"Force Z Malaya 1941" Topic

In late 1941 Churchill dispatched a brace of capital ships, Repulse and Prince of Wales, and a few destroyers, to Singapore to intimidate the Japanese. He called the task force Force Z.

My question is for subjects of the United Kingdom who speak British English, whatever y'all's particular local accent: Do you pronounce Force Z as 'Force Zed'? Did your grandparents? Hereabouts I rarely hear the Queen's English spoken, and we've always called it 'Force Zee'. Really.

Definitely Zed!

as in Zed Ecks 81
BMW Zed 5
Zed's dead man, Zed's dead
but
Zee Zee Top

nobody said it had to make sense!

Zed without a doubt. Timbo Zed Zed Top are Seppos (Septic Tanks = Yanks) and therfor don't know any better.

Fatman

Absolutely – Zee is fine for Sesame Street, otherwise it's Zed….

What I want to know is, how do Brits pronounce the names of the other letters? Is Zed the only one that's different from the U.S. scheme?

Oh, and what's zed ecks 81, above?
-Kle.

ZX as in kawasaki ZX.

Yeah, zed's the only difference, and ZX-81 was an early home computer – arguably the first mass-market one in the UK.

;-)

ay, bee, see, dee, eee, eff, jee, aitch, eye, jay, kay, ell, emm, enn, oh, pee, queue, arr, ess, tee, you, vee, double-you, ecks, why, zed

or, just to confuse matters…

a is for horses, b for honey, c for ships, d for Kate, e for brick, f for vescence etc…..

For the curious -

I'm going to be running a Naval Thunder scenario at Little Wars and Winter War dealing with Force Z – Knives in the Dark.

The night before PoW & Repulse were sunk by Japanese aircraft – the Japanese 2nd Fleet main body sortied in an attempt to intercept them. If they'd managed to find Force Z you would have had Japanese and British capital ships nose to nose in the dark at 'knife fighting' distance.

Exciting for us to contemplate – probably not so much for the sailors involved – although I guess to Force Z it probably would have been preferable to what they got.

Hey Dread,

How were the Brit's night fighting skills then? Anywhere near the Jap level of proficiency?

Dan--yes as we had quite good radar--Ask the Italians about what happened at Cape Matapan!!…Although the IJN were very good (they copied the RN after all!) I think the British experience would have given them the edge…Interesting scenario anyway…What would have the IJN capital ships ionvolved been???

Thank you Arch,

The IJN had a couple of surface forces in the area. I don't recall exact names but one had a couple of BBs and the other a number of CAs. The Brits would have had a ding-dong if either was contacted.

More info from link

"To counter this potential threat, the Japanese provided the Malaya troop convoy with a distant covering force that consisted of the battleships Kongo, Haruna and two heavy cruisers with a screen of 10 destroyers. However, they still considered Kongo and Haruna substantially inferior to the British ships and deployed large numbers of bombers to southern Indochina to safeguard their convoy. They also deployed large numbers of submarines along the most likely routes Prince of Wales and Repulse would take to intercept the convoy."

and later in the article,

"Japanese reaction was swift. In response to the submarine's signal Chokai, the heavy cruisers of the 7th Cruiser Squadron (Mogami, Mikuma, Kumano and Suzuya) and the light cruiser Kinu launched floatplanes to find Force Z. All warships in the area were notified and ordered to intercept, but Kongo and Haruna would not arrive until the following morning. The transports were ordered to stop unloading and scatter north. In an unrewarded effort to draw the British force into battle, the Japanese made extensive use of their radios in the clear.

By this time the fuel situation for the destroyers of Force Z was pressing. Phillips would either have to spend three vital hours fueling at sea or release them to return to Singapore. He chose the latter, and after sunset on the 9th, Tenedos became the first to turn for home. Her captain carried orders for all possible destroyers, including the American 57th Destroyer Division, to come out and meet Force Z north of Anambas Island at dawn of the 11th.

All through the rest of the night both sides groped for each other in the darkness. The Japanese blindly based on an hours old sighting from a cruiser floatplane; Force Z with the questionable aid of radar. It was almost disastrous for the Japanese, who threw 53 torpedo bombers into the search. In the dark, they found a large ship and dropped a flare while setting up an attack. Below, on the bridge of Chokai, the flare burned brightly as her radio operator sent a frantic signal to Saigon: "THERE ARE THREE ATTACKING PLANES OVER CHOKAI. IT IS CHOKAI UNDER THE FLARE." Rear-Admiral Matsunaga read the message and prudently recalled his bombers until daylight.

Five miles south, Electra sighted the flare and notified Prince of Wales. Phillips thought long and hard before ordering his force to turn away. Although both his capital ships had radar, neither was picking up the enemy force of six cruisers and their escorting destroyers. Since he did not know the strength of his opponent, he was unwilling to risk battle for several reasons.

Phillips' objective was to win a strategic victory; he knew the landings were complete and that Force Z was too late to affect the issue. He also realized there was little chance of finding transports in the area, since he believed his presence was already known. While a victory over warships would achieve a tactical advantage, strategic victory could only be won by destroying loaded transports. And this he could no longer do. Thus, Admiral Phillips turned away with the thought of saving his ships for another chance on another day. To the north, the Japanese were badly shaken by their near attack on Chokai. They decided to withdraw north until dawn. This would give Kongo and Haruna time to join up and allow the destroyers time to refuel for a prolonged day action. With both sides withdrawing, the opportunity for a surface action was lost.

Had they encountered each other that night, the battle would have been interesting. With 14" and 15" guns, Force Z possessed a preponderance of firepower over the Japanese with their five 8" gun heavy cruisers and one 6" gun light cruiser. More important, the British possessed radar on a dark night hampered by rain squalls and low clouds. However, one can question its effectiveness after failing to detect the Japanese force at a range of only five miles. Although early models, the sets had a range of 25 miles; they next morning they worked perfectly.

The IJN was also the best in the world when it came to night actions. Superior weaponry and training let it remain competitive at night long after radar was commonplace. With their 24-inch "Long Lance" torpedo, the larger numbers of Japanese destroyers had great potential to cause serious damage to the British force. Also, the British destroyers had never worked together before. Even so, the RN was a capable, well-trained force with excellent officers and crewmen who had nearly three years of combat experience to draw on.

In the end, none of these factors came into play as both sides turned away. Admiral Phillips sought to cover as much ground as possible during the night so he would be out of range of air attack at dawn. The Japanese were equally determined to strike by air if they were denied a surface engagement. But they still had to find Force Z."

Rain can have a seriousdly detrimental affect on maritime radar, especially early sets. Snow is even worse. The waterdroplets reflect the radar signal, so that one can see rain on the radar screen, but they also dissipate the "strength" of the radar that gets through the rain, meaning that one can often not see anything that is the other side of the rain, as the returning signal is also scattered and weakened by the rain.

Well. . . to make matters worse. . . the surface search radar for Prince of Wales was not operational at the time. (I don't recall off-hand what happened to it) – thus eliminating a major British advantage.

My scenario includes the Japanese 2nd Fleet Main Body as described in the TROM from combinedfleet:

29 November 1941:
BatDiv 3's section 2, HARUNA and KONGO, is attached to Vice Admiral (later Admiral) Kondo Nobutake's (former CO of KONGO) Second Fleet, Southern (Malay) Force's Main Body: BatDiv 3/2, CruDiv 4's ATAGO, TAKAO and MAYA and eight destroyers. The Main Body departs Hashirajima for Mako, Pescadores.

2 December 1941:
The Main Body arrives at Mako.

4 December 1941:
The Main Body departs Mako for Indochina (Vietnam) to provide distant support for the invasion forces.

8 December 1941: The Invasions of Malaya and the Philippines:
CruDiv 4's MAYA detaches from the Main Body to support the landings at Appari and Vigan in the Philippines.

9 December 1941: The Pursuit of the Royal Navy's "Force Z":
The Main Body is SE of Indochina near Poulo Condore Island.

At 1415, LtCdr Harada Tamae's submarine I-65 reports sighting a British force steaming NNW at 14 knots. This is Admiral Sir Tom S. V. Phillips who sorties from Singapore to find and attack the Malaya invasion transports with his Force Z: Captain J. C. Leach's new battleship HMS PRINCE OF WALES, Captain (later Vice Admiral) W. G. Tennant's old battlecruiser HMS REPULSE, destroyers HMS ELECTRA, EXPRESS, TENEDOS and Australian destroyer HMAS VAMPIRE. The Main Body sorties south for a night attack against Force Z, but no contact is made.