"Longstreet as general" Topic

I am reading Stephen Woodworth's "No Band of Brothers". I became a bit surprised by his opinions on Longstreet generalship. He says about Longstreet that he had "feeble intellect" (p.22); that in independent commands "he had very little idea what to do" (22); also that he was "hopelessly inept in devising strategy or tactics"(22), to conclude that, except under the command of someone like Lee, he "had pride enough to get himself into trouble and no brains enough to get himself out." (23) The only virtue he recognises of Longstreet is that he was "skillful in the mechanics of moving his brigades around the battlefield." (22)

From Rhea's or Sears' books on Virginia campaigns I was under the impression that Longstreet was a dependable general, with a good grasp of the realities of warfare and of the flow of battle.

Which are your thoughts?

Thanks in advance.

Wasn't it Longstreet who strongly advised against the charge at Gettysburg knowing it would be disastrous?

I too have a low opinion of Longstreet's abilities.

The real point of contention is Lee. In my opinion over rated and the best friend the Union had.

If the aggressive strategy favoured by Jackson had been followed the CSA may have won a negotiated settlement due to impending European intervention.

I digress…

"If the aggressive strategy favoured by Jackson had been followed the CSA may have won a negotiated settlement due to impending European intervention."

And what kind of mess would that have lead too…
And yeah, it was Longstreet who said ? at Gettysburg.

I digress…

I think (my personal opinion) Longstreet may have been the best Corps Commander of the entire war. He advised against Pickets charge (he clearly learned the lesson of Malvern Hill and Fredericksburg that Lee didn't), his Corps was in exactly the right place at the right time in the right formation to save Braggs ass at Chickamuaga, he fought a decent rear guard during the Penusula retreat from Yorktown-granted against Little Mac. If he had been a Union General with these facts in his resume he clearly would have been considered great.

I think he suffers from the bad press of the post war Virginia Mafia and the advocates of the Lost Cause. These folks can't find any fault with Saint Bobby Lee so Longstreet becomes the easy obvious scapegoat. I also suspect joining the Republican party after the war didn't help him with the post war propaganda either.

I think Longstreet was a good general that has been made the scapegoat for R E Lee's own failures!

Now I'll sit down, shut up and watch the fireworks.

Good day!

Donald~

I agree Longstreet was a good corps commander, probably the best the South had. He was deliberate in his planning. Maneuvered well, and when he hit, he hit hard and usually victoriously. But he required oversight. Lee was very good at controlling him; Bragg was not. Longstreet, like so many other Southern generals, could also let his pride interfer with his tactical judgement. His disagreements with Bragg led him to negligently leave Lookout Valley essentially unguarded, allowing the Union to lift the seige of Chattanooga.

As an independent commander, Longstreet was in over his head. His Knoxville campaign was as big a strategic blunder as the Union's Red River campaign. Once Longstreet got to Knoxville, he had no idea how to take the city other than a head long assault and once repulsed, he just sat down to see what happened.

Didn't Burnsides who drove him off at Knoxville?

I believe they had a whisker fight. Only one possible winner of that contest, really.

Longstreet had a cool hat in "Gettysburg".

I like to think of Longstreet as being the South's equivalent of Meade. Not a bad general, cautious and methodical but no real flash either. Like Meade he was the victim of dirty politics.

He was a good, dependable, corps commander, tactically quite gifted, good on both defense and offense, if slow. Pretty unflappable. About on a par with George Thomas of the Union side. His best day of battle was probably in the Wilderness, when he pulled a "Jackson" and outflanked the Union by way of the unfinished railroad cut. His post-Knoxville campaign in East Tennessee shows that he could handle logistics when he had to. The only Confederate corps commander that might rate higher than him would be Jackson, though Gordon showed promise toward the end, especially if you believe his own writings. Definitely better than Ewell, A. P. Hill, Early, Hardee, or Polk.

IMHO Longstreet was a throughly competent and reliable if unimanginative corps commander. Sadly for the Confederacy, as the Knoxville campaign pointed out, he lacked the strategic vision needed by an independent commander.

-BY

Yet Jackson also make his own share of blunders (Seven Days battles come to mind); and even Lee made some pretty good mistakes that could have cost him the war, if he would have been set up against a more aggressive general than McClellan. At Sharpsburg his army could have been wiped out, only if McClellan would have launched an organised attack, instead feeding divisions in driblets into combat.

In any case Woodworth's commentaries on Longstreet seem too harsh.

Longstreet was one of the BEST Corps commanders the South had.

"Wasn't it Longstreet who strongly advised against the charge at Gettysburg knowing it would be disastrous?"

Supposedly. He also supposedly had managed to get Lee to agree to an offensive camapign with a defensive battle before entering PA. Problem is he didn't mention this until after Lee was dead so I have my reservations about his recollections.

Longstreet was a good corps commander under Lee. On his own, Suffolk, Knoxville, he was terrible.

Like any other commander, Longstreet had his good points and his bad points. On the whole I think the good outweighed the bad and that the cited portions of Woodworth's assessment are off the mark. But if you really want to hear criticism of him, just listen to Robert Krick's views (don't recall if this is Robert E.L. or Robert R.).

Good points: generally highly reliable as a corps commander, trusted by Lee, considerate of his men, very hard hitting on the attack and defense

Bad points: sulky (my way of describing it) when felt views were not accepted, did not put his heart into his actions while sulking; this especially showed up the Second Day at Gettysburg and during the Knoxville Campaign (a terrible performance by Longstreet though he did well post-Knoxville).

I've heard several people express the opinion he was best used as the anvil that Jackson's hammer broke the Union on. Yet Jackson played the holding role in the action where Jackson and Longstreet worked together the best (Second Manassas).

After many years of reading about the ACW, I have decided that Michael Sahara over lionized Longstreet in his book "Killer Angels." Yet I attribute that novel to helping to rehabilitate Longstreet's reputation which suffered greatly from the "Virginian" school of ACW history.

Overall I think he was a very good general. However, setting personal opinons aside,one must look at history as it actualy was. On his own he was never as successful as when under Lee's command!

He comes over as a highly competent Corps Commander, his problems at Knoxville may have been as much learning the job of independant command in the field as anything else.

I've always thought of him as an overrated commander. Slow and overly cautious – similar to those corp commanders in the west who (under a poorer general) lost enough battles to lose the war for the confederacy. I believe he would have done the same if he hadn't been under Lee.

He was consistantly late in attacking. He was so late at 2nd Bullrun that any other general than Jackson probably would have folded, losing the battle. He was again late at Gettysburg and the Wilderness. At Chickamauga he was merely lucky.

And I'm not sure I believe his story about Gettysburg.

A solid player as a corps commander, a bit overwhelmed on his own. I do think that in part for joining the Republicans post-war and in part for not kowtowing to the post-war cult of Saint Lee, he was consistently singled out for a harsher treatment by the 'noble cause' types than poorer commanders such as Ewell.

In the end Longstreets most glaring shortcomming was that he was not from Virginia, and in the views of many post war writers that was enough to tarnish and eventully degrade him to scapegoat status. Not the first or last time a deserving man did not get his due!!

For my two cents worth, Longstreet was a good Corps commander and an excellent defensive general – perhaps a little less stellar on the attack, but he certainly did very well at Chickamauga

I think his post-war reputation was badly served by two things, first the fact that someone had to take the blame for Gettysburg, and it was pretty clearly not going to be Lee (who, I think, had the best comment – when asked who was responsible for the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, he said the Yankees had something to do with it) – and second, because Longstreet reconciled with the post-war Administration a lot quicker than some of his "bitter-ender" fellow former Confederates, a fact that they never forgot or forgave – for example, he became a Republican, as I recall the only Confederate general officer to do so

Plus, as Docdennis notes, not a member of the old Virginie aristocracy

He had some hard knocks as well – in 1862 three of his children died within a week of infection, a blow that profoundly changed him

He also faced many challenges during the war, including

"…pretty clearly not going to be Lee (who, I think, had the best comment – when asked who was responsible for the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, he said the Yankees had something to do with it)…"

I thought that was Pickett.

Pickett was given command of about 1/2 of Longstreets attack force. Pettigrew the other 1/2! Lots of Virginians and North Carolina troops! The job was nearly impossible! Nearly everything had to go right for the CSA, and hardly anything did! Pickett was only responsible for his three brigades. They faced overwhelming odds and failed. Pickett did not lose Gettysburg. You must go up the chain of command to find responsibility for failure to achieve victory at Gettysburg for the ANV!!

Actually, I don't think Longstreet did an excellent job at Chickamauga. He only did an OK job. His attack at the point of the gap in the Union lines was mere luck, and cannot be attributed to him. The assault column wasn't planned as such and just happened as the units arrived. Once the attack was underway Longstreet didn't do anything to solve the command problem that resulted from Hood's wounding, did nothing to coordinate the piecemeal attacks against Horseshoe Ridge, and did nothing to take advantage of the 500 yard gap between the Snodgrass farm and the Kelly Field salient, which he personally reconoitered. The only things he did well was adjust the plan from an army-side left wheel to one that went to the right as conditions changed, and bring up Preston and Hindman as reinforcements.

I still agree with the majority assesment though. He as a better than average corps commander, but not good with an independent command (Suffolk and Knoxville). If he had done poorly at Suffolk and then good at Knoxville I could give him a pass as a learning curve. But both together lead me to think he was over his head in an independent command.

Cleburne 1863,
Longstreet did so well at Chickamauga, as everyone in the AOT knew, that he had the audacity to sit down with Jefferson Davis and Braxton Bragg after the battle and tell them face-to-face that Braxton Bragg wasn't worth as a commander.

I thought that was Pickett.

He means it was Pickett who said that, not Lee. And he's correct.

Dollar, maybe I'm missing some sarcasm in your post, but what I'm saying is Longstreet's success at Chickamagua wasn't due to any command decisions he made, but luck and circumstances. Therefore, I don't believe he deserves as much credit as he often receives.

Cleburne,

I can't agree with you here. Longstreet was lucky, true, but the huge success of his attack was also due to his clever management of his brigades. He was who positioned them, and who prepared the assault. To minimise his accomplishment at Chickamauga would be as to say that Jackson was just lucky at Chancellorsville because it was Lee's plan, and O.O. Howard and his 9th corps was the weakest in the AoP.

I can't claim to be so savvy on ACW as to have a strong opinion about Longstreet generalship; but at Chickamauga and the Wilderness he did a good job. Perhaps he wasn't as aggressive as Jackson, but even Jackson made some serious mistakes (Seven Days comes to mind) and that doesn't disqualify him as one of the best CSA generals.

That's just it, he didn't position them. He meant for Hood's division to be on the front line, and early in the morning ordered Stewart division to sidestep to the right to make room. Bushrod Johnson was somehow unaware of the order and moved much of his division's second line in to fill the gap instead. So, Hood's division was stuck behind in a supporting role. Kershaw's (McLaw's) division didn't arrive in position until minutes before the assault began. The assault column wasn't planned, it just happened. You can't attribute the position of the "grand assault column" to Longstreet because he didn't plan it.

For a good read on this, find the article by William Glenn Robertson in Blue & Gray Magazine Volume 25, Issue 2 (Summer 2008) and Maps of Chickamauga by David Powell.

Then after the attack, he displayed almost no leadership at all apart from moving up reinforcements. Even Cozzens acknowledges this.

HMSResolution

I mistakenly thought you meant Pickett lost Gettysburg. I apologize for the short lecture that you did not need to hear from me!

I should note that Longstreet did order Kershaw's Division to form behind and support Hood's Division, but the intent was for Hood's Division to be on the front line with Kershaw in support, not the three division column that came about with Johnson filling in the gap when Stewart moved right. So it wasn't an accident that Kershaw formed behind Hood's Division at the last minute. I didn't mean to imply that in my post above.

Still, it wasn't what Longstreet intended. I believe we have to judge him on the orders he gave and what he intended, as well as how he adapted to changing circumstances. In my opinion, he didn't intend for the assault column to even be formed, even though it ended up being to his advantage. He didn't do anything to solve the command problem that came with Hood's wounding, didn't do anything to coordinate the assaults on Horseshoe Ridge until at least 3 PM, 4 hours after his assault began, and didn't do anything about the gap between the two Union positions on Horseshoe Ridge and Kelly Field. I don't think that makes a good case for a good job done at Chickamauga.

He won, don't get me wrong. That goes a long way. :) However, it cannot be reasonably attributed to his leadership skills. At least at this one battle.

Again though, I like Longstreet and think he was a good general!

Doc--- No worries!

Thanks for the heads up on the article, Cleburne. Besides Cozzens' book, which other would you recommend me on Chickamauga?

Thanks in advance.

Cozzens, The recent Blue & Grey Magazine series on Chickamauga (4 or 5 issues I think), and Maps of Chickamauga by David Powell.

I would also humbly suggest my website

civilwarvirtualtours.com

It has detailed maps of the battle, a complete Order of Battle, as well as pictures and video. I'm finished with the maps for the 1st day and I am currently working on finishing up the 2nd day. Right now I'm working maps during the 11-12 o'clock hours showing the Confederate breakthrough.

Thanks again.

Good website, by the way.

I agree that Longstreet was lucky at Chickamauga. I would also agree that Jackson was lucky at Chancellorsville: lucky that his attack fell on Howard's 11th (not 9th) Corps and that Howard had ignored warnings that something was happening off there in the woods to the west.

Cleburne63 wrote:
"However, it cannot be reasonably attributed to his leadership skills."

Maybe it's attributable to common sense?

1. Successful divisional assault columns didn't happen by chance in the ACW, especially by 1863.

2. A guy who has shown political & diplomatic finesse in upper-echelon command for 2 ½ years, doesn't meet with his president to inform him that his commanding officer isn‘t worth a , unless that guy has more than "luck and circumstance" upon which to base his case.

"1. Successful divisional assault columns didn't happen by chance in the ACW, especially by 1863."

Yet, I can provide recent scholarship and evidence to support the argument that it did.

"2. A guy who has shown political & diplomatic finesse in upper-echelon command for 2 ½ years, doesn't meet with his president to inform him that his commanding officer isn‘t worth a Bleeped text, unless that guy has more than "luck and circumstance" upon which to base his case."

Or arrogance and ambition.

I'm just proposing an alternate opinion of Longstreet based on recent scholarship. Believe what you want. :)

To describe your opinion as "alternate" is to show arrogance and ambition. :)

Well then, I'm in good company with the above mentioned authors.

So, am I, but that doesn't mean I agree with them at every turn.

Nor do I, and I never said I did.

But you said,

<<he assault column wasn't planned as such and just happened as the units arrived. Once the attack was underway…

Longstreet didn't do anything to solve the command problem that resulted from Hood's wounding…did nothing to coordinate the piecemeal attacks against Horseshoe Ridge,

and did nothing to take advantage of the 500 yard gap between the Snodgrass farm and the Kelly Field salient, which he personally reconoitered.

The only things he did well was adjust the plan from an army-side left wheel to one that went to the right as conditions changed, and bring up Preston and Hindman as reinforcements.\>>

Sounds like arrognace and ambition to me.

No, I never said I agreed with them at every turn. Do I agree with them on the issue of Longstreet's performance at Chickamauga? Yes, but not on everything, not even other events at the same battle.

It's arrogant to believe in new research? Ambitious to be public about my opinion on it? OK, count me in.

So unless you want to continue the discussion with some research and sources to back it up, and refrain from personal slights, I'm done discussing the topic with you.

My point is:

A man who spent much of his military career as a paymaster, who put in an employment request to the Confederate government to be a paymaster, who demonstrated loyal and effective leadership under three different ACW commanders--Beauregard, Johnston and Lee--ought to feel historically, perhaps personally, slighted when people interpret his actions after Chickamauga as primarily a result of his arrogance and ambition.

I'd be interested to see the new research. But to argue that one of the most gifted, respected and experienced field comanders in the ACW showed "no leadership" and that the divisional assault column at Chickamauga was a success by some kind of happy accident, despite that commander's presence, is historically preposterous according to all the evidence I've seen.

Using a hammer to smash a circle into a square and then declaring "See, it fits!" is arrogant and ambitious :)

I think Longstreet was a pretty strong ACW commander in many circumstances and was also a little too cautious and maybe a little too ambitious a few times. Normal human I guess!

I am convinced that the 2nd Day Chickamaugua attack that broke the USA line WAS a lucky die roll . Longstreet had no role in removing a division from his front (decently protected by works) nor did he have any role in replacing them with a worn out (somewhat) inferior force that barely had time to get into position! But even so, the attack went in on a not too broad front and very deep, with protected flanks, and with determination by him , not detachment. A lot different than July 3rd for sure! The results of this attack made him a "genius", but it sure could have gone worse without the luck, of course that generally applies to just about all of them, and us !!

Doc, definitely a product of human nature, just like the rest of us!

And Cleburne, nothing was meant as a personal slight. I was just trying to make a point about Longstreet and how historians have interpreted him. Look forward to buying your scenario book some day.

Jim

Re Braxton Bragg: Didn't EVERY subordinate commander who had the misfortune to serve under BB (and also the entire AoT) share Longstreet's opinion?

If Longstreet had NOT complained about BB, it would have been a little odd. Everybody else did too. Longstreet just had a better opportunity to put the case.