"Best Plan of attack MR Company" Topic

You are coy commnder of a Russion motor rifle company (BMP1's). You are ordered to assult a German watch platoon guarding the route. The terrain either side is impassible to wheeled. You artillery support is limited but the Recon say there is minimal Anti vehical obsticals in the platoon. Do you?
Hit the enemy with HE drive through depoly say 200m to the rear and assult from behind, OR depoy 100m infront just as the art lifts. For wargamers, driving though A HE barrage, your own or the enemies is unlikely to do any significant dammage to the basic vehicle. Loseing the aerials etc is about the limit provided you are closed up.

Ps you can tell we are working up to Bulletin Number 2. But look on the bright side even if you help the stuff will be free anyway!

The terrain either side is impassible to wheeled.

So?

To my knowledge BMPs are supposed to be tracked, not wheeled.

OPP late and a long day should have said wheeled/tracked sorry!

Drive a few hundred meters to one side, dismount and assault from a flanking direction (perhaps with the BMPs conducting a little "recon by fire" along the road edges). Last thing you want to do is assault directly into an ambush, where close-in fires from handheld anti-armor weapons tear up your IFVs.

Damon.

1st MRC will assault the Nemtsy security platoon occupying a chokepoint along our route, flanked by terrain impassable to vehicles.

The company will deploy into battle formation, halting at the last position where the terrain provides cover for the company to dismount. The company BMPs will form a bronegruppa under command of the deputy company commander. The deputy commander will establish a command observation point overlooking the enemy position, and will request indirect fire support from the battalion mortars. The company machinegun platoon will occupy a firing position to the enemy's front.

1st and 2d Platoons will maneuver on foot with the company commander to the right flank and establish assault positions. 3rd Platoon will maneuver to the left flank and establiush a blocking position to the enemy's rear.

On the company commander's signal, the bronegruppa will advance and engage the enemy with the vehicles' weapons, supported by the company machinegun platoon, and the deputy commander will lift indirect fires. 1st and 2nd platoons, with the company commander, will assault the enemy platoon, and 3d platoon will complete the destruction of any enemy attempting to escape.

On the company commander's signal, the bronegruppa will cease fire and move forward; the platoons will remount their veicles and continue the mission.

For a number of similar vignettes actually conducted in Afghanistan and subsequently studied by the Frunze Academy, see Les Grau's "The Bear Went Over the Mountain".

Allen

The two answers given before me are decent. Garand suggested a flank. I think you are implying that's not possible. aecurtis suggests a supported frontal. I think driving through and trying to deploy in the rear is just too dangerous and not a likely option. I think a direct hit even from light HE would mess up the crew inside a bmp. Armor is around a half inch on top and even if not penetrated would ring their bell. Even more of a worry is the enemy fire bearing down on you as you drive right through all of their prepared defensive points.

BMP's are tracked vehicles with good armament capable of crossing ground impassable to wheeled vehicles and/or supressing light enemy units or supporting a rapid assault on such.

Are you thinking of BTR's as transport? They are wheeled and not so well armed.

Of course a company is usually attacking only 1-3 squads. And it is usally NOT alone

"And it is usally NOT alone"

True: usually not, particularly in a European conflict, but there are equivalent examples from Afghanistan. There are also actions very much as I described, but scaled up one level, as battalion missions.

And a single MRC *might* be sent out as a detachment specifically to secure a chokepoint, but it would most likely be reinforced with ready fire support assets: a mortar or howitzer battery, a movement support detachment, others…

Allen

Dismounted night attack …

If you are talking doctrine, then the Overrun is a classic doctrinal approach.

The Russian Company Commander will use both HE and Smoke to cover the advance and suppress teh defending platoon as the assault platoons close. If there are any anti-armour assets available; ie BRDM 2 with Sagger these would be used to neutralise any German anti-armor weapons that Recon have identified. Remembering that the defenders are only platoon strength and therefore the Russian Bn or Regt Commander will want this "minor" obstacle cleared quickly!

As Allen describes, this is a very likely scenario for a Cold War Russian Regt or Divisional advance; teh Point would consist of a platoon possibly supported by one MBT, then Advance Guard of the remainder of the Company.

If the Point cannot deal with the enemy encountered, there task is to fix the enemy until the Advance Guard Company closes up which will likely launch into an attack from the March. Aggressive and swift to ensure that the main advance is not delayed!

We seem to be reading the problem differently. I inferred that there was not sufficient room to deploy and conduct a mounted assault.

There are also some problems with doctrinal terms, but we'll let that go.

Allen

A second vote for Ronin's plan, with a slight variation. I'd send one platoon to scout forward and locate the Germans, and possibly engage and pin them.

Just how much training have my company had? I'd hope and expect to be able to do this as a company battle drill. Stereotyped, yes, but fast, and unlikely to befuddle any of my blokes. If they are untrained they might need closer supervision, but if they have ever done any company collective training, they really ought to have done the drill for a quick attack.

I don't know what the higher situation is, but from the mention of a route and recce reports I vaguely imagine that it is the classic sort of thing where my coy might be leading a CARB in an advance to contact. In this case, speed is of the essence; it won't do to wait for nightfall, and I don't want to dismnount until the last possible moment. Hey-diddle-diddle, straight up the middle, tank platoon leading and BMPs in line at their tactical intervals just as shown in countless diagrams of "Soviet motor rifle company attack from the line of march".

I would like fire support from the battalions' 120mm mortar battery or attached 122mm howitzer battery, but if the enemy are in platoon strength and light on anti-tank, or of Sir wants to conserve his precious ammo, I should be able to do it on my own resources (as I'm sure my handy nomogram of combat norms would tell me if I had been issued one). The gunners should have observers well forward and fire organised to lead me through the enemy position without me needing to get involved in any lengthy discussions about fire-planning.

If this is not the first contact the enemy platoon has had, then a more cautious and deliberate approach might be indicated. But if it's the first bump, drive straight over them behind a wave of fire and press on for the Channel Ports.

All the best,

John.

So far, I have yet to read in the original problem that:

- the MRC's parent unit is conducting a meeting battle

- the MRC does not know the location of the enemy

- any march security is required.

The mission is to "assult a German watch platoon guarding the route".

UshCha, please clarify the situation and the mission.

Allen

Like John, I shall reach for my trusty motor rifle company commanders manual, deploy into platoon columns at the desgnated distance, then at the designated distance form line at the correct intervals (IIRC 500-800m frontage) whilst relying in the chaps at battalion, regiment and division to do their stuff and throughly brass up the enemy with artillery, air and ideally tac nuke strikes.

If we are the advance guard where is my tank platoon?

We may or may not get out of the BMPs, depends if we have had any nasty experiences already. Anyway, as the barrage lifts (and trusting that the engineers really have done their job and cleared all the obstacles) we suppress the surviving enemy positions, then close with and destroy them.

I am assuming we know that the enemy are there, if we are actually conducting a recce mission, then we'll do something different.

If we are a forward detachment, I'd hope we've found a way around these people, unless we don't they are there (so back to paragraph above).

I like Allens plan, but I suspect I'm a hastily recalled reservist rather than a long service regular with experience of doing it for real.

OK, time to deal with a few problems, since the "trusty motor rifle company commander's manual" is probably something published in the past by the US or British armies. I'm not picking on you, Martin. It's just that most of my later life's work involved trying to understand the true Soviet perspective on tactics, and breaking the stereotypes we had ingrained in our respective armies' view of same. It doesn't help that we raised a generation of people on David Isby and "Victor Suvorov", and never really got around to understanding the real Soviet point of view until it was too late to publish much on it--as the Soviet Union had ceased to be.

It wasn't easy. It involved literally years of discussions with those trained in Soviet tactical units and in Soviet military academies. And it was no place for arrogance on our part. The typical discussion would run something like this: I would propose a solution to a tactical problem based on what we had thought for years we understood; I would be informed (and you have to hear this in a Slavic accent for the full effect) "This is absolutely stupid!"; and then I would have the correct solution explained, and it would begin to make sense in its own context. And then going back and checking Soviet military encyclopedia and dictionary definitions, and real doctrinal references, it made sense in a new light, and with different meanings than we had previously believed.

First: the meeting battle. The increasing commitment of combat power is characteristic of a meeting battle, where the enemy situation is uncertain and one is not sure where one will meet him. Locating him with a platoon, holding his nose with a company, and maneuvering with the rump of the battalion to defeat him is our stereotype of a meeting battle. It is different from an attack from the march when the enemy disposition is known. UshCha indicated that higher-level reconnaissance (division or regimental) has provided us the enemy location and dispositions. We're not fighting a meeting battle.

Quibbling about terminology: an avantgard (advance guard, and I'll stick to direct translations from now on) is by definition a battalion mission. A company (even a reinforced company) is not going to be tasked as an avantgard. Some missions usually given to battalions--a forward detachment (rarely), a reconnaissance detachment, a raiding detachment, or an enveloping detachment--may be conducted by a company; but never an advance guard. A company (reinforced as necessary) becomes a forward security element for its parent battalion in a meeting battle. It in turn may send out a forward patrol (squad or platoon) for march security, or a combat reconnaissance patrol (platoon-sized) for a combination of reconaissance (primary) and march security (secondary).

Tanks: Martin, if you are an MRC commander operating as a forward security detachment, you may well receive a tank platoon as a reinforcement. But unlike Grey Ronin's suggestion, you would never send out a single tank with a forward patrol or CRP (yes, I've definitely been informed, "This is absolutely stupid!"); it's a matter of command and control for the tank platoon, the details of which we don't need to get into here.

[Deep breath]

Time, Space, Speed, and Correlation of Forces: are we invading Western Europe in the 1980s, or now? It's not clear. But we have been told to "assult" an enemy platoon position. It is not well supported by obstacles, but we know that we do not have room to maneuver (I'd still like to know the width of the chokepoint). A frontal assault of an MRC (with no tanks specified, after all) is by no means guaranteed to succeed against a platoon: sorry. A three-to-one ratio is not even a useful rule of thumb. There are too many factors involved.

An MRC commander would not have a handy nomogram to tell him what to do. He *might* have some useful nomograms for certain technical calculations, but not in aid of this particular decision-making exercise. We know a great deal about calculating the correlation of forces and means from the Soviet perspective (although it's darned odd that the West's best expert on the subject was a Swiss officer…), but we're not army and front chiefs of staff for this exercise. A company commander will attack, and establish the conditions for success when doing so. That may well take time, and we have not been told that time is more important than preserving the force in this case.

We know that "artillery support is limited". Not sure what that means, but it's fairly certain that a battery of 2S1s is not accompanying our company. If it were, "we", as the MRC commander, wouldn't be worrying about it anyway, because the battery commander would probably be next to us in his artillery command observation post vehicle, and would be directing the fires of his own battery.

We can assume that we can call on the battalion mortars. But we haven't been told that the mortar battery commander is accompanying us, or one of his forward observers, so we're probably going to have to quickly plan that fire support over the radio through the battalion chief of staff, who hopefully will spur one of the laggard mortarmen forward to where he can see the objective.

So: we're attacking a chokepoint defended by a platoon with a company of BMPs. We don't have (in Western terms) dedicated fire support. Our maneuver room is limited. A frontal assault is frankly fairly suicidal. To ensure success, we will *take* the time necessary to be successful. In combat examples from Afghanistan, a dismounted element (as in my proposal) could take an hour and a half to get into position.

[Deep breath]

The BMP was designed for operations in a nuclear environment, or in the presence of other weapons of mass destruction. It's great for exploitation when the enemy has been suppressed or the enemy's capabilities degraded by the use of weapons of mass destruction. It isn't ideal for seizing ground from the enemy under conventional conditions, especially when we do not have the fire support to suppress or destroy a substantial portion (this where nomograms come in, for a battery commander, anyway) of the defending enemy. Infantry is ideal; we have it; and we need to maneuver it to use it.

We don't have to rely on special skills to carry out the plan I described above. The platoons will be under the command of their platoon commanders; two of them will be under the close eye of the company commander. All they have to do is move through the flanking terrain, deploy (one platoon in firing positions for the block), and assault as normal. The armored vehicles as a bronegruppa will be under the control of an experienced officer, and all they have to do is pull up into "hull down" positions and support the assault by fire.

Instead of launching a 3:1 frontal attack, we will be concentrating two platoons of infantry on one enemy squad at a time (that's 6:1), while the enemy platoon strongpoint is suppressed by our BMPs' fires. Now, those are good numbers. If the enemy attempts to flee, he will have to go through our platoon, established in their own position, at a disadvantageous ratio.

All very well documented; *very* "Soviet" in thought, even if it doesn't sound right to our ears, and conducted at company and higher level many times in Afghanistan by conscripts.

Allen

Dismount and approach the German position through the impassable to vehicle terrain. Close assault the Germans and summon your transports once you have consolidated your position. Remount and press on to the next objective.

I have some questions for all the former mechanized veterans. What happens when some of your transports are destroyed? Do you split your command and leave some men behind? Is there a contingency plan for this event? On the gaming table most commanders let their transports die but then they are usually not playing as part of a campaign.

In the 80's every infantryman was supposed to be issued a LAW rocket that could mean up to 40 anti tank weapons in a typical platoon used against mounted Soviet infantry or a Bronegruppa and thats not counting ATGMs. I think its one thing to shoot up some Mujhadeen but another thing to assault regular troops armed with a liberal amount of antitank weapons. Your thoughts?

There was a similar reason for not conductng mounted assaults willy-nilly against Mujahideen! They tended to have some stock of RPGs, SPGs, and other things that can put a hole in BMPs, and more so, BTRs.

It's hard to have a specific reconsolidation plan for a mech platoon or company, since you don't know what you will have lost until you have to deal with it. You think about it, and you're prepared to do it, but the exact solution depends on the situation. Most of the time when heavy brigades were coming to the NTC, losing tracks wasn't going to be the problem, since platoons and squads were horribly undermanned to begin with. You could lose a Bradley, pile the team onto a second one, and have something resembling a proper squad.

Allen

First of all thanks for the info.

To clarify (some of which I thought was in the brief some of which I agree is not). Limited artillery was meant to deter those who thought that they could destroy the platoon by artillery alone. The US FM Mortar platoon notes that the rates of fire are such that while it is possible to suppress enemy in fighting positions, in most cases actual damage is minimal. You need a direct hit of a small round ( for US positions they declare them proof against an 80mm mortar direct hit) and even a very close near miss for a heavier round. The battery has enough to suppress, but nowhere near enough to eliminate the enemy.

Where to deploy the foot? Again being only an Armchair general, for advancing troops danger from your own guns is at best about 200m for advancing infantry. So do you deploy outside 200m ready for when it lifts and have a very long walk, or go right in/through and debus when the fire ceases at say 100m or less (which is what I thought cold war doctrine was. Few APC's were proof against an RPG or its western equivalent. Do debus beyond Armbusrt range would mean 300m plus, unless the enemy is suppressed then there is no significant risk.

Ps tactical doctrine for the defender is ideal ground is clear for 400m so the above is not unreasonable if the defender has done his homework.

For the same reason even moving through you own barrage the chances of a direct hit with suppression fire from your own batteries should be an acceptable minimal risk to the BMP's.

I am assuming that the MRC artillery suppression fire available is sufficient to suppress the use of LAD/LAW and even full ATGW's

As to attacking one squad at a time. The target tactical doctrine is to have typically the squads in line abreast so that they overlap fire hence isolating individual squads is probably not practical. On that basis it probably needs 2 platoons of the MRC to assault.

It is not clear to me in this particular and agreed slightly contrived scenario, how the BMP's in the stages of the assault where the enemy are very close, how the BMP's supply fire support. 6 BMP's deployed over 300m (typical platoon frontage) shooting at targets not normal to the line of advance i.e. The enemy are covered from direct frontal fire and so the BMP's would be shooting across their own front. Is this possible, and what drill would be in force? Remember the enemy are at ground level (dug in) and the BMP's gun is at perhaps 6 ft and firing in a straight line (near enough) so halfway to the enemy the rounds are at 3 ft, well capable of hitting their own troops I would have thought.

"Where to deploy the foot?"

In a straight-on assault, the MRC would transition to battle formation (all vehicles on line) at 600-1000m from the enemy. The dismount line would typically be at 300-400m from the enemy, and the BMPs would follow 100-200m behind the deployed infantry, firing *between* the gaps between squads. Don't be so concerned about "grazing" fire: given the ranges, much of the fire, both HE and MG, is going to be passing over the skirmish line until they get in quite close; but the vehicles will be selecting positions where they can fire between the gaps.

Also, don't be too hung up on lateral deployment. The entire company can deploy to attack on a frontage of as little as 500m.

You definitely haven't been specific enough as to the indirect fire support available. From a Soviet commander's perspective, it will be either provided in sufficient quantity to achieve a desired degree of destruction (there are tables for this), which would allow a frontal assault), or to provide suppression. Suppression is best accomplished over a short period of time, when "fire shock" is still effective; the Soviets knew from their own experience that under sustained indirect fire, troops will overcome their fear and re-man their weapons. So suppressive fire is likely to be planned for a short interval right before the assault. (BTW, US manuals aren't a very good indicator of Soviet fire support doctrine.)

"As to attacking one squad at a time. The target tactical doctrine is to have typically the squads in line abreast so that they overlap fire hence isolating individual squads is probably not practical."

Au contraire. That's exactly what we do in Blue doctrine as well: isolate and overwhelm one piece at a time.

Given the situation (and I'm still not clear on the terrain, but I'm still inferring a chokepoint), two platoons assaulting from the flank of the enemy platoon could engage the squad on that flank first. If the enemy has (presumably) dismounted, it's no problem bringing two dismounted platoons' fires to bear on a single squad. And if mounted, one RPG at close range takes care of the mounted squad.

Meanwhile, the twelve BMPs of the bronegruppa and the machinegun platoon's dismounted machineguns are keeping the rest of the enemy platoon from redeploying to engage the assult force. At some point, the remaining two or three enemy squads will attempt to withdraw rather than die in place, and that's what the blocking force is there to take care of.

You seem to be trying to approach this "mathematically". It's not that neat. If you've never done this "for real", it may be difficult to visualize. But I'm willing to bet there are a few OPFOR veterans on here who will have a good idea what I'm talking about--although in this desert, the OPFOR typically had so little infantry that nearly *all* assaults were mounted. Even so, "hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle" is a poor tactic. Isolating and destroying one piece at a time with overwhelming force--if necessary, establishing a BMP firing line to do so--and then moving on to the next, is how it's done.

Allen

Ok, let's put in the other order. What would you do as the German lt if you are ordered to hold?

Again, it would be necessary to have better information about the terrain. But if it is a chokepoint, then he would establish a series of antitank ambushes and provide the best security for them that he can. In the end, He's ed: the enemy has his location and strength; he doesn't have sufficient counter-mobility support; hopefully he can call on significant fires and air support.

Allen

Am i waiting for reinforcements, trying to buy some time for a retreating army?
just acting as a speedbump?

Col Stone, you are on your own and you have been ordered to hold 24-36 hours, with no particular support until then.

(but as Allen said, I think the Germans are pretty much done, it is not a really brainer).

"Ok, let's put in the other order. What would you do as the German lt if you are ordered to hold?"

Deploy off center in the rough terrain and dig in with interlocking fields of fire. If time allows build adequate overhead cover against mortar and artillery. Deploy antitank mines in the center where the vehicles will be forced to advance through the choke point. Force the Soviet infantry to dismount and assault your defense. If they choose to remain mounted and drive past hammer them with LAW and ATGM. Establish a fall back position deeper in the rough terrain and lure the Soviets in without the support of their Bronegruppa.

UshCha, if you have a few hours to spare download and read:

link

It is the 1984 FM 100-2-1 1984: Soviet Army, operations and tactics.

Obsolete and now available for Public Access… go to about pages 5-30 onwards for the type of scenario you are asking about… very informative reading.

Oh, boy.

I had commented on the drafts of FM 100-2-1, -2, and -3 from our detachment at Fort Hood in 1982 and 1983. Bill Gray may have been on some of that before he PCSed, too. At that time, we had very little in the way of current Soviet doctrinal literature to draw from. The manuals were published in 1984; they were in many ways not much better than Isby or the ITAC "Red Book" when it came to combined-arms tactics.

I showed up at Leavenworth in 1985, and after helping kill the "Sergeant York" DIVAD, was given the specific job of revising chapters 2, 4-7, and parts of 13 in FM 100-2-1--basically all the combined arms subjects--and the tank and other AFV sections of FM 100-2-3.

We started working with the newly-formed Soviet Army Studies Office, particularly COL Dave Glantz and LTC Les Grau, to exploit Soviet materials (and also, sometimes even more so, with their counterparts at RMA Sandhurst). With the help of these gentlemen, as well as with individuals who had actually been through the Soviet system, we began to develop a better understanding of what Soviet tactics were really like.

We had updated versions of 100-2-3 and 100-2-1 basically "in the can" ready to go to publication, when I left Leavenworth to come out here to California in late 1989. By that time, Training and Doctrine Command was not interesting in publishing anything on the defunct Soviet Union; they wanted a generic, "world class" OPFOR model for training. Some photocopies of the revised volumes were circulated to the schools and centers, but the new manuals never went into the doctrinal literature publication system.

From Fort Irwin, I continued to use the Army's OPFOR professional bulletin to disseminate useful stuff, particularly as Les Grau was researching the Frunze Academy materials from Afghanistan, and Michael Orr at Sandhurst was digging fascinating bits out of military journal articles. And of course, the NTC OPFOR eagerly siezed on every snippet of Soviet tactical art that could give them an advantage.

But basically, a more sophisticated understanding of Soviet combined-arms doctrine was never passed on to the US Army at large The British Army likewise moved on from updating the threat volumes of the Army Field Manual to Genforce, a generic potential adversary, the same way the US Army went.

FM 100-2-1 (1984) is OK, but it was still a stereotyped, misleading, and woefully incomplete view of the subject. And I'm afraid that very few people know that as intimately as I do. Sorry.

Allen

I think it's time for UshCha to supply us with a proper orbat for the MR Company, a description of its orders in the context of the battalion mission, and the recce reports received about this mysterious "watch platoon". I have been assuming that this was a light or mech (M113) infantry platoon, with no big tank-killing systems; I would not want to put BMPs in the way of un-neutralised 20mm cannon, never mind Milans or 120mms. This assumption of light armament is why I want to remain mounted until the last possible moment; if the armament of the "watch platoon" is light enough, I can just drive up to their positions and, in the great Soviet tradition, say "Davai chasi".

Allen wrote:

Even so, "hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle" is a poor tactic. Isolating and destroying one piece at a time with overwhelming force--if necessary, establishing a BMP firing line to do so--and then moving on to the next, is how it's done.

Certainly it would fail junior Brecon, but I was assuming the terrain made it the only option if one wished to remain mounted, and (against my infanteering instincts) for this one I would want to stay mounted (we need a going map, UshCha). I agree that the 3:1 "rule" (which isn't really) is not a good guide, but if we had a suitably-reinforced MR Coy acting as an advanced detachment, which is what I took it to be, the odds could easily be more like 7:1 -- three rifle platoons, the weapons platoon, the tank platoon and the 2S1 battery firing direct. Citing a great doctrinal source, I point out that 7:1 were the "automatic victory" odds in TAHGC's "Afrika Korps". If that sort of force ratio were the case, and we were trying to get along this route fast (which seems quite a BMPy mission), and bypassing is impossible, then I'd be happy that the correlation of forces was good enough to bounce the block and keep up the tempo. I recall being reprimanded for excessive caution on a UOTC exercise many moons ago in the following terms: "Salt's section halts, so the platoon, halts; the platoon halts, and the company halts; the company halts so the battlegroup halts; the battlegroup halts and the brigade halts; and before we know it the whole of NORTHAG's advance has come to a grinding halt because you are taking cover before the enemy fire is effective!" Maybe this has warped my judgement ever since, but I doubt that the Sovs had any less of a "get forward" spirit, and I'm afraid, comrade Allen, that your unduly slow approach might win you this week's all-expenses-paid stay in the nearest disbat.

On the other hand (did I mention we needed an orbat, UshCha?) it might be a basic MR Coy with no tanks, no howitzers, one of its platoons detached for a march security task and with a couple of vehicles ditched or broken down at the roadside with the driver/mechanics trying to get them running again. That might mean much poorer odds, but I would still want to use the BMP's protection against SA fire to the greatest possible advantage. We don't know how many weapons the defending platoon has that can penetrate thin armour, but we know that all their weapons can penetrate a shirt. Having said all that, if there isn't enough arty even for a quick neutralisation mission, then protracted snurgling and perhaps waiting for nightfall might be the only answers. Then again, the bad guys have indirect fire too, and another reason for staying mounted is that I want to drive through the 120mm mortar DFs at high speed, not try to run, walk or crawl though them.

Isolating and destroying one piece at a time with overwhelming force

Unless the German platoon commander is the biggest charlie in the world, I think it's wishful thinking to imagine that he has laid out his fighting positions without rifle interlock and MG overlap. And if it were me, I'd be using hessian scarers and parapet trenches… but then, if it were me, I'd probably be trying to arrange some way of showing at the susequent board of enquiry that the "hold at all costs" orders never reached me, which is why I withdrew in good order to fight another day, your honour (and on a properly concealed reverse slope position, this time). Fortunately, the Soviet commander's delay in preparing a dismounted assault ensured that the enemy were unable to exploit this fact. ;-)

All the best,

John.

I am getting a feeling that UscCha is starting to regret having posted this scenario in the first place, whilst Mr. Curtis & co keep on picking it apart.

Well it is interesting that many Vets posted their solutions and still remember Russkie Tactics. I remember a lot from my time back then … but not everything. Of course, after leading a Rifle Plt in the 101 and later commanding an M113 Mech Co. … I'd do a dismounted night attack. But that's not always a favorite of Russkies …

Nothing at all wrong with the scenario; just as any commander would do, I'd like more information about the situation!

Allen

Hey if you post on here you expect to get flak. Its still facinating. OK

Watch platoon dead basic:-

Infantry Platoon with
1x Unimog carrying Cmd team of PC, Radioman
2x SAW teams of 2 men & 1 marksman,
1x fire team of 3 Rifles with A/T Armburst LAD

3x Unimog Section each carrying
1x infantry squad of 10 men in
2x fire team of 3 rifles & 1 SAW of 2 men
or Tank Hunting teams 3 Armburst LAD & 1 SAW

MRC
Motor Rifle Company
Company HQ 1x CO in BMP-1K

3x Infantry Platoon each with

1x PC in PC BMP-1 carrying
1x Cmd team 1x NCO, 1x Radioman 1x Marksman
1x Fire team 1x SAW of 2 men, 3x Rifles,

2x BMP-1 each carrying a infantry squad of
1x fire team 1x LSW, 3 Rifles
1x fire team 3 Rifles 1x RPG-7V LAW

The situation as I envisage it is.

Russan reconisance has spotted the Germans digging in. terrain is basicaly flat a narrow gap with impassible swamp either side of the road (NOTE) this is a fiction but is an attempt to force the situation to see what the proable outcome is). 400m to the front is a small hamlet covering the centre 250m at the most and even then you can see through the road. 300m beyond the hamlet is a wood that would allow the enemy to deploy before entering the open ground.

TheGerman platoon has not had time/engineering equipment to do anything yet to conter mobility.

They will have an FDF from from higher up that will cover the fronttage of the platoon. Again its not capable of being sustained for long.

it is 12 noon. The MRC brief is to get rid of them quickly to clear the route as they may need it later. Delay till nightfall is not an option.

PS note taken to be much more precise on these things next time.

This is a bit artificial but you need to start somewhere.

if it were me, I'd probably be trying to arrange some way of showing at the susequent board of enquiry that the "hold at all costs" orders never reached me, which is why I withdrew in good order to fight another day, your honour

That's what i'd do aswell ;)

As the russian i'd confuse those unimogs with TOW-carrying m113's in a heartbeat and ask for airsupport to reduce the german position to a more manageble size.. ;P

Again, how narrow is the gap? The width of the road plus the elevated bank on which it is laid? If it *is* that narrow, where are the Nemtsy digging in?

I'm thinking fuel-air explosives about now. Call for a TOS-1!

But a truck-borne infantry platoon with no heavy weapons is dead meat. A mounted assault (a "drive-by" in NTC terms) *would* probably work under those conditions.

Allen

"Unless the German platoon commander is the biggest charlie in the world, I think it's wishful thinking to imagine that he has laid out his fighting positions without rifle interlock and MG overlap."

Therein lies the advatage of maneuvering to assault from a flank, and the disadvantage of being an isolated platoon. You can't cover everything, and if your flanks are secured against mounted assault, there's a horrible temptation to focus exclusively on the most likely enemy avenue of approach. You don't have to be the biggest charlie in the world: I've seen British, Canadian, and many (many, many, many) US infantry units fail to do a proper terrain appreciation, and experience a great surprise as a result.

But in this situation, nothing fancy may be required at all.

Allen

" I'm not picking on you, Martin."

I know you aren't, that was very interesting Allen. At a lower level I really don't know how much latitude Sov commanders had, but trying to build up overwhelming force at one point on a tactical level makes perfect sense as it is the same as operational doctrine writ small.

As the russian i'd confuse those unimogs with TOW-carrying m113's in a heartbeat and ask for airsupport to reduce the german position to a more manageble size.. ;P

like a smoking crater or three from 250kg bombs?

Something like that :)

however, i'm partial to the TOS-1 solution aswell…

Martin, as much of your interest does lie at the operational level, you may not care so much about getting "down in the weeds". But I heartily recommend Les Grau's "The Bear Went Over the Mountain" and "The Other Side of the Mountain" (now available combined in one volume, I believe) for their wealth of tactical detail.

They show both how the Soviet Army adapted conventional tactics to the environment in Afghanistan, and a great deal of fascinating stuff about mujahideen operations as well. One thing is clear: Soviet junior commanders--and not just in elite units like airborne--were expected to exercise a very high degree of initiative and creativity. Some of the really fascinating vignettes involve aspects of coalition warfare: integrating Afghan regular army forces even down to the platoon level. Sound familiar?

But then a number of the vignettes from the Soviet perspective, involving bounding along the hilltops to secure a route, would look very familiar to the young John Masters and the 4th POW Own Gurkha Rifles, too.

Allen

Nothing a like CAS couldn't handle …

I would set up defense in the hamlet and force the Soviet to dismount and engage in urban warfare. My overall strategy would be to fire from concealed postions and fall back through the hamlet buying as much time as I possibly could. Antitank weapons would be used to force dismounts and I would pray I could achieve a couple of kills blocking the main road.

I think the German's are screwed but winning and survival are not the same thing.

The hamlet is a good idea if the terrain prevents the Soviet company from simply driving around you out of LAW range. But as the effective range of an (n.b.) Armbrust is 300m, and the hamlet is 400m from the gap, I'm not sure that you're able to secure the gap from the hamlet.

Allen

Dragon Gunner mentioned this earlier, and it was answered. About what happens when a carrier is lost. And well, you just stuff the surviving infantry on the other APCs in the unit. But for game purposes, too often carriers are lost/sacrificed. Which shouldn't be the case. If you lose your transport, you lose your mobility. So if you wanted to add a bit of realism, you shouldn't let that happen, regardless … And back to the Scenario … After a sharp heavy barrage, the Soviet infantry moving dismounted on a flank, through the rough terrain, under cover, with their APCs in Support by Fire positions, should have no problem mopping up the Germans … Then bring up their APCs and continue the advance … But again, this basic plan has been stated by others, with a good working knowledge of tactics … It's not only simple, but effective ..

Ok there may be a geograffic culture difference here. Swamp in the UK and my definition for the scenario is, a large flat wet/muddy area with vegitation often not higher than 12 inch tall often more like 4". The plan as I understand it is, to go a good 300m either side? of this (out of Armburst range), debus the grunts who now presumably have to walk across the German flank at low speed (rough going to grunts) before turning in to attack. Agreed that it helps that some of the Gremans will have to reposition under the fire of the BMP's at 300m range, but as there is no rush this may be possible as it will take the MRC troops a long time to taverse 300+ meters exposed in difficult foot going to get to the new start line on the flank. A continious barrage of artillery while the MRC troops walk across my flank and then in would take quite a while and would not in my book count as limited artillery support. Presuably the third platoon would demonstrate against the front to try and prevent too many Germans moving to the German flanks, otherwise it might be a duck shoot if the Gremans can find the odd 12" dip to protect tham from BMP fire from the original front. Them being on dry land.

No one else seems to have asked this question…

Why would a swamp be a barrier to BMPs?

I wouldn't want to debus into a swamp, but what's stopping the BMP mounted infantry outflanking the German position?

Good point Sage … that's another reason why I initially chose a dismounted night attack. Supported by both FA & the BMPs, of course. But if the high command is not willing to wait until dark …