"Spanish perspectives on the Peninsular War?" Topic

I'm reading Charles Esdaile's history of the Peninsular War and have just bought David Gates's history to follow it up but I was wondering if there are any English translations of Spanish works on the conflict?

Even when Anglo-centric works claim to be even-handed they always seem to present the Spanish in a very poor light. I assume that the Spanish don't see it quite the same way but I have never come across any Spanish histories that have been translated into English. Are there any out there?

You are right that the Spanish don't see the war with the same perspective. For our country, the war was an unmitigated disaster. Over a population of barely ten million, between 500,000 and 700,000 people died. The country was ravaged by allied and French armies alike. Many cities and towns were burned to the ground. All the factories and industries created in the reign of Charles III were destroyed. The finances were in distraught. And upon all that, after the war the king Ferdinand VII didn't recognize that a political change was needed… and tried to rule as an absolute sovereign of old: coups, 'pronunciamientos, and civil wars would follow. For Spain would have been better to accept Joseph I as king, and stay in the French orbit.

interesting comments basileus66, I would have thought the opposite

I would guess from a 'realpolitik' viewpoint the trashing of Spain was quite a satisfactory result for Britain in particular, so I can see where basileus is coming from.

Britain was fighting in Spain to support a fuedal, fundamentalist theocracy at a time when France (though perhaps not Napoleon) was trying to export revolution and secularism. That said, neither side was fighting on behalf of Spain but rather using it as a battlefield.

Basileus66 is spot on. In everything.

Oddly enough, both the secularism exported by France and the alleged theocracy of Spain were drenched with blood. I'm not sure there's a choice there.

The film "Goya's Ghost" presents somewhat of an interesting perspective on this issue.

John

There is Esdaile's book on the Spanish army which I think is quite good.

I've been buying up the Arteche volumes as they get reprinted, but have yet to learn Spanish so I can read them.

I always wondered as it seemed like an awful fate. Spain had two superpowers duke it on top of them.

basileus66 can you recommend anything?

It wasn't so long before that Spain was THE superpower and herself had few worries regarding who she picked on, so from a historical perspective I don't think she is worthy of very much in the way of pity, harsh though that may sound.

Quebecnordiques

---Basileus66 is spot on. In everything.---

I thought it was the pope who was supposed to be infallible!

Glynn

basileus66 can you recommend anything?

In Spanish? Or in English? If the first I could recommend you the last study from Dr. Emilio de Diego, España,el infierno de Napoleón; the first part is specially valuable, when he discuss the key points of the war. The second part is a very conventional narrative of the operations; you can skip it altogether if you have read Gates or Esdaile. For more traditional overviews of the war you can try the classic histories of Toreno (beautifully edited by Urgoiti Editores in 2008) and -harder to find, at least complete- Gómez de Arteche history. However you should take into mind that both of them had personal agendas (after all they wrote their histories in 1833-1836 and 1883, respectively) to defend, and therefore their accounts are very biased. In any case, both are classics and worthy to check.

I would guess from a 'realpolitik' viewpoint the trashing of Spain was quite a satisfactory result for Britain in particular, so I can see where basileus is coming from.

I don't believe that trashing Spain was a deliberate policy for Britain, just an after-efect of Spain being the most optimous stage for Britain to defy France's hegemony of Europe. Did benefit Britain to destroy the roots of Spain's power? May be… but I don't believe that it was the main drive after Britain's involvement here.

Regards
A.

I don't believe that trashing Spain was a deliberate policy for Britain, just an after-efect of Spain being the most optimous stage for Britain to defy France's hegemony of Europe. Did benefit Britain to destroy the roots of Spain's power? May be… but I don't believe that it was the main drive after Britain's involvement here.

I'm not so sure, Basileus66. Let's not forget that until 1808 Spain was an enemy of Britain. Britain had invaded and attempted to conquer Rio de la Plata in 1806 & 1807. The original purpose of Wellington's army was to seize South America. The Maitland Plan of 1800 was real and was in effect.

Even after Britain and Spain became allies, the British government harbored pro-Independence leaders and tried to pry drastic trade concessions from Spain in exchange for "mediating" the colonial rebellions, After the war ended England turned a blind eye to its own laws, over numerous protests by the Spanish, and allowed thousands of men to fight as mercenaries in the rebel American armies. They also sold ships, arms and other supplies to the rebels.

Trashing Spain may not have been Britian's objective but separating her from her colonies in one way or another most certainly was. The Peninsular War had the added benefit of getting Spain to expend her blood, treasure and waning power in service of Britain's primary foreign policy goal: the defeat of France.

"The Peninsular War had the added benefit of getting Spain to expend her blood, treasure and waning power in service of Britain's primary foreign policy goal: the defeat of France."

Actually France had Spain's treasure. England expended a good deal of her treasure supporting Spain.

As for Spanish blood and power they seemed quite content to fight the French even when the Brits could not prop them up with funds.

Britain could have just sat back and the end result would have been the same in Spain.

Nappy badly underestimated Spanish reaction to his having liberated them : )

Bob

John

Of course you are right that Great Britain had an ambiguous policy toward Spain. The British needed to balance between their long standing interest in opening the Spanish America to British influence and their war against France. If Spain wouldn't have rebelled it's probable that Britain would have encouraged a rebellion in America. However, once the Spanish uprising happened they put on hold that policy and although didn't help Spain to protect her lands in America, they didn't umpair it either. For example, in 1811 the Regencia -the Spanish government- wanted to send an expedition to Peru. They had a problem, though. The Spanish frigates were needed in the Mediterranean to help with the blockade of Rosas and Barcelona, and to watch the Barbary coast corsaries. Well, the Regencia asked the British representative for help and after receiving authorisation from London two British frigates took the place of the Spanish ones, which were then sent to America protecting a small convoy (around 2,000 men).

Once Napoleon was defeated, of course, all interest in the Spanish alliance was gone for Britain. They reversed to their previous policy, guessing, correctly, that Spain lacked the resources and the will to hold in her American possesions. But that was later. Between 1808 and 1811, at least, the British policy toward Spain was, as Bob said, that of an ally willing to invest a lot of resources to help her partner. Self-interest? No doubt. Deliberate trashing? I am not so sure.

For Spain the loss of her American possesions was a matter of time. The only scenario that would have allowed her to control them for a while longer, would have been that Britain and France would have found another country to fight over but Spain… Even then I don't think that she could have retained South America for much longer than she actually did.

A.

The only scenario that would have allowed her to control them for a while longer, would have been that Britain and France would have found another country to fight over but Spain… Even then I don't think that she could have retained South America for much longer than she actually did.

Had the Coalition somehow won at Trafalgar and sent the British fleet to the bottom, thus enabling Napoleon to get into Britain, it may well have been that Spain could have held on to its American possessions.

Hindsight makes this a preposterous proposition but in 1804, it may have seemed the best bet.

Great Britain had an ambiguous policy toward Spain

A good way to phrase it! Britain did not aid Spain out of any altruistic impulse. She did so because Spain temporarily fit her larger policy of defeating France. It was an opportunistic adjustment that took advantage of Napoleon's strategic error. As soon as the larger policy of Napoleon's defeat was secured, Britain's interest in aiding Spain ceased. On either side of that aid was a long standing policy, going back at least to 1795, of gaining control of South America for the perceived economic opportunities.

Britain could have just sat back and the end result would have been the same in Spain.

The fact that Britain sent Moore to Spain and Wellington to Portugal shows they didn't think they could leave it to the Spanish by themselves. Whether to augment conventional Spanish strength or serve to encourage and maintain Spanish guerilla resistance (or both), Britain obviously felt the need to put boots on the ground to prevent the French from overrunning and pacifying Spain and Portugal.

Nappy badly underestimated Spanish reaction to his having liberated them

Yes he did! :-) Coming off Tilsit and judging how he handled Charles IV and Ferdinand VII at Bayonne, he probably felt like he could dictate terms to the world…all except those pesky English…

Even when Anglo-centric works claim to be even-handed they always seem to present the Spanish in a very poor light.

I'm going to challenge this assumption.

Let's look at the two classic British authorities on the Peninsular; Oman and Napier.

Both show the same basic bias, which can be summed up, from another war, as "lions lead by donkeys". The bravery of the Spanish was beyond question, when properly lead the troops were formidable. Too often, unfortunately, aged and incompetant commanders let them down far too often.

How do Spanish sources handle this question?

There is obvious horror the actions of both sides in the asymetrical warfare of resistance, but the authors do acknoweldge the military contribution of the irregular forces effectiveness in consuming French resources.

Hi 138Squadron,

When I said that Anglo-centric works seem to present the Spanish in a very poor light I was referring to the way in which the nation as whole is represented. I'm not making an argument about the quality of the Spanish armies – I don't know enough about them to comment – I was just asking if there are any translations of Spanish histories of the conflict since I imagine they will have a different bias from works by British-based authors.

Regards

Stephen