"The British (again) on the ACW." Topic

This is an interesting fictional game taking in account a British intervention in the ACW.
Want to share with you.

link

Hope you enjoy.

Amicalement
Armand

Another source for a British intervention that may have have escalated further in the Pig War up in the Pacific North-West; en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pig_War

A recent book on the Pig War has also been published; link

Ezza

Interesting, though again I'd love to know why people insist on thinking the British were potential allies of the Confederates when all available contemporary information suggests otherwise.

There is a big difference between being annoyed at having ones ships boarded and supporting a rebel government.

I mean, whose ships were patrolling the Atlantic harrassing honest Yankee slaving ships…:)

As for the Pig War, again much ado about nothing. Both sides realised the locals had over-reacted as soon as they heard about it.

Allies – no.

Cobelligerents – yes.

There was no way the British would send an army to reinforce the Confederacy. However, Vice Admiral Milne's plans included cooperation with Confederate land forces.

For a scenario, I always thought the invasion of Maine ca. Feb 1862 (if war had broken out) was a good one. The following is from a Alt-Hist I continue to (slowly) write, but the forces are as historically accurate as possible:

4,000 Bayonets: The Invasion of Maine
A Tale from the Trent War

(Authors note, these events occur late January – early February 62, before the point I've reached elsewhere)

With the apparent coming of hostilities with the United States, Major General Hastings Doyle, commanding the Nova Scotia Military District, considered how best to bring the war to the enemy. There were two competing plans, Doyle wanted to invade Maine from New Brunswick, while Milne (the Royal Navy theatre commander) wanted to launch an amphibious desant on Portland. In the event, both launched their plans simultaneously.

The defences of Maine were comparatively weak. Portland had no modern naval artillery, and her Forts were garrisoned by roughly 300 men of the Maine Volunteer Artillery. The only manoeuvre forces available were 2 newly raised Regiments of Maine Volunteer Infantry, which were retained at Augusta rather than being sent south to the Army of the Potomac.

The Department of New England was under the command of Butler, who had been sent to New England to raise an expeditionary force to attack New Orleans. With the a war with Britain in the offing, Butler recalled many of his units, and started to build an Army of New England. By the time of the declaration of war, he had the following units:

Maine

Augusta
1st Brigade (13th, 14th and 15th Maine Infantry)
2nd Brigade (7th and 8th New Hampshire)
Maine Cavalry (later 1st Maine Cavalry)
New England Cavalry (later 1st Rhode Island Cavalry))
1st Maine Light Artillery Battery

Portland: 2nd-6th Maine Light Artillery Batteries (garrisoning the Forts)

En route, and present on the crossing of the frontier:

12th and 13th Connecticut Infantry
7th and 8th Vermont Infantry
28th and 31st Massachusetts Infantry

1st Connecticut Light Artillery Battery
6th Massachusetts Light Artillery Battery

Butler's 11 Infantry Regiments mustered with ca 10,000 men, but a few marches had quickly thinned this force to 6,000 bayonets. Similarly, the 2 Cavalry Regiments had only 900 sabres by the time the war broke out. The 3 Batteries of artillery had only 12 guns between them, 8 of them being old 6 pounders, while 4 were heavier Napoleon 12 pounders (which were very difficult to divert from McClellan).

Butler organised his little army into 5 state infantry brigades (each under the senior Colonel), and organised them into 2 lines, the first being the slightly older Maine, Connecticut and Massachusetts Brigades, while the New Hampshire and Vermont Brigades were placed in the second line. The Cavalry was placed a regiment on each wing, with the Maine Cavalry to the right and the New England to the left. His three artillery batteries were organised into a single artillery battalion.

Butler's forces were much larger than those Doyle would bring to the table, but they were raw recruits, and very badly equipped. Meanwhile Doyle's little invasion force was:

Infantry
62nd Regiment of Foot (ca 950 bayonets)
63rd Regiment of Foot (ca 900 bayonets)
1st (St Johns) New Brunswick Volunteers (ca 700 bayonets)
2nd New Brunswick Volunteers (ca 600 bayonets)
1st (Halifax City) Nova Scotia Volunteers (ca 600 bayonets)
1st Prince Edward Island Volunteers (ca 500 bayonets)

New Brunswick Yeomanry (ca 400 sabres)

A Battery, 8th Brigade, RA (6 x12 pdr Armstrong Rifles)

Battering Train (8x 40 pdr Armstrong Rifles of the 10th Brigade, RA)

Doyle only took part of the volunteers of Nova Scotia, the rest were used to form the leadership cadres of the provincial militias, and indeed, later large numbers of the volunteers that participated in the invasion were promoted into the unified militia (most Sergeants becoming Captains for example). He thus had ca 4,000 infantry (of whom 1/2 were regulars), 400 militia cavalry, 6 field and 8 siege guns.

He organised his little army as two brigades, each centred on a Regular Regiment of Foot, the 62nd for his right hand brigade, and the 63rd for his left, with the Colonels acting as Brigadier. His formation thus was:

Left: 1 PEI – 63rd – 1 NB 2 NB – 62nd – 1 NS

His guns were to be drawn up in the centre, and his cavalry forward as a screen.

The Invasion

Doyle had assessed that the frontier was essentially unguarded, and that the two keys to Maine were the destruction of Butler's field army at Augusta, and the capture of Portland. With the RN taking care of Portland (on the 5th day of the war, 3 Battleships steamed into Portland Harbor, commanded the guns of the Forts, and landed a Battalion of 800 Royal Marines to take possession of the City), he only needed to smash Butler.

Butler was in a quandary, Portland was to his rear, and the British possession of the city cut off his rail link with the rest of the US, thus he wanted to use his army aggressively against it, hoping that the British might simply take a look at the size of his force and withdraw to their ships, however, with Doyle's much larger force to his front he risked being taken on the march. In the end, he marched out to meet Doyle, hoping to knock out the larger force, then turn on Portland.

It was near Bangor that the two forces met, in a classic meeting engagement. The New Brunswick Yeomanry and the Maine Cavalry met each other, but very little fighting was done. A squadron of the Maine Cavalry had old smoothbore muzzleloading carbines and tried to skirmish with the New Brunswickers, who returned fire with their Breechloading Westley-Richards, and forced the Maine Cavalry back. Both sides as they approached the field formed their battlelines in the classic fashion, by right wheeling their columns.

Butler's Army was lucky to occupy the military crest of Mount Hope, with the Penobscot River on their right flank, while the British deployed on fairly open ground roughly 1,000 yards to their front. Butler thought he had the better position, so positioned his artillery and prepared for defence, thinking his 12 guns would dominate the British, and massed his cavalry to protect his left.

This would have been well and good, except that 1,000 yards was out of range for his 6 pounders, and only just in range for his 12 pounders. This, combined with very inexperience gun crews saw little damage being inflicted on the British. Meanwhile, the British 12 pdr rifles were landing shells generally within 10 feet of their target, and rapidly silenced the American guns. However, occupying a military crest, Butler's infantry was fairly immune to artillery. It was a stalemate.

Butler was content to sit and wait, but Doyle didn't have the luxury, his force was organised as a flying column, and would have to either advance or retreat. Butler planned to use his cavalry to take the British in the flank on the inevitable British assault. It was a fairly sound Frederickian tactic.

The British however saw their guns weren't effective, and shifted them to the right of their line, and advanced on a front nearly a mile wide, with cavalry and artillery screening their right. The 1,000 sabres of the American force saw a wall of infantry marching towards them (with the Militia in widely spaced 4 rank lines, for greater shock and to enable rapid square formation). At 300 yards the British stopped, and the right hand brigade started delivering volleys. These volleys were deadly, and the Americans rather than being shot to pieces charged.

This was expected, and the British rapidly formed 6 infantry squares, and continued firing, meanwhile the New Brunswick Yeomanry charged the disordered American cavalry and drove them off. The British reformed their line and their right hand brigade started a left wheel, to take the Americans in the flank.

Seeing this, Butler left wheeled his reserve line and formed a new line at a right angle to his front line. The British came on up the slopes, and the Americans delivered three volleys, one at 100 yards (which had little effect), one at 60 yards (which hit roughly 50 men), and a final volley at 20 yards, which was effective (hitting several hundred men), but it was answered immediately by a murderous British volley with clean muskets, felling maybe 1,000 of the American defenders. This was immediately followed by a bayonet charge which broke the Americans sending them running to the West, only to find the New Brunswick Yeomanry standing there and collecting prisoners.

By this point, the only effective American force was a few hundred Cavalry who had rallied to the west of Bangor, and came up to see what was happening. They witnessed the collapse of Butler's army, and some 3,000 prisoners taken, and decided to retire.

The British, later that day occupied Bangor, one of the principle centres of the free soil movement with no major problems, and several days later invested Augusta, which surrendered fairly rapidly.

Thus on the 8th February 1862, the Governor of Maine signed terms of occupation, outlawing partista activity and allowing the British free passage throughout the state. Of the 3,000 prisoners taken by the British, roughly a third would volunteer for the British Maine Militia over the next few months……

67thtigers

Not a bad story – but must quibble with the Governor of Maine signing terms of occupation. Israel Washburn was one of the leaders of the Republican Party – along with his six other brothers – some of whom used Washburne. (Brother and Congressman Elihu Washburne of Galena Illinois managed to get a fellow townsmen – one Sam Grant – a Brigadier Generalship in the Volunteer Army.) I doubt that Israel Washburne – who declined a third term as governor in 1863 – would surrender his state to the British occupation.

I think that you are confusing the Maine of 1814 with the Maine of 1862. In 1814 the population was far smaller and as part of Massachusetts felt deserted by the remainder by the rest of the state – who thought the War of 1812 was a mistake.

In 1862 Maine had a population of 628,000, and managed to send 72,000 men off to serve – the second largest number of troops out of New England. Somehow I don't see a British force of 10,000 men managing to subdue the entire state

But that's my .02

We have played a few ACW games with British intervention – makes for interesting battles; we gave the British troops excellent morale but reduced the command radius of the generals (the argument was, relative lack of experience in commanding large forces)

Very interesting 67thtigers!
Thanks for share.

Amicalement
Armand

Fort Knox would have been a major hinderance to any naval attempt on Bangor.

The forts defending Portland were nothing to make fun of either. link

Somewhere on the web is a copy of the British navy's survey of all US ports and their fortifications in 1861, plus what was recommended to blockade them.

Invading Maine would have been a major undertaking by the British and would have left them vulnerable to attacks by forces from New England (railroads were good coming up from Boston), naval intervention (ironclad monitors would have been excellent in such coastal waters) and cut off from their Canadian bases in the bad weather of the winter (no rail connections from Maine unless going west).

An attack to occupy Long Island might make more sense as it could then be used to support a blockade of NYC, or several other such places (Block Island, Nantucket, etc.). Unlike the War of 1812, the British would have needed a huge local naval base just to support their coal burning ships, as well as dedicating lots of naval protection to the supply ships coming from the UK.

The logistics are what get in the way of a decent British intervention scenario.

Dan

The OR contain the report on the Maine coastal defences. They're exceptionally weak, much weaker than the British believed them to be. Unlike most of the other states they reported actual armament etc. rather than the design spec: link

To summarise:

Penobscot Bay: undefended
Kennebec River: undefended
Portland: one pre-1812 fort with a single 8" mortar and 12x 24 pdrs
Portsmouth: 4x 32 pdrs on the Maine side and 1x 32 pdr, 20x 20 pdrs and 4 field guns on the NH side

None of these would stop a screw sloop of war, let alone a determined squadron. A frigate, 2 sloops and 2 gunboats were assigned to Portland in the war plan. It was more than enough.

BTW The British noted that the Portsmouth defences were so poor a mortar frigate could stand off outside the range of the forts and hit the naval yard with no return fire….

PS: Look at my blog: link

not an expert on maine of anything
but from here in delaware, does anyone plan a campaign in maine in the winter?

I believe that at the height of the Trent crisis, while the British were trying to send troops to Canada in the early winter (just in case), they ended up having to send thousands via Boston as that port had railroad connections with Canada, as the weather did not permit shipping directly to Quebec from the UK (just a vague memory of something I read once).

As to the official British forces in Canada and the British military's view, I suggest that you check the Wiki article at link and the section with foot notes #91 – 110.

Raw Union troops or not, it appears that the British army expected to be heavily outnumbered and expected US reaction to be an invasion of Canada at any point it chose along the Great Lakes (US rail roads ran parallel to them all the way from New England to the mid-west). link (chose 1860 map). Note that even during the Red River Rebellion, the British had to dispatch a force via St. Paul, MN (and this was years after the ACW).

I have no doubt that the Canadian militia would have proved to be good troops, but it appears that they were few in number and all weapons and equipment would have had to come from the UK for them and the thousands called to service in 1862.

Again, as I've suggested, it would have come down to logistics and I'm not sure that the UK could have gotten supplies to Canada in the amount that would be needed.

There is a constant muttering by authorities that since the UK had a large fleet, that they'd have swept the US Navy away with little effort. I'm not sure that the British Navy thought that way (smile) as it would have been fighting the first steam ship war thousands of miles from its bases, forced to protect the British merchant fleet from raiders (note effect of US attacks in 1812-1815 and the Confederate efforts in 1861-65) and been out numbered (at least at the start) in ironclad warships (I believe there is some doubt as to if Warrior and Black Prince could have actually traveled to the US, or been effective once they got there due to their great draft and heavy consumption of coal). Again, logistics was the coke point for the UK. There was recently a book out on the subject of UK reaction to the Union's ironclads, as well as why the monitors (as a type) were supposedly built (to frighten the UK). If interested, contact me and I'll go get my copy out of storage and send you the title and author.

And don't think that I'm suggesting that the Union could have won such a war. It had its own problems with supplies, man power and national morale, not to mention lousy generals (smile). Both the UK and the US made smart decisions NOT to go to war and we should all be glad.

Dan

No, the troops landed at Halifax and marched to Riviere du Loup, where they entrained for Montreal.

The wikipedia article is a strange one. It largely contradicts the War Office records, but as they're "original research" they're not permissible.

On Lake Ontario (the one that mattered) the British had a clear superiority. The British had 6 unarmed war steamers ("mail packets") and their guns in store. The Union had nothing. On Lake Erie the Union had a single gunboat.

The Canadian Militia on mobilisation fielded over 100,000 men.

The British had 10 ironclads in service in January 1862. The Union had none.

The British prepositioned three months supply of coal for combat operations immediately upon the Trent Affair occurring. They'd supplied over 250,000 tons annually to their fleets considerably further away in 1854-6. Coal was not a problem.

The book your referring too is Fuller's Clad in Iron: link It is not convincing, even in the original thesis: link

The British understood the Monitors were weak little armoured gunboats, of limited utility against a real warship.

Oh, of course Warrior etc. could travel to the US, although sustaining full military power for that long was not possible. In practice they sustained 20% power (10 kts, 14 kts with sail), at which rate the coal supply lasted 20 days.

I think each person interprets historical data as they want (smile).

The US had major cities with heavy industry on the lakes, the Canadian side did not.

US had the ability to move troops and heavy artillery (including naval guns) by rail along the entire border, the Canadian side did not.

The US had the ability to build weapons (small arms, artillery and ironclads), there was no ability to do so in Canada and nearly everything would have had to be shipped in.

In terms of ironclads, I have no doubt that the UK could have produced more such ships in the long run, but in 1863 the UK only had five (5) such ships in service and they were deep water frigates, not much use in coast waters, bays, rivers and such. link Since in the scenario you are presenting the US would only try to control its coastal waters and send out raiders (by the hundreds), then the monitor type ironclads would have been more than enough to do so (and they outnumbered the British ironclads by 1863) as that is all they were built to do (and much faster and cheaper than the British ironclads that would have had to be built to cross the Atlantic).

The UK had problems in other parts of the world and could not just gather all its troops and ships and send them to North America. Enemies such as Russia and not so friendly counties such as France had to be considered. India had to be occupied, as well as dozens of other locations. The fact that the UK was dependent on the US for nearly half of its corn imports would have been a consideration also (smile).

Coal was a major issue, suggest you read of the difficulties the US Navy had just supplying its blockade fleet on the southern coast. Since a steam powered ship burnt up all its coal in a matter of days, even the US ships on blockade duty normally swung at anchor with low steam and had to re-coal every week or so. To supply a group of steamships, the British would have had to sent hundreds of ships bearing coal every month, all the time having to protect them. Nasty logistics trap for all involved.

I'll leave with a quote from several of the historians who were quoted in the Wiki article:

"Of course, the military option was not needed. If it had been, Warren concluded that, "Britain's world dominance of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had vanished; the Royal Navy, although more powerful than ever, no longer ruled the waves."[109] Military historian Russell Weigley concurs in Warren's analysis and adds:

The Royal Navy retained the appearance of maritime supremacy principally because it existed in a naval vacuum, with no serious rivals except for halfhearted and sporadic challenges by the French. At that, the British Navy would have had a difficult time making itself felt on the North American coast. The coming of steam power had destroyed the ability of its best warships to cruise indefinitely in American waters as the blockading squadrons had done in 1812. Even with a major base at Halifax, or possible aid from Confederate ports, the British Navy would have found it a precarious venture to try to keep station on the U.S. Coast. No steam navy operated with success against any reasonably formidable enemy at the distances from its home ports that a trans-Atlantic war would have imposed on the British fleet until the U.S. Navy fought the Japanese in World War II."

In the end, neither of us will agree, but the discussion has been interesting. The US had major weaknesses during this period, but it was not a slam dunk that you have presented. I'd suggest that both sides at the time thought very carefully.

Highly recommend link

Dan

Not really. The industrialisation of the Lakes starts with the discovery of major ore fields on the US-Canadian border in 1866.

There were plenty of railways in Canada, your map just stopped at the border. Look at these: link

The US ability to build weapons matters less in 1862, because their rate of building was sluggish. 19/20ths of US acquisitions in 1861/2 were from Europe. *All* nitre for gunpowder comes from the UK, and that's the real crux of the issue. In three months the US wouldn't have any gunpowder left to fight with. *All* the major arms manufacturing centres bar the cannon foundry in Pittsburgh are within range of the Royal Navy, who intended on destroying them.

You're wrong. The balance of RN ironclads vs US ironclads is:

1 Jan 61: 8 vs 0
1 Jan 62: 10 vs 0
1 Jan 63: 16 vs 7
1 Jan 64: 19 vs 9
1 Jan 65: 25 vs 17

(see link for US strength). This underrates RN strength, who left essentially complete ships in dock for considerable periods before Commissioning them (which had a different meaning).

The US was noted for building poor engines that used too much coal, and they simply didn't have nearly as much lift capacity as the RN that had a dedicated collier fleet. Any notions of hitting the colliers ignore the vast numbers of cruisers the RN can deploy to protect them, and the utter lack of cruisers the US can deploy (less than a dozen, assuming they all survive and escape the blockade), and of cause the logistics problems they would have, since they have no logistics network to draw coal etc. from.

The British weren't concentrating their army in America. The planning figures were for roughly a quarter of the regular establishment (M-day strength) to be sent. Their other commitments would not be affected.

You do know I've read Bourne, probably in a lot more detail than you. I even know what he got wrong because I've seen the documents in the National Archive. Your quotes are wrong, the British gained a lot more power with the coming of steam because it enabled the navy to project power inland. They were no longer limited to a wind based blockade. The US of the time knew it, they said as much in their assessment of their own helplessness: link

See Lambert: link

I thereby bow to you (smile), especially as you know what detail I read in.

Dan

No, Dan; that doesn't look right to me. When you bow *to* someone, you are facing them. The other way means something different.

The concept of moving an infantry brigade, not to mention a battering train, from any given crossing point from New Brunswick, as far as Bangor, in 1862, kept me in stitches most of the day yesterday. I couldn't get any painting done.

Allen

Well, Allen, you and I both grew up in Maine, so what would we know (smile). Better yet is the idea of doing it during the winter.

I suspect that there are lots of laymen out there that have the prevailing view that in war things are easy or simple, as that might explain why the masses can be convinced to go to war so easy. Of course Karl von Clausewitz got it right by saying "Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult."

I tend to be in the small crowd that hangs back and wants to think it over and talk it out instead of rushing to action (smile). In that I'd suggest that at the time both the UK and US government thought it over and as Lincoln is supposed to have said, "One war at a time.". Smart and professional military men on both sides did not want to go to war and they convinced their political leaders not to.

Sadly we've had too few such types lately.

Dan

Just a note on 67th's link about Union ironclads. He leaves off the Milwaukee class (4 monitors, double turret – fought at Mobile Bay) and the Neosho class river monitors (2) as well as the Casco class light draft monitor which had two built before the wars end.

Also the USS Michigan on Lake Erie was iron hulled and built in 1843-1844 so the north had some capacity to build ships on the lakes.

Hi

And, of course, punishing the US was the only thing on the British plate!

Look you wanna game alt-history, fine. If your agenda is "Rule Britannia" or some other romantic notion (the south will rise), also fine. But take a step back and don't treat your romantic notions as real.

Rocky

Since a steam powered ship burnt up all its coal in a matter of days …

Which might explain why Churchill, when First Lord of the Admiralty, switched the RN over to oil -- thus starting the Western world's dependency on the nasty stuff.

The concept of moving an infantry brigade, not to mention a battering train,from any given crossing point from New Brunswick, as far as Bangor, in 1862,kept me in stitches most of the day yesterday.

Quite agreed- it's still a long slog now by car. The idea that someone could effectively fight a war over it in 1862 is definitely laughable!

-Will

To follow on, on land there's going to be basically two theaters- the Champlain Valley and the Great Lakes. There are no other areas were there would be enough infrastructure to make major combat possible. The US has superior industrial power to bring to bear on the Lakes, and will eventually seize control, whether the Brits like it or- the Canadians are just going to get out built and eventually overrun.

The Champlain valley seems to offer a better route, but the terrain running north-south still isn't very conducive to major military movements.

On the high seas, the US Navy would not seek nor fight a battle with the Royal Navy- they can do the exact same of commerce raiding the CSA conducted, only many orders of magnitude more effectively.

-Will

Hmm… if we wanted to be nasty, we wouldn't need to bother with getting down and dirty with the US armed forces.

In co-operation with the French, simply trash the Unions economy via screwing their banking sector and denying US goods a amrket in Europe.

One thing the USN couldn't do was escort duty across the Atlantic.

In co-operation with the French, simply trash the Unions economy via screwing their banking sector and denying US goods a amrket in Europe.

But what would be the point of this? A large part of why Britain and the US didn't go to war was because it would have been bad for business on both sides of the Atlantic.

When push came to shove, there was no compelling reason to fight- there was money to be made, and new cotton supplies were coming in from Egypt and India so why bother?

-Will

USS Michigan was built at Pittsburg and assembled on the Lakes. She was built as a response to the gunboats HMS Cherokee and HMS Mohawk (iron) built at Kingston (the RN shut down active warship construction there in 1853, but retained the facility for reactivation in the event of war).

Of course the US had some shipbuilding capacity on the Lakes, however, in 1862 Canada had superiority on Lakes Ontario and maybe Erie.

The US had 250 deep draught steamers on the Upper Lakes, but these could not pass much beyond Lake St. Clair. This is why Detroit became a major trade centre, it was the furthest point which a large steamer on the Upper Lakes could reach. Cargos were transferred to small barque rigged sailing ships called "Canallers" for the trip to Montreal where they would transfer again to Coasters to go to New York etc., or Oceanic steamers to go to Europe. The Canadians only had 50 large vessels on the Upper Lakes.

Steamers on the Lower Lakes (Erie and Ontario) were largely governed by the size required to transit the Welland Canal between the Lakes. The US have roughly 50 steamers on the Lower Lakes, and the Canadians roughly 80.

Lake Ontario is totally open to the sea. Any steamer capable of making 8 kts and will less than ISTR 18 ft draught (which is a good many reasonably sized warships) can reach Lake Ontario by running the rapids. If small enough, they can use the canal system.

Lake Erie is only accessible via the Welland Canal, which is too small to permit major warships, but could permit 1st class gunboats and gunvessels and small ironclads if built to transit (none were, but the vessels were designed and would take 90 days to deliver to the RN).

In event of war, when the St Lawrence thawed the RN would place 36 gunboats on the Lower Lakes (plus the 6 "designed but not fitted as" gunboats of the Canadian Marine Militia, and whatever else they put into service), and possibly 6 ironclads (and at least the one which were already in existence). The US have 1 gunboat (the Michigan), 1 sail revenue cutter and whatever they can improvise by arming existing steamers.

Hi

Some issues with your figures on Great Lakes boat traffic.

To start with Lake Ontario was no longer a player in the American transportation system that it was in the War of 1812. The Erie Canal moved the all important point of connection to Buffalo. Ontario is important to the British/Canadian because of its connection to the St. Lawrence but it has little impact on American trade – hence the lack of an American naval presence or interest on the Lake – where as the British are very concerned.

Lake St. Clair is above Detroit – so it can not be a hinderance for the deep draft lake steamers on the American side on the Upper Lakes – if they can make it to Detroit they can make it to Lake Erie and on to Buffalo which was the normal route.

Detroit/Windsor would have been the transhipment point for Canadian trade moving east due to a lack of good harbors on the Canadian side of the lake – but American trade would have gone directly to Buffalo – transfered to canal barges – which were shipped to Albany and taken by tug to New York City.

The Ohio rail net is such that by 1860 the need for boat transport on Lake Erie between American ports has dropped – hence the smaller number of American boats on Lake Erie compared to Canadians.However there are far more American boats on the Upper Lakes which could be quickly moved south if needed

My .02

Another factor that hit me in the shower last night is that in regards to the Ironclad comparison (numbers in service), using numbers of monitors built is somewhat misleading. Even during the height of the war US shipyards built two ocean-going Ironclads for Italy and one that was sold to France. So obviously US shipyards were operating below capacity when it came to the number of ironclad warships that could have been in service if they had been needed- in the event they weren't, since the Confederate Navy never posed a large enough threat.

-Will

I'd like to point out that the phrase Ironclad needs some examination. The "Ironclads" of the British and French Navies weren't completely armored, they merely had iron hulls, and they only armored the central part of their ships. The USS Monitor and the CSS Virginia were completely armored bow to stern. Big difference in the use of the term "Ironclad."

I too have lived in Maine. During the winter it is anything but hospitable. Even today it's very difficult to move anything along I-95 in a snow storm, secondary roads are near impassable, especially with frost-heaves. During the Spring and Summer the Midges will eat people alive.

"Ironclads" – the complete armour was worse. It spread less over a greater area. The wooden hulls didn't allow for watertight compartmentalisation.

US ironclads were general weak due to the type of armour used. The 68 pdr 95 cwt when experimentally fired at a 10" thick US style laminated target (of higher quality) smashed straight through. The 11" Rodman was incapable of piercing Warrior at any range. Warriors guns will smash straight through Monitors turret (especially now we know that the iron used was 5% silicia!), Monitors guns will not dent Warrior.

The two ships built for Italy were problematic. The manufacturers took three years to produce the plates for the first, and they turned out to be very substandard (the French tested them, and found they did not resist shot), the hulls were unseasoned and hence kept opening up to the sea, and they had to import the engines from Britain, as no US manufacturer could make high-spec engines. Dunderburg was, of course, even more substandard. Webb got no foreign buisness after 1864 due to the low quality of his output.

Hi

Is this a trend, 67th? In every thread you assert that the US was hopeless in drill, hopeless in cav, 100 years behind in artillery and the ships sucked!

So, just why didn't the british reclaim their wealthy american ex-colonies?

Rocky

Rocky you forgot that we cant shoot, and where much to stupid to notice these deficiencys. Aperently they didnt even nedd to reenforce Canada, a regiment or two should have been enough to sweep clear to DC and preserve slavery for ever. It seems amazing Luxemburg didnt send over some boyscouts and take uus out.

The Union shot as well about as well as the Prussians, actually slightly better (the Union average around 1 in 200 shot fired hitting, Prussia against the massed Austrian shock columns in 1866 hit only with ca. 1 in 250). They just didn't shoot as well as the British of the era (frequently hitting with more than 5% of shots on the battlefield), because they weren't properly trained.

and yes, the US ironclads did suck, because the US was technologically very behind Europe at this time in heavy industry. There's no arguing that American built steam engines developed lower pressure, or that the largest rolling mill in the US in 1861 could only roll 1.5" iron.

Hi

And your stats come from WHERE?

I am amazed by the various threads that show up on TMP that "prove" that the US was stupid except for the ones that "prove" that eh UK was hopeless and let others "die" and on and on and on. I wonder if this is a paradigm driven by game rules which list things as "A through F" as ratings.

Rocky

Hi

Just remembered an incident from 1940 "If the Germans are tight, they will be marching down whitehall in a week, if they are not, they won't."

Rocky

Actualy I am not sure if the numbers prove americans cant shoot, or that europeans cant seek cover very well.

Statistics can be a great way to distort things if you dont know how they where arived at. The number for WWII is that it took 16000 rounds of ammo to create a casualty. So if an Anmerican rifle company fought a German rifle company, there should only be 1-2 casualties a side, as there is just not enough ammo to hurt more than that. The problem lies with what they added into the basic figure.

Considering the state of supply accountability in the ACW, I question if anybody has much idea of how many rounds where expended. IOt could be far higher than normaly used if soldiers had rounds from earlier. It could be lower if supply Sgts are adding in ammo that was somehow wrecked. Supply guys are notorious about trying to hide loses they may be liable for, so ammo left in the rain get used in the next battles numbers.

I also dont doubt that in places like the Wilderness, shot/hit numbers are low. Buit I question whether anybody else could have done much better in the same conditions.

I dont know enough about Inkerman to form an opinion. But, napoleonic russians did not really make it hard to hit them. I am not sure they had gotten any better at ducking by the Crimean. I do suspect that Britsh supply accountability systems where a lot better than Amercans systems where.

But without knowing where any of this comes from, it sure sounds like a manipulation of statictics rther than legitiment differences in capabilitys.

I have no problem believing that a fresh out of the factory recruit in 1861 was not very good with a rifle. I have a much harder time beleiving that the same guy by 1663 has learned nothing about what is going on. Very hard to believe that they didnt realize that hiting rebs was going to make thier own survival a lot more likely, and do a bit about getting better at it. Unless you believe that Americans are just naturaly to dense to learn anything, which does crop up from time to time.

" because the US was technologically very behind Europe at this time in heavy industry. There's no arguing that American built steam engines developed lower pressure, or that the largest rolling mill in the US in 1861 could only roll 1.5" iron."

Sources? Clearly somebody forgot to tell the British engineers who came to Cambria Iron in the late 1850s to study how they produced iron?

In 1861 US iron foundries were just beginning to find their stride, by the 1870s everyone, GB, France, and unified Germany were trying to catch up with what was going on along the Ohio Valley. The magnitude of industrial might that was created by the War is difficult to comprehend.

Most Labor Historians point to this decade as the one of true ascension of American Industry. The Historiography on the subject is overwhelming in the other direction of your assertion. 1861 is not a valid point of comparison, no one in the world could produce the amount of rolling stock, ready made rr bridges, rails etc. that the North produced with one arm behind its back

We still haven't even touched upon the vast natural resources available to the US. It was this decade that the Clearfield seem was first mined. The BTU from the coal mined in Central PA almost rivals the BTU found in anthracite.

The problem with this discussion is that there is NO way GB could justify the death of one soldier in defense of slavery. 100,000 Canadians and 20,000 redcoats sounds impressive until you take into account the 200,000 Irishmen that would flock to the colors the second they had a chance to shoot one.

At this time ALL ironclads were pretty aweful!! Many were wooden frigates with iron armour rushed into service. The Monitor was an excellent design for fighting but had very dodgy seaworthyness…This is the problem with any new technology--It takes a while to get right..

On the idea of Britain and the Union going to war--Unfortunately (shakes head) the British politicians weren't Machiavelian enough to take advantage of Americas division and weakness during the Civil War….

British troops were superior to American troops--Professional volunteers who soldiered around the world with a tough and effective Regimantal system..With reforms in place since the Crimea to improve the logistics and Generalship….However while the British maybe able to field an army of perhaps 60,000 (very iffy) the US could and did raise a mass army of over half a million which we would be eventually swallowed up by As the CSA were…

archstanton73 I have no problem believeing that a proffesional army is superior to one just thrown togather, with so few veterens in the ranks that they where buried in the mix. And I am a big fan of Col James Scarlett.

My objection wasnt that they where better at the start, but that the Americans are apperently helpless, and id not learn anything through the course of the war. I bet even British infantry would have had a bad time with an 1863 Army. Not that they might not have won, but certainly they would have known they had been in a fight.

I also think that if they could have gotten the sealift to get them there, they could have taught us that the day of heavy cavalry was not totaly over. A division of heavy charging at the end of pickets charge might have come close to ending the war two years early.

As for the Ironclads, I agree they all sucked, except in relation to everything else. As far as the possible fighting, I am not enough up on the different ships to have a detailed opinion. However, It would not at all surprise me to see a justland type fight, where even if they won tacticaly, a British fleet might find itself in bad shape far from home and no facilitys for repair. If the South would have had yards with that abiility, they would have been building ships in the south, rather than buying them in Britain.

As for the Moniter in combat agains the Warrior, I bet that little bit turret was a very tough target for the fire control systems of the day at any range other than just about touching.

If I owned a good detailed set of ACW naval rules I would game it out just to see. but almost every set I have seen claims to be fast paly. Not what is needed to work out technical and tacticl results from an encounter like this.

In the end, I just cant see any British goverment being in a position to be portrayed as supporting slavery. From what it looks to me, that may well have caused a goverment to fall, but British internal politics are not always as clear as they could be, so I would certainly deffer to a counter opinion from one of you Islanders.

All of this has interested me enough that I am hopeing to eventualy collect a few Crimean figures and let them reenforce my normal confederate opponent and see how it goes.

Owen

As a Brit--By the 1860's slavery was unacceptable to most sections of the population--The ruling class didn't like it because coolie labour at a penny a day in India/West Indies was far more efficient and effective than slavery ever was..A free man will work harder and better than a beaten man in chains even if it is for a pittance. So profits were much higher. The middle and working class didn't like slavery for obvious humanitarian/religeous reasons--IE it was cruel and wrong..During the war Lancashire cotton workers refused to handle Southern imported cotton knowing it was from slave labour..
Any British government would have found it impossible to support a Slaveocracy over a Democracy…As one CSA General (Lee??) said "We should have freed the slaves and then declared independance" If they had done that then Britain would very probably have been able to stir it up a bit--

Maybe limiting the war to "freedom of navigation of the high seas" and defence of Canada…And putting pressure on Lincoln to reach a mediated solution…Actually if the CSA had ended slavery then there would have been no civil war to start with!!!!

Militarily the British would have done well--In the Crimea and Indian Mutiny our infantry did perform miracles of endurance and sheer bloody mindedness--Frontal assaults/seiges etc etc that had one thing that many Civil War regiments lacked…(as discussed endlessly) the ability and willingness to close in or stand and take close quarter hand to hand fighting with the bayonet…A few battles and the Redcoats may have built up a reputation which struck fear into any defending unit (nobody wants to get skewered) and that would have given us an edge--Despite US superiority in numbers…

I'm not saying the Americans would be helpless but that they would be at a distinct disadvantage!!
Also British Lt Cols and Majors would have been Lts and Capts during the Crimea and Mutiny so would have a lot of experience..As would a fair percentage of Redcoats.

Hi

One side issue is addressed by "fire control". The short version is that both the US and the UK had lieutenants who started studying how to hit with guns at sea, and discovered that the "tests" were crocked. Revised the entire system for both navies.

But the point I am getting to is rules. I have NEVER seen rules for the post naploleonic period that could replicate any action that happened. Now, the issue is bothered, of course, with the idea that it is hard to do this with a limited sample base.

One of my futile efforts was to take the 1889 rules at the behest of a friend and tweek and tweek and change trying to get something that would fit with the later understanding of how arty hits ships AND the protection involved. I ended up with an MONSTER. Sigh.

My issue with threads like this is that they never seem to actually be honest discussions, but various voices promoting some agenda that I don't quite "get". It is again, people starting with conclusions then searching for "proof".

Your mention about the WW2 ratio of shots to kills is a case in point. This was promoted by a writer who had an agends and has yet to stand up. In one of my day jobs a few years ago, i was asked to justify "smart bombs" being that the hit rate was inferior to the British hit rate in WW2 with no real bomb site and iron bombs.

Without context, stats can be worse than meaningless, but deceptive.

Rocky

I think it was Licoln who said "There are lies, damn lies and statistics!"

I strongly believe after reading lots of accounts of naval battles through the years that ALL gunfire damage is essentially random/special events--And that the end of a ship is usually caused by a series of cataclysmic hits!!

So you get a case where the Monitor and Merrimack spend all day beating the hell out of each other with very little serious damage…It could easily have been a victory for , say, Merrimack if she had got a lucky hit on Monitor and blown her sky high!!!

archstanton73 13 Sep 2010 9:59 p.m. PST
……Frontal assaults/seiges etc etc that had one thing that many Civil War regiments lacked…(as discussed endlessly) the ability and willingness to close in or stand and take close quarter hand to hand fighting with the bayonet…A few battles and the Redcoats may have built up a reputation which struck fear into any defending unit (nobody wants to get skewered) and that would have given us an edge--Despite US superiority in numbers…

*NJH: Well now, where to begin… The difficulty with your statement is that it is incorrect. During the ACW there are several instances of cold steel being met with cold steel.

The most obvious example of bayonet and HtH combat was Pickett's Charge. Please remember that it was Americans who closed with the bayonet, and it was Americans that stood their ground with the bayonet.

Cold Harbor is another example of cold steel met with cold steel.

Read about Hood's campaign in the west – plenty of HtH and cold steel there.

Asserting that only the Brits were capable of a bayonet charge, or of facing one, betrays an ignorance of the ACW.

archstanton73 14 Sep 2010 2:33 p.m. PST

I think it was Licoln who said "There are lies, damn lies and statistics!"

*NJH: No, it was not Lincoln. He was quite dead when it was attributed to Mark Twain who attributed it to Disraeli. The origin of the phrase is still open to conjecture, but the evidence points to a UK originin the latter part of the 19th Century.

Would the Brits have wanted to trade Canada for the South, while politically supporting the continued enslavement of fellow human beings, oh yeah, officially abolished in 1833 ?

Lincoln had it right, slavery needed to stop right it where it was.

"Asserting that only the Brits were capable of a bayonet charge, or of facing one, betrays an ignorance of the ACW."

Errr no I didn't assert that the Americans were incapable of bayonet charges etc etc just that the Brits would have been better!!!

"Bayonet Charges"

The two cited examples I am familiar with, Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg and Hood's attack at Franklin were not shock bayonet charges.

I'm familiar only with Grant's final assault at Cold Harbor and only at the far left of the Federal line was close contact made.

Both Pickett's and Hood's charges devolved into standup firefights. There were a few small local rushs, none of which reached bayonet contact because the other side fled, which is *normal* for bayonet charges.

The general problem with ACW tactics is that a "charge" often means advance to musket range (usually 50-100 yds) and shoot for extended periods of time. It was green units that were often more willing to actually mix it up at bayonet point.

archstanton73 14 Sep 2010 10:30 p.m. PST
"Asserting that only the Brits were capable of a bayonet charge, or of facing one, betrays an ignorance of the ACW."

Errr no I didn't assert that the Americans were incapable of bayonet charges etc etc just that the Brits would have been better!!!

Frontal assaults/seiges etc etc that had one thing that many Civil War regiments lacked…(as discussed endlessly) the ability and willingness to close in or stand and take close quarter hand to hand fighting with the bayonet…A few battles and the Redcoats may have built up a reputation which struck fear into any defending unit (nobody wants to get skewered) and that would have given us an edge--Despite US superiority in numbers…

*NJH: Seems fairly assertive to me.

67thtigers 15 Sep 2010 5:58 a.m. PST
"Bayonet Charges"

The two cited examples I am familiar with, Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg and Hood's attack at Franklin were not shock bayonet charges.

I'm familiar only with Grant's final assault at Cold Harbor and only at the far left of the Federal line was close contact made.

Both Pickett's and Hood's charges devolved into standup firefights. There were a few small local rushs, none of which reached bayonet contact because the other side fled, which is *normal* for bayonet charges.

The general problem with ACW tactics is that a "charge" often means advance to musket range (usually 50-100 yds) and shoot for extended periods of time. It was green units that were often more willing to actually mix it up at bayonet point.

*NJH: Where to begin….?

Are you saying that Pickett's Men did not close with the Yankees?

I said "Hood's Campaign in the West." Examine the entire campaign and I'm sure you'll find find plenty of HtH.

badger22 13 Sep 2010 5:42 p.m. PST
…..

I also think that if they could have gotten the sealift to get them there, they could have taught us that the day of heavy cavalry was not totaly over. A division of heavy charging at the end of pickets charge might have come close to ending the war two years early.

The cavalry would have had to move across the same ground as the infantry. Which means the following:

Crushing the wounded infantry under hoof. Not to mention their own casualties.

Moving across undulating ground that would alternately expose and blind the units.

Expose the cavalry to the direct and enfilading fire of the union artillery – Light Brigade anyone?

Expose the cavlry to the direct and enfilading fire of the union infantry.

Charging over fences (stone and wooden) would have been problematic.

And, how would the cavalry close to contact over the fieldworks of the Union infantry? Cavalry doesn't do very well charging over linear obstacles.

If Bobby Lee thought that a cavalry charge would have broken the union line, he'd have ordered one. He didn't, and I think he didn't because it wasn't a good idea.