"TYW Push of Pike? Swedish Phase" Topic

Currently reading 'The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy' by Peter Wilson. Rather large and in dept book. Good balence between the regilous, political and military aspects of the TYW.

Did push of pike happen on the TYW battlefield? Currently at the Swedish Phase in the book. I'm thinking the Catholics' liked the bigger infantry formations based (modified) on the Spanish Terico while the Swedish used infantry formations based on the Dutch linear style regiments/brigades. My point being that Imperial infantry anchored the center of the battle line and were mostly defensive while the Swedish were more moblie with fire power.

So was there a push of pike or did the Swedish just put fire into the big Catholic formations until they broke or were weak enough to be charged by cavalry. On the other hand after the Lion was dead and the Imperialist had better Spanish Infantry did they close with the pike and the Swedish thinner Linear formations break?

I find the whole thing rather confusing. Unless I'm missing something, there are more examples of imperial battalia being used on the tactical offensive than there are of the Swedes and other Protestants. Yet the refrain that Swedes are mobile, imperialists are not is often repeated. Could it be more correct to say that the Swedes were more tactically flexible? They seem to be designed for a firefight and I would think that if it came to a push of pike it would indicate an impending disaster. I also tend to assume that the imperialist formations were largely designed to be a means of moving firepower across the battlefield, the pikes providing a living wall to protect the musketeers when necessary. Part of the reason for depth is for maneuver, is it not? I'm thinking of columns and pike squares.

I am sure that in previous threads Daniel S has adressed this issue,

Tally Ho!

I'll let Daniel address the Swedish issue. "Push of Pike" simply means hand-to-hand fighting with pikes. Of the two integrated arms, pikes and shot, it was more important to drive the pikes from the battlefield than it was the shot. The reason is pikes can still fight on the battlefield without the shot. Without pikes the shot cannot withstand any attacks by enemy pikes or cavalry. In other words, break the pikes and the shot must also go. That's why shot was instructed to fire on the enemy pikes.

Large pike blocks were designed for protection from attacks that might develop from any direction. If we use the block formation with shot advanced at the corners, if an attack develops directed at the rear, the rear pikes can face about and advance until they are aligned with the shot. The same process is used when attacked from the flanks. The idea of being able to use firepower around on the battlefield is simply anachronistic. Shot was used to weaken the enemy pikes so your pikes will have the advantage when it comes to ‘push-of-pike'.

It was the Dutch who first developed the use of smaller pike and shot units on the major battlefield. In the one and only major battle Maurice fought using these smaller units, the smaller units were beat up quite badly by the Spanish large pike blocks. It was the Dutch cavalry that finished off the Spanish. However, the infantry, while being pushed back, never broke. As the front ranks were defeated, they fell back behind their rear ranks and regrouped ready to take on the Spanish when the ranks before them fell back. It was designed to bend but not break. The Spanish infantry was certainly not defeated by the "superiority" of the Dutch shot. Also, while the Spanish decided to go with their large blocks, they were used very aggressively. The idea that the large block formations of the Spanish/Imperials were defensive formations is simply not true. This is something that Michael Roberts got wrong.

Small pike&shot formations pre-date Maurice by decades. Swedes were using them in the 1560's simply because large German style formations did not fit the terrain in Sweden. The Germans used them as well in some circumstances, I've got a 1537 document detailing a fighting formation a bit over 500 strong. The importance of Maurice's reforms is that he was the first since Swedish King Erik XIV to use small formations as the main fighting formation rather than a specialised formation for use in special circumstances. (Though given that "small war" was more common than big battles the Landsknechts may well have deployed in small formations more often than we think.

Push of pike certainly happend in the TYW, particularly in the pre-1635 period.

The Imperial & Leaugist formations had little to do with the Spanish tactical system based around the Escaudron of pikes with it's Guarnicones of shot for escort and the mangas who supplies the main part of the shot based firepower.
Instead it evolved from the German military system under the influence of reformers like Giorgio Basta who was the military mentor of both Tilly and Wallenstein.

Swedish tactics were agressive at Breitenfeld, shortrange fire by regimental cannon and musket salvos were followed imediately by an all out charge by pikemen and musketeers. The use of musketeers in the charge was probably part desperation as 3 Swedish brigades were facing the bulk of Tilly's foot.

The Swedish brigade was designed to use fire and shock equaly well. The thin formation which limited the endurance in a long struggle was not a problem as superior Swedish firepower was to prepare the way for the charge while the thinner formation could gain the flank of a deeper formation by manouvering one of the 3 squadrons around the flank.

Tilly was one of the most agressive commander of the war, he agressively sought battle if the odds seemed the least bit in his favour and his use of his infantry mirrored that agressive approach. Wallenstein on the other hand focused on the defensive and would only go over to the attack when the odds were hugely in his favour. Hence the missed oppurtunities at Alte Veste and Lützen. Most other imperial commanders the Swedes fought tended towards the defensive simply because the Swedes created situations where that was the only choice.

Firepower always played a part in Tilly's tactics, in Hungary Tilly had led a regiment of wallons that was almost pure shot (270 shot to 30 others in a company) and large groups of detached musketeers featured in several of Tilly's battles in the TYW.

The Swedish collapse at Nördlingen had little to do with formation depth, rather it was caused by being worn out by up hill assaults on a fortified position held by excellent Spanish and Imperial troops until cavalry well supported by detachments of shot (the mangas) gave the Swedish troops the finaly push and routed them below the Albuch.

Thanks for the info

What about Cavalry? Is it correct to say that Swedish Cavalry used speed and sword while the Imperalist still relied upon pistols. Was Caracole still used? Did both sides use command/detached Musketeers for cavalry to reform behind?

Interested in Danial S or anyone else's thoughts on this: Minus changes in fashion and pike to shot ratio can Nieuwpoort to the Dunes be considered the same period of warfare or did tactics changed so much.
-Largely Mercenary Armies lead by Great Captains in dynastic struggles. High Age of Pike and Musket?

I have reference to 800 Swiss fighting off Imperial cavalry during the Swabian Wars, around 1500. This predates Eric XIV by a great deal. Eric's infantry was based on Swedish citizens and was overwhelmingly shot. Swedish soldiers did not like the pike much preferring the arquebus or musket. I don't believe Sweden had a standing army at this time therefore much of the infantry were composed of Swedish amateurs. I don't believe Eric's military reforms were ever tested in battle. As such, Eric's experiments had no real influence on the development of Western European warfare.

What Maurice did, and what my statement pointed out, was develop a system whereby small units of pike and shot could be used in a major battle. Prior to this time major battles were fought by large pike blocks. "Small wars" were fought out by small units well before Eric's experiments.

<q<The Imperial & Leaugist formations had little to do with the Spanish tactical system based around the Escaudron of pikes with it's Guarnicones of shot for escort and the mangas who supplies the main part of the shot based firepower. 
Instead it evolved from the German military system under the influence of reformers like Giorgio Basta who was the military mentor of both Tilly and Wallenstein.

This is to misunderstand the military developments of the Spanish and Imperial military developments. Armies were raised through the use of military entrepreneurs. These men hired and trained their new hires. They all used basically the same tactics. Therefore Roger Williams could fight in the armies of the Dutch separatists and in the Spanish army.

Basta was born in the Austrian lands of a stradiot family. His military career began in the Spanish army. He became a cavalry commander under the leadership of the Italian commander of the Spanish army: Alexander Parma. After Parma died he transferred his service to the Imperial army. Transfers like Williams and Basta indicate there was little difference between the tactical make-ups of any of these armies. Personnel flowed back and forth especially between the Spanish and Imperial armies. There is no indication of the existence of a specialized Spanish doctrine versus Imperial doctrine. The use of a particular battlefield formation was based on the desire of the commanding general rather than any supposed national doctrine. It was generally some form of shot and big pike unit. And, many of the commanding generals for both armies came from Italy.

This all changed after Maurice instituted the use of smaller units of pike and shot. Gustav made his own changes to Maurice's tactical system. Eventually so did the Spanish and Imperial generals.

As for "firepower", commanded shot, that is what Tilly used, have been used in the Italian Wars, the French wars of religion, by both sides in the wars between Spain and the Netherlands. In fact, this was a standard method of using shot.

Rich,
Don't know where you get your information about the Swedish army or the army of Erik XV but it certainly isn't based on Swedish primary sources. Sweden had a standing regular army since the days of Gustav I, 50% of Erik's infantry had pike or halberd while the musket would not be introduced until the 1590's. Erik's reformed army was tested repeatedly in the battles of the Nordic 7-years war, notably the battles of Mared and Axtorna. The Swedish infantry preformed well each time but the success of the infantry could not make up for the failure of the cavalry. It is true that the reforms had little impact outside Sweden, but like Maurice the entire tactical system was built around the use of small units rather than small units being used in some circumstances such as the 800 Swiss you mention. Even when the army abandoned the use of pikes due to there being little need for them in the wars with Russia during Erik's successor Johan III the small units were retained and made it comparatively easy to adopt the Dutch reforms in the reign of Karl IX, the problem of course was the the army had a much greater problem with unlearning it's bad habits of fighting unarmoured and not using pikes. And making effective reforms while in the middle of a war with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth proved hard to do as the repeated defeats were a serious drain of trained officers and men.

If you compare the Spanish & German primary sources such as Valdes and Fronspergeryou will find clear difference between the two systems. Johann von Nassau-Siegen's eassay's on the "Current German system of War" amply and vividly illustrates the German military systems and allows for easy comparisson with the Spanish and Dutch systems. National doctrine certainly existed as fact to the military writers of the period, neither Basta nor Nassau-Siegen would have written about the need for change and reform if the traditional German system had not been diffrent from the Spanish and Dutch tactical schools.
TRansfered officers had limited impact on the Imperial army before before the Long Turkish War as Habsburg forces were locally raised in the 'east' while the Spanish recruited their German officers in the 'west'. Most transferes took place when the wars of religion in France ended which freed up officers who had served the Lorrainers such as Tilly or even some Spanish officers like Basta.
The transfer of these officers had a very real impact on the Imperial army and would lead to a much greater use of Italian officers in particular during the TYW period.

Commanded shot,
Swedish and Imperial cavalry tactics were identical, both sides made much use of the pistol as the sword had little effect against the heavy armour worn by the 'true' cuirassiers. As the use of armour declined the sword would become a more effective weapon. Caracoles were used but only by the mounted arkebusiers when they fired arquebus or carbine. 'Good' arkebusiers would employ proper pistol based shock tactics just as the cuirassie

Commanded shot was not much to reform behind unless supplied with some sort of field obstacle such as swinesfeathers. Lacking pikes commanded shot detachments were not solid enough to be able to act as solid base to reform behind. All instances of cavalry reforming behind infantry involved pike&shot units.

The main task of commanded shot when supporting cavalry was disrupt the enemy and thus pave the way for a successfull charge by your own side. "Everyone" certainly knew of this use for commanded shot, Basta and Tilly had been on the reciving end of it in France where Henri IV used it against them and transfered it to the Imperial army fighting the Ottomans. Basta also consistently recomends it in his "Maestro Campo Generale".
However no army made such extensive and skillfull use of commanded shot as the Swedes. For the Swedes fighting with commanded shot supporting the cavalry was the standard way of fighting, other armies only employed the tactics occasionaly and never as skillfully as the Swedes.
There were no reason for Tilly and Wallenstein to use commanded short as they both had high quality cavalry in ample numbers. (Commanded shot was seen as something to use when outnumbered, particularly by the Ottomans)
The Swedes on the other hand had evolved into first rate army while fighting Polish & Lithuanian armies whose cavalry not only was superior in quality but also in numbers for much of the Swedish wars with the commonwealth.

I'd say that the 1600-1658 period was very roughly the same period but with considerable changes as warfare evolved into more linear tactics. There would be considerable changes in tactics in some armies, for example the Swedes went from using Dutch tactics with the cavalry company being the basic fighting unit, to using massed squadrons of several companies to back to using single companies as the basic combat formation during 1600-1658

Thanks Daniel S

What about Wallenstein use of detached musketeers at Lutzen along the road. Is this an example of Commanded Shot, a Forlon Hope or a early instance of skirmishers.

I will readily admit my source could be wrong. And, probably is. It comes from the writings of George Gush (not a recognized authority on Swedish military) He wrote: "Swedish 16th Century infantry were organised in a 'Fanika' (ensign or company), which could be of varying composition and size, as these examples from Gustavus Vasa's time show:

Date . . . . . . 1552 . . 1552 . . 1556
Halberds etc. . . .4 . . . . .29 . . . . 19
Firearms . . . . 183 . . . . .69 . . . 210
Crossbows . . 499 . . . . 506 . . .223
. . . . . . . . . . . .---- . . . ---- . . . ----
Totals . . . . . . 686 . . . .604 . . . 452

If you will notice there is a lack of pike presence. Until Swedish military historians wish to share their knowledge with the much greater English reading public we are forced to turn to sources such as Gush.

Erik's reformed army was tested repeatedly in the battles of the Nordic 7-years war, notably the battles of Mared and Axtorna. The Swedish infantry preformed well each time but the success of the infantry could not make up for the failure of the cavalry.

"The battle of Mared was one of only two significant land battles during the Nordic Seven Years War (1563-1570) between Sweden and Denmark. The war began with the Danish capture of Älvsborg, removing Sweden's only direct access to the North Sea. In response Erik XIV of Sweden raised an army 25,000 strong, most of which was made up of Swedish conscripts. With part of that army he attempted to capture the then Danish town of Halmstad. Despite breaching the walls of Halmstad on 5 November, Erik's army was unable to storm the town, failing twice. In the aftermath of those failures Erik left the army, leaving a French mercenary in charge.
On 9 November the Swedish army was attacked by a smaller Danish force. The Swedish cavalry fled without offering serious resistance, leaving the infantry dangerously exposed. Fortunately for them, the 2000 arquebusiers in the Danish army were lagging behind the cavalry, and did not arrive until late in the day, allowing the Swedish force to escape. Even so, the Danes captured forty-one guns and drove the Swedes away from Halmstad. The battle demonstrated the superior fighting ability of the professional mercenary soldiers who made up the Danish army over the Swedish levies. However, Frederick II of Denmark was soon to find that his mercenary army was too expensive to maintain and for the rest of the war he was rarely able to mount large scale campaigns."

Here is the best I could find in English concerning the battle of Axtornia:

"The Danish commander Daniel Rantzau had been forced to yield the fortress Varberghus to the Swedes on September 15, 1565, after they had taken Ny Varberg, then Halland's largest city. Rantzau received the news that a Swedish army of superior strength led by Jacob Henriksson Hästesko was approaching from the east forced him to move his forces toward Falkenberg. Rantzau had decided to commit to combat since the Swedish force had just arrived from its march and hadn't rearranged into a militarily cohesive unit.

The Danes won as a consequence of Rantzau's superior tactics and he became renowned as a great general after the battle. But despite the victory and the capture of the Swedish artillery, the Danish host had incurred great losses while large portions of the Swedish army had not been involved in the battle."

From these accounts there is no way I could infer the Swedisb conscripts performed well. At Mared, the infantry was able to escape because of the failure of the Danish army to bring up commanded shot in a timely manner. At Axtornia the Swedish army was still in march mode when it was destroyed. This indicates a lack of leadership and a lack of training. There is nothing in these two battles that would indicate Erick's experiments had anything to offer the military of other countries. The advantage Erick had over the Danes was it was cheaper to raise a conscript army than a professional mercenary army raised by the Danes. However, every time the Danish and Swedish armies met the Danes won.

What were the differences between Valdes' thought and Fronsperger's thought? Next show that actual military changes came about because of these authors. While you are at it, which Johann von Nassau-Siegen are you taking about and what is so fundamental about his military writings and what changes were brought about by his thoughts?

Actually you don't have to reference any of these authors to get an idea how Imperial armies should approach battle. There was a German who held high military office and wrote on how armies should approach battle and was in a position as an Imperial general to put those ideas into practice within the imperial system. He was Raimondo Montecuccoli. Not only that, his military book is in English. If there was anywhere that could show the Imperial system as different from the Spanish and Dutch systems it should be found in this book. Unfortunately his thoughts are simply variations on the Dutch system. By the 17th century all western European armies were using variations of the Dutch system, even the Spanish. Maurice had instituted a fundament change by which western armies approached battle. All other changes were simply variations on the Dutch system.

Swedish and Imperial cavalry tactics were identical, both sides made much use of the pistol as the sword had little effect against the heavy armor worn by the 'true' cuirassiers. As the use of armor declined the sword would become a more effective weapon. Caracoles were used but only by the mounted arkebusiers when they fired arquebus or carbine. 'Good' arkebusiers would employ proper pistol based shock tactics just as the cuirassie.

While the question concerned the cavalry, shot was used for the same purpose with the pikes. By the way, the caracole was used by mounted pistoleeers against pikes when they could.

However no army made such extensive and skillfull use of commanded shot as the Swedes.

I don't think that's quite correct. The French armies of Henry IV used commanded shot far more extensively than the Swedes. As to the Swedes versus other armies, it may be true, however, I don't think there is enough evidence to support such a statement.

Gush actually describes Eriks reformed fänika IIRC though in in incomplete and misunderstood detail. You'll find more information if you google "Nordic Fury" and download the army briefing s I wrote for that game supplent.

The numbers you quote are all pre-Erik XIV so hardly relevant to his army.

Both discriptions of Mared & Axtorna rather lacking in detail and accuracy but that is to be expect from anyting written in English given the general lack of knowledge and ignorance of the subject among English language writers, the lack of details and simplified descriptions is a classic telltale sign that they are not to be trusted. Any argument made based on their content will stand on rather less than solid ground.

Lets deal with the issue of the Swedes being "conscripts" first, this is a myth created by 19th & early 20th C. historians in Sweden and Germany which saw conscription a mark of a 'modern' national army and thus overinterpreted the evidence. The use of the words "conscription"&"conscript"
also leads to misunderstandings as it is interpreted in light of 19th & 20th Century experience of conscription.
First of all the Swedish army was a standing army of paid regulars who were recruited from volunteers as far as possible. However if needed more recruits could be raised by using the laws enacted in 1544 which allowed for a form of conscription, the "Utskrivning". Lars-Olof Larsson has fully explored the use of volunteers versus conscripts in the Vasa armies in a series of essays and his conclusion was that it was only during the lenghty wars of Johan III and Karl IX that conscription became a significant source of recruits.

That a battle was lost does not tell you about the performance of individual units in any detail, the Swiss lost at Marignano but can hardly have been said to have performed badly, the same applies to the Huguenot Gendarmes at Dreux and the Spanish infantry at Ravenna.

The description of Mared is the least bad but still leaves out a lot of detail and is wrong about the timeline of some events. The Swedish cavalry did rout due to the experience of the many newly raised units. (Erik had roughly doubled the size of the army since becoming king, this lead to shortages of training and cohesion among the new units, particularly at the start of the war as experience troops had been left to continue the war in Estonia) But not before routing the cornets of Danish nobles who spearheaded the Danish charge. It was the battle harded German Reiters, veterans of the Valois-Habsburg wars who carried the day in the cavalry fight.

Inrealith the Landsknecht arquebusiers arrived fairly rapidly and it was they who caputred the Swedish artillery which had been holding out against the Danish Cavalry together with the Swedish infantry supporting it. This left only De Mornay and King's own regiment of Foot holding their separate position. Despite lacking any cavalry support the Swedes not only held their ground but counter attacked and retook the lost cannon. The Danes only captured the cannon because the Swedes had neither horses nor limbers to remove them when De Mornay withdrew in good order at nightfall.

The Axtorna description is pretty much nonsense as the Danes were desperate to avoid battle but were forced to fight when their march to the fords across the river was interupted by the closeness of the Swedish army. Rantzau hoped that the strenght of his postition with artillery on two hills and a ravine and stram in front of his infantry and cavalry would deter the Swedes from attacking but Jacob Henriksson was determined to fight and moved his army from the nearby camp where is men had spent the night in full order of battle.
The notion that the Swedes had not "rearranged into a militarily cohesive unit" is exaggeration of the problems suffered by the Swedish cavalry due to the nature of the terrain. Forced to advance through a wood alogn the only narrow road they were slow to deploy on the other side of the wood, only the first "battle" of three would be deployed in good order on the other side of the wood and even it only had 80% of it troops ready when engaged. The 2nd "battle" was engagaed by the Danes just as it was emerging from the woods and hastily routed as a result. The 3rd battle of cavalry had not entered the wood when the remants of the first and second battles came pouring of of the wood in rout. The King's housedold cavalry and the Upplanders wanted to fight but an raw Vastgota units panicked and the rout spread to the 3rd battle as well. (Most of the units of the 3rd battle would rally however and returned to the battlefield to fight in the last phase of the battle)

None of this had any effect on the Swedish infantry and artillery, the artillery had moved up in fine style and begun a relentless bombardment of the Danes while bands of Swedish arquebusiers drowe back the few Danish and Landsknechts arquebusiers forming the forward screen of the Danish army. The capture of the dominat hill known as the Byaberg in front of the Danish infantry allowed the Swedish artillery commander to move his lightest cannon even further forward to support the skirmishers. It was the relentless Swedish artillery fire combined with the slowness with which the Swedish cavalry deployed which cause Rantzau to lack his cavlary in a desperated charge agaisnt the Swedish artillery and the cavalry coming up behind them. The Swedish infantry in the meanwhile moved forward in good order despite the partly broken and marshy ground, a testiment to the advantages of the small and nimble units introduced by King Erik. As they approached the Landknechts and Danes waiting behind the ravine & stream they foudn themsleves without both cavalry and artillery support as the Danish cavalry had overrun the artillery and was wining the fight with the Swedish cavalry. Undaunted the Swedes made the assault across the ravine and struck the Landsknechts hard, in some places cuting their way to the colours carried in the middle of the landsknecht formation. The Landskenchts were driven back to their wagon train and were on the verge of surrender when the Danish cavalry returned to the field and threatend the rear of the Swedish infantry which broke of it's assault and moved to assume an all around defensive formation, some of the fanikas failed to do this and were broken but the largest part formed a defensive "orbis" on a hill in slightly marshy ground while others, partilary the shot hastily with drew into the woods and hills surrounding the battlefield. The Danes now tried to breake the "orbis", first with cavalry charges then by brining forward the reformed landsknechts who had use the pause to rally from their near defeat. At this point Henriksson however launched his reserve infantry into the fray supported by those parts of the Swedish cavalry which had rallied from the rout. The Landsknechts once again came under sever preassure and were close to encircled when the Danish nobles and the Reiters finaly succeded in once again routing the Swedish cavalry and tired Swedish infantry coudl not stand against a combined force of cavalry and infantry. but withdrew, some units in disorder, others in tighly formed ranks with drums beating and flags held high.
(A far cry from being 'destroyed' as you wrote)

Losses were heavy on both sides, Rantzau noted that only a third of his cavalry was fit for combat after the battle. The proffessional landsknechts, veterans from the war with France had been badly mauled and at one point had begun to signal their surrender only to be saved in the nick of time.

Commanded Shot,
Wallenstein's use of commanded shot at Lutzen is an example of commanded shot used both as a forlorn hope forward of the main position and shot posted to hold defensible terrain. (Commanded shot simply implies that the shot in question has been commanded out of their parent formation, they can then be used for a wide variety of tasks including close suppport of cavalry and forlorn hope duties)

Francisco de Valdes was a highly experienced Maestro de Campo whom the Duke of Alva commisioned to write an instruction of the office of Sergeant-Major for use by the Spanish army. It was published as "Espejo y disciplina militar" and was translated both into Italian and English as well a repeatedly reprinted. Surprised you didn't know of him given that he is translated in into English and appears in academic works such as David Eltis' "The military revolution in sixteenth-century Europe"

"the famous "Kriegsbuch" by Leonhart Fronsperger (ca. 1510-1575), a true encyclopedia, not only of sixteenth century life, work and customs of the military, but of sixteenth century culture as a whole, beautifully coming to life through the lively woodcuts by Jobst Amman (1539-1591). First published in 1573, at the end of Fronsperger's life, the work had gradually grown from smaller military essays, of which the first, called "Kayserliche Kriegsrechte" was published in 1552. This was followed in 1555, 1558, 1564 and 1566 by "Fünf Bücher von Kriegsregiment und Ordnung", a compilation of military knowledge, rules and customs at the time, illustrated with woodcuts by Virgil Solis, predecessor of Jobst Amman as illustrator of Fronsperger's books. "Von Geschüss und Feuerwerk", appeared in 1557 and 1564, "Besatzung" in 1563 and 1564, and in 1566 the first collected and enlarged edition of Fronsperger's writings was published as "Kriegsbuch", subdivided into ten Books. Though published as a complete and all-round compendium of military science, seven years later two other parts were added, in 1573, much enlarging and adding to all subjects treated in the first part; thus completing the work in all aspects and making it truly encyclopedic, encompassing the whole range of military science of the period, both in theory and practice. Fronsperger was long seen as the earliest German military author and generally accepted as the authority in the field for the sixteenth century."

I'm refering to Joahnn VII von Nassau-Siegen, Maurice of Nassau's cousin. Together with Wilhem Ludwig of Nassau and Simon Stevin, Johann von Nassau-Siegen was part of that inner circle which with Maurice as it head created and developed the Dutch military reform. English language authors tend to focus only on Maurice but Dutch historians have come recognise Maurice "supporting cast" and their valuable contributions to the Dutch reforms. (This evolution and be seen in comparing Wijn's seminal "Het krijswezen in den tijd van prins Maurits …"(1934) with the later Exercise of arms: warfare in the Netherlands, 1568-1648
(Ed.Marco van der Hoeven).
We are extremly lucky that not only has Johann von Nassau-Siegen's military archive survived with little damage but it was also published in print, first Wijn published part of the texts then in the 1970's Hahlweg published the complete surviving archive.
Before his death Joahnn von Nassau-Siegen was the driving force behind the movement to reform the (protestant) German armies along Dutch lines and he wrote studies which in detail laid down the faults and remedies of the German military system. He alsopart of the Dutch influence on the Danish and Swedish armies instructing both Christian of Denmark, Karl IX of Sweden and Gustavus Adolphus in military matters, he even commanded the Swedish army in the Livonian war for a time.

More to follow when I return from Turkey as I don't bring 16th C works with me when I travel.

Given the lack of quotes or named sources in your own posts before you mentioned Montecuccoli I'm sure the others who read the thread are just as interested as me in learnign which Spanish and German primary sources you base you conclusions on and their qualifications.

Rich,

Regarding Montecuccoli

Do I understand you correctly that you are arguing that Montecuccoli is the only valid source for the Imperial army, not only during the TYW but in the pre-TYW period as well? That once one has access Montecuccoli one can dismiss and ignore all the other parts of the rich body of military texts that German and Spanish writers left us from the 16th and 17th Centuries?
Could you for example explain why we should use the writings of a man who wasn't even born when Basta commanded the imperial army in Hungary rather than Basta's texts to study the military experience of the Imperial army of in the early part of the 17th Century?

As a source Montecuccoli is facinating to be sure but it must be put in the proper context. Raimondo Montecuccolli was an italian from Modena rather than a German as you wrote, he enter military service in 1625 and only reach the rank of general (actually Feldmarschaleutnant) in the Imperial army in 1644.
The work which Thomas Barker translated into English from the orignal Italian in 1975 was written when Montecuccoli was a prisoner of the Swedes in 1639-1642 and remained unpublished in the authors lifetime. It is a mixture of Montecuccolis own experiences in the TYW, information gleaned from conversations with his Swedish captors, his personal pet theories such as the never used octagonal battalion and knowledge copied from the military works found in the library he had access to in Stettin. For example Montecuccoli has borrowed parts from both La Noue and Basta to name two.

Montecuccoli tells us very little about the Imperial army of the early days of the war and nothing at all about the pre-1618 period. If we look at the limited instances when Montecuccoli actually clearly states that this is the depth & formation used by the Imperial army then those are from Wallensteins 2nd period as commander and the post-Wallenstein period.

Nor does Montecuccoli and other Imperial sources show much in the way of Dutch influence, compare the Imperial use of massed cavalry squadrons with the Dutch use of 75 man cavalry companies as the basic combat unit. The 1000 man brigades with the Dutch 500 man battalions and so on. Nor do the army deployments match.

That the Spanish army simply used a variation of the Dutch system in the TYW is not the conclusion of the authors who has worked with the Spanish and German sources such as Dr. Pierre Piquet and Pavel Hrnčiřík. Nor do the Spanish military texts from the early 17th C period show such a complete change. To fit the Spanish system as used in the TYW into the Dutch mold would require that one stretches the meaning "Dutch system" to the point of being meaningless I'm afraid.

Rich,
Regarding Commanded Shot
If you re-read the original question by Commanded Shot you will see that the question was aimed at the TYW period (the Swedish phase of 1630-1635 to be specific) and the use of commanded shot in close support of the cavalry. My answer was limited to that period as well, a period which Henri's army was not part hence I only mentioned it in the part of the reply where I discussed the background of the use of close support by commanded shot and not in the part which dealt with the use of commanded shot durign the Swedish phase.
The 2nd part of your reply regarding the use of commanded shot has me confused I'm afraid. First you state without hesitation that Henri's army employed commanded shot more extensivly than the Swedes of Gustavus and his successors. Sligthly later you conclude that the information needed to make such assertions doesn't exist?

I don't why you think that the information is not available? I certainly have it for all of the battles fought by the Swedes as well as the majortity of the other battles fought inside the Empire. My coverage of battles in France, Flanders, Italy and Spain are not as complete as I would like but I have enough to see the basic pattern.
For the Swedes the standard deploymentwas for every interval between the cavalry squadrons in the first line to be filled with a detachment of commanded shot. At first the detachments were squadron sized (200-500), later on they were reduced to platoon size (50). For the Swedes not to use this form of deployment was the exception and due to the terrain such as at Nördlingen or by the need to free the Cavalry wings to move rapidly as at Wittstock.

No other army use this style of deployment with the same regularity as the Swedes, indeed examples of the other armies doing so are rather hard to find, particularly in the Swedish phase of the TYW.

Henri vs Gustavus
If we look at Henri's 3 major battles Coutras, Arques and Ivry we find that Henri did not deploy commanded shot with his cavalry at Arques, at Coutras he did so but in rather small detachments. At Ivry Henri did mix infantry and cavalry throughout his entire battleline which is actually taking things even further though it is at least partly diffrent from using commanded shot. The regiments were certainly fullfillingsuch a duty but that can hardly be said about the Swiss & Landsknecht pikes.

If we look at Gustavus use of commanded shot we find that 3110 musketeers were deployed as commanded shot supporting cavalry squadrons at Breitenfeld. At Lutzen the number was lower with 2000 musketeers but these had been reinforced with 20 regimental cannon.
More samples to follow when I can access my 17th C original documents when I return home.

The other differnce was that Henri's use of commaned shot & infantry was essentialy a one shot weapon. After the intial blast of firethe cavalry charged into enemy and there seems to have been little thought to use the shot more than once.

The Swedes on the other hand would have the musketeers fire, followed by the cavalry charging. While the cavalry fought a short but sharp engagement the musketeers reloaded. Then the Swedish cavalry withdrew back to the musketeers and let the enemy avance into the Swedish musketry once more. This reduced losses among men and horses and reduced the build up of fatigue as well.

Both descriptions of Mared & Axtorna rather lacking in detail and accuracy but that is to be expect from anything written in English given the general lack of knowledge and ignorance of the subject among English language writers, the lack of details and simplified descriptions is a classic telltale sign that they are not to be trusted.

A summary of a battle is not necessarily an indication of a lack of knowledge. The knock on English writers for a lack of Swedish information only goes so far. My sources for both battles were public sources very amenable to change (wikepedia for example) But I don't see Swedish military historians rushing to correct the record. If you have the sources to correct the prevailing impression of the battle then present it to the world for all to see. If you are not confident in your English, which is very good, send it to me, I'll help.

Francisco de Valdes was a highly experienced Maestro de Campo whom the Duke of Alva commissioned to write an instruction of the office of Sergeant-Major for use by the Spanish army. It was published as "Espejo y disciplina militar" and was translated both into Italian and English as well a repeatedly reprinted. Surprised you didn't know of him given that he is translated in into English and appears in academic works such as David Eltis' "The military revolution in sixteenth-century Europe"

I know who Valdes was. I've even read his book. That's not the issue. You presented Valdes and Fronsperger as representative of two different military systems. All I asked was for you to show how the two systems differed. As you pointed out Fronsperger wrote a number of military treatises around the middle of the 16th century. The first new military system, after the establishment of the Spanish system, was Maurise's system. I see no new Imperial system arising from Fronsperger's writings. What Fronsperger wrote was suggested alterations of the Spanish system he certainly didn't design a new military system. And even if he had, he was in no position to insure that his system was used throughout the Imperial lands. The only writer who had the power to put his reforms in action was Raimondo Montecuccoli. Just because one wrote about military subjects does not mean military authorities put those ideas into practice.

With regards to Maurice, regardless of the origins of the ideas it was Maurice who reformed the army. He is the one responsible for their implementation therefore the reform was his. With regards to Johann von Nassau-Siegen, first you state,

"Johann von Nassau-Siegen's essay's on the "Current German system of War" amply and vividly illustrates the German military systems and allows for easy comparison with the Spanish and Dutch systems."

Latter you state

"Before his death Joahnn von Nassau-Siegen was the driving force behind the movement to reform the (protestant) German armies along Dutch lines and he wrote studies which in detail laid down the faults and remedies of the German military system."

First you state Johann von Nassau-Siegen's writings illustrate the difference between the German military system and the systems developed by the Spanish and the Dutch. Then you state he helped reform the German army along the lines of the Dutch. This doesn't sound like Joahnn von Nassau-Siegen developed a separate system from the Dutch but rather modifications of the Dutch system.

Do I understand you correctly that you are arguing that Montecuccoli is the only valid source for the Imperial army, not only during the TYW but in the pre-TYW period as well?

Certainly not. What I said was Montecuccoli was the only writer who managed to reach a status where he could implement his idea. Yes, Montecuccoli was an Italian. What I meant to say was that he was an Imperialist and served in the Imperial army. Just because Leonhart Fronsperger wrote some popular military tracks does not justify stating that he was instrumental in creating a new German military system. What were his ideas and how did they differ from the existing military system? It seems to me that Imperial armies of the TYW began that war using the Spanish military system: Tilly and his large pike block with blocks of shot. I don't see Fronsperger's influence. Nor do I see a third, German, military system.

Basta is known for three books. He wrote more but is noted for these three books, He wrote a book about the major general, a book about light cavalry and a book about artillery. What was new about the information he presented that helped to create a new military system. With regards to Montecucolli's book, it is not that it created a new military system but that is was the thought of a major military thinker of the conduct of war.

Commanded Shot

The term means the management of shot through independent command. In a pike and shot unit, command resides in the colonel of the pike and shot unit. His commands are relayed to the lieutenants in command of the shot. Thus the shot is dependent on the colonel's order. Commanded shot means that shot has been withdrawn from the pikes and is commanded independent. Commanded shot is frequently used to support cavalry. It can also be used as an independent forlorn hope. It can be used to man a defensive position such as fieldworks. It can be used to take and hold villages. There are a number of ways of using commanded shot.

Now if you want to say the Swedes tended to use commanded shot to support their cavalry more than other nations, I have no problem. To say they used commanded shot more than other armies, considering all the ways commanded shot can be used, I don't think there is the evidence for it. As for Henry IV using commanded shot more extensively than the Swedes, at one point all Henry had was cavalry and commanded shot. He couldn't afford pikemen.

If you re-read the original question by Commanded Shot you will see that the question was aimed at the TYW period (the Swedish phase of 1630-1635 to be specific) and the use of commanded shot in close support of the cavalry.

I'm afraid you are wrong Daniel. The question revolved around the use shot within infantry units that included pikes. The use of commanded shot in support cavalry was not part of the question.

My first question was on push of pike however a follow up question was on cavalry and commanded shot.

Currently reading Oman's 'The Art of Warfare in the Sixteenth Century'. First few chapters in.

When do we see the term or rather tactic of 'commanded shot' come into military use?