"Why and when Marmont move to treason." Topic

After a hard battle against the Allied at the gates of Paris were they lost more than 9 thousand soldiers against the tiny Corps of Marmont and Mortier, became the top moment of desition if Napoleon could remain at his throne or was lost.

I always wonder to know which was the exaclty moment when the Duc of Ragusa had decided the last chance and I had see that:

Marmont before his talk with Talleyrand (when he return to the first line and made one of his most heroic performace in front of this troops) his fidelity had been shaken. The ovation he had received by the mob of the Paris people and Talleyrand poison words had been turned the Marshal's head.
Marmont show him as a mass of vanity and envy.
Neither rank, titles, nor grant of money had satisfied his ambition.
He saw, at this exactly moment a prospect to be second to none because he became as the arbitrer of France. He takes note that he held his master in the hollow of his hand,
Talleyrand had given him to understand that the destinity of the Emperor depend upon him.
So, Marmont decided to signed the capitulation of Paris with the Count of Orlow, ADC of the Emperor or Russia without discussion and even knowing that his master was less at a day of march to Paris.
This was the moment when the "Ragussade" was born.

Amicalement
Armand

Amicalement
Armand

Salut,

I think the turning point was the arrival of Marmont's aide-de-camp, M. de Montessuy, who was sent by the provisional government to talk Marmont into turning away from Napoleon. I think he found him on 3 April and had a long conversation with him on this subject. The relations between Marmont and Napoleon had been strained during the campaign (see Napoleon's reaction to Marmont;s actions at Laon) so it did not take much to convince him in switching sides. Even then he did try to safeguard Napoleon by stipulating that if Napoleon were to be captured by the Allies, they should respect his life, liberty, and find him a suitable and safe retreat.

By the way, can you cite any specific citations that can support your claim that he he saw himself as "second to none because he became as the arbitrer of France."

Also, what do you mean he "signed the capitulation of Paris with the Count of Orlow, ADC of the Emperor or Russia without discussion and even knowing that his master was less at a day of march to Paris"? I do not know if you have read Orlov's memoir, but they show quite a bit of back-and-forth negotiations which, by the way, gained entire day for Napoleon. I have recently translated this memoir and you can find it here:
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Best wishes,
Alex

For what it's worth, I think Marmont came to full realization it was really over with. Just like when the Allies were at the gate of Berlin in 1945, even winning the battle will still mean you lose the war. I don't blame him for capitulating, the war was just wasting lives.

Marmont didn't 'captiulate.' He turned his corps over to the allies which enraged his troops. He also enraged the other marshals who were counting on a regency for Napoleon's son after Napoleon abdicated. Marmont's act ruined this plan and brought back the Bourbons, which was probably Talleyrand's plan all along. Talleyrand wanted a France untroubled by wars in which he could continue his life the way he wanted it. He undoubtely believed the Bourbons would be ready to be plucked by him and Fouche to enrich themselves further. Talleyrand played to Marmont's vanity and ego, both of which were on steroids. Treason on Marmont's part was the result.

Sincerely,
K

10th Marines,

I think it's just semantics, capitulated or turned over his corps, there's not a noticeable difference. Do you seriously believe if he had continued fighting Napoleon might have ended up winning anyways? In the end, I see that his capitulating simply sped up an inevitable outcome.

By 1814 the Allies were onto a crusade, rather like the Allies in 1944. Nothing less than a new government in France that had nothing to do with any form of Bouneparte was going to satisfy them – especially Alexander.

I'd soon have Tallyrand in charge of foreign policy than Bouneparte any day of the week.

La défection de Marmont en 1814: ouvrage suivi d'un grand nombre de documents inédits ou peu connus, d'un précis des jugements de Napoléon 1er sur le maréchal Marmont, d'une notice bibliographique avec extraits de tous les ouvrages publiés sur le même sujet etc. etc. by Louis Nicolas Rapetti. Published by Poulet-Malassis et De Broise in 1858. 475 pages:

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I'd soon have Tallyrand in charge of foreign policy than Bouneparte any day of the week.

Sorry for the point of view of military history, Bouneparte left in charge in 1814 would have given us lots more potential for conflicts in 1815/6 and on as he attempts to rebuild the lost ground. From an humanitarian view point, Tallyrand is the way to go.

But Sir… do you REALLY beleaved that Talleyrand was moving on an act of humanity?.

It seems that Talleyrand always had only one objetive on his life: Talleyrand himself!.

He can show thousands of "acts of humanity" on his long career under Napoleon or the Bourbones and he only show it when there was crearly advantages from his part.

Not mention Fouché…

Amicalement
Armand

'I think it's just semantics, capitulated or turned over his corps, there's not a noticeable difference. Do you seriously believe if he had continued fighting Napoleon might have ended up winning anyways? In the end, I see that his capitulating simply sped up an inevitable outcome.'

It isn't semantics. The 'inevitable outcome' had already happened-Napoleon had already abdicated in favor of his son when Marmont's subordinates led his corps over to the allies without the troops and subordinate commanders knowing what was going on. That's treason by any definition of the word.

You can surrender honorably-witness Pachthod in the same campaign at La Fere Champenoise. Marmont suffered from a very large contusion of the ego, and had problems in the field at the beginning of the campaign when his performance was poor on France's eastern marches. That can be compared to Mortier in the same theater doing his duty.

Marmont had character problems and he listened to Talleyrand, a known scoundrel and traitor, when his reply to him should have been the same as Lannes' from years before when Lannes told Talleyrand to his face that he was nothing but a silk stocking full of excrement.

Further, Marmont broke his oath of service and spent the rest of his life trying to justify his actions. As Blucher told Bourmont the next year after he deserted from Nord-the son of a female dog is still the son of a female dog.

Sincerely,
K

Elliott,

Talleyrand never did anything unless he would benefit. One of his smaller scandals was the attempted bribery of American officials in the 1790s in the famous XYZ Affair. There is little doubt that he and Fouche were in cahoots with one another.

After using Lafayette to their own ends in 1815 after Waterloo, Fouche made the remark that Lafayette was 'an old imbecile whom one can use like a …ladder which one throws down after one has used it.'

Napoleon knew that the fall of Paris in 1814 was partly the fault of Talleyrand's intrigues with the Royalists, as well as his own brother's (Joseph) cowardice.

Talleyrand was not sent by the Bourbons to represent France at Vienna in 1814, he just showed up undoubtedly using his slippery manner to get what he could that would benefit himself in the long run.

After Waterloo when the proscription lists were being drawn up for arrest and trial for Napoleon's supporters, Talleyrand supposedly congratulated Fouche on the list as all of Fouche's friends were on it.

If you negotiated with Talleyrand, first he wouldn't be honest, and second, it would be akin to trying to sort out a basket of eels.

Sincerely,
K

Kevin,

What do you mean by "Talleyrand was not sent by the Bourbons to represent France at Vienna in 1814, he just showed up…"? He was sent in official capacity to represent France and had considerable back-and-forth correspondence with the court. Besides, can you indicate specifically how Talleyrand personally benefited from defending French interests in Vienna?

With warmest wishes,
Alex

<;^}

Alex,

Didn't Talleyrand destroy most, if not all, of his papers? Talleyrand posed at Vienna as wanting to assist in helping France, but what he wanted was a Europe untroubled by wars so that he could enrich himself and live a life of luxury and wealth.

My opinion of anything Talleyrand said would be akin to this: if he told me the sky was blue on a sunny day while standing on a stack of Bibles, I'd still look for myself to check the color and shade of the sky at the time Talleyrand told me it was blue.

Sincerely,
K

It isn't semantics. The 'inevitable outcome' had already happened-Napoleon had already abdicated in favor of his son when Marmont's subordinates led his corps over to the allies without the troops and subordinate commanders knowing what was going on. That's treason by any definition of the word.

Napoleon had lost the war as soon as Prussia and Austria rose up and rearmed themselves for war. It didn't matter what Marmont did to finish the war, Napoleon deserved to be removed simply because he became a tyrant; like the rest of the kings of Europe.

Talleyrand was unquestionably a wretched human being, but how do you condemn Marmont for talking to Talleyrand? If Napoleon had executed him or imprisoned him, then he wouldn't have had a chance to betray anyone. I think of Marmont's actions akin to a German general surrendering his corps to the Allies in April 1945.

Napoleon had been a great leader and thinker. Over time with absolute power, he then degenerated into the likeness of the inbred imbeciles who ruled England, Russia, Austria, Prussia and Spain.

I agree with 138SquadronRAF (hate admitting that) on the fact they wouldn't have permitted any Bonaparte to retain the throne on remain in any form of power. Marmont may have been an opportunist, but I don't think he did anything most normal human beings would have also done.

Talleyrand posed at Vienna as wanting to assist in helping France, but what he wanted was a Europe untroubled by wars so that he could enrich himself and live a life of luxury and wealth.

Just like some of the Marshalate – didn't Massena want to sit out the 3rd Invasion of Portugal for similar reasons?

Elliott,

Comparing Massena and Talleyrand is interesting, but quite different. Massena was a proven commander and a logical choice for the Portugal job, unfortunately, people have their day in war as in anything else, and he wanted to retire-he was probably burned out. Further he was two years younger than Talleyrand and died in 1817-Talleyrand, unfortunately, lived until 1838. Massena's service was hard and almost continuous. As an interesting aside, he had the character to refuse to take part in Ney's trial.

Sincerely,
K

'Napoleon had lost the war as soon as Prussia and Austria rose up and rearmed themselves for war. It didn't matter what Marmont did to finish the war, Napoleon deserved to be removed simply because he became a tyrant; like the rest of the kings of Europe.'

Prussia entered the war in early 1813 and Austria not until July-August. During the spring campaign of 1813 Prussia and Russia were beaten at Lutzen and Bautzen and their armies were pretty well depleted. They were driven back to the Oder. That doesn't sound like losing to me. They couldn't win without Austria and Austria entering the war which resumed in August didn't ensure victory for the allies. So you assumption is incorrect, though we could probably argue over that for hours and never agree.

As to Napoleon being a tyrant, he doesn't fit the 'profile.' As JC Herold eloquently states (and he is not pro-Napoleon by any means) Napoleon was a lawgiver and governed by the rule of law, though there were few notably exceptions. Wherever the writ of the French Empire ran there was freedom of religion and basic civil rights and that cannot be said of his opponents.

If you believe that Napoleon had to be removed because he had become a tyrant like the other monarchs, then the others should have been removed, something Napoleon didn't do, again with a few notable exceptions. Broad, sweeping statements don't prove anything and definitely are not a definitive argument.

'I think of Marmont's actions akin to a German general surrendering his corps to the Allies in April 1945.'

The Wehrmacht was disintegrating in April 1945, that wasn't the case with the French in 1814. There was a field army in Holland, one in Spain, Napoleon's army in France, and the garrisons, like Davout's that held out against all odds. The comparison with the Germans/Nazis in War II is also meaningless, as the two situations were completely different.

'Marmont may have been an opportunist, but I don't think he did anything most normal human beings would have also done.'

The marshals that forced Napoleon's abdication didn't do it, nor did other French commanders until Napoleon abdicated. Marmont committed treason, and no amount of early 21st century moralizing or rationalization can change that fact.

Sincerely,
K

An interesting point has been raised, here. Up through 1809 Napoleon was still pretty much a child of the Revolution. When he sat down with the Austrians after Wagram he betrayed the Revolution and became a "king," like all the other bastards that the French had risen against. A number of the OG Horse Grenadiers broke their sabers upon hearing of the peace in 1809. Napoleon should have pursued that war to the bitter end and disolved the Austrian Empire. No matter how many times the Austrians were defeated, no matter how many peace agreements they made, they always broke the peace and attacked as soon as they were able.

And look what being merciful to those Austians got Napoleon. It's a classic case of "those who sleep with dogs . . ."

Alex,

Which countries were 'invited' to send representatives to the Congress of Vienna? If I recall correctly, France wasn't (and I could be mistaken).

Sincerely,
K

Widowson,

I'm glad you can understand it. I share a similar viewpoint in that after Austria moved for war in 1809, they proved themselves untrustworthy. If the king had been exiled along with the royal family and nobles, Austria would have been subdued. Prussia's government should have experienced a similar fate with rebel Prussian officers being executed.

Any pathetic uprisings without leaders would fail and subside over time.

"If you believe that Napoleon had to be removed because he had become a tyrant like the other monarchs, then the others should have been removed, something Napoleon didn't do, again with a few notable exceptions. Broad, sweeping statements don't prove anything and definitely are not a definitive argument."

=>Funny, I wasn't arguing, it was my opinion. You might learn some tact and reasoning skills as your posts are coming across as a personal "argument" instead of a discussion. I do believe they all should have been removed, they were parasites that contributed little but absorbed much.

"The marshals that forced Napoleon's abdication didn't do it, nor did other French commanders until Napoleon abdicated. Marmont committed treason, and no amount of early 21st century moralizing or rationalization can change that fact."

Treason is simply a matter of dates.

In case of treason, didn't Napoleon himself size power by a kind of treason – with the coup d'etat of 18 brumaire?

in case he would have failed – he would have been condemned for high treason.

Napoleon was never a child of the Revolution he founded a hereditary dynasty (prerogative by birth and not by capability, the King of Rome was the heir), did not last long, but he did it.

The coup would have gone on with or without Napoleon and the danger is that Barras wanted to bring back the Bourbons. The Directory was corrupt, France was bankrupt financially, and there was general lawlessness in the country-not to mention there was a war on. The result of the coup was beneficial and the social gains of the Revolution were generally maintained. And the war was ended relatively quickly. I'd say that's a benefit.

Sincerely,
K

"The coup would have gone on with or without Napoleon and the danger is that Barras wanted to bring back the Bourbons."

True; but non-responsive. Had the coup failed Napoleon would most certainly have been tried for treason.

"The other guy is worse" is no defense.

It isn't a defense, it's what happened.

By the principles of the Revolution, the Directory had broken the contract with the governed-that was the same principle that guided the United States in 1776 when it rebelled against the British crown.

Napoleon had also tried to become a Director, but he was too young by law. If the coup had failed, Napoleon probably would have been dead.

And the other guy was worse-especially Barras who was betraying the country to the Bourbons.

Sincerely,
K

'Napoleon was never a child of the Revolution he founded a hereditary dynasty (prerogative by birth and not by capability, the King of Rome was the heir), did not last long, but he did it.'

Initially that is incorrect. The decision was brought on by the assasination attempts by the Bourbons sponsored by the British-so you can blame the British and the Bourbons that Napoleon became Emperor of the French.

Sincerely,
K

Kevin,

Could you not assisinate a self-styled 'Emperor' in the same was a you assinate a First Consul. Why would the change in title change the fundimental principle?

Asymetrical wars of insurgency are cheaper to fund and fight both politically and financially that conventional wars for a major power.

Do you blame the British for fighting a war of resistance in France using local agents in the period 1940-44? Before you say the cases are not the same, I would point out that initially the Vichy government of Marshal Pétain received widespread support amongst the French people. Certainly Vichy was popular with the French people so than any initial resistance movement. Similarly, the Republic was more popular than the failed regime of the Bourbons, but it was not univerally loved.

Assuming you support the work of the French resistance, why the indigantion at the same type of scheme in 1800-1805? The idea of the Special Operations Execute was not new to the the British in June 1940. Reading some the SOE files in the Public Records Office in Kew I found a document pointing out the work that the SOE was doing in France harked back to the work of Wellington's intelligence officers in Spain in arming the guerrillas.

Also remember the US goverment followed the same principles with establishment of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) and renamed the CIA in 1947.

Best wishes,

E

I wonder if Rustveli is translating all those fine documents in vain – they are seemingly ignored by bombastic.