"A myth of the Russian Invasion" Topic

As others "common histories" about Nap Era, there are one that said that the Russians were not pushed into their own country by the French/Allied troops, that it was a kind of strategy to "attract" they enemy to the deeply Russian soil
and then crush them on winter time.

Was it possible?

Amicalement
Armand

Russia has always had the luxury of being able to trade space for time. It's a big place.

The Russian winter really became a factor during the retreat. When Napoleon suddenly remembered that he had a previous engagement in Paris…Avant pour la Gloire!

As I understand it, the Russian generals had difficulty finding a suitable battlefield.

And a suitable commander in chief. Barclay de Tolly and Bagration had no love for each other. Bagration almost handed Napoleon the campaign early on by his aggression. But Barclay lost the Russian confidence by continuing to trade space for time.

Kutusov fought, probably knowing he would be defeated, but they couldn't give up Moscow without a fight. After that, he played the campaign very well.

Check the troop strengths and you will find that most French and Allied units were severely depleted before the Russian Late Fall. man yunits lost numerous men to Summer attrition and the need to garrison many of the small cities that they had 'conquered'.

Right. The French invade with some 450,000 and are down to 130,000 before Borodino. True, there are flanking forces and garrisons, but that's more losses than the winter costs.

Personally I think they bungled there way to victory. Had an opportunity arisen where the Russian command thought they had a shot, they would have turned and fought earlier..

It has been said that had Napoleon actually invaded Russia with half the men he did, and therefore given the Russian the confidence to be agressive early in the campaign, he would have been victorious.

So.. he was firstly too clever operationally and scared the Russians off each time he got close, and his army was too big which again made them run away…

Not sure I answered the question but.. = )

TW.

There is a long debate on this on another forum with a lot more references being thrown about.

I'm with the pro Alenander and Barclay side.

I think the evedence clearly shows a Russian plan to blunt the French attack by trading space.

This was a policy highly opposed by most of the Russian born generals – e.g. Bagration – who wanted to fight (and would have given Napoleon the early victories he needed).

Its not a clear cut policy though – defenses were thrown up in places, for example, but as an overall strategy it does come through clearly, I think.

It also fits with the more recent works on earlier Russian strategy, which put Alexander as must more to the fore in the early Napoleonic years as well, at a diplomatic level.

No doubt one or more of those taking the 'other side' who are also on that forum will be along shortly to put the counter view.

Short answer – the russians knew what Napoleon's strategy would be – surround and destroy their army by fast marching – and knew how to beat it – pull back until he has exhausted himself.

The popular view is that the French lost the 1812 campaign in Winter.

The conventional military history view is that they lost it in Summer. This is not an original view, I wrote an University essay about it in 1981 (paraphrasing Chandler, which is even older).

There is no evidence to suggest it was a cunning plan on the part of the Russians. Just as losing half their country and 20 million of the population wasn't their plan in 1941.

I post this simply in order to note that there is a debate about this now, and to show that sources are being referenced from Russia now which were not available when most received wisdom on 1812 was formed in English.

"Until April 1812, Alexander and Barclay de Tolly, did not rule out an initial spoiling attack into Poland to ruin Napoleon's preparations, destroy his supplies and delay his attack. But as Alexander made clear, for example, to the Austrian minister as early as August 1811, his basic strategy was a defensive one, designed to draw Napoleon into the Russian interior in order to deplete his army, frustrate the French monarch and wait for him to make mistakes." Referenced by D. Leiven Russia & the Defeat of Napoleon 1812 – 14 D to Oncken, Osterreich, Vol II appendices, #30, dispatch of 13 August 1811, 611 – 14

Mke of it what you will, but it is an valid alternative view to that expressed above.

I'm in agreement with Keraunos and his comments. There were a few thoughts of staying and fighting including a moderate skirmish at Smolensk, but the "plan" was to continue retreating. As was mentioned, this did not sit well with Bagration and others. The result of their lobbying effort was a "stand" at Borodino. It was decided that they should at least fight one battle before Moscow. Alexander/de Tolly were actually content with Moscow being taken without a battle.

I believe that if they had stayed and fought early in the campaign, or Napoleon "trapped" them by bringing fewer troops as was suggested earlier, then the Russian Army would have been beaten and a "conventional peace" would have been invoked.

Alexander/de Tolly showed some real backbone to stick to their plan.

The initial Russian plan, concocted by a the Prussian officer Phull, centred around a large camp built at Drissa. This was to be a base for the 1st Western Army to withdraw to and lure for the French. 50000 of the 1st WA would be in the camp and the remaining troops (intended to be 70000) would attack the French as they tried to take the camp. If the French didn't take the bait, then BArclay would be poise to attack the French LOC

A Russian withdrawal was planned from the start, but the distance involved was tiny compared to what actaully happened. A huge amount of resources were ploughed into constructing this camp but the Tsar was persuaded that the plan was ineffective. Barcly withdrew his forces so that he could meet up with the 2nd WA. Even then, the aim was not to withdraw indefinitely – at various points battle was very nearly offered, such as at Vitebsk.

Clausewitz's discussion of this is interesting. It is at times partisan and has the benefit of hindsight but he does acknowledge this in places, such as mentioning that no-one foresaw the melting away of the invading army. He says that if this had been known then the Russians could have withdrawn in a different direction as the French couldn't have afforded to detach much to go after Moscow while the Russian army was still intact.

So, the myth WAS TRUE!.

Amicalement
Armand

True-ish.

The Russians realised that fighting away from the frontier was in their interest.
The strategy was, to begin with, still to fight well to the west of Smolensk.

Once Moscow was taken, they realised that they didn't need to give in to Napoleon's demands as the approach of winter would force a retreat.

So the idea that they intended from the start to withdraw so far and to wait so long is a bit of a myth, but over time they realised (more or less) that this would work – though at a pretty terrible loss in damage to land and cities.

Swampster posts the next stage of the argument 'from tradition' (Clauswitz notably).

since this has not degenerated yet, here is the counter argument.

"Phull wanted to recreate W`s Lines of Torres Vedras in western Russia. He sold the idea to the Zsar and was given funds to play with. Many Russian officers thought he was a waste of time, space and money.
Just before the invasion began, Alexander visited the camp at Drissa for the first time and was left in no doubt by his entourage, that the project was dead in the water.
The camp was on the enemy side of the river, instead of behind it and the river was easily fordable both upstream and downstream of the site. The plan was abandoned that same day.
As in many armies in similar situations, many contingency plans are thrown up and toyed with, before a final selection was made.
Retreating deep into Russia would have been highly unpopular with the army and the populace (particularly in the affected areas) so I am not surprised that this project was kept under wraps until the last minute. " – Digby Smith

I'm quoting, anothers words, of course, but I trust this is not an offence in context.

The short answer is, recent research into German, Austrian and Russian archives is challenging our ideas on the conduct of the wars in many areas.
Russia in particular is coming out as a much more coherent actor than she had appeared to be (during the cold war in aprticular, but I'm sure that's acoincidence).

This debate, and other similar ones, are the good stuff about this period.

What is an answer to a dumb question?- A dumb answer!

I just posted details from a Russian memo submitted to BArclay de Tolly in 1812 on the other forum, so check it out as well.

Hi
There is a new book about this topics:
Russia Against Napoleon
Dominic Lieven
Allen Lane,2009
It shows the history under the Russian point of view: no more French 'gloire', no more Russian 'stupidity'…
A fresh view!
Regards
Rafa

See:

link

I have changed my thinking a bit on this invasion as a result of reading:
"The Illustrious Dead: The Terrifying Story of How Typhus Killed Napoleon's Greatest Army."

(see a review in link

I have always wondered about why there were such high losses during the initial invasion months. It appears that typhus (possibly a combination of a lot of new-to-different-troops strains) caused this and the continuing impact drained the army of troops throughout the campaign. How this played along with the lack of supplies, the Russian response and what would have occurred without it… is open for guessing as well. You will find 5-10X the number of dead French allies from the little bug than from Russian lead and steel.

Well worth a read!!!