff in one of the Soviet Union's "testbed" divisions. Through a very bizarre set of coincidences, yours truly wound up being this officer's de facto "handler" during his "community debrief": an opportunity for subject-matter expert analysts from throughout the intelligence community to ask him questions, face-to-face.

Now this officer, besides making things very clear regarding tactics issues that we had not completely understood, had provided two fairly startling pieces of "news". One was the indentity and purpose of those two last vehicles in the motorized rifle companies (and just at the same time, these were also mentioned in open-source Soviet journals); the other was the existence of laser blinding weapons, assigned down to the regimental level.

It was very embarrassing to watch our idiotic analysts from certain agencies, caught by surprise by both of these, call this man a liar, simply because their assessments would have to be changed. He was right, of course, on both counts. 'Nuff said. And that's why the machinegun and machinegun/antitank platoons got into the revised version of FM 100-2-3 at the last minute.

So why did the TRADOC DCSINT change this to an "ATGM section" (page 172 for the "IFV Company", page 188 for the "APC Company")? I could not possibly say…

Well, I could…

Allen

Yes, well it's no secret how reticent most people are to altering their point of view, even in light of overwhelming evidence. I'd imagine there's some personal fear of being perceived as less than competent for having been wrong. Oh the joys and implications of working for organisations with rigid hierarchies and social status stratifications. Behavioral economics at its simplest and finest level.

More interestingly, however, what about the laser blinding weapons? Are you talking about the Stilet/Sangvin/Szhatie complexes? You'll have to excuse the lack of appropriate designations, I have only heard mention of them by name (and a few poor but publicly available photos). How were they distributed (in what quantities for a given unit) and intended to be employed?

The former Soviet officer was only able to describe sealed containers which were kept in the regimental secure facility. As the regimental commander, he was not authorized to know what they were! A friend of his, the divisional chief of artillery, told him privately that they were laser blinding weapons.

A special platoon was assigned to operate them, but did not train with the regiment, although they were billeted with them. At intervals, the platoon would go to a special training area in the military district, apparently to work with similar systems.

The purpose of the platoon was to protect the regiment against attack by disabling enemy target acquisition systems: US FIST teams, for example; and in particular, optical trackers and designators for precision guided munitions. The lasers were designed to craze optics.

We believe that eventually we were able to match this description, and the nickname which the COA had provided, to an actual system. It was not one of the complexes you list.

Allen

its informative and constructive threads like this that keep me coming back to TMP.

Thanks guys. very informative.

The British Army 1976 Soviet Small Unit Tactics Manual discusses the introduction of the MR Company MG Platoon as the consequence of a Soviet manpower shortage – the third MR platoon was deleted and replaced by the MG platoon, which had lower manning but high fire power.

Many Russian-language sources indicate the MR company MG platoon had been a feature for a rather long time. Certainly from before the 1970s. They may be lying – but its hard to see why at this point.

Wow, I certainly wouldn't have expected that one. Wonder if this (and other developments like GPS jammers) should trigger a re-evaluation of Cold War Gone Hot rules? ie, Would they have made a difference?

Collins,

I imagine so. I expect that 1976 was the first time that the British Army had noticed it and (incorrectly?) assumed that it was there to offset low strength. The MG Platoon was certainly there after the companies regained their strength, which does suggest that it had long been a permanent part of company organisation.

I certainly don't think it was a reaction to Afghanistan.

Russians I have spoken with are shocked by the West missing this. They weren't aware of any mis-information campaign. The MG units were there from the early 70s at least.

Many modern rules still omit the correct OB.

Joe Collins

"should trigger a re-evaluation of Cold War Gone Hot rules"

It is an OB issue, not a rules one.

The MG Platoon is an OB issue; but I think that 'Lampridae' is refering to Modern rules for Soviet Motor Rifle companies using anti-laser weapons et al.

I second 'Crucible Orc' fascinating thread. Thanks for the links and info Allen, just what I have been looking for.

Oliver

There was a British Army reference sometime in the late '70s, I recall, that showed the MG platoon, but not as an MRP replacement. I don't recall what it was; Bill Gray. do you, by any chance?

It may have been the Recognition Journal…

Anyway, between the Canadians and the British, our allies were definitely more on top of this than we were. And there may not have been a misinformation campaign, but the Soviets were very good at not mentioning anything but a ten-vehicle motorized rifle company in open-source literature right up to the late '80s.

Now if we had been better in ensuring that attache reporting got back to our intelligence training folks (that direct linkage was what made the British and Canadian systems work better…

At Ashford, for example, the same instructors who taught British attaches--and BRIXMIS too, I believe--were also the instructors who prepared training materials for the entire Army, and the attaches sent photos and reports straight back to them.

But we didn't. We had to pry and cajole declassified material out of the intelligence community for release to the troops, and as a result, never told the troops there was a machinegun platoon at company level until the Soviet Union had ceased to exist.

Allen