"Smoothbore cannon effectiveness compared to musketry" Topic

Obviously the cannon had a longer range, but what was it's destructive power like?

(NB I am ignoring 'canister' range in these, this is all about ball. And yes, I know you don't get .66 of a hit- it is obviously averaged!)

F&F one stand (approx 6 guns) his equal to about 800 men (4 stands) for the medium range, then 600 men, then 400 men at long range (Infantry range 8, Guns 4-8/->16/->24/-32)

Civil War Battles (Peter Pig)
Typical infantry unit in 4/2 formation. Rifled Muskets to 10. Can expect to do just under 1 hit per 2AP (average), after save thrown (given average dice rolling – 5d6 2 hits, 2 rerolls, save on 3+ ).
Guns approx .22 hits per 2AP up to range 10, .11 up to range 30

Shako (1)
Muskets Range 4. Ave 'Kills' per throw = .5
Foot Artillery .33 kills up to 18, .16 up to 24

Black Powder
Muskets range 18, .75 unsaved hits per volley
Foot Guns up to range 24 .84 hits, 24-48 .33 hits per shot.

Artillery tends to be an annoyance rather than a killer, especially at over half range. Does this reflect reality. If not is it because writers want to encourage us to close, rather than have cannon duels?

I think if a set of rules lets a battalion of infantry close frontally with a battery of guns, with no cover or troop quality issues, it's probably being a bit hard on the guns.
If it lets a battery of guns annihilate a battalion of infantry at long range, in the course of a day's fighting, it's probably being a bit hard on the infantry..

During the Napoleonic wars the guns caused most of the casualties. Terrain was often fairly open and canister out ranged muskets.

During the ACW it was the other way around, in part due to much closer terrain and canister range being long rifled musket range rather than safe.

Perhaps artillery was longer-ranged, but not nessecarily more accurate?

In any case a skilled soldier could fire a musket what, two or three times a minute? A skilled crew could fire a fieldgun once every few minutes perhaps? So rate of fire counts against the guns.

"In any case a skilled soldier could fire a musket what, two or three times a minute? A skilled crew could fire a fieldgun once every few minutes perhaps? So rate of fire counts against the guns."

An artillery crew can fire a cannon at least once per minute. The procedure is about the same for a musket and a muzzle loading cannon, only larger for the cannon and each function is done by a different person. One artilleryman can even talk infantrymen through the procedure without much trouble.

Mike "Bunkermeister" Creek
bunkermeister.blogspot.com

I do not think it is because rule writers want to get a certain outcome. eg Hamlin A. Coe, Mine Eyes Have Seen The Glory. Memoirs of a sergeant in 19th Michigan. "The Rebels seldom fire their cannon except when they can use grape or canister".

It was at canister range that decisive results could be expected.

The primary measure of ACW artillery effectiveness may not simply be the number of victims, there are other more telling impacts – the shock/morale effect is significant; the deterrent to directly assaulting where guns are located; forcing the enemy to seek cover.

There are many battles which are documented as only having between 1% and 3% of casualties caused by shot/shell.

An interesting question Last Hussar.

"Artillery tends to be an annoyance rather than a killer, especially at over half range. Does this reflect reality. If not is it because writers want to encourage us to close, rather than have cannon duels?"

Even in an era of quick firing artillery with explosive shells this is true. Yes, they cause most of the casualties, but it is spread over time, their main battlefield effect is suppressive/disruptive, it is highly unlikely that a single battery can 'destroy' an entire enemy infantry battalion with long range cannon fire, and even if it does expend all its ammo in doing so, there are lots of other infantry batallions. It can thoroughly disrupt and depress it though, as well as causing significant attrition.

For smoothbore artillery, decisive ranges were close ranges (ideally cannister range). An artillery battery deployed at standard intervals was considered capable of 'keeping its front clear' ie killing everything stupid enough to walk in front of it with cannister. Even individual pieces could be a very effective supplement to infantry firepower at close ranges, which was why battalion guns were so effective in the WSS etc. At close range an artillery battery has roughly the firepower of an infantry battalion, concentrated into the frontage of a company or two.

The morale effect at longer ranges should not be underestimated, being under lethal cannon fire for hours at a time and unable to respond was somewhat un-nerving.

Nosworthy goes into this stuff in some detail.

In short, at longer ranges ACW arty could often (with decent accuracy) scare the ….. out of you causing you to take cover or go prone and simply discourage you!! At close range ACW arty could usually( with single or double Cannister) knock the …. out of you causing you to be dead and that was also discouraging!

The 5th Indiana Battery, by itself (6 Napoleons), practically stopped the attack of Stevenson's entire division on the first day of Resaca. A combination of long range and close range fire, as well as the quality of Stevenson's troops.

I am currently reading a book about the battle of Fredericksburg and it seems that while the CSA artillery did a lot of killing at various ranges, the Union infantry kept advancing towards Marye's Heights. It was only when the Confederate infantry in Cobb's brigade at the stone wall started firing muskets, that the Union attacks were truly stopped. They couldn't close within 75-100 yards of the wall.

Why would being dead discourage you? You have nothing else to lose!

"I am currently reading a book about the battle of Fredericksburg and it seems that while the CSA artillery did a lot of killing at various ranges, the Union infantry kept advancing towards Marye's Heights. It was only when the Confederate infantry in Cobb's brigade at the stone wall started firing muskets, that the Union attacks were truly stopped. They couldn't close within 75-100 yards of the wall.
"
I don't know how many guns the CSA had at that battle but I think that would have some effect.

Frendricksburg would actualy one of the ACW battles that are closest to Napoleoinc, big open field. for clear line of sight for the guns.
Most other ACW battles were more "jungle warfare" the lush terrain of eastern north america looks beutifull to fight over, but makes it hard to use artillery truly effecively.

Reading about leipzig a battery of 24+ guns could get sevral infantry battalions to retreat, up that to 40+ and you got serious killing power.
But leipzig also had ALOT of street fighting(on a level not seen again unitl WW2 I would think) which would mean musket kills and woundings would be higher then normal.

Most people alive think of artillery from their experiences and impressions from the last 75 years (2 generations or so). Lets compare the type of big barrel weapon that would be firing at enemy troops closing from 400 yards.

A 82mm mortar would have a missile that's weight matched to a 1/4 oz.:::: a 6 pound cannonball would vary by 4-12 oz (guess)

A 82 mm mortar round would be machined to at least hundreds of an inch in diameter and be smooth::::: a 6 pound cannonball would be +/- 1/4 inch in diameter, not completely round, pitted and rusted.

A 82 mm mortar round would have a stable, non-hyrdoscopic propellent and varying number of "rings" of charge:::: a 6 pound cannon would have either loose powder or varying weights and wetness of low-explosive black powder that would foul the barrell for succesive shots.

A 82mm mortar round would be set on a very heavy baseplate (I know it is a very heavy baseplate!), which moves very little and aimed at various firing stakes or angles off the firing stakes. The elevation of the tub, leveling of the piece and firing charge would be known from tables and often set from test firing shots that are reproducible::::: a 6 pound cannon would freely recoil after each shot, dig itself into the ground, be set with the same charge each time and maybe aimed by peering down the barrel through smoke.

The 82mm mortar has its fall of shot adjusted by observers connected by wire or wireless to the firing pit. They use good optics and have a visible burst to observe::: the 6 pounder cannon has its fall of shot(?) (path of shot) adjusted by someone ducking around the gun, nearly to the next gun in line and watching the path of the ball if they can see it through the general smoke.

the 82mm mortar goes up and down in its flight path. It goes over interveining stone walls, trees, and expodes and damanges the bad guys where it hands::::: the 6 pounder cannon basically follows a pretty straight line path. Trees, small ridges, water, negative slopes all stop it or interfer with it getting to where the bad guys are. If they are in a hollow, it may go overhead regardless of what the cannon-men do. It may bounce overhead, get burried in a opposing slope- it is basically a dumbstraight line projectile which is real good on a level plain, but useless in clutter or broken terrain.

What I am trying to get across is that a cannon firing cannonball is a very limited weapon that needs ideal terrain to be deadly. It has to be situated with great care and most of the time has very limited areas where it can play with effectiveness. A good commander would place his artillery where it could be effective and then plan the rest of his battle around it. Unfortenately, in our wargaming we often see the rules acting as if artillery is ALWAYS in an ideal firing position with flat terrain arranged in front of it so that every cannon shot skimms within 6 foot of the ground at to maximum range and knocks down every living thing out to a mile or so. It is not so.

Think about the difference of Fredricksburg (~~~"General Lee, with my cannon in place,(facing a flat plain in front), a chicken could not live there for 2 minutes after I start firing") versus the Wilderness.

I hope people get where I am coming from- you appear to. It's just that over the years I have popped away with a variety of cannon, and, outside canister range, not really felt it was going to play a major effect.

I left canister out on purpose- that is a major factor on the table, and I think we have all been on the wrong end of canister!.

What really made me think was Black Powder, FPW vs Sunjester, when he commented on the failure of my Prussian guns. In BP over half range roll 1d6, 4+ to hit, save on 5/6 – thus 50%*66% = 33% chance per shot.

Ive watch Shako troops march across the table under artillety fire as if nothing was happening.

I've shelled ACW defenders with 2-3 different batteries at medium range trying to open a hole for the infantry with little success, apart from the occasional need to hitch up and retire to restock the ammo.

I wonder whether we should widen the bell curve – keep average hits the same, but allow for stupendous results to happen occasionally.

LH, do your rules force a morale test if a unit is under artillery fire?

Black powder doesn't force morale for just normal artillery shots; only if an excess hit, or an artillery hit at chargers (which would be from canister anyway). However if a Break test was forced, and Cannon scored a hit then it is -1 of 2d6. Just noticed that any artillery hit at a charging unit forces a morale test, even if it is the only hit it has.

I haven't done the maths for F&F for chance to kill- so looking at it. 1 stand at medium ranges 10% chance of killing 1 infantry stand. Total chance of disordering (including the 'and kill' result) at medium 30 or 40% depending on actual range. in F&F this gets you onto a worse table for moving.

Just noticed made an error- there is a -1 in BP for shots over half range- so 5+ needed. This gives a 21% chance of inflicting a casualty (33% to hit x 66% fail to make save)

All in all wargame 'gunpowder' artillery seems quite weak outside of canister range.

Artillery is a device (weapon) for inflicting ongoing casualties on an enemy that is at distance. The mounting casualties suffered gradually deteriorates the enemy unit's resolve (morale) effectively softening them up so that their will to continue the fight has been reduced.

When these units come into engagement range it is hoped that their ability to fight on level par with troops friendly to that artillery had diminished to a point below the will of these friendly troops thus securing a better chance of victory.

The level of reduction in the resolve of the enemy troops is directly related to several factors, the number of guns, the calibre, the accuracy, the time length of the bombardment, the weather, the ground, the fire rate and many more. All of these factors working together to place pressure on the enemy unit forcing its resolve to decrease.

The quicker the casualties are inflicted on the enemy the faster their resolve deteriorates. The quicker the friendly troops can move in and hasten the deterioration of the already suffering enemy the quicker they break. This pressure can even get so intense that the friendly units (cavalry or Infantry attacks) are not even needed. But on the other hand the pressure can be so insufficient that the enemy units are not softened and thus capable of solid and stoic resistance. In cases like this stubborn and prolonged close range fighting can and does occur.

When artillery is fired at greatly reduced ranges, such as within canister range etc the pressure on the enemy units increases due to proximity and increased accuracy. Optimal range for canister is between 100-300yds. This is where the casualty infliction is at its height because of the complete overlapping of the canister cones. However, the pressure is at its highest at under this range. Artillery canister cones are much more narrow under this range but the effect on morale is much increased because of the proximity to the guns the target has reached.

So for my mind the equation looks like this:

Long Range 1000yds or more – Casualties (low) – Pressure (very low)
Effective Range 500-1000yds – Casualties (medium) – Pressure (low)
Long Canister Range 300-500yds – Casualties (medium) – Pressure (medium)
Optimal Canister Range 100-300yds – Casualties (Extremely high) – Pressure (High)
Point Blank Canister Range – Casualties (high) – Pressure (Extremely high)

Of course, this is only my opinion.

Shane

Artillery fire is a rather complicated affair that is poorly understood by most if not all of us.

Artillery could be fired quite rapidly. A well trained crew firing a light piece could get off multiple rounds in a single minute. -- probably faster than musket fire.

Relatively speaking, smooth bore artillery was more accurate than smooth bore muskets at any range over 100 yards (and maybe over 40 yards.

Remember smooth bore artillery was firing at compact blocks of troops.

The comment made above, 'artillery accounted for the vast majority of casualties in the Napoleonic wars' is spot on.

Game rules often reflect the bias of the author. There are all kinds of rationales or excuses for casualty rates. A lot of this has to do with game 'feel' not necessarily some approximation of historical casualties under similar circumstances.

mjc

I also think that, where rules are concerned, the effects of artillery are not always that obvious for the first few games you play.

It takes a while for the odds to work through under different games conditions.

Of course eventually you may reject performance in any one set of rules. For example, the artillery in original Fire and Fury varies way to much for a lot of players, Shako 2 its not as powerful as some would like and so far in Black Powder, we have found, it can take a little beefing up too.

Then again the individual effects can some times be a little too much in some areas. Its too easy for artillery to drive other guns from the field in some rules.

Black Powder would be one of those and we have altered things to compensate in the Break Test.

If you look at casualty reports that go into sufficient detail, the safe place to be was in the artillery! Even in the bloody battles of the era the percentage casualties we very low compared with the effects on solid bodies of troops.

Obviously not all rules are designed to be casualty driven but even those supposed to be representing combat effectiveness need to take this into account.

The opposite view is that wargamers tend to use small amounts, and we forget that our 6 piece battery is of course no where near the masses of tubes that were available to higher level commanders.

I don't know- how common were 30+ guns firing at 1 unit?

Or is it we/the rules don't give enough time: who truly has a 5 or 6 turn preparation bombardment in the average game. Or do the infantry move too fast/have muskets that fire too far?

I know I keep revisiting this thread, but artilley is an important arm, and H&M seems almost like Rock-Scissors-Stone at times, and to underplay artillery changes what we are trying to do.

"I don't know- how common were 30+ guns firing at 1 unit?"

Not that often. That's 4 – 5 batteries in most armies. That number would fire over an area, just as they do now, not single out a unit as wargamers do.

"Or is it we/the rules don't give enough time: who truly has a 5 or 6 turn preparation bombardment in the average game. Or do the infantry move too fast/have muskets that fire too far"

That's also very relevant. Players are too keen to get stuck in and units move way too fast, or not fast enough, depending on the ground scale (if any) and the time a turn is supposed to represent.

Most rules have a huge disconnect between the distance troops cover in a turn and the amount of time a turn is reckoned to be.

Although in fairness the mismatch between the space a unit takes up and the ground scale doesn't help. A single figure in any scale takes up way too much depth, for example. Of course the physical amount of table you can play across has an effect too.

Representation of time is very difficult if you want to cater for the wish to have a game but a half hour bombardment would probably do a lot more damage than a lot of rules allow for in one turn.

The other problem is constructing damage/disruption effects that give enough allowance for situations like Borodino where there were a lot of guns and a lot of death and still take account of the Waterloo and Gettysburg situation where there were a lot of guns but nowhere near the death people expected from gun fire, in terms of bombardment episodes.

I know the latter two are not a straight comparison due to the differing type of ammunition used but I hope you get my meaning?

"Not that often. That's 4 – 5 batteries in most armies. That number would fire over an area, just as they do now, not single out a unit as wargamers do.
"

or less then 3 russian Napoleinc batteries.

If you look at Leipzig you got over 2500 guns on the fied, when you got that number it's not that hard to imaagien sevral 30-40 gun batteries.

And the Batteries fired at the closest ennemies, if the ennemy charged with 3 battalions, thats what they fired at.
Now 3 battalions in columns would get shot to pieces.
And as I said sevral times a 24+ battery made sevral battalions retreat.

Now in Carnage and Glory artillery can be VERY effective.
The truns are 15 minutes in game time so when you have a russian 12 gun battery you can do serious damige to a battalion.

Artillery, even in ca 1800, had to capability to cause massive casualties in a short period of time. Senarmont's thrity guns caused the Russian infantry 4,000 casualties in twenty minutes, plus ruining a Russian cavalry counterattack, at Friedland in 1807.

For the effectiveness of well-directed counterbattery artillery fire, French artillery batteries engaged in a duel with Russian artillery that had helped defeat Ney's first assault at Friedland from across the Alle River, and methodically knocked them out.

Drouot's 80-gun artillery battery destroyed the allied center at Lutzen in 1813 destroyed the allied center and the Guard infantry that attacked through the breech in the line saw how thoroughly the units there were destroyed, including whole regiments, and there were large places where the bodies were so think on the ground that they couldn't help but walk on them.

The same thing occurred at Ligny in 1815 and on other fields.

For an outstanding account of what it was like to be in the infantry in formation and having to take an artillery bombardment in ranks see Coignet's memoirs. He is quite graphic.

Sincerely,
K

Gunfreak,

The question was "how common were 30+ guns firing at 1 unit"

Leipzig was the largest battle of the entire period, its not representative. Even then, do you know how many of those guns actually saw use, or exactly where "30+ guns firing at 1 unit" occurred?

Its a very specific question that Last Hussar asked.

Trajanus,

Senarmont had 30 guns firing at the Russian center at Friedland and Drouot had 80 firing at the allied center at Lutzen. I would consider both of these large batteries firing at one unit.

Sincerely,
K

Kevin,

I wouldn't argue with the principal but I think we need to agree on a definitive idea of a "unit".

Last Hussar's questions arise from the effects in specific list of rules. As far as I know, in one of them the "unit" is a brigade in the others they are battalions.

Looking at a game were a Brigade is your unit, you would no doubt be correct but at a single battalion level, I would still question if in either example there was a cone of fire centered on a single unit!

Wargamers have little problem creating the kind of crossfire that Wellington organized in Spain, to support his line using 2 gun sections, with entire table top batteries.

This kind of thing might also be what Last Hussar is questioning.

By Unit I meant the lowest size unit on the table top- so F&F a Brigade, BP a Battalion. In many games the only way to really damage a 'Unit' is 2 -4 'batteries' firing 2-3 turns, this 20+ pieces. Mean while the rest of the formation closes. To hold off the Parent formation you need 3 gun units per infantry unit in most games.

now concentrating 3 batteries against one unit, and doing that for 4 units (ie 12 gun stands) for 3 turns will do the sort of damage that a preparority bombardment would do, but how many battles where destroying one Parent unit (ie F&F Division) would be significant do the attackers have 12 stands of guns available.

Over Canister range and guns rarely stop lead infantry.

OK, so are you asking how many times a Division or Brigade was wrecked by artillery prior to an assault?

I have no real idea, there were a lot of battles! :o)

However, I don't recall it in Spain, so I would think the investigation needs to be centered in Northern Europe between 1809 – 1813 (loads more guns and a lot more targets). Although, as Kevin points out, the Prussians took a grand hammering at Ligny.

Our old chum Senarmont was a bit of an exception, in that his guns continually closed the range and the Russian obligingly stood there and got shot to pieces!

The other 1807 event that could give a few clues would be the demolition of Augereau's Corps at Eylau. Where the visibility caused the French to wander straight into massed Russian artillery – something that doesn't happen in most wargames!

BTW: I think you need to separate this discussion between periods to some degree.

As already noted there was a difference in the relationship between musket performance and canister in the Napoleonic and ACW periods but also a big difference in formations and ordinance.

Napoleonic formations were deeper (both at battalion and higher) and the ‘skittles' effect on casualties from ball was more pronounced as a result. Also, there was a significant drop off in the use of ball/solid shot in the ACW, in favour of shell, primarily due to the advent of rifled artillery.

Adkin's Gettysburg book has some interesting info on the amount of shell to solid shot carried by batteries in the period.

Of course being hit by an unexploded shell had a similar effect to ball but overall there was a drop in artillery casualties, where air burst effects predominated – Gettysburg would be an example where canister and musketry did the major execution.

Shell hadn't really moved on from the earlier periods. There may have been a lot more of it thrown about but the bursting charge was still way off post 1900 effectiveness.

LH,

"Over Canister range and guns rarely stop lead infantry"

Does this surprise you? Look at it this way:

An Eight Gun battery is firing head on at an advancing battalion in three rank line (columns are subject to wild variation). If every round wins a coconut, you will hit at the most 24 men + the occasional one in the supernumerary rank behind, per round of fire.

Say that's 25 men. In a 600 strong battalion that's a pin prick. A very scary pin pick if you are adjacent to the points of impact but not carnage.

OK, that will be followed by other rounds, but they are not all landing at once and you are closing the range all the time, causing the gunners to adjust. Experienced gunners tried to aim short for this reason and let the bounce take care of things.

However they will miss (sometimes).

So as Shane points out, in reality it comes down to bottle and how much you have in your infantry unit. Shear weight of casualties is not going to get the job done unless there is clear line of sight from a long way out and don't forget all that lovely smoke in front of your guns – one reason they didn't all fire at once.

At canister range it hurts – balls and lots of them but also concussion, the shock wave in front of 12 pounders was legendary. If a rule set lets units walk up to a battery from canister range that's more of an issue but even then its not a fore gone conclusion that they will be stopped.