"Discussion The Soviet Operational Art" Topic

The Soviet operational Art
Quote: FM-100-2-1
"It is often difficult to seperate Soviet tactics from what the Soviets call the 'Operational Art' because the maneuver divisions that are the subject of tactics are the maneuver elements that achieve the 'operation' objectives of armies and fronts. Moreover, the two concepts are clearly interrelated in Soviet military thinking and planning. A recurring theme in Soviet military writing is the need for athe commander to keep the 'operational' goal in mind. The overriding objective of the combined arms success by a well orchastrated combination of massive fire, maneuver, and deep strikes."

"It is important to understand what the Soviets mean by 'tactics' and 'operations' as well as the various words and verbal formulas that they associate with the concept. To the Soviet officer, the word 'operation' informs him that the activety in question involves at least an army or a front that was probably tailored for the mission. Tactics consist of combat operations at the division leveland lower. Divisions have a set organizational structure that, except for combat support reinforcement, does not vary from mission to mission."

"Divisions fight battles, wheras armies conduct operations. First echelon divisions usually pursue tactical objectives in the enemy's tactical depth, whereas armies, normally using their second-echelon divisions, must achieve operational objectives in the enemy's operational depth."

Unlike Western military thinking, where everything is neatly divided into tactics, operations, and strategic, the Soviet operational art has no such clear cut definitions attached to it. The operational art covers all three levels of warfare at the same time with the position the formation is at in the operation determining its level of use in the entire operation. Therefore the actions of a company, battalion, regiment, or division can become, in the Soviet mind, operational in nature. This would lead one to think that the Soviets muddle through their battles when in fact the exact opposite is true. Actually it insures that every single element of the army, or front, is working toward the single final goal of the operational art AND that at anytime a formation can be designated as being the operational maneuver element of the entire operation. In effect the transition of one element to another as the main focus of the operational art is more smooth then it would be in Western armies because it is an accepted fact in Soviet circles.

It is also interesting to understand just what constitutes the objective of the operational art. The Soviets do not really care about geographical locations as objectives in their planning. To them they are merely like phase lines are in Westerm military thought, and are used to mark the positions reached by friendly forces. To them the real objective is the destruction of the enemy's forces, plain and simple. This is for them practical as geographical locations of extreme value, like cities, will fall like ripe fruit if the enemy holding them are already ravaged.

Von Mellenthin describes in detail the battle of the XLVII Panzer Corp as it fended off the assaults of the 5th Tank Army (Dec. 7-19 1942). No doubt the XLVII Panzer Corp was winning its tactical battle against the Soviets, but……..While the XLVII was winning its fight the entire Italian 8th Army was destroyed and Army Detachment Hollidt was cut to ribbons. In effect while the Germans were winning the small tactical battles the Soviets were winning the much bigger strategic battle, almost by default.

Frank Chadwick, I think, explained it the best. "To me, German offensives in WWII usually look good at the tactical level…….But the battle always goes wrong, somehow, and it is always as a result of some failure 'somewhere else.' The higher you go looking at a German offensive, the less focused it seems to be, the more vague in purpose and execution."

"By contrast, Soviet tactics often seem crude, and stero-typed, and at the regimental and division level their attacks don't always seem to make a lot of sense. On the other hand, each step back you take from the tactical battle, the clearer the pattern of the (Soviet) offensive becomes, until at the front and theater level, it becomes, to me at least, almost chilling in its clarity of purpose."

Sun Tzu would agree.

Do you. Lets have at it

"FM-100-2-1"

Yeah, that sounds kinda familiar. All in the past now, though. We learned just enough to execute a Soviet-style operation in 1991. The world has changed. If we ever need to do it again, we will have forgotten how, and why.

Allen

Already had the beer for super bowl lol

The German Way of War by Citino is the best overall discussion of this topic. Due to size and logistical constraints and restraints, Prussia learned to fight "short and lively wars." They became excellent practioners of what we would now term "operations." They never really made the jump to strategic thinking. What are the purpose of your operations? They never had to make that leap in the 18th or 19th centuries. When they did, they failed.

The best single example is Ludenforff. In 1918, when Germany had a potentially war winning weapon in the shape of their retrained armies, ready to be unleashed, somone asked the German Supremo what the ultimtae goal was. He replied: "We'll punch a hole in their lines. Then we'll see." So, instead of sequentially connected offensives, the Germans threw their army away in a series of uncoordinated actions.

In WWII, one can look at the confusion in the German high command (not just Hitler) over Moscow or Kiev.

As has been seen elsewhere, unconnected battles – as victorious as one may be – do not a victory make.

The operational art covers all three levels of warfare at the same time with the position the formation is at in the operation determining its level of use in the entire operation. Therefore the actions of a company, battalion, regiment, or division can become, in the Soviet mind, operational in nature. This would lead one to think that the Soviets muddle through their battles when in fact the exact opposite is true. Actually it insures that every single element of the army, or front, is working toward the single final goal of the operational art AND that at anytime a formation can be designated as being the operational maneuver element of the entire operation. In effect the transition of one element to another as the main focus of the operational art is more smooth then it would be in Western armies because it is an accepted fact in Soviet circles.

I would the transition is transparent to the troops on the ground and probably to most of the command structure. At divisional level and below, whatever is happening is going to be tactical, and the command structure will think in those terms in accomplishing the mission.

At higher echelons (army and front), low-level units are indeed the instruments of the execution of the operation, but to them, the battle is still tactical in nature. Of course, as with all things, military or otherwise, one must keep in mind the desired end state (in our parlance, the commander's intent) and how that relates to the objectives of at least the next higher echelon. But I seriously doubt that in a theater-level campaign, divisional commanders would be planning anything beyond tactical level.

"They never really made the jump to strategic thinking. What are the purpose of your operations? They never had to make that leap in the 18th or 19th centuries. When they did, they failed."

Ha – failed their way from a backwater province to a Great Power in Europe, in the 18th and 19th centuries. Frederick the Great, Bismarck – superb strategic thinkers.

"Do you."

Yes, I agree. As Allen already said, Soviet offensive doctrine was pretty much the one used in GW1 and arguably GW2, as it was the best available.

Not sure how a discussion of Soviet military techniques has turned once more into 'how great were the Prussians/Germans'!

Soviet forces of course weren't always tactically clumsy in every case, but it was a less significant element than the overall scheme. One of the challenges faced in WW2 was how to structure and manage their available forces to overcome German superiority at a tactical level in both the breakthrough and exploitation.

The contrast with the German 'bumble forward and hope something good happens' approach is quite marked.

Most of our wargaming is tactical, so these sorts of considerations don't impinge, just how 'unfair' it is that the Russians can mysterkiosu mass 10:1 superiority at the point of main effort. I wonder how they managed to do that…. obviously because they outnumbered the Germans 8:1 along the whole front, just like Manstein said.

Operational wargaming on the Eastern Front is really the most interesting IMHO, as it is very asymmetrical in all sorts of ways.

It does kind of indicste a problem with the points based approach to wargaming such things.

To make the game look right you need Soviet Superiority in numbers, but for play balance you downgrade the troops so that it is a "fair fight".

If by that stage the Soviets have "won" the operational battle by getting their forces concentrated to achive the short term goal on this battlefield to support the next part of the operation, then a better fight might be how long can their opponents hold out until reinforcements, or execute a fighting retreat.

In that case the Soviets should be allowed their proper capabilities and the performance of both in the game will relect something more akin to reality.

So whether Germans in WWII or Allies in a Cold War gone hot, if playing against Soviets in an operation they contriol, the ground rules should reflect that.

"If by that stage the Soviets have "won" the operational battle by getting their forces concentrated to achive the short term goal on this battlefield to support the next part of the operation, then a better fight might be how long can their opponents hold out until reinforcements, or execute a fighting retreat."

Well, that is true of most games really. There are some interesting examples of good scenarios in the face of overwhelming tactical superiority in the TAC Publications 1944 Eastern Front scenario booklet, although facing off an entire Rifle Division with your battalion of Latvian police can be a tad depressing (well, it only becomes depressing when then supporting artillery run out of ammo).

<quote>obviously because they outnumbered the Germans 8:1 along the whole front, just like Manstein said.</quote>

errrm, no, they didn't. As the Germans own intelligence documents from Fremde Heeres Ost show the Soviet manpower superiority was a long way short of the levels Manstein spoke of.

IIRC Glantz references exactly this in 'American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in the Second World War' if you want the actual refs.

Frontovik

I think that might have been Mr Rapier's point. That the reason they could obtain strong local supriority was down to organisation and planning rather than having a natural numerical advantage of such high levels.

At least I hope that I interpreted him correctly, that the Manstein quote was sarcastic

Yes, I was being sarcastic, sorry doesn't come across very well on the Internet sometimes. I can't recall the actual correlation of forces when Manstein made his 8:1 claim (IIRC it was during the retreat to the Dneipr) but as the Red Army didn't achieve a theatre superiority of 2:1 until mid 1944, it was rather less than 8:1 overall…

Sheeeeeeeeeesh,

With all this revisionist fluff going on in these pages,it
won't be long before we are hearing that the Germans outnumbered the Soviets……..Red Army superiority of only 2:1 in 1944? Where do you get this stuff?

For the uninitiated, what is "FM-100-2-1"?

"Red Army superiority of only 2:1 in 1944? Where do you get this stuff?"

Shock to have paradigms overturned, isn't it?

"For the uninitiated, what is "FM-100-2-1"?"

Field Manual 100-2-1 "Soviet Army Operations and Tactics" (Field manuals are kind of like how-to guides for the Army with reference information; Technical Manuals are for hardware).

What you are likely to encounter (including PDF versions online) is the obsolete version of FM 100-2-1 that was actually published Army-wide in 1984. If you can get your hands on one, a better reference would be the final draft of the updated version of the manual, dated 18 June 1990. It contains a more complete undertanding of the subjects contained within.

The updated version was ready to go into the doctrinal literature system, and photocopies had been widely distributed to the TRADOC schools and centers, but the Soviet Union inconveniently ceased to be, and so there was no perceived need for a manual that better explained Soviet operational art and tactics.

And that's all that I'm saying on the matter, because some head copied my last thoughts on this subject in toto and posted them to another, unrelated forum. Thanks a lot, !

Allen

If we ever need to do it again, we will have forgotten how, and why.

But we do need to do it again -- on our wargaming tables!

Interesting discussion. I've never been quite clear on just how operations fits in between strategy and tactics -- where one leaves off and the next begins. I suppose it grew out of the immensely larger armies and frontage areas of WWI as opposed to the days when entire armies would fit onto a battlefield a few miles square, such as Gettysburg or Waterloo. In that era we had what was called grand tactics, which, I suppose was the 18th-19th Century equivalent of "operations." Or vice versa. Would that be correct?

'Shock to have paradigms overturned.isn't it?'

Hhhm.That depends on whose books, and facts and figures you believe….or more likely WANT to believe…….

"Army superiority of only 2:1 in 1944? Where do you get this stuff?"

Err, Table C in the Appendix of Glantz's 'When Titans Clash'. Correlation of forces.

I only said 'achieved a superiority 2:1'. The theatre ratio of 2:1 was exceeded for two brief periods in 1943, but remained consistently above 2:1 from July 1944, rising to over 4:1 by May 1945. A theatre ratio of 2:1 is fairly overwhelming, more than sufficient to achieve tactical superiorities of 10:1.

"it
won't be long before we are hearing that the Germans outnumbered the Soviets"

They did until December 1941, if you only count the troops in the western military districts and not those mobilising in the rear and you include the Axis allies in the force calculations. Not by much of course.

Overall the USSR mobilised far more troops and suffered far more casualties, but the combat strength ratios only moved slowly in their favour – hardly surprising given the disproportionate losses suffered.

"revisionist fluff"

?

Martin,
All these 'facts'sound pretty ambiguous to me,having read a large number of books about the war in the east.For example you said the Germans outnumbered the Soviets until Dec 1941.That does not square with what I have read about the opening days and weeks of the campaign, the ratio was at this time more like 3 to 4 million Axis troops against upwards of
5 million frontier and western military district Soviet troops..This
is just one example of the conflicting facts that writers keep
coming up with.I must say you have great faith in Glantz's facts and figures,and that comes from someone who owns some of his books,but I own other equally good books on the German-Soviet war by other writers who come to different conclusions,hence my remark to tuscaloosa's pedantic remark about paradigms being overturned…….According to who?

Like I said 'revisionist fluff' or more probably populist
history,I hope Martin you understand the point I'm making because,as you stated some things said, do not come over well on the internet………

Regards Phew!

A word about Soviet numbers…………

Ok, only in the last fifteen years, and do not ask me why, have a number of important WWII documents been released into the archives (NARA). In this case the document "Abteilung Fremde Herre Ost" (Gehlen) revealed that Manstien had inflated the numbers. The truth was the Soviets outnumbered the Germans around 1.5 to 1 and about 2 to 1 in Manstein's area of action. These documents have also revealed that a good number of German authors inflated the numbers on the Eastern Front, so they were the real revisionists in the story. What is happening is that the truth is now slowly coming out.

The truth is the Soviets did outnumber the Germans at the start of the invasion, this is a fact. But by the end of the first two months of the invasion Soviets numbers at the front had dropped way off.

By the time the Germans had gotten to the gates of Moscow the Germans did have the edge in bodies at the front. But that was in warm bodies NOT in artillery, tanks, trucks, and other pieces of key equipment (Like warm clothes). So while the Soviets were outnumbered in warm bodies their artillery, tanks, trucks, planes, and just about every piece of key equipment, was in fine working order. So the Germans had no way to take advantage of their number of warm bodies.

It is interesting how a discussion on the Soviet Operational Art still has the Germans stuffed into the conversation. LOL

While it is true that the Soviet Operational Art doesn't come into play in most wargames, it does to those of us whom play campaigns.

We re-fought a bathtub of the Russian front 1941-1942, using my own 'Division Commander' rules (Company Level). I commanded the Soviet forces with four sub-commanders (ten players total on both sides). In that campaign I used the knowldge I had gleaned about the operational art at Irwin in the campaign. Even though we lost the campaign the offensives we launched did go as planned, just not enough to pull out a win.

Like the old saying goes, you can win most of the battles and still lose the war. I guess old Sgts shouldn't pretend at being Generals LOL.

jizbrand for the most part you are correct that the view from the tactical level will be less focused, if seen at all.

But an important part of the Operational Art, which for reason of brevity I did not include in the opening, is that divisional commanders, and up, ARE present for the 'strategic' view of the operation should their formation become the focus of that operation.

So while they will still be fighting the 'battle' on a tactical level they will have at least an understanding of the focus of the operation should the need arise.

I hope this is clear as it is difficult, and was difficult for me at first as a westerner trained in a western army, to fully grasp the entire Soviet concept of the operational art. Once I did though it opened a whole new view on warfare for me.

As a side note: donlowry The Don Lowry of Tractics/Chainmail fame?

And that's all that I'm saying on the matter, because some Bleeped texthead copied my last thoughts on this subject in toto and posted them to another, unrelated forum. Thanks a lot, Bleeped text!

I'm betting you won't be able to stop yourself, if the topic goes on long enough.

After all, this was your whole job for how long? And you have to suffer people stumbling about the subject, saying things that aren't right, or are only sort of right…

OTOH, you do have a pretty good stubbornness stat. It'll be fun to find out!
-Kle.
-Kle.

Von Mellenthin describes in detail the battle of the XLVII Panzer Corp as it fended off the assaults of the 5th Tank Army (Dec. 7-19 1942). No

In 1942 the Soviets threw four 300-500,000 man operations at the Germans. In three out of four of these they pulled back a bloody stump. Only did the one against the Stalingrad army succeed.
It's not the numbers in the field at one particular time, it's the numbers that can replace those. Soviets can burn through troops and equipment with failed operations only to have them replaced to try again months later.

Besides the Soviets didn't believe war was an art. They believed it was a science.

"It's not the numbers in the field at one particular time, it's the numbers that can replace those. Soviets can burn through troops and equipment with failed operations only to have them replaced to try again months later."

Indeed, that is one of the factors which makes it such an interesting asymmetrical conflict, coupled with the disparity in tactical combat effectiveness.

One of the few games I came across which really captured some of the unique flavour of the WW2 Eastern Front at an operational level was the old AHGC game 'Russian Front'. Very interesting implementation of step reduction, and used combat differentials rather than ratios.

Steelback, I assume that you and I (and most people on this board) have read the same basic works about the eastern front. They were the classic books when I first started getting interested in the topic (v Mellenthin's Panzer Battles, Paul Carell, Speidel, etc). And they were written mostly by German generals who were there and knew whereof they spoke.

There was precious little to read about the Soviet side, for two reasons: 1) we were fighting the Cold War, and anything the Soviets had to say on the topic was filtered through contemporary realities that these were our most likely enemies, and 2) the Soviet generals, either before or after deStalinization (Kruschev's speech that turned the Soviet world upside down) had their professional reputations to protect, because offering contrary opinions was not a healthy option in a police state. And pointing out that their best successes came in spite of Stalin's advice, not because of it, was not politically correct.

Problem however with the German books, was that the German generals wrote self-serving explanations of why they consistently got their butts kicked from 43-45. For reasons of professional pride, and because they knew that's what "we" (their new NATO allies) wanted to hear, their memoirs were heavy on emphasizing the Soviets as an unstoppable mass of manpower, rolling forward shouting "Urrah", empty vodka bottles behind them. No matter how good the skilled and elite Panzergenerals were, the Soviets just kept coming.

However, what has happened in the meantime, since those books were written, is that Soviet archives opened up (albeit closed again in the meantime), and some researchers (Glanz foremost) have taken a harder, closer look at what really happened on the East Front. And the conclusion they are in many cases coming to, is that the Soviets learned from the Germans and turned around and outfought them, primarily at the operational level.

Moko54 touched on this on the opening post; Frank Chadwick has written some great refutations of the earlier simplistic view, supporting a more realistic understanding of how the Soviets won.

Read more on the topic; I am wading my way through the second book in Glanz's series on Stalingrad. I have criticised Glanz before, but this second book he has really come into his own. Much, much better than his previous (dry as dust) works. He tells you what happened, then he tells you *why* it happened. Stalingrad was like judo; Chuikov used the Germans' own arrogance and strength to lure them to their own destruction; he didn't just overwhelm them with masses of conscripts.

As a side note: donlowry The Don Lowry of Tractics/Chainmail fame?

Such fame as it is/was, yes. And it's too late for a refund.

Quote Donlowry:Such fame as it is/was, yes. And it's too late for a refund.: End Quote

LOL I have first run editions of both rules sets (My age is showing here), and played both for many, many years.

No refund wanted, instead I wanted to thank you for many years of loads of fun wearing out both sets of rules playing games with my friends (WNYWA=Western New York Wargaming Association)

I wish you all the best in the future sir for those years of fun you gave me playing your game designs.

Back on Subject………………

As this seems to have led into 'What Happened on the Eastern Front' instead of the Soviet Operational Art I'll add my two cents.

In many ways the 'Facesless Slavic Horde' of the German writers just didn't make a lot of sense when I first started reading their books. Something just didn't fit, as I am a Great Russian by birth (Kalmuk Cossack of the Kutauz Clan), and my relatives recounts just didn't fit with what I was reading. (No I was born in the USA, but some of my relatives still lived in the old USSR at the time) Either they were BS'ing me, or the Germans were inflating their numbers, a lot.

In some ways Mr. Chadwick did confirm what my relatives had said, but I believe he was a bit more biased in his writings then he should have been, such is the field of opinion. But by the same turn of the coin not that far off the mark either.

I think he is right that the German writers did inflate their numbers, to make themselves feel better and to play into the Western Cold War Craze, just not to the absolute degree he claims either.

Basically, the Soviets DID use 'wave' tactics of faceless slavic troops, they were called Penal Battalions/Regiment, to dislocate/pin German forces (My relatives confirm this). And they didn't care how many losses these formations suffered. On the reverse side of the coin they also said they, in Cavalry formations, were never just 'thrown away' in pointless engagements.

They told me a favorite Soviet operational plan was to use a reinforced Rifle Division to punch a hole in the German front line that a Cavalry Division (Or sometimes a Corp) would then rush through and then cause holy hell in the German rear areas for the next week or two.

In the end I think, and my recent research confirms this (recent being the last ten years), that the real truth lays somewhere between these two extreme points.

However, what has happened in the meantime, since those books were written, is that Soviet archives opened up (albeit closed again in the meantime), and some researchers (Glanz foremost) have taken a harder, closer look at what really happened on the East Front.

Doesn't this depend on the validity of Soviet Archive material? This becomes self-serving for Glantz or anyone else to tout this as factual as much as the ubiquitous lying German post-war book writers.

If you've read some books by others who have a fairer review of Soviet reports you find that Soviet Generals report one thing for the archives then years later write their own memoirs and say that their reports were bogus.

Oh, I forgot! The Russian archivists were evil Reds,innately deceitful aparatchiks who wrote this trash so that they could keep it secret for 50 years and then use it to dupe dewey-eyed naive archivists like Col Glantz.

The German generals, OTOH were souls of probity and truthfulness with no axe to grind. Paul Carrel had no political agenda either.

Puh-leese

Yes … I studied FM 100-2-1,"back in the day" … Even had a copy lying around, but gave it to someone … Of course if Sun Tzu would agree and aecurtis read it too … who am I to disagree … But I thought we perfected the "Air-Land Battle Doctrine" in '91 … But who knows … we may have took some ideas from Ivan ? We used to half-jokingly refer to the Air-Land Battle Doctrine as "The Late 20st Century Version of the Blitzkrieg" …

"Doesn't this depend on the validity of Soviet Archive material? This becomes self-serving for Glantz or anyone else to tout this as factual as much as the ubiquitous lying German post-war book writers."

What Glanz does (and I've gone from criticising him to defending him on these boards) is take the internal Soviet reports and communications (and these were not for public consumption, i.e. flagwaving propaganda) and compare them to the German internal reports.

"They told me a favorite Soviet operational plan was to use a reinforced Rifle Division to punch a hole in the German front line that a Cavalry Division (Or sometimes a Corp) would then rush through and then cause holy hell in the German rear areas for the next week or two."

I'm impressed at the level of command your relatives must have served at, to recall and incisively analyze what was happening. My relatives' war memories were of the much more common "Go there and wait; then go there and dig in" etc. They would have had no idea, as most soldiers do not, of what their role at the operational or strategic level was.

I forgot. Russians reporting that their plans and efforts failed were hailed. That they took great losses with no or little success were rewarded with dachas on the Black Sea shore.

Not.

In one example when the Germans captured Mcensk they captured intact a few BM-13 Kaytushas for which Gen. Lelushenk was made responsible with his head. He lived to tell the tale proves no one knew of the losses.

Quote:
I'm impressed at the level of command your relatives must have served at, to recall and incisively analyze what was happening. My relatives' war memories were of the much more common "Go there and wait; then go there and dig in" etc. They would have had no idea, as most soldiers do not, of what their role at the operational or strategic level was.
End Quote:

One said he was a Staff Officer in a Cavalry Corp the other said he commanded a Cavalry Regiment.

Many of the Cossack Cavalry Divisions formed were from the same Clans, and this put relatives in command positions. Few of the division officers were non-Cossack, I was told, so I do believe 'most' of what they have told me. Most of the info comes from the first, the second did recount instances when Penal formations were used to 'clear the way.' Of course one has to take what they say with a grain of salt, relatives stories ARE stories flavored a bit!