"Book Review - The Mons Myth by Terence Zuber" Topic
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Ponder | 20 Apr 2010 3:33 p.m. PST |
Howdy, The Mons Myth by Terence Zuber is a welcome addition to the historical literature of the Great War. In reading the book, I wondered, "Why didn't anybody write this book before?" All the sources were there. But only Zuber set out to collect and review them. "Why aren't other historians doing this?" For this reason, I think Zuber is the most significant military historian writing about World War One today. His work seems to have the pattern of digging out obscure (at least in English) sources and presenting a fresh look at what they provide (consider his challenge to the dogma of the Schlieffen Plan as a warplan). However, his polemic, in your face, writing style will prevent him from winning academic awards and acclaim for his work. Those invested in history as written will not appreciate Zuber's work. The Mons Myth begins with a survey of sources, both British & German. Zuber looks at German regimental histories in a systematic way to present an account of the Mons and LeCateau very different than presented in British histories. J.E. Edmonds, author of the British official history, called Mons & LeCateau British military victories (shades of The Princess Bride, I had always wondered if Edmonds knew what those words meant). Following the opening chapter is a presentation on tactical doctrine and training comparing the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) with the German Army. This chapter will be familiar to readers of Zuber's prior book, Ardennes 1914 – The Battle of the Frontiers. Then we get to the meat of the work, a thorough description of the German First Army's march through Belgium, and a day-by-day detailed look at the clash of the First Army with the BEF. Zuber presents a telling case: The German Army of 1914 possessed a more mature tactical doctrine than the Belgians, French, or British; and trained it; the German Army of 1914 was better trained than the Belgians, French, or British. The static, linear defense of the BEF at Mons and LeCateau was inadequate in the face of well-applied combined arms doctrine. Despite my praise for the book, I rate it with only four-stars (out of five). I downgrade its presentation due to the maps presented to support the text. I spent too much time searching for locations mentioned in the text, that were not to be found on the maps. However, I found the black and white photographs to be very illustrative of the open ground the German attacks had to cross – they were well worth including, as were the black & white line sketches of the German Army in action. I recommend this book. Ponder on, JAS |
Ponder | 20 Apr 2010 3:36 p.m. PST |
Howdy, I understand Zuber will be a guest speaker at Historicon 2010, and two presentation are planned: (1) The Schlieffen Plan Myth (2) The Mons Myth Ponder on, JAS |
Shagnasty | 20 Apr 2010 5:11 p.m. PST |
Sounds like one of them revisionists! |
drummer | 20 Apr 2010 6:19 p.m. PST |
"Zuber looks at German regimental histories in a systematic way to present an account of the Mons and LeCateau very different than presented in British histories." And accepts what they say without question. This is one of the problems I have with his writing. He does not question the German accounts at all. He even accepts the German contention that all the unidentified fire from "friendly" areas was Franc Trilleur and does not even consider that perhaps much of this is stragglers, scouts, etc. Another problem I have with Ardennes 1914 is his poor ability to lay out the story in a easy-to-follow manner. The maps look like they were drawn on a napkin. I had to make time-lines and my own situation maps using 1:50k topographic maps from 1944 to do terrain analysis and "see" how the action unfolded. I recall that once it seemed he was suggesting the same unit is at two places at once. Zuber never explains why the German doctrine is better. He makes it sound like they just shoot better. He does not explain what the Germans did in terms of training and preparation that was so superior other than talk about how they had maneuver areas. He does not at all talk about the political and budgetary considerations that might explain how the Germans could afford these maneuver areas but the allies could not. He does not explain the limitations of the process of using umpires to carry out peace-time maneuvers on a battlefield using smokeless powder and subdued uniforms. He also does not explain how the Germans were far more selective in their conscripts and again how political and budgetary considerations forced the French to use older and less capable men. He really doesn't explain much of anything. Finally, Zuber ignores artillery in general. Artillery effect is typically decisive in 1914 engagements (a big surprise to all involved) but all he keeps talking about rifle fire. How artillery selected targets and engaged them (Fire control and coordination), and ammunition re-supply and their effect on battles should have been discussed in-detail but he simply ignores this incredibly important subject. So overall in my opinion the only value in Zuber's work is that he managed to present a condensed English translation of German regimental histories and the information and post war propaganda they contain. I would give him only three stars out of five – at best. I recommend for anyone who reads Zuber to also read Eric Dorn Brose's "The Kaiser's Amry". He is the exact opposite of Zuber and points out pretty much all their shortcomings like the fascination with training for massed cavalry charges and why they did not provide remotely enough artillery ammunition for the campaign, ignored supply considerations, etc. |
Ponder | 20 Apr 2010 7:14 p.m. PST |
Howdy, I don't think you read the Mons book. Combined arms in 1914 is Infantry & Artillery. In both books, Mons and Ardennes, there is extensive discussion on artillery fire from open and covered positions and their respective advantages and disadvantages. Their are numerous instances in the Mons book where artillery fire and its effect is highlighted. A key concept cited in German tactical doctrine is the concept of fire superiority, that is suppressing enemy fire permits friendly maneuver. Looking back to across the 20th century, this idea seems obvious, it was not at the time. Zuber cites his sources. I like the reliance on primary sources; I find it refreshing. Nobody else but Zuber is looking at low level tactical actions, and publishing comprehensive accounts. Great stuff for wargamers, regardless of your opinions. If the German Army was not well-trained how do you explain their consistent tactical success in the Battle of the Frontiers? Why did they take fewer casualties? Zuber has examined the actions of three of the seven German armies in detail, does he have to evaluate all seven? Given the latitude, given to German commanders (even during training) would you not expect variation? I would. Do you consider the French Army well-trained? The BEF? The Belgians? What were their tactical doctrines and how did these armies train? How do they compare to the Germans. What other author even discusses such issues in terms of evaluating the opening campaign of WW1? Zuber seems to be systematically addressing myths from the campaign and presenting alternative explanations, explanations BASED ON PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIAL. How many historians have uncritically accepted the French accounts of the Ardennes actions (i.e., Germans entrenched behind wire) rather than as meeting engagements? How many historians have uncritically accepted the British accounts of Mons and LeCateau? It is fair to have reservations of Zuber's work. I do; but I find his accounts to reasonably fit into the overall canvas of the campaign. Zuber's books seem to answer more questions than they raise. I too, dislike the mapping. Ponder on, JAS |
John Leahy | 20 Apr 2010 8:28 p.m. PST |
Not read his book so have no dog in this fight. However, my understanding was that based on Boer War experience and an all volunteer army the BEF was one of the best trained (at least at regimental level) armies to start the war. |
aercdr | 20 Apr 2010 8:30 p.m. PST |
Regardless of the difference of opinion, it is refreshing to see greater use of German sources. Many otherwise fine books rely totally on British source materials. I purchased Hamm's "Cambrai 1917, Myth of the First Great Tank Battle." It is a good book, but I was so bothered by the lack of information on the German side that I picked up Sheldon's "The German Army at Cambrai" and am reading them in parallel. Similarly, I have Beckett's highly praised "Ypres 1914, the First Battle." Of several hundred sources in the bibliography, only 3 (maybe I missed one) or 4 are German. |
Martin Rapier | 21 Apr 2010 2:10 a.m. PST |
"Nobody else but Zuber is looking at low level tactical actions, and publishing comprehensive accounts. Great stuff for wargamers, regardless of your opinions." Apart from Jack Sheldon and Duffy? Personally, I find any any historical book with 'myth' in the title gives me the heebie jeebies. Like that Mosier bloke. urgh. "What other author even discusses such issues in terms of evaluating the opening campaign of WW1?" Samuels in 'Command or Control. Command, training and tactics in the British and German Armies 1888-1918'?? One of the finest expositions of mission directed command and elastic defence I've ever read. One problem with accounts from the German side was destruction of many of their WW1 records in bombing raids, which was why e.g. Sheldons use of the Bavarian archives was such a break through. The 1898 War Office Wargame rules are an interesting examination of British tactical doctrine up to division level pre Boer war (as well as being an entertaining game). "If the German Army was not well-trained how do you explain their consistent tactical success in the Battle of the Frontiers? Why did they take fewer casualties? " Because defending against mass attackers when armed with magazine fed rifles with smokeless ammo and supported by machineguns and quick firing artillery against mass attacks is easy? Biddle (Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle) would argue that it was also attributable to force employment ie tactics rather than the degree of training. Anyway, I shall no doubt add Zuber to my WW1 libraries at some point. |
NoLongerAMember | 21 Apr 2010 7:55 a.m. PST |
Ummm at what point was LeCateau a German Victory, a superior force was stopped by an inferior one and allowed them to escape to intervene later in the campaign in an important manner. The same can be said of Mons as well. They were holding actions that cost the German advance vital time and men and played an important part in setting up the Battle of the Marne which did stop the German advance. |
backsdrummer | 21 Apr 2010 8:18 a.m. PST |
I read Ardennes 1914 carefully. I have not read the book on Mons but I will likely get a copy. I agree with much of what Zuber says. The Germans were better trained in maneuver-warfare, especially on the division-corps-army levels and it told in the early encounter battles. My fundamental problem with him is that he is too much of a "fan" of the German Army to be a good analyst. If memory serves in "Ardennes 1914" he calls the German Army the best of "all time". Not just better than the Allies of 1914 but all armies in all conflicts. I believe that his near-worship of the Germans short-changed what could have been a great book. He never discusses any German weaknesses (weaknesses often shared by the Allies) or why these weaknesses existed. This would have been extremely instructive. I can't tell you how disappointed I was when he failed to do this in Ardennes 1914. He must have had this information but failed to talk about it. Instead Zuber in content with fully accepting the self-promoting histories of out-of-work German officers still smarting from losing a war to the French. To make things worse Zuber is highly selective in his choice of sources, apparently culling out any regimental histories that make the Germans look very human. For example, I have two copies of the regimental history of the 124th (Rommel's regiment). This regimental history records that during mobilization their nervous sentries fired at shadows and bumps in the night. This was during the time the French remained 10km from the border to ensure they did not look like aggressors, and this history is clear there was no threat and that in spite of the "strictest measures" every night "crackled with rifle and pistol fire". Later, the 124th's history records how the day after the Battle of the Frontiers the regiment engaged in a "mad minute" long after the French had withdrawn. This GERMAN history attributed this incident to sheer nervousness. No one could explain what they were shooting at. This is good evidence that these green Germans were acting like normal human beings by at times being trigger-happy, something that Zuber takes great pains to discount when he talks about their professionalism and "Franc Trilleurs". Instead Zuber relies on Rommel, who also left these details out of his self-promoting account (but never contradicts them). Was it because Zuber could not get a copy of this regimental history? Or was it because, like Rommel, his main goal was to promote himself and the German Army? Three stars out of five. At best. |
Ponder | 21 Apr 2010 4:11 p.m. PST |
Howdy, John wrote: "Not read his book so have no dog in this fight. However, my understanding was that based on Boer War experience and an all volunteer army the BEF was one of the best trained (at least at regimental level) armies to start the war." JAS: I think individual and at the battalion (regimental) level the BEF was well trained. However, they did not act coherently as an army – Their defense at both was static and linear, units within the army did not support each other. The whole was weaker than the parts. That the BEF escaped from Mons and LeCateau was due failures on the German part, rather than because of any virtues of the BEF. Fredd wrote: "Ummm at what point was LeCateau a German Victory, a superior force was stopped by an inferior one and allowed them to escape to intervene later in the campaign in an important manner. The same can be said of Mons as well. They were holding actions that cost the German advance vital time and men and played an important part in setting up the Battle of the Marne which did stop the German advance."
JAS: What do you mean by stopped? At Mons, the British defending behind the canal were pushed back, with the Germans crossing in three locations. Darkness stopped the attack. The British claim to victory was they had inflicted disproportate casualties on the Germans: British about 1600 and the Germans 6,000 to 10,000 a ratio of 4 or 6 to 1. German casualties were estimated based on suppostion. Zuber tallies German casualties at no more than 2,000. A ratio of 5:4. Hardly disproportionate. The British did not hold the field, and retreated in disorder. At Le Cateau, II Corps actually outnumbered the attacking Germans. But was pushed out of position taking more casualties than inflicted. II Corps was virtually routed. Neither sounds like a victory to me. As to participation in the Battle of the Marne – exactly where and when? I don't recall any significant contact between the BEF and the Germans during the remaining portions of the Marne Campaign. I don't count incidental actions like Nery, where the Germans stumbled onto a cavalry camp. Where was the British security? Why didn't the British cavalry screen the BEF's positions, or cover the withdrawal? I think it is certainly fair to criticize Zuber for the way he uses his sources. However, he is using them. He did go look for them. Others have not. In the almost 90 years since the British Official History came out, nobody else did a relook a Mons and LeCateau. The simply accepted, uncritically the Official History – isn't that what you're criticizing Zuber for? I've not read Samuels (thanks for the tip), what did he say of Mons and LeCateau? Any significant use of German sources in assessing the battle? Ponder on, JAS |
drummer | 21 Apr 2010 5:42 p.m. PST |
JAS you make an excellent point that the German regimental histories are not consulted enough. They are a good source and should be used more. One of the best books I've read on the start of WW1 was "Tannenberg, Clash of Empires" by Dennis E. Showalther who utilized German regimental histories extensively (but did not rely only on them). Showalther does a great job explaining the strengths and weaknesses of the German Army and I recommend his book even if you are trying to learn about the West Front. I apologize for my passion regarding Zuber. I spent 11 years as an Internal Affairs Investigator for a mid-sized Police Department in the USA and it pushes my buttons when I see someone relying exclusively on single sources, including "official" reports and histories. If a writer wants my respect, he should consider his source's motivations, find and question as many witnesses as possible from "all sides", and always seek out the physical evidence. No exceptions. |
John Leahy | 21 Apr 2010 7:11 p.m. PST |
I agree about Showalter. That book is outstanding. Of course, I have yet to read one of his books I didn't like. At Mons the British were vastly outnumbered. I am surprised that they were able to hold the field as long as they did. Simply holding the field does not mean you achieved a victory. Thanks, John |
Martin Rapier | 22 Apr 2010 4:48 a.m. PST |
"I apologize for my passion regarding Zuber." Don't worry about that, I think we've all been there, it shows in the exuberance of your initial review. I had similar feelings about Griffiths 'Battle Tactics of the British Army 1916-18', a transformational book, for me at any rate. I think the good thing is that there are so many excellent new books being written about WW1, many of them very though provoking, even if some go a bit OTT (Mosier, Mud, Blood & Poppycock etc). I really like Jack Sheldons stuff, it is absolutely fascinating. I'll have to have a look and see what Samuels says about 1914, but obviously he covers a fairly lengthy period and to a certain extent is concerned with structural differences in the German/Prussian army and the British whic while they produced overtly similar doctrines, their execution was very different, particularly the phenomenon of 'umpiring' by commanders. Showalter and his student Wavro always have interesting things to say about the Prussian/German army as well. Gudmussons 'On Infantry' is pretty good as well, although he is a bit of a Germanophile. wrt 1914 specifically, I've always been a little dubious about the mythical powers of the BEF, and I can't help thinking that John Keegan was right when he said that in the new military environment anyone attacking was going to find it very difficulty. Given the burden of attack lay with the Germans in Belgium and the French on the frontiers, the disproportionate losses are perhaps explicable. I'm not sure I've ever seen Le Cateau portrayed as a victory, a draw at best, and a bloody one at that. Mons, well, that is up there with Dunkirk:) Dupuys analysis of formation combat effectiveness and overall combat model in WW1 is quite interesting, particular the 'fudge factors' he has to put in to explain the German success in Operational Micheal. These chime with Biddles more recent combat analysis of the battle, however the tactical and operational solutions developed for 1918 are very different to those used in 1914. |
Ponder | 22 Apr 2010 4:53 p.m. PST |
Howdy, How about this as a question. On a scale of 1 to 6, with as the highest level, where do you rate the overall training and capabilities of the combatants in the August-September (i.e., the Marne Campaign)? My answers below: Germans regulars/reserve – 4 German Landwehr – 2 BEF – 3 French regulars – 2 French Colonial troops – 3 French Territorials & Reserve – 1 Belgians – 1 Ponder on, JAS |
Ponder | 05 May 2010 6:31 p.m. PST |
Howdy, Just finished with Martin Samuels, "Command or Control? -Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888 – 1918." A very good book, well worth reading. I recommend it. It does not examine the 1914 battles, except in passing comments. Samuels does point out that the British Offical History was SPECIFICALLY WRITTEN AS PATRIOTIC PROPAGANDA. Samuels examines four hypotheses: 1) The differences between the German and British armies has as much to do with failings in British performance as with German superiority. 2) The differences between the armies was attributable in part to the differences in the philosophy of war. 3) The differences in philosophies was expressed in the differences in command systems. 4) The difference in philosophies and command affected the training and doctrine of the two armies. With reference to Zuber's work, Zuber would extend the list to five and argue, "armies fight the way they train." I think Samuels would likely say Zuber's assessment of performance of the BEF in August 1914 was right on, and directly attributable to the above list. Ponder on, JAS |
The MudCrab | 28 May 2014 5:15 p.m. PST |
I am wading into this rather late, but this week a picked up a 'Monster' boardgame of the western front 1914 and Zuber is on the game's reading list. I have Zuber's Schlieffen Plan book but not read any of his others and was casually googling to see what the greater history/wargames world thought of Zuber's conclusions. Personally I have struggled to take his conclusions seriously. As posters here have said, 'Myth' in the name of any book is normally a warning, as is any review that tells us this book is shaking the grounds of accepted wisdom. Now personally shaking the grounds of accepted wisdom is always a good thing. As a history and wargames fan I want to know WHAT happened and WHY, not stroke the ego of whatever jingo traditions my culture worship. If my cultural heroes screwed up I want to know about it as it helps me understand why they screwed up and, hopefully 'lean from our mistakes' cliche cliche. So I wanted to like Zuber, but ended up not being able to take his conclusions remotely seriously. I think it is very clear to anyone who has read him that he really enjoyed his time in German and, maybe, went a little Native. His Schlieffen Plan book goes on somewhere in everyone chapter to remind us that the Germans of that era were wonderful, experts and, most of all, the victims of WW1. However, as some of the posters above have pointed out in his other works, Zuber rarely seems to explain WHY any of this is true. References are mentioned, therefore conclusion is valid. The more I read of his the more I feel he is the sort of researcher who has a conclusion and then sets out to find facts that prove him right, as opposed to pondering a point, spreading the facts in front and then coming up with a probably answer. To him the Germans were great people (hey, I admit to being a big fan of the Germans as well so not blaming him for that), but in being great they can do no wrong. The book I read was more stragetic in nature but he summerised the campaign in his closing chapters. I found his logic somewhat unusual in many spots. At one stage he tells the reader the German Cav was vastly superior to the BEF in all ways, then goes on to say the BEF only escaped because of failures in the German Cav. Hang on? Didn't he just tell us how great they were? Can't of been THAT good if they allowed the BEF to escape. Perhaps they were, maybe, only about the same as everyone else?? I do feel there are some massive misunderstanding about how WW1 was actually fought, and frankly, there are some VERY average wargames out there for the period. I do want to understand more fully exactly how and why these battles were fought, I do want to know how a division was fought in this era, and unfortunately, and without wanting to wear my ANZAC ego on my sleeve, I do not think Zuber is the person to explain that to me. In comparision I have read 'Artillery in the Great War' by Strong and Marble. Their arguement was that the 1914 German Corps was more powerful because it had a superiority in heavy guns. In battle their heavy guns would suppress the French (and/or BEF I guess) field artillery and then their own field weapons could do what they liked to the enemy. Hence Germans win the battles. By the time the Germans were nearing Paris they had outrun their heavy support. They no longer had the superior amounts of heavy guns available to suppress the French field weapons and the superior amount of French field guns could suppress the Germans. Hence French win. In comparison I am not seeing that sort of discussion in Zuber's writing. Instead everything seems to be 'Germans are Cool – deal with it'. Again, only read the Schlieffen Plan. I know I should read his Mons book before I comment (rant violently?? :P) about it, but having not enjoyed the book I owned I don't see myself making the effort to buy any of his others. Not sure his work would be 'general' enough to pick up in any of the libraries around here so I do hope I am not coming across as a smug git for first not reading the book and then disagreeing with him. |
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